diff --git a/app.py b/app.py
index e2dbe6e43..e57e85706 100644
--- a/app.py
+++ b/app.py
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ from core.constants import (
     REQUEST_TIMEOUT, OPENAI_API_KEY,
 )
 from core.database import SessionLocal, ApiToken
-from core.middleware import SecurityHeadersMiddleware
+from core.middleware import SecurityHeadersMiddleware, is_cors_preflight
 from core.auth import AuthManager
 from core.exceptions import (
     SessionNotFoundError, InvalidFileUploadError,
@@ -253,6 +253,15 @@ if AUTH_ENABLED:
     class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
         async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
             path = request.url.path
+            # A genuine CORS preflight (OPTIONS + Access-Control-Request-Method)
+            # carries no credentials by design and must reach CORSMiddleware to be
+            # answered. AuthMiddleware is the outermost middleware, so gating the
+            # preflight on auth 401s it before CORS can respond -- which blocks
+            # every cross-origin browser/WebView client before the real request
+            # is sent. Let real preflights through (only OPTIONS w/ the ACRM
+            # header; never a credentialed request).
+            if is_cors_preflight(request.method, request.headers):
+                return await call_next(request)
             if _is_auth_exempt(path):
                 return await call_next(request)
             # In-process internal-tool token bypass. Used by the agent
diff --git a/core/middleware.py b/core/middleware.py
index a0b7cd8b7..b3775e812 100644
--- a/core/middleware.py
+++ b/core/middleware.py
@@ -17,6 +17,15 @@ INTERNAL_TOOL_TOKEN = os.environ.get("ODYSSEUS_INTERNAL_TOKEN") or secrets.token
 INTERNAL_TOOL_HEADER = "X-Odysseus-Internal-Token"
 
 
+def is_cors_preflight(method: str, headers) -> bool:
+    """True for a genuine CORS preflight: an OPTIONS request carrying the
+    Access-Control-Request-Method header. Such requests are credential-less by
+    design and must reach CORSMiddleware to be answered -- gating them on auth
+    401s the preflight and breaks every cross-origin browser/WebView client.
+    Pure so it can be unit-tested without standing up the app."""
+    return method == "OPTIONS" and "access-control-request-method" in headers
+
+
 def require_admin(request: Request):
     """Raise 403 if the current user isn't an admin.
     Allows access when auth is explicitly disabled, or when the request carries
diff --git a/tests/test_cors_preflight.py b/tests/test_cors_preflight.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..24f69290b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_cors_preflight.py
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+"""Regression test for the CORS-preflight auth bypass.
+
+AuthMiddleware is the outermost middleware, so it used to 401 the credential-less
+OPTIONS preflight before CORSMiddleware could answer it -- which blocks every
+cross-origin browser/WebView client before the real request is ever sent. The
+fix lets a genuine preflight through; `is_cors_preflight` is the pure predicate
+it uses. Guard it so the bypass can't silently regress.
+"""
+
+import os
+import sys
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+
+from core.middleware import is_cors_preflight
+
+
+def test_genuine_preflight_is_detected():
+    assert is_cors_preflight("OPTIONS", {"access-control-request-method": "POST"}) is True
+
+
+def test_bare_options_is_not_a_preflight():
+    # OPTIONS without Access-Control-Request-Method must NOT bypass auth.
+    assert is_cors_preflight("OPTIONS", {}) is False
+
+
+def test_real_methods_are_never_preflight():
+    headers = {"access-control-request-method": "POST"}
+    for method in ("GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH"):
+        assert is_cors_preflight(method, headers) is False