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feat: Add workspace: confine agent tools to a folder (#1103)
* feat: Add workspace: confine agent tools to a folder Pick a server folder as the agent's workspace so its file/shell tools work there and don't touch files outside it. File tools are hard-confined; bash/ python run with cwd set to the folder. Includes a slash command: `/workspace` (alias `/ws`) — show / `set <path>` / `clear` / `pick` (open the directory browser). - routes/workspace_routes.py: GET /api/workspace/browse (admin-only). - src/tool_execution.py: hard path confinement for read_file/write_file; bash/python cwd. Threaded route → stream_agent_loop → execute_tool_block. - src/agent_loop.py: workspace note prepended to the system prompt. - static/: overflow menu item, input-bar pill, directory-browser modal, and the /workspace slash command. - tests/test_workspace_confine.py. * Wire workspace confinement into tools that landed after this PR edit_file (#1239) and grep/glob/ls (#1670) merged after workspace-confine was written, so they bypassed the workspace boundary. Thread the workspace through: - edit_file: _do_edit_file resolves via _resolve_tool_path_in_workspace - grep/glob/ls: _resolve_search_root confines to the workspace (root + paths) - bash/python/bg cwd: workspace or _AGENT_WORKDIR (keep the #2586 data-dir default when no workspace is set) Tests cover edit_file + grep/ls confinement (inside ok, outside rejected). * Workspace picker: editable path bar + modal style cohesion + cross-platform hardening - Make the current-folder strip an editable address bar: type/paste a full path and press Enter to navigate (also reaches other Windows drives and hidden dirs the up-only browser cannot). - Reuse shared modal CSS: drop bespoke .workspace-modal-content/.workspace-btn* in favour of base .modal-content/.modal-body and the .confirm-btn button family; separators/hover use var(--border). Net -31 CSS lines. - Fix the path field overflowing the modal right edge (flex stretch + margin vs an overflow:auto scrollbar-feedback loop): full-bleed, no h-margin. - Cross-platform confinement: normcase the workspace commonpath check so containment holds on case-insensitive filesystems (Windows/macOS). - Make tests OS-portable: sibling temp dirs instead of /etc, python os.getcwd() instead of pwd. 5 pass.
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@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
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import asyncio
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import json
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import os
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import time
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import logging
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from datetime import datetime
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@@ -394,6 +395,12 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
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compare_mode = str(form_data.get("compare_mode", "")).lower() == "true"
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incognito = str(form_data.get("incognito", "")).lower() == "true"
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chat_mode = str(form_data.get("mode", "")).lower() # 'chat' or 'agent'
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# Workspace: confine the agent's file/shell tools to this folder. Validate
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# it's a real directory; ignore (no confinement) otherwise.
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workspace = (form_data.get("workspace") or "").strip()
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if workspace:
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_ws_real = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(workspace))
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workspace = _ws_real if os.path.isdir(_ws_real) else ""
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# Did the USER explicitly pick agent mode? (vs. us auto-escalating
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# below). Skill extraction should only learn from real agent sessions,
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# not chats we quietly promoted for a notes/calendar intent.
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@@ -1007,6 +1014,7 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
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disabled_tools=disabled_tools if disabled_tools else None,
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owner=_user,
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fallbacks=_fallback_candidates,
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workspace=workspace or None,
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):
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if chunk.startswith("data: ") and not chunk.startswith("data: [DONE]"):
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try:
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@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
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"""Workspace API — browse server directories to pick a tool workspace folder."""
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import os
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Request, HTTPException, Query
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from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user
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from src.tool_security import owner_is_admin_or_single_user
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def setup_workspace_routes():
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/workspace", tags=["workspace"])
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@router.get("/browse")
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def browse(request: Request, path: str = Query(default="")):
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"""List subdirectories of `path` (default: home) so the UI can navigate
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the server filesystem and pick a workspace folder. Directories only.
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ADMIN-ONLY: this enumerates the server filesystem, so it is gated the
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same way the file/shell tools are (read_file/write_file/bash are in
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NON_ADMIN_BLOCKED_TOOLS). A non-admin who can't use those tools must not
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be able to map the host's directory tree either.
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"""
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owner = get_current_user(request)
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if not owner_is_admin_or_single_user(owner):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Workspace browsing is admin-only")
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# Resolve symlinks so the reported path is canonical and the UI navigates
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# real directories (defends against symlink games in displayed paths).
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target = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(path.strip() or "~"))
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if not os.path.isdir(target):
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target = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser("~"))
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dirs = []
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try:
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with os.scandir(target) as it:
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for entry in it:
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try:
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# Don't follow symlinks when classifying — a symlinked
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# dir is skipped rather than letting the browser wander
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# off via a link. Hidden entries are omitted.
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if entry.is_dir(follow_symlinks=False) and not entry.name.startswith("."):
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# Build the child path server-side with os.path.join
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# so it's correct on Windows (backslashes) and Linux.
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dirs.append({"name": entry.name, "path": os.path.join(target, entry.name)})
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except OSError:
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continue
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except (PermissionError, OSError):
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dirs = []
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parent = os.path.dirname(target)
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return {
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"path": target,
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"parent": parent if parent and parent != target else None,
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"dirs": sorted(dirs, key=lambda d: d["name"].lower()),
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}
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return router
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