ci: harden existing workflows for the security gate (#3498)

Pin actions to commit SHAs, set persist-credentials: false on every
checkout, and scope token permissions to the jobs that use them. Suppress
the two findings that are safe by design: the description bot's
pull_request_target trigger (no fork code runs) and an intentional
word-split in the docker manifest step.

Clears actionlint and zizmor against dev so the blocking gate from #1314
can pass once both land.
This commit is contained in:
nopoz
2026-06-08 11:58:59 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 5198516979
commit ed6cc88974
4 changed files with 37 additions and 16 deletions
+5
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5
with:
python-version: "3.11"
@@ -31,6 +33,8 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
with:
node-version: "20"
@@ -53,6 +57,7 @@ jobs:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
persist-credentials: false
# Detect whether this PR only touches documentation files.
# If so, skip the expensive pytest run while still reporting a passing check.