ci: harden existing workflows for the security gate (#3498)

Pin actions to commit SHAs, set persist-credentials: false on every
checkout, and scope token permissions to the jobs that use them. Suppress
the two findings that are safe by design: the description bot's
pull_request_target trigger (no fork code runs) and an intentional
word-split in the docker manifest step.

Clears actionlint and zizmor against dev so the blocking gate from #1314
can pass once both land.
This commit is contained in:
nopoz
2026-06-08 11:58:59 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 5198516979
commit ed6cc88974
4 changed files with 37 additions and 16 deletions
+5
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5
with:
python-version: "3.11"
@@ -31,6 +33,8 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
with:
node-version: "20"
@@ -53,6 +57,7 @@ jobs:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
persist-credentials: false
# Detect whether this PR only touches documentation files.
# If so, skip the expensive pytest run while still reporting a passing check.
+12 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ concurrency:
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
env:
REGISTRY: ghcr.io
@@ -32,6 +31,9 @@ jobs:
build:
name: build (${{ matrix.arch }})
runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }}
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
@@ -44,6 +46,8 @@ jobs:
runner: ubuntu-24.04-arm
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Set up Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@d7f5e7f509e45cec5c76c4d5afdd7de93d0b3df5 # v4.1.0
- name: Log in to GHCR
@@ -78,8 +82,13 @@ jobs:
name: merge manifest + tag
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Read APP_VERSION + short sha
id: ver
run: |
@@ -116,6 +125,8 @@ jobs:
run: |
tags=$(jq -cr '.tags | map("-t " + .) | join(" ")' <<< "$DOCKER_METADATA_OUTPUT_JSON")
digests=$(printf "${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_NAME}@sha256:%s " *)
# word-splitting is intended: $tags and $digests each expand to multiple args
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
docker buildx imagetools create $tags $digests
env:
REGISTRY: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}
@@ -14,10 +14,11 @@ jobs:
# Skip bots (Dependabot, release-drafter, etc.)
if: ${{ github.event.issue.user.type != 'Bot' }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3
with:
sparse-checkout: .github/scripts
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/github-script@v7
- uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v9.0.0
with:
script: return require('./.github/scripts/check-issue-description.js')({github, context, core})
+17 -13
View File
@@ -1,26 +1,25 @@
name: ci / PR checks
on:
pull_request_target:
# pull_request_target runs in the base-repo context (has secrets) so the check
# works on fork PRs. Safe here: the checkout pins to the base branch (no fork
# code runs) and the scripts only read context.payload and call the GitHub API.
pull_request_target: # zizmor: ignore[dangerous-triggers]
types: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review]
# pull_request_target runs in the base-repo context (has secrets).
# The checkout below pins to the base branch so no fork code is executed.
# The script only reads context.payload and calls the GitHub API.
# Least privilege: contents:read for the base-ref checkout, pull-requests:write
# to add/remove labels and post comments on PRs, and issues:write for the same
# on real issues. NOTE: modifying a *pull request's* labels/comments needs the
# `pull-requests` scope even though the REST path is under `/issues/{n}/...`;
# `issues:write` alone returns 403 on PRs.
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
issues: write
# Default-deny at the workflow level; each job opts into only the scopes it needs.
# Note: modifying a PR's labels/comments needs pull-requests:write even though the
# REST path is under /issues/{n}/...; issues:write alone returns 403 on PRs.
permissions: {}
jobs:
check-description:
name: Check PR description
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
issues: write
# Skip bots: they open PRs programmatically and have their own process.
if: github.event.pull_request.user.type != 'Bot'
steps:
@@ -28,6 +27,7 @@ jobs:
with:
ref: ${{ github.base_ref }}
sparse-checkout: .github/scripts
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v9.0.0
with:
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ jobs:
check-title:
name: Check PR title (Conventional Commits)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions: {}
# Skip bots: they open PRs programmatically and have their own process.
if: github.event.pull_request.user.type != 'Bot'
steps:
@@ -59,6 +60,9 @@ jobs:
check-mergeable:
name: Flag unmergeable PRs
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
pull-requests: write
issues: write
# Skip bots: they open PRs programmatically and have their own process.
if: github.event.pull_request.user.type != 'Bot'
steps: