5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Vykos 4a9085d252 fix(endpoint): scope secondary endpoint lookups by owner
* Scope secondary endpoint lookups by owner

* Reject unregistered image endpoint URLs for non-admins

* Adjust owner-scope tests for rebased routes

* Allow non-admins to compare endpoints they own

The compare owner-scope guard called _reject_raw_endpoint_url_for_non_admin
with endpoint_id=None, so it rejected every signed-in non-admin
/api/compare/start request — even for endpoints the caller owns — because
compare resolves endpoints by URL and carries no endpoint_id. That locked
non-admins out of compare entirely.

Resolve the owned ModelEndpoint first and pass its id, so a registered
endpoint the caller owns is allowed while only truly raw, unregistered URLs
are rejected (mirrors the gallery inpaint/harmonize checks in this PR).
Replace the source-only reject test with deterministic reject + allow
regressions that no longer depend on the dev DB contents.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Bind compare sessions to the resolved owner-scoped endpoint

/api/compare/start created the [CMP] helper sessions with the raw
caller-supplied endpoint URL and only used the owner-scoped lookup to
decide whether to copy an API key. That stopped key borrowing but still
let a non-admin inject an arbitrary raw endpoint URL into the compare
session path.

Now, when the supplied URL resolves to a registered endpoint visible to
the caller, the session binds to that row's own normalized base URL
(build_chat_url(normalize_base(ep.base_url))) plus its headers — the same
registered-endpoint shape session_routes uses. The raw URL survives only
when ep is None, which non-admins already hit a 403 on, leaving raw URLs
reachable solely for admins / single-user mode with no borrowed key.

Adds compare-specific behavior tests: another user's private endpoint is
rejected (nothing created), the session binds to the stored URL rather
than the raw input, and an admin raw URL is allowed but carries no
inherited key.

Addresses the review on #1511.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Validate both compare endpoints before creating any session

start_comparison resolved + created each [CMP] session inside one loop,
so a request pairing a valid owned endpoint A with an unregistered raw
endpoint B raised 403 only after A's session was already created — and
its Authorization header copied in. The rejected request left a partial
compare session with that header behind.

Split the flow into two phases: phase 1 resolves and owner-validates
both endpoints (running the raw-URL reject helper) and stashes the
session URL + headers; phase 2 creates the two sessions only once both
passed. A 403 on either endpoint now aborts with nothing created and no
header copied.

Adds a regression test: owned endpoint A + unregistered/raw endpoint B
-> 403 with no sessions created.

Addresses the follow-up review on #1511.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Resolve compare credentials by endpoint id, not URL alone

Two endpoints visible to a caller can share a base_url but hold different
api_keys. _owned_endpoint_by_url returned whichever row sorted first, so
/api/compare/start could copy the wrong key into the [CMP] session.

Add _owned_endpoint_by_id (same owner scoping) and optional endpoint_a_id/
endpoint_b_id form fields. The id pins the exact registered endpoint; URL
resolution remains only for legacy/admin raw-URL callers. An id the caller
can't see 404s instead of falling back to a same-URL row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Loosen research-routes owner-scope assertion to the stable substring

The rebased _resolve_research_endpoint generalized its owner derivation to
honor an explicit owner arg first (owner = owner or getattr(sess, ...)), so
the exact-line assertion broke CI. Assert the stable session-derivation
substring instead of the full line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 11:51:55 +01:00
Rudy Wolf 1c43daa564 fix(compare): stop blind mode leaking model identities via session names (#1318)
Blind Compare anonymized the pane headers, but each pane still created a helper chat session named "[CMP] <real-model>" and GET /api/sessions returned the session's model field. So the sidebar and the session-list API let a user map "Model A" back to its real model before voting, defeating the blind test.

- Frontend (static/js/compare/index.js, panes.js): in blind mode, name helper sessions by their neutral slot ("[CMP] Model A") instead of the model, matching the existing blind pane labels.
- Backend GET /api/sessions (routes/session_routes.py): blank the model field for [CMP]-prefixed helper sessions via a new _public_model helper.
- Backend /api/compare/start (routes/compare_routes.py): name blind sessions by slot and withhold model_left/model_right/mapping from the blind response (revealed at /vote).
- Tests: tests/test_blind_compare_redaction.py.

Fixes #1285.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 04:39:01 +01:00
Mahdi Salmanzade 729a30a10e fix(compare): owner-scope endpoint key lookup
POST /api/compare/start (a normal-user route — no admin gate) creates two
caller-owned [CMP] sessions from caller-supplied endpoint URLs (endpoint_a /
endpoint_b), then copies a ModelEndpoint's *decrypted* api_key into each
session's headers by matching on URL:

    ep = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.base_url == base).first()

The match was not owner-scoped. ModelEndpoint is per-user (core/database.py:
non-null owner = private, "the model picker only shows the endpoint to that
user"). So a user could pass another user's endpoint base_url, have that owner's
api_key copied into a [CMP] session they own, then drive /api/chat_stream on that
session — spending the victim's API key / quota and reaching whatever base_url
they configured. Same multi-tenant owner-scoping class already fixed for
companion/models, /api/v1/chat (#870, #1045), session create/switch-model
(#1093), and /api/research/start (#1099).

Extract `_owned_endpoint_by_url(db, base_url, owner)` which scopes the match via
the shared owner_filter helper (own rows + legacy null-owner shared rows),
mirroring session_routes._owned_endpoint. A scoped miss copies no key (the
comparison session simply carries no borrowed credential). A null/empty owner
stays a no-op (single-user / legacy mode).

Add regression tests pinning the scoped match (cross-owner rejected, own-row
allowed, legacy shared-row allowed, no-match None, null-owner no-op).
2026-06-03 23:17:12 +01:00
Alexander Kenley 2c4b8b57dd feat(ai): add OpenRouter and Ollama Cloud providers (#231)
Co-authored-by: Alex Kenley <Alex.Kenley@threatvectorsecurity.com>
2026-06-01 14:26:10 +09:00
pewdiepie-archdaemon e5c99a5eee Odysseus v1.0 2026-05-31 23:58:26 +09:00