Commit Graph

13 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Kenny Van de Maele 613bbb0dba fix: port main-only fixes to dev (#2761 sharpen auth, #2762 doc version 404) (#3303)
* fix(gallery): add auth check to /api/image/sharpen endpoint (#2761)

Every other image-processing endpoint (denoise, upscale, remove-bg,
enhance-face, inpaint, harmonize) calls require_privilege(request,
"can_generate_images"). The sharpen endpoint was missing this check,
allowing unauthenticated users to trigger CPU-intensive image processing.

* fix(document): add 404 guard to version list/get endpoints (#2762)

list_versions and get_version used a soft 'if doc:' guard that skipped
ownership verification when the Document row was missing (e.g. after
hard delete). Orphaned DocumentVersion rows would be returned to any
caller without auth. Now raises 404 when the parent document is gone,
matching the pattern already used in restore_version.

---------

Co-authored-by: Ernest Hysa <59969602+ErnestHysa@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-07 17:19:24 +02:00
Vykos 67aeea4f8b Scope gallery image endpoints by owner (#3001) 2026-06-07 12:51:21 +02:00
Vykos a6490ffb1b Harden gallery album assignment scope (#3004) 2026-06-07 12:49:03 +02:00
Vykos ff4508d396 Scope vision model resolution by owner (#3009) 2026-06-07 12:39:02 +02:00
nubs 747d005645 fix(gallery): validate target album owner on image PATCH + owner-scope album count/cover (#2755) 2026-06-05 15:01:01 +02:00
Vykos 194985b5e1 Constrain gallery filenames to image root (#2828) 2026-06-05 10:29:11 +02:00
Vykos 193dc2f085 fix(uploads): bound direct upload reads
* Stabilize full test collection

* Add bounded reads for direct uploads
2026-06-04 00:32:50 +01:00
Mubashir R 319ba50a44 fix: validate client-supplied image _endpoint to prevent SSRF (gallery proxies) (#1718)
POST /api/image/harmonize and POST /api/image/inpaint read an `_endpoint` from
the request body and issue server-side httpx POSTs to it with no validation. A
caller can set `_endpoint` to http://169.254.169.254/ (cloud instance metadata)
or any internal/loopback address the server can reach, turning these routes into
an SSRF primitive.

routes/embedding_routes.py already runs its user-supplied endpoint through
src.url_safety.check_outbound_url; these two routes were missing the same guard.
Validate `_endpoint` the same way before any outbound request: non-HTTP(S)
schemes and the link-local metadata range are always rejected, and
IMAGE_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true blocks private/loopback for full lockdown (the
local-first default still allows LAN diffusion servers).

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-03 13:34:17 +09:00
SurprisedDuck 934bca9e48 Providers: omit temperature for OpenAI reasoning models
* fix: omit temperature for OpenAI reasoning models (o1/o3/o4/gpt-5)

These models only accept the default temperature; sending any explicit
value (even 0.0) returns HTTP 400 "Only the default (1) value is
supported". This broke two paths:

- Endpoint probing in _probe_single_model hardcodes temperature: 0.0, so
  a perfectly valid o3/gpt-5 endpoint is reported as failing in the
  Model Endpoints health check.
- Chat/stream payloads send temperature unconditionally, so a non-default
  temperature preset 400s on these models.

The code already special-cases the same model family for
max_completion_tokens, so this adds a sibling _restricts_temperature()
helper and omits the field for those models, letting the API use its
required default. gpt-4.5 is intentionally excluded (not a reasoning
model; accepts temperature normally).

Adds tests/test_llm_core_temperature.py covering the predicate and the
synchronous payload builder.

* fix: also omit temperature for reasoning models on the direct-POST paths

The first commit only covered llm_call/llm_call_async/stream_llm and the
endpoint probe. Email auto-summary, urgency-less spam classification, the
email reply-summary endpoint, and gallery vision tagging build their
OpenAI payloads inline and POST them directly (requests/httpx), bypassing
llm_core — so a reasoning model configured there would still 400 on the
temperature field. These sites already branch on _uses_max_completion_tokens,
so they're the same class; added the matching _restricts_temperature guard.

gallery_routes also gains the max_completion_tokens branch it was missing,
so gpt-5 vision tagging works end to end.

Note: email_pollers urgency scoring goes through llm_call_async and was
already covered.
2026-06-02 20:58:33 +09:00
Tatlatat 67517eaed1 Gallery: match image endpoint URLs with exact v1 suffix
The image-edit endpoint lookup compared stored vs incoming base URLs with
`.rstrip("/v1")`. `str.rstrip(chars)` treats its argument as a character
set, not a suffix, so any URL ending in '/', 'v', or '1' is over-stripped
(e.g. `http://host1/v1` -> `http://host`). Two endpoints that are not the
same can then compare equal, or the real endpoint fails to match its own
stored record, leaving `api_key` unset and sending the upstream image call
unauthenticated.

Use `.removesuffix("/v1")` (exact-suffix removal) with surrounding
`.rstrip("/")` on both sides so only a genuine trailing `/v1` is dropped.

Adds a focused test that parses the actual comparison expression out of
gallery_routes.py via AST and evaluates it — it fails if the fix is
reverted and uses no mocking.
2026-06-02 20:34:05 +09:00
Refuse 323f027865 Security: sanitize export and gallery filenames
Co-authored-by: RefuseOdd <refuseodd@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 20:29:56 +09:00
red person d36896c5f7 Gate image editor AI endpoints by privilege (#447) 2026-06-01 22:35:24 +09:00
pewdiepie-archdaemon e5c99a5eee Odysseus v1.0 2026-05-31 23:58:26 +09:00