AuthMiddleware is the outermost middleware, so a credential-less CORS preflight
(OPTIONS + Access-Control-Request-Method) was rejected with 401 before
CORSMiddleware could answer it. That blocks every cross-origin browser/WebView
client: the preflight fails, so the real request is never sent.
Let a genuine preflight through at the top of AuthMiddleware.dispatch via a pure,
unit-tested predicate (core.middleware.is_cors_preflight). Precise -- only
OPTIONS carrying Access-Control-Request-Method; a credentialed request is never
matched -- and no data access.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): add HSTS and Permissions-Policy headers to SecurityHeadersMiddleware
Strict-Transport-Security is sent only when the connection is HTTPS
(detected via request.url.scheme or X-Forwarded-Proto: https), so
plain-HTTP dev deployments behind a reverse proxy are unaffected.
Permissions-Policy disables camera, microphone, and geolocation APIs
unconditionally — Odysseus does not use them, and this prevents a
successful XSS from requesting browser-native sensor access.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): scope Permissions-Policy microphone directive to same-origin
Reviewers on PR #3081 (alteixeira20, NubsCarson) flagged that
microphone=() blocks mic access for same-origin (self) too, breaking
Odysseus's own voice/STT flow (getUserMedia({audio: true}) in
static/js/voiceRecorder.js). Scope it to microphone=(self) so
third-party origins stay locked out while the app's own UI keeps mic
access; camera and geolocation remain fully disabled as unused.
Adds focused middleware tests covering HSTS scoping (HTTPS direct,
X-Forwarded-Proto, absent on plain HTTP) and the Permissions-Policy
same-origin microphone contract.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hardens issues found in a security review of the current tree (separate from
the cookbook SSH PR):
- Email thread rendering (static/js/emailLibrary.js): the flat read path runs
inbound HTML through the allowlist sanitizer, but the two threaded paths
(_renderTurnsAsBubbles / _renderTurnsFromServer — the default view) injected
server-parsed `body_html` raw into the DOM. A crafted inbound email could
inject arbitrary markup (phishing/form/credential-capture/tracking; full XSS
if a deployment relaxes the script CSP). Now sanitized on all paths.
- Attachment extraction (routes/email_routes.py, routes/email_helpers.py): the
on-disk extraction dir was `ATTACHMENTS_DIR / f"{folder}_{uid}"` with
user-controlled folder/uid and no containment, so a folder like `../../tmp`
could escape ATTACHMENTS_DIR. New attachment_extract_dir() flattens both to a
single safe segment and asserts containment.
- Diagnostics routes (routes/diagnostics_routes.py): /api/db/stats,
/api/rag/stats, /api/test/youtube, /api/test-research relied only on the
global session check (any logged-in user). Now require_admin-gated.
- Defense-in-depth HTML escaping: session HTML export escapes the session name
(routes/session_routes.py); the MCP OAuth page escapes the reflected Host
header / server_id (routes/mcp_routes.py).
- Internal-tool token now compared with secrets.compare_digest (constant time)
in core/middleware.py and app.py.
Adds regression tests in tests/test_security_regressions.py.
Marius