Commit Graph

1 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
nopoz a7fc1343a3 fix(security): prevent ReDoS in verdict-prose and continuation matchers (#4943)
Two py/polynomial-redos sinks ran regexes with two adjacent \s-matching
quantifiers over untrusted model text, backtracking O(n^2) when the tail failed
on a whitespace flood:

  - routes/skills_routes.py: the last-resort verdict-from-prose extractor used
    `["\'\s:]*\s*` — the class already matches \s, so the trailing \s* was a
    redundant second quantifier. Dropped it (extracted to a documented module
    constant _VERDICT_PROSE_RE); the matched text is identical, the scan linear.
  - src/agent_loop.py _EXPLICIT_CONTINUATION_RE: `\s*[.!?]*\s*$` put two \s*
    around `[.!?]*`. Rewrote as `\s*(?:[.!?]+\s*)?$` — same accepted tails (no
    two \s* adjacent), linear. Portable form (no possessive quantifiers).

Both verified output-equivalent to the originals across a fuzz corpus. Adds
tests/test_redos_verdict_continuation.py pinning the unchanged match sets and
bounding the flood inputs (old patterns took seconds at 40k whitespace chars).
2026-06-28 11:42:20 +01:00