The Fast/Full popover now has a kebab (three-dot) button alongside the
two preset choices. Clicking it expands a textarea below with a
'Draft with note' send button. The textarea is for the user to tell
the AI how to reply ('confirm Tuesday at 2', 'decline politely', 'say
we'll need an extra week') instead of accepting a generic draft.
Plumbing:
- emailLibrary.js: kebab button + note panel inside .email-ai-reply-choice
menu. Submitting calls _runAiReplyFromButton with mode='ai-reply-full'
and a noteHint string.
- _runAiReplyFromButton signature gains noteHint; passes it through
state._onEmailClick as opts.noteHint.
- emailInbox.js consumer: forwards opts.noteHint into _openEmail's new
5th arg, which puts it in the /api/email/ai-reply POST body as
user_hint.
- routes/email_routes.py /ai-reply: reads user_hint, appends a
'User's instructions for THIS reply' section to the user message
(priority over default tone/length). Also skips the per-message
AI-reply cache when a hint is set — the cached generic draft would
silently override the instructions otherwise.
Closes the auto-send hole that let earlier models invent signatures
(e.g. signing 'David' for a user named Felix) and SMTP them to real
recipients before the user could review.
New setting: agent_email_confirm (default True).
When on, the MCP send_email and reply_to_email tools no longer SMTP
directly — they write the composed email to scheduled_emails with a new
status 'agent_draft' (far-future send_at so the scheduled-send poller
ignores them) and return a {pending: true, pending_id, to, subject,
body, message: ...} payload. The model surfaces that to the user.
Backend endpoints to approve / cancel:
- GET /api/email/pending → list staged drafts for the owner
- POST /api/email/pending/{id}/approve → flip status to 'pending' +
backdate send_at so the
existing scheduled-send
poller delivers immediately
- DELETE /api/email/pending/{id} → status = 'cancelled'
UI:
- Settings / AI Defaults gets a new 'Email Safety' card with the
toggle, default on.
- Tool descriptions for send_email and reply_to_email now include the
pending behavior + an explicit 'DO NOT invent a signature, do not
type a person's name' guardrail.
Pass 2 (next): inline chat card with Send / Discard buttons so the user
doesn't have to type a confirmation reply. Today's prompt + the listing
endpoint give the model a clean path to surface drafts.
Move every per-route upload byte-limit into src/upload_limits.py as a
validated, env-overridable constant via read_byte_limit_env:
- Add GALLERY_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES, GALLERY_TRANSFORM_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES,
MEMORY_IMPORT_MAX_BYTES, PERSONAL_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES,
EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES, STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES, ICS_MAX_BYTES.
- Routes import their constant instead of defining it locally: replaces 4
raw int(os.getenv(...)) and removes 3 hardcoded literals.
- The 3 previously-hardcoded limits (email compose, STT audio, calendar
ICS) are now env-overridable with the same ODYSSEUS_*_MAX_BYTES naming.
- Defaults unchanged, so behavior is unchanged unless an env var is set;
an invalid value now fails fast with a clear message instead of a bare
int() ValueError.
- Document all env vars in .env.example and the README.
Fixes#3364
* refactor(constants): single source of truth for data dir + merge core/src constants
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(contributing): use named src.constants for data paths, drop core/constants references
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Normalize scheduled email send_at values with timezone offsets or Z suffixes to naive UTC before storing, matching the poller's lexicographic comparison format and preventing early/late sends.
If any exception occurred after conn was created but before the
explicit conn.logout() call, the IMAP connection leaked. Use
try/finally to guarantee cleanup on all exit paths.
* fix: omit temperature for OpenAI reasoning models (o1/o3/o4/gpt-5)
These models only accept the default temperature; sending any explicit
value (even 0.0) returns HTTP 400 "Only the default (1) value is
supported". This broke two paths:
- Endpoint probing in _probe_single_model hardcodes temperature: 0.0, so
a perfectly valid o3/gpt-5 endpoint is reported as failing in the
Model Endpoints health check.
- Chat/stream payloads send temperature unconditionally, so a non-default
temperature preset 400s on these models.
The code already special-cases the same model family for
max_completion_tokens, so this adds a sibling _restricts_temperature()
helper and omits the field for those models, letting the API use its
required default. gpt-4.5 is intentionally excluded (not a reasoning
model; accepts temperature normally).
Adds tests/test_llm_core_temperature.py covering the predicate and the
synchronous payload builder.
* fix: also omit temperature for reasoning models on the direct-POST paths
The first commit only covered llm_call/llm_call_async/stream_llm and the
endpoint probe. Email auto-summary, urgency-less spam classification, the
email reply-summary endpoint, and gallery vision tagging build their
OpenAI payloads inline and POST them directly (requests/httpx), bypassing
llm_core — so a reasoning model configured there would still 400 on the
temperature field. These sites already branch on _uses_max_completion_tokens,
so they're the same class; added the matching _restricts_temperature guard.
gallery_routes also gains the max_completion_tokens branch it was missing,
so gpt-5 vision tagging works end to end.
Note: email_pollers urgency scoring goes through llm_call_async and was
already covered.
Hardens issues found in a security review of the current tree (separate from
the cookbook SSH PR):
- Email thread rendering (static/js/emailLibrary.js): the flat read path runs
inbound HTML through the allowlist sanitizer, but the two threaded paths
(_renderTurnsAsBubbles / _renderTurnsFromServer — the default view) injected
server-parsed `body_html` raw into the DOM. A crafted inbound email could
inject arbitrary markup (phishing/form/credential-capture/tracking; full XSS
if a deployment relaxes the script CSP). Now sanitized on all paths.
- Attachment extraction (routes/email_routes.py, routes/email_helpers.py): the
on-disk extraction dir was `ATTACHMENTS_DIR / f"{folder}_{uid}"` with
user-controlled folder/uid and no containment, so a folder like `../../tmp`
could escape ATTACHMENTS_DIR. New attachment_extract_dir() flattens both to a
single safe segment and asserts containment.
- Diagnostics routes (routes/diagnostics_routes.py): /api/db/stats,
/api/rag/stats, /api/test/youtube, /api/test-research relied only on the
global session check (any logged-in user). Now require_admin-gated.
- Defense-in-depth HTML escaping: session HTML export escapes the session name
(routes/session_routes.py); the MCP OAuth page escapes the reflected Host
header / server_id (routes/mcp_routes.py).
- Internal-tool token now compared with secrets.compare_digest (constant time)
in core/middleware.py and app.py.
Adds regression tests in tests/test_security_regressions.py.
pewdiepie-archdaemon