* refactor(constants): single source of truth for data dir + merge core/src constants
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(contributing): use named src.constants for data paths, drop core/constants references
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(gallery): add auth check to /api/image/sharpen endpoint (#2761)
Every other image-processing endpoint (denoise, upscale, remove-bg,
enhance-face, inpaint, harmonize) calls require_privilege(request,
"can_generate_images"). The sharpen endpoint was missing this check,
allowing unauthenticated users to trigger CPU-intensive image processing.
* fix(document): add 404 guard to version list/get endpoints (#2762)
list_versions and get_version used a soft 'if doc:' guard that skipped
ownership verification when the Document row was missing (e.g. after
hard delete). Orphaned DocumentVersion rows would be returned to any
caller without auth. Now raises 404 when the parent document is gone,
matching the pattern already used in restore_version.
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Co-authored-by: Ernest Hysa <59969602+ErnestHysa@users.noreply.github.com>
POST /api/image/harmonize and POST /api/image/inpaint read an `_endpoint` from
the request body and issue server-side httpx POSTs to it with no validation. A
caller can set `_endpoint` to http://169.254.169.254/ (cloud instance metadata)
or any internal/loopback address the server can reach, turning these routes into
an SSRF primitive.
routes/embedding_routes.py already runs its user-supplied endpoint through
src.url_safety.check_outbound_url; these two routes were missing the same guard.
Validate `_endpoint` the same way before any outbound request: non-HTTP(S)
schemes and the link-local metadata range are always rejected, and
IMAGE_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true blocks private/loopback for full lockdown (the
local-first default still allows LAN diffusion servers).
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: omit temperature for OpenAI reasoning models (o1/o3/o4/gpt-5)
These models only accept the default temperature; sending any explicit
value (even 0.0) returns HTTP 400 "Only the default (1) value is
supported". This broke two paths:
- Endpoint probing in _probe_single_model hardcodes temperature: 0.0, so
a perfectly valid o3/gpt-5 endpoint is reported as failing in the
Model Endpoints health check.
- Chat/stream payloads send temperature unconditionally, so a non-default
temperature preset 400s on these models.
The code already special-cases the same model family for
max_completion_tokens, so this adds a sibling _restricts_temperature()
helper and omits the field for those models, letting the API use its
required default. gpt-4.5 is intentionally excluded (not a reasoning
model; accepts temperature normally).
Adds tests/test_llm_core_temperature.py covering the predicate and the
synchronous payload builder.
* fix: also omit temperature for reasoning models on the direct-POST paths
The first commit only covered llm_call/llm_call_async/stream_llm and the
endpoint probe. Email auto-summary, urgency-less spam classification, the
email reply-summary endpoint, and gallery vision tagging build their
OpenAI payloads inline and POST them directly (requests/httpx), bypassing
llm_core — so a reasoning model configured there would still 400 on the
temperature field. These sites already branch on _uses_max_completion_tokens,
so they're the same class; added the matching _restricts_temperature guard.
gallery_routes also gains the max_completion_tokens branch it was missing,
so gpt-5 vision tagging works end to end.
Note: email_pollers urgency scoring goes through llm_call_async and was
already covered.
The image-edit endpoint lookup compared stored vs incoming base URLs with
`.rstrip("/v1")`. `str.rstrip(chars)` treats its argument as a character
set, not a suffix, so any URL ending in '/', 'v', or '1' is over-stripped
(e.g. `http://host1/v1` -> `http://host`). Two endpoints that are not the
same can then compare equal, or the real endpoint fails to match its own
stored record, leaving `api_key` unset and sending the upstream image call
unauthenticated.
Use `.removesuffix("/v1")` (exact-suffix removal) with surrounding
`.rstrip("/")` on both sides so only a genuine trailing `/v1` is dropped.
Adds a focused test that parses the actual comparison expression out of
gallery_routes.py via AST and evaluates it — it fails if the fix is
reverted and uses no mocking.
Mike