* feat(agent): workspace confinement via context-local binding + get_workspace tool
Bind the per-turn workspace once in execute_tool_block; the shared path
resolvers (_resolve_tool_path / _resolve_search_root) and the subprocess cwd
helper (agent_cwd) read it, so file tools + bash/python are confined centrally
and a new tool that uses the shared helpers cannot accidentally bypass it.
Adds the admin-gated /api/workspace/browse picker, a workspace pill + directory
modal (reusing existing modal/button CSS), the /workspace slash command, and a
get_workspace tool (replaces a system-prompt block). Confinement is OS-agnostic
(realpath/normcase/commonpath) and docker-safe (container paths, no host
assumptions). Reopens#2023.
* ux(workspace): clarify workspace is not a sandbox
Picker modal note + pill tooltip + get_workspace tool/output wording now state
plainly: read_file/write_file/edit_file/grep/glob/ls are confined to the folder,
but bash/python only start there (cwd) and are not sandboxed. Modal note reuses
the existing .muted class.
* fix(agent): treat an active workspace as file-work intent
A vague low-signal message (e.g. "look at the local project") matches no
domain keywords, so tool retrieval is skipped and only always-available tools
are offered — leaving the agent with no file access even though a workspace is
set. When a workspace is active, include the file/code tools (incl.
get_workspace) on low-signal turns so the agent can act on the folder.
Also requires the tool index (ChromaDB) to be reachable for normal retrieval;
that is an environment dependency, not part of this change.
* ux(workspace): hide pill + overflow entry in chat mode
Workspace only scopes the agent's file/shell tools, so the pill and the
overflow 'Workspace' entry are agent-only now — hidden in chat mode like the
bash toggle. Mode read from the DOM in syncWorkspaceIndicator; applyMode() is
called from the agent/chat setMode handler.
* prompt(tools): steer bash/python to defer to the dedicated file tools
bash/python schema descriptions (what native-tool-calling models read) were
bare and gave no steer, so models would do file ops via the shell (e.g. writing
SVG/HTML, which then dumps raw markup into the tool preview). Tell bash/python
in the schema + tool-index + prompt section to prefer read_file/write_file/
edit_file/grep/glob/ls and only be used for what those do not cover.
* prompt(tools): keep bash/python deferral generic (no hardcoded tool names)
Reference 'a dedicated tool' rather than listing read_file/write_file/grep/etc.
by name, so the guidance does not go stale if those tools are renamed.
* style(workspace): drop em-dashes from added code comments/strings
* ux(workspace): terser non-sandbox note in picker (no tool-name list)
* ux(workspace): mirror terse non-sandbox wording in pill tooltip
* chore: untrack local venv symlink (run-only, not part of the feature)
* prompt(workspace): keep get_workspace text generic (no hardcoded tool names)
* fix(agent): low-signal + workspace surfaces only read-only file tools
Intersect the files tool group with PLAN_MODE_READONLY_TOOLS so a vague message
in a workspace exposes read_file/grep/glob/ls/get_workspace for exploration, but
not write_file/edit_file/bash/python -- those wait for a request that actually
calls for them (RAG retrieval still adds them on a real ask).
* feat(workspace): cap browse listing at 500 dirs with a truncated hint
Mirror the filesystem_tools._CODENAV_MAX_HITS pattern with a module-local
_MAX_BROWSE_DIRS so a directory with thousands of children does not dump every
row into the picker; the response carries a truncated flag and the modal tells
the user to type a path to jump in.
* chore: untrack local venv symlink (run-only artifact)
* fix(workspace): vet the workspace root against the sensitive-path deny list at bind time
The in-workspace resolver deny-lists sensitive paths inside the workspace,
but the empty-path search root is the workspace itself, so a workspace of
~/.ssh could be listed via ls with no path. vet_workspace() (public, in
tool_execution next to the resolvers) rejects non-directories and sensitive
roots before the path is ever bound; chat_routes uses it instead of its
inline isdir check.
* fix(workspace): reject filesystem roots and stop showing rejected workspaces as active
Review findings from #3665:
P2: vet_workspace accepted / (and would accept drive/UNC roots), which makes
every absolute path 'inside' the workspace and collapses confinement into
host-wide file access. A root is its own dirname, so reject when
dirname(resolved) == resolved; the browse response now carries a selectable
flag and the picker disables 'Use this folder' on unselectable dirs.
P3: /workspace set stored any string client-side and the chat route silently
dropped rejected values, so the pill could claim a confinement that was not
in effect. New admin-gated /api/workspace/vet validates manual paths before
they persist (canonical path returned), and when a posted workspace is
rejected at send time the stream emits workspace_rejected so the client
clears the stored value and toasts instead of continuing silently.
* fix(workspace): check caller privilege before vetting the posted workspace
Review finding: /api/chat_stream called vet_workspace() on the posted value
for every caller and emitted workspace_rejected on failure, so a non-admin
who can chat but cannot use file/shell tools could distinguish existing
directories from missing/file/sensitive/root paths by whether the event
appeared. The resolution now lives in _resolve_request_workspace, which
drops the submitted value uniformly for non-admin callers, with no vetting
and no event, before the path ever touches the filesystem. Admin and
single-user behavior is unchanged. Test pins that valid and invalid paths
are indistinguishable for a non-admin and that vet_workspace is never
invoked for them.
_warmup_endpoints called model_discovery.get_endpoints(), which does not exist
on ModelDiscovery. It raised AttributeError on every startup and on every 60s
keepalive tick, was swallowed by the outer except, and pinged nothing, so the
cold-start prevention the loop exists for never ran.
Add ModelDiscovery.warmup_ping_urls(), which resolves the /models probe URLs
from the real discover_models() output, and call it from the warmup loop via
asyncio.to_thread (discovery does a blocking port scan, so keep it off the event
loop).
Adds tests/test_warmup_ping_urls.py: resolves /models URLs from discovered
items, honors the limit, degrades to [] on discovery failure, and documents that
get_endpoints never existed.
The frontend's text assets shipped uncompressed on every cold load. Add
Starlette's GZipMiddleware. Measured on the current assets:
- style.css 1,127 KB -> 238 KB (-79%)
- index.html 202 KB -> 35 KB (-83%)
- chat.js 238 KB -> 60 KB (-75%)
minimum_size=1024 skips tiny bodies; Starlette excludes `text/event-stream` by
default, so the SSE streams (chat, shell, research, model-probe — all served with
media_type="text/event-stream") are never compressed or buffered. Composes
cleanly with the existing security-header middleware. No behavioural change.
Built by OdWar -- with Claude thinking alongside.
* Add consolidated service health endpoint for degraded-state reporting
ROADMAP (High Priority) asks for "Better degraded-state reporting for
ChromaDB, SearXNG, email, ntfy, and provider probes." Until now there was no
single readout of which subsystems are actually working: /api/health is only a
liveness ping and each subsystem's signal lives in a different module, so a
misconfigured self-host install gives no consolidated picture.
This adds an admin-only GET /api/diagnostics/services endpoint backed by a new
src/service_health.py aggregator. Each subsystem reports a uniform
{name, status, detail, meta} where status is ok | degraded | down | disabled,
and the response rolls up an overall verdict (worst non-disabled status).
Probes are deliberately non-intrusive and safe to poll:
- ChromaDB: reads the .healthy flags on the RAG and memory vector stores.
- SearXNG: GET /healthz (2xx), falling back to the instance root (<500). No
search query is run.
- ntfy: GET the server's built-in /v1/health. No test notification is sent.
- email: short IMAP connect+logout per configured account (no credentials in
meta).
- providers: probe each enabled ModelEndpoint's model list (no api_key in meta).
Probe functions take their inputs as parameters and isolate the network call to
injectable callables, so they unit-test without touching the network (same
pattern as the merged provider-endpoint tests). Network probes run concurrently
off the event loop via asyncio.to_thread with bounded per-probe timeouts.
memory_vector is now passed into setup_diagnostics_routes (new optional param,
backward-compatible) so ChromaDB's vector-memory store can be reported too.
Tests: tests/test_service_health.py — 29 tests covering every status mapping
per subsystem, the overall rollup, and that no secrets leak into meta.
Verification:
python -m pytest tests/test_service_health.py -q # 29 passed
python -m py_compile src/service_health.py routes/diagnostics_routes.py app.py
python -m pytest tests/test_endpoint_resolver.py tests/test_provider_endpoints.py -q
Backend + tests only; an Admin/Settings UI badge that renders this endpoint is
a natural follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(diagnostics): bound service-health wall-clock and redact secrets
Addresses review on #964.
Blocker 1 — genuinely bounded wall-clock:
- providers_health and email_health now fan out per-item probes across a
bounded thread pool (_bounded_map) with a hard total budget (_FANOUT_BUDGET),
instead of probing endpoints/accounts sequentially. Stragglers are reported
as a controlled `timeout` and never block; the pool is shut down with
wait=False so the response returns on time regardless of endpoint/account
count.
- The IMAP connect path now honors the service-health budget: _imap_connect
gained a pass-through `timeout` param and the probe calls it with
_PROBE_TIMEOUT instead of the default 15s.
- collect_service_health runs the four network subsystems concurrently, each
under a per-subsystem deadline (_SUBSYSTEM_DEADLINE), with an overall
wait_for ceiling (_AGGREGATE_DEADLINE) as a backstop.
Blocker 2 — no secret/raw-error leakage in the response:
- _safe_url strips userinfo, query, and fragment from every URL surfaced in
meta (searxng instance, ntfy base, provider name fallback), keeping only
scheme/host/port/path.
- _classify_error maps every probe failure to a controlled category token
(timeout, connection_refused, dns_error, tls_error, network_error,
http_error, auth_or_protocol_error, …) — raw str(exception), which can embed
credentialed URLs or server text, is never returned.
Tests (tests/test_service_health.py, +tests/test_diagnostics_service_route.py):
- URL userinfo/query redaction for searxng/ntfy/providers.
- secret-bearing exception strings map to categories and don't leak.
- multiple slow providers/accounts stay bounded (single + 25-endpoint cases).
- subsystems run concurrently; aggregate deadline yields a controlled result.
- route-level unauthenticated (401) / non-admin (403) / admin (200) coverage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(diagnostics): isolate route tests so they don't leak module globals
The new route tests replaced src.service_health.collect_service_health and
routes.diagnostics_routes.require_admin via direct assignment, which persisted
for the rest of the pytest session. In CI's full alphabetical run that fake
collector (returning services=[]) leaked into the later collect_service_health
tests and failed them. Switch to monkeypatch.setattr so both are restored after
each test. No production code change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <111787685+alteixeira20@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs: add implementation plan for fixing chat context drifting (#135)
* fix: make Session.history immutable + fix {}.history crash
- Session.history now exposes a COPY of the internal _history list
- add_message() replaces history with a fresh copy each time
- get_context_messages() derives from _history directly
- replace_messages() updates both _history and history
- truncate_messages() updates both _history and history
- _persist_message() line 207: fixed {}.history fallback crash
- Added 11 tests for session isolation and edge cases
Addresses #135 root cause #1: shared mutable references
* fix: task scheduler uses SessionManager methods instead of overwriting sessions
- Added ensure_task_session() to SessionManager (checks cache first)
- Task scheduler now uses ensure_task_session() instead of direct dict assignment
- Task scheduler now uses SessionManager.add_message() for message persistence
- Removed direct sess_obj.history.append() that was silently losing data
Addresses #135 root causes #2 and #3
* fix: add age guard to cleanup_empty_sessions — don't delete sessions <1h old
Prevents the cleanup task from deleting sessions that were just created
and haven't received any messages yet (message_count == 0).
Addresses #135 root cause #5
* test: comprehensive session isolation tests (10/10 passing)
* refactor: consolidate _session_manager into singleton pattern
- Added set_session_manager_instance / get_session_manager_instance to core/models
- kept backward-compat aliases (set_session_manager, get_session_manager)
- session_manager.py re-exports the singleton functions
- ai_interaction.set_session_manager now syncs with the core singleton
- context_compactor uses get_session_manager_instance() instead of getattr hack
- app.py initializes the singleton once
Addresses #135 root cause #4: fragile global wiring
* test: add concurrent session isolation integration tests
Verifies:
- Concurrent add_message to different sessions doesn't cross-contaminate
- Rapid parallel writes maintain isolation
- Read-write concurrent access is safe
All 3 async tests pass, proving the immutable history fix works under concurrency
* fix: pre-import core.models in conftest to prevent test pollution
test_agent_loop.py stubs sys.modules['core.models'] = MagicMock() at
module level during collection. Any test collected after it imports
Session as a MagicMock. Pre-importing core.models in conftest.py
before test_agent_loop.py's module-level code runs prevents this.
* fix: make .history authoritative mutable list, address PR review
Per review feedback: keep .history as the authoritative mutable list so
existing code doing .history.pop(), .history = [...], etc. still works.
Fix the cross-contamination bug by ensuring __post_init__() gives each
Session its OWN unique history list (never shared).
Changes:
- core/models.py: .history IS the authoritative list. _history aliases it.
Each Session gets its own list in __post_init__.
- core/session_manager.py: add_message() delegates to Session.add_message()
instead of appending directly — no double-append, single source of truth.
- tests/test_session_manager.py: updated test to reflect that .history
references see new messages (same list, not a snapshot).
- docs/plans/2026-06-01-fix-chat-context-drifting.md: removed (not for
shipping — useful design context but too much process/doc to ship).
All 272 tests pass (3 pre-existing failures unrelated).
* Fix session manager message persistence
* Fix session history alias regressions
* Fix session history aliasing and task delivery
The DB owner-rename loop in rename_user patched every SQL column named
owner, but three non-SQL stores were left behind:
1. session_manager.sessions -- in-memory Session objects carry s.owner
set at server-boot time. get_sessions_for_user() does an exact
s.owner == username check, so the renamed user chat sidebar goes empty
until a server restart.
2. data/deep_research/*.json -- each completed research report is a
standalone JSON file with an owner field. research_routes filters
by d.get(owner) == user, making every report invisible to the
renamed user.
3. data/memory.json -- a flat JSON array; each entry carries an owner
field. memory_manager.load(owner=user) filters on it, so all memories
vanish from the memory panel.
Fix: after the SQL loop, patch all three:
- iterate sm.sessions and update owner in-place (exposed via app.state)
- walk data/deep_research/*.json and rewrite owner with atomic_write_json
- update matching entries in memory.json with atomic_write_json
All three use the same case-insensitive lower() comparison the SQL loop
already uses. Each step is independently wrapped so a single failure
does not abort the others or the rename itself.
Fixes#3362
Surface a lot of accumulated cookbook + UI work as a single non-agent
commit so the agent rework lands cleanly.
Highlights:
- Ollama as a first-class backend in the Cookbook:
* Download input accepts ollama-style names (name:tag) → backend=ollama
* /api/cookbook/ollama/library (cached scrape of ollama.com + curated
fallback so classic models like qwen2.5 stay reachable)
* "Browse Ollama library" toggle below Download with size chips
* Engine=Ollama in hwfit toolbar merges the Ollama library into the
main scan list as per-tag rows with the same Fit/Param/Quant/VRAM
columns; click → fills Download input
- API Tokens form added to Integrations panel (matching wired
loadTokens()/initTokenForm() that had no HTML)
- Serve panel polish: Advanced fold tightening (-8px nudges on vLLM
checks, Extra args, Spec row), n_cpu_moe + Split Mode controls
pulled up 8px to align with the row's checkboxes, GGUF File dropdown
exposed for Ollama backend, GPU re-render on Edit serve restore,
_forceBackend flag so saved serveState wins over backend detection,
cookbook:servers-changed CustomEvent so panels don't need refresh
- Models page redesign: Add Models row (URL + hidden API key reveal +
Type select + Scan/Ollama/Key/Test/Add icon buttons), Probe All +
Clear-offline buttons in Added Models toolbar, offline-pill removed
(opacity already conveys state), Engine dropdown gains Ollama option
- _ping_endpoint probes /v1/models then base, accepts 4xx as
reachable (vLLM returns 404 on bare /v1, fully working endpoints
were showing offline)
- Diagnosis card: × dismiss + Copy bundle buttons restored on the
serve error feedback card
- Orphan tmux sweep re-enabled behind a 60s rate-limit + background
Thread (off the main event loop) so dead serves get discovered
- cookbook_routes auto-register watchdog: drops the endpoint if the
serve session exits non-zero within the first ~3min
- ollama-rocm sidecar awareness in download wrapper (`docker exec
ollama-rocm ollama pull` when host ollama isn't installed)
- Skill extractor sets initial_status="published" when
auto_approve_skills pref is on (audit demotes later)
- Skill list / model list / cookbook scan misc polish
* feat: Add ChatGPT Subscription support and related features
- Introduced a new provider option for ChatGPT Subscription in the endpoint selection UI.
- Implemented OAuth flow for ChatGPT Subscription sign-in, including polling for authorization status.
- Updated admin interface to handle ChatGPT Subscription, including disabling API key input and providing user guidance.
- Enhanced cost tracking logic to differentiate between subscription and non-subscription endpoints.
- Added new slash commands for managing skills, including listing, searching, and invoking skills.
- Implemented caching for skill catalog to optimize performance.
- Updated tests to cover new ChatGPT Subscription functionality and ensure proper endpoint probing.
- Refactored existing code to accommodate new features and improve maintainability.
* refactor: share provider device-flow setup
- reuse one device-flow backend for Copilot and ChatGPT Subscription
- add one frontend device-flow helper for Settings and /setup
- put GitHub Copilot back into Add Models, now as a dropdown option
- make provider selection just select; clicking Add starts sign-in
- stop ChatGPT Subscription setup from opening auth tabs automatically
- make /setup copilot and /setup chatgpt-subscription work from chat
- show ChatGPT Subscription in the /setup suggestions
- show the real error message when setup fails
- add focused tests for the shared flow and setup UI
* feat(chatgpt-subscription): harden credential lifecycle and streamline auth UX
Backend:
- Resolve runtime bearer for provider-auth endpoints at probe time via a
shared _resolve_probe_key() that delegates to resolve_endpoint_runtime,
applied across all probe/refresh call sites.
- Skip live completion probes and health pings for discovery-only providers
(centralized behind _is_discovery_only_provider) — the Codex/Responses API
has no such endpoints, so status is derived from cached models.
- Never persist the short lived ChatGPT bearer to the plaintext sessions
table; proactively clear any stale bearer left by an earlier code path.
- Revoke orphaned ProviderAuthSession credentials when the last endpoint
backing them is deleted (_delete_orphaned_provider_auth), surfaced via
cleared_provider_auth in the delete response.
Frontend (admin.js):
- Auto-start the device-auth flow on provider selection so the authorization
panel (code + Authorize) shows immediately instead of behind a "Sign in" click.
- Remove the redundant top button for device auth providers, move retry
into the panel via an inline "Try again".
- Drop the self-evident hint text and add an execCommand clipboard fallback so
Copy works in non-secure (HTTP/LAN) contexts.
* fix: harden chatgpt subscription provider
* chore: remove PR media from branch
* Fix chatgpt subscription recovery and token handling
---------
Co-authored-by: 5p00kyy <admin@5p00ky.dev>
* refactor(constants): single source of truth for data dir + merge core/src constants
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(contributing): use named src.constants for data paths, drop core/constants references
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
AuthMiddleware is the outermost middleware, so a credential-less CORS preflight
(OPTIONS + Access-Control-Request-Method) was rejected with 401 before
CORSMiddleware could answer it. That blocks every cross-origin browser/WebView
client: the preflight fails, so the real request is never sent.
Let a genuine preflight through at the top of AuthMiddleware.dispatch via a pure,
unit-tested predicate (core.middleware.is_cors_preflight). Precise -- only
OPTIONS carrying Access-Control-Request-Method; a credentialed request is never
matched -- and no data access.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bring main's maintainer-curated work (cookbook scheduler, calendar rendering/sync, settings polish, agent debug loop) into dev so dev is a superset of main (resolves the dev/main drift, #2543).
- Schedule cookbook serves through the existing ScheduledTask system: the
serve preset gets a ^ button next to Launch that opens a daily/hourly/
weekly form mirroring the admin-switch style; the schedule action runs
action_cookbook_serve, which delegates to /api/model/serve and stamps
the resulting task with _scheduledStopAtMs. A background
cookbook_serve_lifecycle loop ticks every 60s and kills any serve
whose window has ended, also dropping the auto-registered endpoint
so the model picker doesn't keep pointing at a dead server.
- Stop and remove on a Running serve now awaits the SSH/tmux kill,
re-checks tmux has-session, and surfaces an error toast (leaving the
row) when the kill failed. Previously fire-and-forget, so a failed
SSH/tmux call silently left the live serve running while the row
vanished from the UI.
- Cookbook tasks/status orphan-adoption sweep no longer requires the
serve-/cookbook- session-id prefix; any tmux session whose pane is
running a known model-server process gets auto-pulled into Running.
Without this loosening, a cookbook-launched serve whose tmux id
fell back to a bare number was invisible — you couldn't see it,
let alone stop it.
- Ollama serve always launches a fresh process under cookbook's tmux
(no more monitor-mode reattach to a systemd/Docker ollama Stop can't
reach). The handler pre-picks a free port by probing the target
host over SSH and mutates req.cmd's OLLAMA_HOST so the runner script
AND the auto-registered endpoint agree on the same bind port.
- Auto-register uses host.docker.internal (when running inside Docker)
instead of localhost, matching the URL /setup adds for Ollama by
hand. Local cookbook serves now produce a chat-reachable endpoint
on first launch.
- Cascade-delete: removing a scheduled cookbook task also deletes any
linked calendar event (cookbook_task_id marker in the description).
- Tasks list groups cookbook_serve under a "Cookbook" category that
sorts above the rest, so scheduler-launched serves are easy to find.
* feat: Add workspace: confine agent tools to a folder
Pick a server folder as the agent's workspace so its file/shell tools work
there and don't touch files outside it. File tools are hard-confined; bash/
python run with cwd set to the folder.
Includes a slash command: `/workspace` (alias `/ws`) — show / `set <path>` /
`clear` / `pick` (open the directory browser).
- routes/workspace_routes.py: GET /api/workspace/browse (admin-only).
- src/tool_execution.py: hard path confinement for read_file/write_file;
bash/python cwd. Threaded route → stream_agent_loop → execute_tool_block.
- src/agent_loop.py: workspace note prepended to the system prompt.
- static/: overflow menu item, input-bar pill, directory-browser modal, and
the /workspace slash command.
- tests/test_workspace_confine.py.
* Wire workspace confinement into tools that landed after this PR
edit_file (#1239) and grep/glob/ls (#1670) merged after workspace-confine was
written, so they bypassed the workspace boundary. Thread the workspace through:
- edit_file: _do_edit_file resolves via _resolve_tool_path_in_workspace
- grep/glob/ls: _resolve_search_root confines to the workspace (root + paths)
- bash/python/bg cwd: workspace or _AGENT_WORKDIR (keep the #2586 data-dir
default when no workspace is set)
Tests cover edit_file + grep/ls confinement (inside ok, outside rejected).
* Workspace picker: editable path bar + modal style cohesion + cross-platform hardening
- Make the current-folder strip an editable address bar: type/paste a full
path and press Enter to navigate (also reaches other Windows drives and
hidden dirs the up-only browser cannot).
- Reuse shared modal CSS: drop bespoke .workspace-modal-content/.workspace-btn*
in favour of base .modal-content/.modal-body and the .confirm-btn button
family; separators/hover use var(--border). Net -31 CSS lines.
- Fix the path field overflowing the modal right edge (flex stretch + margin
vs an overflow:auto scrollbar-feedback loop): full-bleed, no h-margin.
- Cross-platform confinement: normcase the workspace commonpath check so
containment holds on case-insensitive filesystems (Windows/macOS).
- Make tests OS-portable: sibling temp dirs instead of /etc, python os.getcwd()
instead of pwd. 5 pass.
* feat(provider): add GitHub Copilot provider with device-flow auth
Adds GitHub Copilot as a model provider, so Copilot models (gpt-4o/4.1/5,
Claude, Gemini, …) work through the normal chat + agent loop, incl. native
tool calling and vision.
Auth is one-click via the GitHub OAuth device flow; the access token is stored
as the endpoint's (encrypted) api_key and sent directly as `Authorization:
Bearer` (no Copilot-token exchange, no refresh — matching how editors talk to
the Copilot API). Copilot is a normal ModelEndpoint detected by host; the only
provider-specific behaviour is a small set of required request headers,
injected centrally.
Sign-in is available from Settings → model endpoints ("Connect GitHub
Copilot") and from chat via `/setup copilot`.
- src/copilot.py (new), routes/copilot_routes.py (new): constants, header
builders, device-flow start/poll, model discovery, owner-scoped endpoint
provisioning.
- src/llm_core.py, src/endpoint_resolver.py: detect `copilot`, inject headers,
per-request x-initiator/vision.
- src/agent_loop.py: allowlist api.githubcopilot.com for native tool schemas.
- src/model_context.py: known context windows for Copilot (no unauthenticated
/models probe).
- static/, README, tests/test_copilot*.py.
* Tidy copilot_routes: clarify supports_tools, note _PENDING is per-process
- Claude Agent integration: AGENT_CONFIGS.claude, INTG_TYPES.claude,
setup_claude_routes + integrations/claude/ skill bundle. Wired in
app.py alongside the existing Codex integration; same scope-gated
/api/codex/* backend; agent form has new description so users know
it's setup for an external CLI, not an agent streamed inside Odysseus.
- Remove mark_email_boundaries action: not good enough yet. Stripped
from task UI, scheduler defaults, registry, tool schema, clear-cache
route. Added to RETIRED_HOUSEKEEPING_ACTIONS so existing rows + their
task_runs auto-purge on startup.
- Cookbook download reliability: "Reconnect" fix button in the crash
diagnosis runs _reconnectTask after probing has-session. 30s confirm
window before marking a download "done" — kills the Finished/Downloading
flicker when tmux briefly drops between captures.
- Mobile UX: tap anywhere on a note card body opens the editor;
Update button morphs to Archive when no text was edited; bell icon
accent-colored; chip-trashing notif pills fade so only the icon
rotates into the trash zone.
- Settings integrations: SVG-per-provider in email + API preset
dropdowns, custom drop-up-aware menus, accent sub-header icons
(IMAP/SMTP), consistent card styling between list + edit, contacts
Edit/Delete icons, agent form description copy.
This persists work that had been living only in the cookbook docker
container's writable layer — never committed to the host source. Brought
back to git intact, app.py registration re-applied surgically on top of
current main (not the older container copy, which would have regressed
the Windows MIME fix, asynccontextmanager lifespan, and webhook auth
exempts).
routes/codex_routes.py (new):
- GET /api/codex/capabilities — what this Odysseus exposes.
- GET /api/codex/plugin.zip — downloads integrations/codex as a zip.
- GET /api/codex/todos — scope-gated todos:read|write.
- POST /api/codex/todos — scope-gated todos:write.
- GET /api/codex/emails — scope-gated email:read|draft|send.
- GET /api/codex/emails/{uid} — single-message fetch.
- _scope_owner() enforces api_token scopes before touching user data.
routes/api_token_routes.py (+103 lines):
- Adds Codex-token-specific issuance + revocation paths.
integrations/codex/ (new bundle, shipped via /api/codex/plugin.zip):
- README.md — install instructions.
- .codex-plugin/plugin.json — Codex plugin manifest.
- scripts/odysseus_api.py — Python client used by the skill.
- skills/odysseus/SKILL.md — Codex skill definition.
static/js/settings.js (+253 lines):
- New "Codex Agent" option in the Integrations dropdown.
- Add / edit panel with plugin-bundle download link + curl-with-token
install instructions per agent.
app.py:
- 7-line surgical change: capture email_router = setup_email_routes()
and register setup_codex_routes(email_router=email_router) after the
email module so the Codex routes can borrow its helpers.
This persists work that had been living only in the cookbook docker
container's writable layer — never committed to the host source. Brought
back to git intact, app.py registration re-applied surgically on top of
current main (not the older container copy, which would have regressed
the Windows MIME fix, asynccontextmanager lifespan, and webhook auth
exempts).
routes/codex_routes.py (new):
- GET /api/codex/capabilities — what this Odysseus exposes.
- GET /api/codex/plugin.zip — downloads integrations/codex as a zip.
- GET /api/codex/todos — scope-gated todos:read|write.
- POST /api/codex/todos — scope-gated todos:write.
- GET /api/codex/emails — scope-gated email:read|draft|send.
- GET /api/codex/emails/{uid} — single-message fetch.
- _scope_owner() enforces api_token scopes before touching user data.
routes/api_token_routes.py (+103 lines):
- Adds Codex-token-specific issuance + revocation paths.
integrations/codex/ (new bundle, shipped via /api/codex/plugin.zip):
- README.md — install instructions.
- .codex-plugin/plugin.json — Codex plugin manifest.
- scripts/odysseus_api.py — Python client used by the skill.
- skills/odysseus/SKILL.md — Codex skill definition.
static/js/settings.js (+253 lines):
- New "Codex Agent" option in the Integrations dropdown.
- Add / edit panel with plugin-bundle download link + curl-with-token
install instructions per agent.
app.py:
- 7-line surgical change: capture email_router = setup_email_routes()
and register setup_codex_routes(email_router=email_router) after the
email module so the Codex routes can borrow its helpers.
/api/health is a liveness ping. This adds /api/ready as a readiness /
integrity self-check that returns 503 unless every critical subsystem is
whole, so an orchestrator (Docker/Compose/k8s) can gate traffic on real
readiness rather than mere process liveness:
- database: opens a connection and runs SELECT 1
- data_dir: confirms the data directory exists and is writable
- local_first: reports whether storage stays on the host (informational;
a remote database is a valid deployment, so it never fails readiness)
The check logic lives in src/readiness.py so it is unit-testable in
isolation; the route is a thin wrapper. Covered by tests/test_readiness.py.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POSTing to the per-task webhook URL shown in the Tasks UI returned 401
Unauthorized even though the URL is labelled "no auth needed". The
trigger handler at routes/task_routes.py:873 (`POST
/api/tasks/{task_id}/webhook/{token}`) was written as an
unauthenticated endpoint — the 32-byte path-embedded `webhook_token`
generated by `secrets.token_urlsafe(32)` is the credential, and the
handler validates it against the row before doing anything. But
AuthMiddleware in app.py runs first and only knows about
AUTH_EXEMPT_EXACT (static path set) and AUTH_EXEMPT_PREFIXES (only
`/static`), so every external POST (curl, Zapier, n8n, Make,
Activepieces) got rejected before the route ever saw the request.
External callers can't supply a session cookie, which is precisely
why the per-task token exists.
Fix: add an AUTH_EXEMPT_PATTERNS list of compiled regexes for dynamic
public paths and route `^/api/tasks/[^/]+/webhook/[^/]+/?$` through
it. The route handler still enforces `ScheduledTask.webhook_token ==
token` and 404s on mismatch, so an attacker without the token gets a
404 (indistinguishable from a non-existent task), and a holder of the
token gets the documented "POST and a task fires" behaviour. The
sibling endpoint `/{task_id}/webhook-regenerate` is admin-gated and
deliberately does NOT match the pattern — it requires `_owner(request)`
and a session.
Tests: tests/test_webhook_trigger_auth_exempt.py extracts the regex
list out of app.py, applies it to a representative trigger path
(positive) and the four neighbouring task paths that must stay
authenticated (negative — `/api/tasks`, `/api/tasks/{id}`,
`/api/tasks/{id}/webhook-regenerate`, `/api/tasks/{id}/run`), and
pins the handler-side token check so a refactor of the route doesn't
quietly turn the endpoint into a truly anonymous one.
Closes#621.
First, smallest cut of a LAN companion bridge (split out of #855 per review):
a thin, additive, read-only layer so a LAN client can discover what a server
offers. No new LLM logic; auth is enforced by the existing AuthMiddleware.
- GET /api/companion/ping -- cheap auth-validated health check
- GET /api/companion/info -- server identity + capability flags
- GET /api/companion/models -- the CALLER's own model endpoints
/models scopes to the caller's real owner (the token's owner for bearer callers)
plus legacy null-owner shared rows, mirroring owner_filter, and never returns
api_key material. The owner rule lives in two pure helpers (token_owner,
owner_can_see) with direct tests proving a token for owner A cannot see owner B's
rows and that null-owner rows don't widen access.
get_tool_index() calls index_builtin_tools() on first init
(src/tool_index.py:469-470), and _warmup_tool_index then calls it
explicitly right after. Every cold boot embeds all 58 built-in tools
twice and double-upserts them into the ChromaDB collection.
The remaining get_tools_for_query call still pre-warms the query path.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hardens issues found in a security review of the current tree (separate from
the cookbook SSH PR):
- Email thread rendering (static/js/emailLibrary.js): the flat read path runs
inbound HTML through the allowlist sanitizer, but the two threaded paths
(_renderTurnsAsBubbles / _renderTurnsFromServer — the default view) injected
server-parsed `body_html` raw into the DOM. A crafted inbound email could
inject arbitrary markup (phishing/form/credential-capture/tracking; full XSS
if a deployment relaxes the script CSP). Now sanitized on all paths.
- Attachment extraction (routes/email_routes.py, routes/email_helpers.py): the
on-disk extraction dir was `ATTACHMENTS_DIR / f"{folder}_{uid}"` with
user-controlled folder/uid and no containment, so a folder like `../../tmp`
could escape ATTACHMENTS_DIR. New attachment_extract_dir() flattens both to a
single safe segment and asserts containment.
- Diagnostics routes (routes/diagnostics_routes.py): /api/db/stats,
/api/rag/stats, /api/test/youtube, /api/test-research relied only on the
global session check (any logged-in user). Now require_admin-gated.
- Defense-in-depth HTML escaping: session HTML export escapes the session name
(routes/session_routes.py); the MCP OAuth page escapes the reflected Host
header / server_id (routes/mcp_routes.py).
- Internal-tool token now compared with secrets.compare_digest (constant time)
in core/middleware.py and app.py.
Adds regression tests in tests/test_security_regressions.py.
Personal Docs (POST /api/personal/add_directory and friends) currently
returns HTTP 503 'RAG system is not available' for every request,
because get_rag_manager() and rag_manager are both hardcoded off. The
disablement was added when chromadb 1.4.1 / pydantic 2.12 were mutually
incompatible at the client init layer.
That compat issue is fixed in the current pins (chromadb 1.5.x +
pydantic 2.13.x). Verified by calling the original lazy initializer
against a running chroma server — VectorRAG instantiates, reports
healthy=True, and indexes successfully.
This change:
1. src/rag_singleton.py — replace the hardcoded `return None` in
get_rag_manager() with the original lazy init body. Keeps the
30s retry-throttle so a missing chroma server doesn't busy-retry
on every request.
2. app.py — replace the parallel `rag_manager = None` /
`rag_available = False` hardcoding with a get_rag_manager() call.
Logs the resolved state at startup. If chroma isn't reachable yet,
rag_manager stays None and personal-doc routes still return 503,
but the *next* request will hit the retry-throttle path in
get_rag_manager() and try to init again.
Doesn't touch requirements.txt. Repos using docker-compose get chroma
automatically; manual installs that want Personal Docs to work still
need to either pip install chromadb (full package) and run `chroma run`
or point at an external chroma instance via env. That can be a
follow-up README / requirements-optional note.
Kfir Sadeh