4 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Kenny Van de Maele	620fdd0859	feat(agent): confine agent file/shell tools to a selectable workspace (#3665) ... * feat(agent): workspace confinement via context-local binding + get_workspace tool Bind the per-turn workspace once in execute_tool_block; the shared path resolvers (_resolve_tool_path / _resolve_search_root) and the subprocess cwd helper (agent_cwd) read it, so file tools + bash/python are confined centrally and a new tool that uses the shared helpers cannot accidentally bypass it. Adds the admin-gated /api/workspace/browse picker, a workspace pill + directory modal (reusing existing modal/button CSS), the /workspace slash command, and a get_workspace tool (replaces a system-prompt block). Confinement is OS-agnostic (realpath/normcase/commonpath) and docker-safe (container paths, no host assumptions). Reopens #2023. * ux(workspace): clarify workspace is not a sandbox Picker modal note + pill tooltip + get_workspace tool/output wording now state plainly: read_file/write_file/edit_file/grep/glob/ls are confined to the folder, but bash/python only start there (cwd) and are not sandboxed. Modal note reuses the existing .muted class. * fix(agent): treat an active workspace as file-work intent A vague low-signal message (e.g. "look at the local project") matches no domain keywords, so tool retrieval is skipped and only always-available tools are offered — leaving the agent with no file access even though a workspace is set. When a workspace is active, include the file/code tools (incl. get_workspace) on low-signal turns so the agent can act on the folder. Also requires the tool index (ChromaDB) to be reachable for normal retrieval; that is an environment dependency, not part of this change. * ux(workspace): hide pill + overflow entry in chat mode Workspace only scopes the agent's file/shell tools, so the pill and the overflow 'Workspace' entry are agent-only now — hidden in chat mode like the bash toggle. Mode read from the DOM in syncWorkspaceIndicator; applyMode() is called from the agent/chat setMode handler. * prompt(tools): steer bash/python to defer to the dedicated file tools bash/python schema descriptions (what native-tool-calling models read) were bare and gave no steer, so models would do file ops via the shell (e.g. writing SVG/HTML, which then dumps raw markup into the tool preview). Tell bash/python in the schema + tool-index + prompt section to prefer read_file/write_file/ edit_file/grep/glob/ls and only be used for what those do not cover. * prompt(tools): keep bash/python deferral generic (no hardcoded tool names) Reference 'a dedicated tool' rather than listing read_file/write_file/grep/etc. by name, so the guidance does not go stale if those tools are renamed. * style(workspace): drop em-dashes from added code comments/strings * ux(workspace): terser non-sandbox note in picker (no tool-name list) * ux(workspace): mirror terse non-sandbox wording in pill tooltip * chore: untrack local venv symlink (run-only, not part of the feature) * prompt(workspace): keep get_workspace text generic (no hardcoded tool names) * fix(agent): low-signal + workspace surfaces only read-only file tools Intersect the files tool group with PLAN_MODE_READONLY_TOOLS so a vague message in a workspace exposes read_file/grep/glob/ls/get_workspace for exploration, but not write_file/edit_file/bash/python -- those wait for a request that actually calls for them (RAG retrieval still adds them on a real ask). * feat(workspace): cap browse listing at 500 dirs with a truncated hint Mirror the filesystem_tools._CODENAV_MAX_HITS pattern with a module-local _MAX_BROWSE_DIRS so a directory with thousands of children does not dump every row into the picker; the response carries a truncated flag and the modal tells the user to type a path to jump in. * chore: untrack local venv symlink (run-only artifact) * fix(workspace): vet the workspace root against the sensitive-path deny list at bind time The in-workspace resolver deny-lists sensitive paths inside the workspace, but the empty-path search root is the workspace itself, so a workspace of ~/.ssh could be listed via ls with no path. vet_workspace() (public, in tool_execution next to the resolvers) rejects non-directories and sensitive roots before the path is ever bound; chat_routes uses it instead of its inline isdir check. * fix(workspace): reject filesystem roots and stop showing rejected workspaces as active Review findings from #3665: P2: vet_workspace accepted / (and would accept drive/UNC roots), which makes every absolute path 'inside' the workspace and collapses confinement into host-wide file access. A root is its own dirname, so reject when dirname(resolved) == resolved; the browse response now carries a selectable flag and the picker disables 'Use this folder' on unselectable dirs. P3: /workspace set stored any string client-side and the chat route silently dropped rejected values, so the pill could claim a confinement that was not in effect. New admin-gated /api/workspace/vet validates manual paths before they persist (canonical path returned), and when a posted workspace is rejected at send time the stream emits workspace_rejected so the client clears the stored value and toasts instead of continuing silently. * fix(workspace): check caller privilege before vetting the posted workspace Review finding: /api/chat_stream called vet_workspace() on the posted value for every caller and emitted workspace_rejected on failure, so a non-admin who can chat but cannot use file/shell tools could distinguish existing directories from missing/file/sensitive/root paths by whether the event appeared. The resolution now lives in _resolve_request_workspace, which drops the submitted value uniformly for non-admin callers, with no vetting and no event, before the path ever touches the filesystem. Admin and single-user behavior is unchanged. Test pins that valid and invalid paths are indistinguishable for a non-admin and that vet_workspace is never invoked for them.	2026-06-11 18:17:54 +02:00
Kenny Van de Maele	0aba00f4cf	refactor(tools): remove dead workspace-confinement plumbing (#3590) ... Commit e6b1009 removed the workspace feature's entry point (deleted routes/workspace_routes.py + static/js/workspace.js and dropped the workspace-param parsing in chat_routes), but left the downstream backend plumbing dangling: chat_routes passed a hardcoded workspace=None into stream_agent_loop, which forwarded it to execute_tool_block, so the workspace value was permanently None and every workspace-gated branch was unreachable. Remove the now-dead code (no behavior change, since workspace was always None): - src/tool_execution.py: drop _resolve_tool_path_in_workspace and the workspace params/branches on execute_tool_block, _direct_fallback, _call_mcp_tool, _do_edit_file, and _resolve_search_root; restore the bash/python/bg cwd to _AGENT_WORKDIR. - src/agent_loop.py: drop the workspace param on stream_agent_loop, the dead 'ACTIVE WORKSPACE' system-prompt block, and the workspace forward. - routes/chat_routes.py: drop the hardcoded workspace=None arg and var. - tests: delete test_workspace_confine.py (tested the removed feature) and the workspace assertion in test_tool_policy.py. Full suite: 2903 passed, 1 skipped.	2026-06-09 08:30:50 +02:00
pewdiepie-archdaemon	1a529d63d9	Fix remaining CI regressions	2026-06-09 10:21:56 +09:00
Kenny Van de Maele	2be3779e6e	feat: Add workspace: confine agent tools to a folder (#1103) ... * feat: Add workspace: confine agent tools to a folder Pick a server folder as the agent's workspace so its file/shell tools work there and don't touch files outside it. File tools are hard-confined; bash/ python run with cwd set to the folder. Includes a slash command: `/workspace` (alias `/ws`) — show / `set <path>` / `clear` / `pick` (open the directory browser). - routes/workspace_routes.py: GET /api/workspace/browse (admin-only). - src/tool_execution.py: hard path confinement for read_file/write_file; bash/python cwd. Threaded route → stream_agent_loop → execute_tool_block. - src/agent_loop.py: workspace note prepended to the system prompt. - static/: overflow menu item, input-bar pill, directory-browser modal, and the /workspace slash command. - tests/test_workspace_confine.py. * Wire workspace confinement into tools that landed after this PR edit_file (#1239) and grep/glob/ls (#1670) merged after workspace-confine was written, so they bypassed the workspace boundary. Thread the workspace through: - edit_file: _do_edit_file resolves via _resolve_tool_path_in_workspace - grep/glob/ls: _resolve_search_root confines to the workspace (root + paths) - bash/python/bg cwd: workspace or _AGENT_WORKDIR (keep the #2586 data-dir default when no workspace is set) Tests cover edit_file + grep/ls confinement (inside ok, outside rejected). * Workspace picker: editable path bar + modal style cohesion + cross-platform hardening - Make the current-folder strip an editable address bar: type/paste a full path and press Enter to navigate (also reaches other Windows drives and hidden dirs the up-only browser cannot). - Reuse shared modal CSS: drop bespoke .workspace-modal-content/.workspace-btn* in favour of base .modal-content/.modal-body and the .confirm-btn button family; separators/hover use var(--border). Net -31 CSS lines. - Fix the path field overflowing the modal right edge (flex stretch + margin vs an overflow:auto scrollbar-feedback loop): full-bleed, no h-margin. - Cross-platform confinement: normcase the workspace commonpath check so containment holds on case-insensitive filesystems (Windows/macOS). - Make tests OS-portable: sibling temp dirs instead of /etc, python os.getcwd() instead of pwd. 5 pass.	2026-06-05 00:06:37 +02:00