1 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
dependabot[bot] 6b8c3ae6b0 chore(deps): bump the python group across 1 directory with 4 updates
Updates the requirements on [httpcore](https://github.com/encode/httpcore), [pydantic-settings](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-settings), [mcp](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk) and [markitdown](https://github.com/microsoft/markitdown) to permit the latest version.

Updates `httpcore` to 1.0.9
- [Release notes](https://github.com/encode/httpcore/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/encode/httpcore/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/encode/httpcore/compare/1.0.0...1.0.9)

Updates `pydantic-settings` to 2.14.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-settings/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-settings/compare/v2.14.1...v2.14.2)

Updates `mcp` to 2.0.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/blob/main/RELEASE.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/compare/v0.2.0...v2.0.0)

Updates `markitdown` from 0.1.6 to 0.1.7
- [Release notes](https://github.com/microsoft/markitdown/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/microsoft/markitdown/compare/v0.1.6...v0.1.7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: httpcore
  dependency-version: 1.0.9
  dependency-type: direct:production
  dependency-group: python
- dependency-name: pydantic-settings
  dependency-version: 2.14.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  dependency-group: python
- dependency-name: mcp
  dependency-version: 2.0.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  dependency-group: python
- dependency-name: markitdown
  dependency-version: 0.1.7
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: python
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2026-07-30 17:36:13 +00:00
26 changed files with 2695 additions and 3260 deletions
+3 -3
View File
@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ app.include_router(setup_stt_routes(stt_service))
logger.info("STT service initialized (provider managed via settings)")
# Documents (artifacts/canvas)
from routes.document.document_routes import setup_document_routes
from routes.document_routes import setup_document_routes
document_router = setup_document_routes(session_manager, upload_handler)
app.include_router(document_router)
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ set_ai_rag_manager(rag_manager, personal_docs_mgr)
logger.info("AI interaction tools initialized (session, memory, RAG, UI control)")
# Webhooks
from routes.webhook.webhook_routes import setup_webhook_routes
from routes.webhook_routes import setup_webhook_routes
app.include_router(setup_webhook_routes(webhook_manager, auth_manager, session_manager, api_key_manager))
# API Tokens
@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ app.include_router(setup_codex_routes(
))
app.include_router(setup_claude_routes())
from routes.vault.vault_routes import setup_vault_routes
from routes.vault_routes import setup_vault_routes
app.include_router(setup_vault_routes())
# Contacts (CardDAV)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -33,4 +33,4 @@ PyMuPDF
# magika (onnxruntime), already a core dep via fastembed. We avoid the
# [all]/Azure/audio extras (cloud + heavy). Pinned to a release >30 days old per
# the dependency-age discussion in issue #485.
markitdown[docx,pptx,xlsx,xls]==0.1.6
markitdown[docx,pptx,xlsx,xls]==0.1.7
+3 -3
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ uvicorn
python-multipart
python-dotenv
httpx
httpcore>=1.0,<2.0
httpcore>=1.0.9,<2.0
pydantic>=2.13.4
pydantic-settings>=2.14.1
pydantic-settings>=2.14.2
SQLAlchemy
pypdf
beautifulsoup4
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ bcrypt
# Built-in servers use the v1 low-level Server decorator API. MCP SDK v2 is a
# breaking rewrite, so keep fresh installs on the maintained v1 line until the
# servers are migrated together.
mcp<2
mcp<3
pyotp
qrcode[pil]
croniter
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
"""Document route domain package (slice 2m, #4082/#4071).
Contains document_routes.py and document_helpers.py, migrated from the flat
routes/ directory. Backward-compat shims at routes/document_routes.py and
routes/document_helpers.py re-export from here.
"""
-243
View File
@@ -1,243 +0,0 @@
"""document_helpers.py — Pydantic models, doc serializers, owner gating, file-locator helpers shared with document_routes.py."""
"""Document routes — CRUD for living documents with version history."""
import logging
import os
import re
from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel
from core.database import Document, DocumentVersion
from core.database import Session as DbSession
from src.auth_helpers import _auth_disabled
from src.upload_handler import UploadHandler
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# ---- Request schemas ----
class DocumentCreate(BaseModel):
session_id: Optional[str] = None
title: str = "Untitled"
language: Optional[str] = None
content: str = ""
class DocumentUpdate(BaseModel):
content: str
summary: Optional[str] = None
force_version: bool = False
class DocumentPatch(BaseModel):
title: Optional[str] = None
language: Optional[str] = None
session_id: Optional[str] = None # link/unlink document to a session
# ---- Helpers ----
def _doc_to_dict(doc: Document) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": doc.id,
"session_id": doc.session_id,
"title": doc.title,
"language": doc.language,
"current_content": doc.current_content,
"version_count": doc.version_count,
"is_active": doc.is_active,
"archived": bool(getattr(doc, "archived", False)),
"created_at": (doc.created_at.isoformat() + "Z") if doc.created_at else None,
"updated_at": (doc.updated_at.isoformat() + "Z") if doc.updated_at else None,
# Source-email provenance (set when doc was created from an email
# attachment) — drives the "Send signed reply" menu item.
"source_email_uid": getattr(doc, "source_email_uid", None),
"source_email_folder": getattr(doc, "source_email_folder", None),
"source_email_account_id": getattr(doc, "source_email_account_id", None),
"source_email_message_id": getattr(doc, "source_email_message_id", None),
}
def _version_to_dict(v: DocumentVersion) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": v.id,
"document_id": v.document_id,
"version_number": v.version_number,
"content": v.content,
"summary": v.summary,
"source": v.source,
"created_at": v.created_at.isoformat() if v.created_at else None,
}
def _verify_doc_owner(db, doc: Document, user: str):
"""Verify `user` owns this document. Raise 404 if not.
Documents now carry their own `owner` column, so a doc whose session
was deleted (session_id → NULL) can still prove ownership and stay
openable / cloneable. We trust that column first and only fall back to
the session join for any not-yet-backfilled legacy row.
"""
if user is None:
if _auth_disabled():
return # Single-user / no-auth mode: allow access
raise HTTPException(403, "Authentication required")
if doc.owner is not None:
if doc.owner != user:
raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
return
# Legacy fallback: derive ownership from the linked session.
if not doc.session_id:
raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
session = db.query(DbSession).filter(DbSession.id == doc.session_id).first()
if not session or session.owner != user:
raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
def _owner_session_filter(q, user):
"""Restrict a documents query to those owned by `user`.
Documents now carry their own `owner` column (backfilled at boot from
the linked session, or assigned to the admin user for legacy/orphaned
docs). We filter on that directly rather than on a session join, so a
document whose session was deleted (session_id → NULL) still shows up
for its owner instead of silently vanishing from the Library + search.
The owner backfill runs in init_db before the app serves requests, so
by the time this filter is live there are no NULL-owner rows to leak;
we therefore match the owner strictly for authenticated callers."""
if not user:
if user == "" or _auth_disabled():
return q
return q.filter(False)
return q.filter(Document.owner == user)
def _slug(name: str) -> str:
"""Filesystem-friendly version of a document title.
Whitespace becomes underscores; other unsafe punctuation is dropped.
Preserves letters, digits, dot, hyphen, underscore. Idempotent.
"""
import re as _re
s = (name or "").strip()
# Drop the trailing extension if the title happens to include one
s = _re.sub(r'\.pdf$', '', s, flags=_re.IGNORECASE)
s = _re.sub(r'\s+', '_', s)
s = _re.sub(r'[^A-Za-z0-9._-]', '', s)
s = _re.sub(r'_+', '_', s).strip('_')
return s or "form"
# DPI scale for the interactive PDF view. ~150 DPI (2x of 72 PDF user-units).
_PDF_RENDER_SCALE = 2.0
def _upload_path_inside(upload_dir: str, path: str) -> bool:
base = os.path.realpath(upload_dir)
p = os.path.realpath(path)
try:
return os.path.commonpath([base, p]) == base
except Exception:
return False
def _resolve_user_upload_path(
upload_handler: Any,
upload_id: str,
owner: Optional[str],
auth_manager=None,
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Resolve an upload id to a filesystem path the caller may read."""
if upload_handler is None:
return None
resolved = upload_handler.resolve_upload(
upload_id,
owner=owner,
auth_manager=auth_manager,
)
if not isinstance(resolved, dict) or not resolved:
return None
path = resolved.get("path")
upload_dir = getattr(upload_handler, "upload_dir", None)
if path and upload_dir and not _upload_path_inside(upload_dir, path):
logger.warning("Upload path outside upload directory: %s", path)
return None
return path
def _locate_upload(
upload_dir: str,
file_id: str,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
auth_manager=None,
upload_handler: Any = None,
):
"""Find an upload by its filename ID via UploadHandler.resolve_upload."""
if upload_handler is None:
from src.upload_handler import UploadHandler
base_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(upload_dir))
upload_handler = UploadHandler(base_dir, upload_dir)
return _resolve_user_upload_path(upload_handler, file_id, owner, auth_manager)
def _assert_pdf_marker_upload_owned(
request: Request,
content: str,
user: Optional[str],
upload_handler: Any,
) -> None:
"""Reject document content whose pdf_source marker points at another user's upload."""
if upload_handler is None:
return
from src.pdf_form_doc import find_source_upload_id
upload_id = find_source_upload_id(content or "")
if not upload_id:
return
auth_manager = getattr(getattr(request.app, "state", None), "auth_manager", None)
if not _resolve_user_upload_path(upload_handler, upload_id, user, auth_manager):
raise HTTPException(
400,
"Document PDF marker references an upload you do not own",
)
def _derive_title(content: str) -> str:
"""Derive a title from document content."""
import re
if not isinstance(content, str):
return "Untitled"
text = content.strip()
if not text:
return "Untitled"
# Markdown header
md = re.match(r'^#{1,3}\s+(.+)', text, re.MULTILINE)
if md:
title = md.group(1).strip()
if len(title) > 50:
title = title[:48] + ""
return title
# HTML heading
html = re.search(r'<h[1-3][^>]*>([^<]+)</h[1-3]>', text, re.IGNORECASE)
if html:
title = html.group(1).strip()
if len(title) > 50:
title = title[:48] + ""
return title
# First non-empty line (if short enough)
for line in text.split('\n'):
line = line.strip()
if line and 2 <= len(line) <= 60:
title = re.sub(r'[:#*`]+$', '', line).strip()
if title and len(title) > 50:
title = title[:48] + ""
return title or "Untitled"
return "Untitled"
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+239 -10
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,243 @@
"""Backward-compat shim — canonical location is routes/document/document_helpers.py.
"""document_helpers.py — Pydantic models, doc serializers, owner gating, file-locator helpers shared with document_routes.py."""
This module is replaced in ``sys.modules`` by the canonical module object so
that ``import routes.document_helpers``, ``from routes.document_helpers import
X``, and the ``sys.modules.pop("routes.document_helpers")`` + re-import
pattern used by test_security_regressions.py all operate on the *same* object.
Keeps existing import paths working after slice 2m (#4082/#4071).
"""
"""Document routes — CRUD for living documents with version history."""
import sys as _sys
import logging
import os
import re
from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
from routes.document import document_helpers as _canonical # noqa: F401
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel
_sys.modules[__name__] = _canonical
from core.database import Document, DocumentVersion
from core.database import Session as DbSession
from src.auth_helpers import _auth_disabled
from src.upload_handler import UploadHandler
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# ---- Request schemas ----
class DocumentCreate(BaseModel):
session_id: Optional[str] = None
title: str = "Untitled"
language: Optional[str] = None
content: str = ""
class DocumentUpdate(BaseModel):
content: str
summary: Optional[str] = None
force_version: bool = False
class DocumentPatch(BaseModel):
title: Optional[str] = None
language: Optional[str] = None
session_id: Optional[str] = None # link/unlink document to a session
# ---- Helpers ----
def _doc_to_dict(doc: Document) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": doc.id,
"session_id": doc.session_id,
"title": doc.title,
"language": doc.language,
"current_content": doc.current_content,
"version_count": doc.version_count,
"is_active": doc.is_active,
"archived": bool(getattr(doc, "archived", False)),
"created_at": (doc.created_at.isoformat() + "Z") if doc.created_at else None,
"updated_at": (doc.updated_at.isoformat() + "Z") if doc.updated_at else None,
# Source-email provenance (set when doc was created from an email
# attachment) — drives the "Send signed reply" menu item.
"source_email_uid": getattr(doc, "source_email_uid", None),
"source_email_folder": getattr(doc, "source_email_folder", None),
"source_email_account_id": getattr(doc, "source_email_account_id", None),
"source_email_message_id": getattr(doc, "source_email_message_id", None),
}
def _version_to_dict(v: DocumentVersion) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": v.id,
"document_id": v.document_id,
"version_number": v.version_number,
"content": v.content,
"summary": v.summary,
"source": v.source,
"created_at": v.created_at.isoformat() if v.created_at else None,
}
def _verify_doc_owner(db, doc: Document, user: str):
"""Verify `user` owns this document. Raise 404 if not.
Documents now carry their own `owner` column, so a doc whose session
was deleted (session_id → NULL) can still prove ownership and stay
openable / cloneable. We trust that column first and only fall back to
the session join for any not-yet-backfilled legacy row.
"""
if user is None:
if _auth_disabled():
return # Single-user / no-auth mode: allow access
raise HTTPException(403, "Authentication required")
if doc.owner is not None:
if doc.owner != user:
raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
return
# Legacy fallback: derive ownership from the linked session.
if not doc.session_id:
raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
session = db.query(DbSession).filter(DbSession.id == doc.session_id).first()
if not session or session.owner != user:
raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
def _owner_session_filter(q, user):
"""Restrict a documents query to those owned by `user`.
Documents now carry their own `owner` column (backfilled at boot from
the linked session, or assigned to the admin user for legacy/orphaned
docs). We filter on that directly rather than on a session join, so a
document whose session was deleted (session_id → NULL) still shows up
for its owner instead of silently vanishing from the Library + search.
The owner backfill runs in init_db before the app serves requests, so
by the time this filter is live there are no NULL-owner rows to leak;
we therefore match the owner strictly for authenticated callers."""
if not user:
if user == "" or _auth_disabled():
return q
return q.filter(False)
return q.filter(Document.owner == user)
def _slug(name: str) -> str:
"""Filesystem-friendly version of a document title.
Whitespace becomes underscores; other unsafe punctuation is dropped.
Preserves letters, digits, dot, hyphen, underscore. Idempotent.
"""
import re as _re
s = (name or "").strip()
# Drop the trailing extension if the title happens to include one
s = _re.sub(r'\.pdf$', '', s, flags=_re.IGNORECASE)
s = _re.sub(r'\s+', '_', s)
s = _re.sub(r'[^A-Za-z0-9._-]', '', s)
s = _re.sub(r'_+', '_', s).strip('_')
return s or "form"
# DPI scale for the interactive PDF view. ~150 DPI (2x of 72 PDF user-units).
_PDF_RENDER_SCALE = 2.0
def _upload_path_inside(upload_dir: str, path: str) -> bool:
base = os.path.realpath(upload_dir)
p = os.path.realpath(path)
try:
return os.path.commonpath([base, p]) == base
except Exception:
return False
def _resolve_user_upload_path(
upload_handler: Any,
upload_id: str,
owner: Optional[str],
auth_manager=None,
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Resolve an upload id to a filesystem path the caller may read."""
if upload_handler is None:
return None
resolved = upload_handler.resolve_upload(
upload_id,
owner=owner,
auth_manager=auth_manager,
)
if not isinstance(resolved, dict) or not resolved:
return None
path = resolved.get("path")
upload_dir = getattr(upload_handler, "upload_dir", None)
if path and upload_dir and not _upload_path_inside(upload_dir, path):
logger.warning("Upload path outside upload directory: %s", path)
return None
return path
def _locate_upload(
upload_dir: str,
file_id: str,
owner: Optional[str] = None,
auth_manager=None,
upload_handler: Any = None,
):
"""Find an upload by its filename ID via UploadHandler.resolve_upload."""
if upload_handler is None:
from src.upload_handler import UploadHandler
base_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(upload_dir))
upload_handler = UploadHandler(base_dir, upload_dir)
return _resolve_user_upload_path(upload_handler, file_id, owner, auth_manager)
def _assert_pdf_marker_upload_owned(
request: Request,
content: str,
user: Optional[str],
upload_handler: Any,
) -> None:
"""Reject document content whose pdf_source marker points at another user's upload."""
if upload_handler is None:
return
from src.pdf_form_doc import find_source_upload_id
upload_id = find_source_upload_id(content or "")
if not upload_id:
return
auth_manager = getattr(getattr(request.app, "state", None), "auth_manager", None)
if not _resolve_user_upload_path(upload_handler, upload_id, user, auth_manager):
raise HTTPException(
400,
"Document PDF marker references an upload you do not own",
)
def _derive_title(content: str) -> str:
"""Derive a title from document content."""
import re
if not isinstance(content, str):
return "Untitled"
text = content.strip()
if not text:
return "Untitled"
# Markdown header
md = re.match(r'^#{1,3}\s+(.+)', text, re.MULTILINE)
if md:
title = md.group(1).strip()
if len(title) > 50:
title = title[:48] + ""
return title
# HTML heading
html = re.search(r'<h[1-3][^>]*>([^<]+)</h[1-3]>', text, re.IGNORECASE)
if html:
title = html.group(1).strip()
if len(title) > 50:
title = title[:48] + ""
return title
# First non-empty line (if short enough)
for line in text.split('\n'):
line = line.strip()
if line and 2 <= len(line) <= 60:
title = re.sub(r'[:#*`]+$', '', line).strip()
if title and len(title) > 50:
title = title[:48] + ""
return title or "Untitled"
return "Untitled"
+1806 -13
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-5
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@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
"""Vault route domain package (slice 2k, #4082/#4071).
Contains vault_routes.py, migrated from the flat routes/ directory.
Backward-compat shim at routes/vault_routes.py re-exports from here.
"""
-242
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@@ -1,242 +0,0 @@
"""
vault_routes.py
Vaultwarden / Bitwarden CLI integration — config and unlock endpoints.
Stores the BW_SESSION key in data/vault.json with restrictive permissions.
"""
import json
import logging
import os
import shutil
import asyncio
from pathlib import Path
from datetime import datetime
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel
from core.middleware import require_admin
from core.platform_compat import IS_WINDOWS, safe_chmod, which_tool
from src.constants import VAULT_FILE as _VAULT_FILE
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
VAULT_FILE = Path(_VAULT_FILE)
def _find_bw() -> str:
"""Locate the bw binary, checking PATH and common npm-global locations.
On Windows the Bitwarden CLI shim is `bw.cmd`/`bw.exe`, resolved by
which_tool via PATHEXT.
"""
p = which_tool("bw")
if p:
return p
if IS_WINDOWS:
appdata = os.environ.get("APPDATA", os.path.expanduser("~"))
for candidate in (
os.path.join(appdata, "npm", "bw.cmd"),
os.path.join(appdata, "npm", "bw.exe"),
):
if os.path.isfile(candidate):
return candidate
return "bw"
home = os.path.expanduser("~")
for candidate in (
f"{home}/.npm-global/bin/bw",
f"{home}/.nvm/versions/node/*/bin/bw",
"/usr/local/bin/bw",
"/opt/homebrew/bin/bw",
):
if "*" in candidate:
import glob
for m in glob.glob(candidate):
if os.path.isfile(m) and os.access(m, os.X_OK):
return m
elif os.path.isfile(candidate) and os.access(candidate, os.X_OK):
return candidate
return "bw" # fall back to PATH lookup (will FileNotFoundError, handled below)
def _load_config() -> dict:
if VAULT_FILE.exists():
try:
data = json.loads(VAULT_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
except Exception:
pass
return {}
def _save_config(cfg: dict):
VAULT_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
VAULT_FILE.write_text(json.dumps(cfg, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
# POSIX: restrict the BW_SESSION store to 0o600. Windows: no-op (profile dir
# is ACL-restricted already).
safe_chmod(str(VAULT_FILE), 0o600)
async def _run_bw(args: list, session: str = None, input_text: str = None,
bw_password: str = None) -> tuple:
env = {}
env.update(os.environ)
if session:
env["BW_SESSION"] = session
# Secrets must never be passed as argv — process arguments are world-readable
# via `ps` / `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` to any local user. Keep --passwordenv
# support for bw commands that need it; unlock/login callers should prefer
# stdin so the master password is not left in the child environment either.
if bw_password is not None:
env["BW_PASSWORD"] = bw_password
bw_path = _find_bw()
try:
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
bw_path, *args,
stdin=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE if input_text else None,
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
env=env,
)
except FileNotFoundError:
return "", "bw CLI not installed (install `nodejs-bitwarden-cli` or `bitwarden-cli`)", 127
except Exception as e:
return "", f"Failed to launch bw: {e}", 1
try:
stdout, stderr = await proc.communicate(input=input_text.encode() if input_text else None)
except Exception as e:
return "", f"bw subprocess error: {e}", 1
return stdout.decode(errors="replace").strip(), stderr.decode(errors="replace").strip(), proc.returncode
class VaultConfig(BaseModel):
server_url: str = ""
email: str = ""
class VaultUnlockRequest(BaseModel):
master_password: str
class VaultLoginRequest(BaseModel):
email: str
master_password: str
def setup_vault_routes():
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/vault", tags=["vault"])
@router.get("/config")
async def get_config(request: Request):
"""Return vault config (no sensitive fields)."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
return {
"server_url": cfg.get("server_url", ""),
"email": cfg.get("email", ""),
"unlocked": bool(cfg.get("session")),
"unlocked_at": cfg.get("unlocked_at", ""),
"bw_installed": await _check_bw_installed(),
}
@router.post("/config")
async def save_config(req: VaultConfig, request: Request):
"""Save vault URL + email. Runs 'bw config server' to point at Vaultwarden."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
cfg["server_url"] = req.server_url.strip().rstrip("/")
cfg["email"] = req.email.strip()
if cfg["server_url"]:
_, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(["config", "server", cfg["server_url"]])
if rc != 0:
return {"ok": False, "error": f"bw config failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True}
@router.post("/login")
async def login(req: VaultLoginRequest, request: Request):
"""Log in to Vaultwarden (required once per account)."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
# Update email
cfg["email"] = req.email
_save_config(cfg)
stdout, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(
["login", req.email, "--raw"],
input_text=req.master_password + "\n",
)
if rc != 0:
# Already logged in is OK
if "already logged in" in stderr.lower():
return {"ok": True, "already": True}
return {"ok": False, "error": f"Login failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
# bw login --raw prints session key on success (when 2FA disabled)
if stdout:
cfg["session"] = stdout
cfg["unlocked_at"] = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True}
@router.post("/unlock")
async def unlock(req: VaultUnlockRequest, request: Request):
"""Unlock the vault and save the session key."""
require_admin(request)
# Pass the master password on stdin, not argv. argv is visible through
# `ps` / /proc/<pid>/cmdline; stdin also avoids leaving the secret in
# the child process environment.
stdout, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(
["unlock", "--raw"],
input_text=req.master_password + "\n",
)
if rc != 0:
return {"ok": False, "error": f"Unlock failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
session = stdout.strip()
if not session:
return {"ok": False, "error": "bw returned empty session"}
cfg = _load_config()
cfg["session"] = session
cfg["unlocked_at"] = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True, "message": "Vault unlocked"}
@router.post("/lock")
async def lock(request: Request):
"""Lock the vault (clear session from config)."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
cfg.pop("session", None)
cfg.pop("unlocked_at", None)
_save_config(cfg)
# Also tell bw to lock
await _run_bw(["lock"])
return {"ok": True, "message": "Vault locked"}
@router.post("/logout")
async def logout(request: Request):
"""Log out of the Bitwarden CLI completely."""
require_admin(request)
await _run_bw(["logout"])
cfg = _load_config()
cfg.pop("session", None)
cfg.pop("email", None)
cfg.pop("unlocked_at", None)
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True}
return router
async def _check_bw_installed() -> bool:
try:
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
_find_bw(), "--version",
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
)
await proc.communicate()
return proc.returncode == 0
except Exception:
return False
+237 -9
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,242 @@
"""Backward-compat shim — canonical location is routes/vault/vault_routes.py.
"""
vault_routes.py
This module is replaced in ``sys.modules`` by the canonical module object so
that ``import routes.vault_routes``, ``from routes.vault_routes import X``,
and the ``import ... as vr`` + ``monkeypatch.setattr(vr, ...)`` pattern used
by test_vault_password_not_in_argv.py all operate on the *same* object.
Keeps existing import paths working after slice 2k (#4082/#4071).
Vaultwarden / Bitwarden CLI integration — config and unlock endpoints.
Stores the BW_SESSION key in data/vault.json with restrictive permissions.
"""
import sys as _sys
import json
import logging
import os
import shutil
import asyncio
from pathlib import Path
from datetime import datetime
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel
from routes.vault import vault_routes as _canonical # noqa: F401
from core.middleware import require_admin
from core.platform_compat import IS_WINDOWS, safe_chmod, which_tool
from src.constants import VAULT_FILE as _VAULT_FILE
_sys.modules[__name__] = _canonical
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
VAULT_FILE = Path(_VAULT_FILE)
def _find_bw() -> str:
"""Locate the bw binary, checking PATH and common npm-global locations.
On Windows the Bitwarden CLI shim is `bw.cmd`/`bw.exe`, resolved by
which_tool via PATHEXT.
"""
p = which_tool("bw")
if p:
return p
if IS_WINDOWS:
appdata = os.environ.get("APPDATA", os.path.expanduser("~"))
for candidate in (
os.path.join(appdata, "npm", "bw.cmd"),
os.path.join(appdata, "npm", "bw.exe"),
):
if os.path.isfile(candidate):
return candidate
return "bw"
home = os.path.expanduser("~")
for candidate in (
f"{home}/.npm-global/bin/bw",
f"{home}/.nvm/versions/node/*/bin/bw",
"/usr/local/bin/bw",
"/opt/homebrew/bin/bw",
):
if "*" in candidate:
import glob
for m in glob.glob(candidate):
if os.path.isfile(m) and os.access(m, os.X_OK):
return m
elif os.path.isfile(candidate) and os.access(candidate, os.X_OK):
return candidate
return "bw" # fall back to PATH lookup (will FileNotFoundError, handled below)
def _load_config() -> dict:
if VAULT_FILE.exists():
try:
data = json.loads(VAULT_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
except Exception:
pass
return {}
def _save_config(cfg: dict):
VAULT_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
VAULT_FILE.write_text(json.dumps(cfg, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
# POSIX: restrict the BW_SESSION store to 0o600. Windows: no-op (profile dir
# is ACL-restricted already).
safe_chmod(str(VAULT_FILE), 0o600)
async def _run_bw(args: list, session: str = None, input_text: str = None,
bw_password: str = None) -> tuple:
env = {}
env.update(os.environ)
if session:
env["BW_SESSION"] = session
# Secrets must never be passed as argv — process arguments are world-readable
# via `ps` / `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` to any local user. Keep --passwordenv
# support for bw commands that need it; unlock/login callers should prefer
# stdin so the master password is not left in the child environment either.
if bw_password is not None:
env["BW_PASSWORD"] = bw_password
bw_path = _find_bw()
try:
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
bw_path, *args,
stdin=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE if input_text else None,
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
env=env,
)
except FileNotFoundError:
return "", "bw CLI not installed (install `nodejs-bitwarden-cli` or `bitwarden-cli`)", 127
except Exception as e:
return "", f"Failed to launch bw: {e}", 1
try:
stdout, stderr = await proc.communicate(input=input_text.encode() if input_text else None)
except Exception as e:
return "", f"bw subprocess error: {e}", 1
return stdout.decode(errors="replace").strip(), stderr.decode(errors="replace").strip(), proc.returncode
class VaultConfig(BaseModel):
server_url: str = ""
email: str = ""
class VaultUnlockRequest(BaseModel):
master_password: str
class VaultLoginRequest(BaseModel):
email: str
master_password: str
def setup_vault_routes():
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/vault", tags=["vault"])
@router.get("/config")
async def get_config(request: Request):
"""Return vault config (no sensitive fields)."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
return {
"server_url": cfg.get("server_url", ""),
"email": cfg.get("email", ""),
"unlocked": bool(cfg.get("session")),
"unlocked_at": cfg.get("unlocked_at", ""),
"bw_installed": await _check_bw_installed(),
}
@router.post("/config")
async def save_config(req: VaultConfig, request: Request):
"""Save vault URL + email. Runs 'bw config server' to point at Vaultwarden."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
cfg["server_url"] = req.server_url.strip().rstrip("/")
cfg["email"] = req.email.strip()
if cfg["server_url"]:
_, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(["config", "server", cfg["server_url"]])
if rc != 0:
return {"ok": False, "error": f"bw config failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True}
@router.post("/login")
async def login(req: VaultLoginRequest, request: Request):
"""Log in to Vaultwarden (required once per account)."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
# Update email
cfg["email"] = req.email
_save_config(cfg)
stdout, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(
["login", req.email, "--raw"],
input_text=req.master_password + "\n",
)
if rc != 0:
# Already logged in is OK
if "already logged in" in stderr.lower():
return {"ok": True, "already": True}
return {"ok": False, "error": f"Login failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
# bw login --raw prints session key on success (when 2FA disabled)
if stdout:
cfg["session"] = stdout
cfg["unlocked_at"] = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True}
@router.post("/unlock")
async def unlock(req: VaultUnlockRequest, request: Request):
"""Unlock the vault and save the session key."""
require_admin(request)
# Pass the master password on stdin, not argv. argv is visible through
# `ps` / /proc/<pid>/cmdline; stdin also avoids leaving the secret in
# the child process environment.
stdout, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(
["unlock", "--raw"],
input_text=req.master_password + "\n",
)
if rc != 0:
return {"ok": False, "error": f"Unlock failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
session = stdout.strip()
if not session:
return {"ok": False, "error": "bw returned empty session"}
cfg = _load_config()
cfg["session"] = session
cfg["unlocked_at"] = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True, "message": "Vault unlocked"}
@router.post("/lock")
async def lock(request: Request):
"""Lock the vault (clear session from config)."""
require_admin(request)
cfg = _load_config()
cfg.pop("session", None)
cfg.pop("unlocked_at", None)
_save_config(cfg)
# Also tell bw to lock
await _run_bw(["lock"])
return {"ok": True, "message": "Vault locked"}
@router.post("/logout")
async def logout(request: Request):
"""Log out of the Bitwarden CLI completely."""
require_admin(request)
await _run_bw(["logout"])
cfg = _load_config()
cfg.pop("session", None)
cfg.pop("email", None)
cfg.pop("unlocked_at", None)
_save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True}
return router
async def _check_bw_installed() -> bool:
try:
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
_find_bw(), "--version",
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
)
await proc.communicate()
return proc.returncode == 0
except Exception:
return False
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
"""Webhook route domain package (slice 2l, #4082/#4071).
Contains webhook_routes.py, migrated from the flat routes/ directory.
Backward-compat shim at routes/webhook_routes.py re-exports from here.
"""
-395
View File
@@ -1,395 +0,0 @@
"""Webhook, API Token, and sync chat routes."""
import uuid
import logging
from typing import Optional
import httpx
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request, Form
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
from core.database import SessionLocal, Webhook, ModelEndpoint
from src.auth_helpers import owner_filter
from src.url_security import validate_public_http_url
from src.webhook_manager import WebhookManager, validate_webhook_url, validate_events
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api", tags=["webhooks"])
# Input limits
MAX_NAME_LEN = 100
MAX_URL_LEN = 2048
MAX_SECRET_LEN = 256
MAX_MESSAGE_LEN = 32_000
from core.middleware import require_admin as _require_admin
def _select_api_chat_fallback_endpoint(db, token_owner: Optional[str]):
"""First enabled ModelEndpoint visible to token_owner — their own rows plus
legacy null-owner ("shared") rows. Owner-scoped: an unscoped .first() would
let a chat-scoped token fall back onto another user's private endpoint and
silently spend that owner's API key/quota. Prefer owner rows before shared
rows. Fails closed to null-owner rows only when token_owner is absent.
Does not validate base_url — admin-configured local/LAN endpoints remain allowed.
"""
query = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True) # noqa: E712
if token_owner:
query = owner_filter(query, ModelEndpoint, token_owner)
return query.order_by(ModelEndpoint.owner.desc(), ModelEndpoint.created_at).first()
return query.filter(ModelEndpoint.owner == None).order_by(ModelEndpoint.created_at).first() # noqa: E711
def _caller_owns_session(sess_owner, caller) -> bool:
"""Strict session-ownership gate for the token-authenticated sync-chat
endpoint (`POST /api/v1/chat`).
Mirrors ``_verify_session_owner`` in session_routes.py and the null-owner
gates in notes/calendar/gallery: a caller may resume a session ONLY when
its owner matches them exactly. A null/empty session owner (legacy or
migrated rows) is deliberately NOT resumable by an arbitrary token — the
old ``sess_owner and sess_owner != caller`` form skipped the check whenever
``sess_owner`` was falsy, so any chat-scoped token (e.g. a paired mobile
device) could resume such a session, inject a message, and read back its
history and reuse the owner's endpoint credentials. Fail closed: an
unresolvable caller also returns False.
"""
if not caller:
return False
return sess_owner == caller
def setup_webhook_routes(
webhook_manager: WebhookManager,
auth_manager,
session_manager=None,
api_key_manager=None,
) -> APIRouter:
@router.get("/webhooks")
def list_webhooks(request: Request):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
hooks = db.query(Webhook).all()
return [
{
"id": w.id,
"name": w.name,
"url": w.url,
"has_secret": bool(w.secret),
"events": w.events.split(",") if w.events else [],
"is_active": w.is_active,
"last_triggered_at": w.last_triggered_at.isoformat() if w.last_triggered_at else None,
"last_status_code": w.last_status_code,
"last_error": w.last_error,
"created_at": w.created_at.isoformat() if w.created_at else None,
}
for w in hooks
]
finally:
db.close()
@router.post("/webhooks")
def create_webhook(
request: Request,
name: str = Form(""),
url: str = Form(""),
secret: str = Form(""),
events: str = Form(""),
):
_require_admin(request)
name = name.strip()[:MAX_NAME_LEN]
if not name:
raise HTTPException(400, "Webhook name is required")
try:
url = validate_webhook_url(url)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
try:
events = validate_events(events)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
secret_val = secret.strip()[:MAX_SECRET_LEN] or None
# Encrypt the secret at rest using the same Fernet key as API keys
encrypted_secret = None
if secret_val and api_key_manager:
encrypted_secret = api_key_manager.encrypt_api_key(secret_val)
elif secret_val:
encrypted_secret = secret_val # Fallback if no encryption available
webhook_id = str(uuid.uuid4())[:8]
db = SessionLocal()
try:
db.add(Webhook(
id=webhook_id,
name=name,
url=url,
secret=encrypted_secret,
events=events,
is_active=True,
))
db.commit()
finally:
db.close()
return {"id": webhook_id, "name": name}
@router.post("/webhooks/{webhook_id}/test")
async def test_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
wh = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).first()
if not wh:
raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
url, secret = wh.url, wh.secret
finally:
db.close()
await webhook_manager.deliver_test(webhook_id, url, secret)
return {"status": "sent"}
@router.patch("/webhooks/{webhook_id}")
def toggle_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
wh = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).first()
if not wh:
raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
wh.is_active = not wh.is_active
db.commit()
return {"id": webhook_id, "is_active": wh.is_active}
finally:
db.close()
@router.delete("/webhooks/{webhook_id}")
def delete_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
deleted = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).delete()
db.commit()
if not deleted:
raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
finally:
db.close()
return {"status": "deleted"}
# ================================================================
# Sync Chat Endpoint (for n8n / Make / Activepieces)
# ================================================================
# Known provider base URLs — auto-resolved from api_key prefix or model name
KNOWN_PROVIDERS = {
"deepseek": "https://api.deepseek.com/v1",
"openai": "https://api.openai.com/v1",
"mistral": "https://api.mistral.ai/v1",
"groq": "https://api.groq.com/openai/v1",
"together": "https://api.together.xyz/v1",
"openrouter": "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1",
"ollama": "https://ollama.com/api",
"opencode-zen": "https://opencode.ai/zen/v1",
"opencode-go": "https://opencode.ai/zen/go/v1",
"fireworks": "https://api.fireworks.ai/inference/v1",
"venice": "https://api.venice.ai/api/v1",
"kimi-code": "https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1",
"kimicode": "https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1",
}
# Model prefix → provider mapping for auto-detection
MODEL_PROVIDER_MAP = {
"deepseek": "deepseek",
"gpt-": "openai",
"o1": "openai",
"o3": "openai",
"o4": "openai",
"mistral": "mistral",
"llama": "groq",
"mixtral": "groq",
"kimi-for-coding": "kimi-code",
"kimi": "kimi-code",
}
def _resolve_base_url(model: Optional[str], provider: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Try to auto-resolve a base URL from provider name or model prefix."""
if provider and provider.lower() in KNOWN_PROVIDERS:
return KNOWN_PROVIDERS[provider.lower()]
if model:
model_lower = model.lower()
for prefix, prov in MODEL_PROVIDER_MAP.items():
if model_lower.startswith(prefix):
return KNOWN_PROVIDERS[prov]
return None
class SyncChatRequest(BaseModel):
message: str = Field(..., max_length=MAX_MESSAGE_LEN)
model: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=200)
session: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=100)
api_key: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=256)
base_url: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=MAX_URL_LEN)
provider: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=50)
@router.post("/v1/chat")
async def sync_chat(request: Request, body: SyncChatRequest):
if not getattr(request.state, "api_token", False):
raise HTTPException(403, "This endpoint requires an API token")
scopes = set(getattr(request.state, "api_token_scopes", []) or [])
if "chat" not in scopes:
raise HTTPException(403, "API token is not scoped for chat")
token_owner = getattr(request.state, "api_token_owner", None)
from core.models import ChatMessage
from src.llm_core import llm_call_async
from src.endpoint_resolver import build_chat_url, build_headers, build_models_url, normalize_base
message = body.message.strip()
if not message:
raise HTTPException(400, "Message is required")
session_id = body.session
sess = None
# --- Case 1: Resume an existing session ---
if session_id and session_manager:
try:
sess = session_manager.get_session(session_id)
except (KeyError, Exception):
raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
# SECURITY: verify the API-token's user owns this session — without
# this any token holder could resume any user's chat by passing its
# ID. The token's user is on request.state.user (set by API-token
# middleware); fall back to require_user if not present.
try:
from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user as _gcu
_tok_user = token_owner or getattr(request.state, "user", None) or _gcu(request)
except Exception:
_tok_user = None
# Strict ownership (see _caller_owns_session): fail closed so a
# null-owner / cross-owner session can't be resumed by an arbitrary
# chat-scoped token.
_sess_owner = getattr(sess, "owner", None)
if not _caller_owns_session(_sess_owner, _tok_user):
raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
# --- Case 2: Direct API key + model (no pre-configured endpoint needed) ---
if not sess and body.api_key:
api_key = body.api_key.strip()
model = body.model or "deepseek-chat"
# Validate only token-supplied direct base_url; auto-resolved known-provider
# URLs are not subject to extra local/LAN blocking beyond existing provider logic.
direct_base_url = body.base_url.strip().rstrip("/") if body.base_url else None
if direct_base_url:
try:
base_url = validate_public_http_url(direct_base_url)
except ValueError as e:
detail = str(e).replace("URL", "base_url", 1)
raise HTTPException(400, detail)
else:
base_url = _resolve_base_url(model, body.provider)
if not base_url:
raise HTTPException(400,
"Could not auto-detect provider. Pass base_url (e.g. 'https://api.deepseek.com/v1') "
"or provider ('deepseek', 'openai', 'groq', etc.)")
base_url = normalize_base(base_url)
endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
if not session_manager:
raise HTTPException(500, "Session manager not available")
sid = str(uuid.uuid4())
sess = session_manager.create_session(
session_id=sid, name="API Chat", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
model=model, owner=token_owner,
)
sess.headers = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
session_manager.save_sessions()
session_id = sid
# --- Case 3: Fall back to first configured ModelEndpoint ---
if not sess:
db = SessionLocal()
try:
ep = _select_api_chat_fallback_endpoint(db, token_owner)
finally:
db.close()
if not ep:
raise HTTPException(400,
"No session, api_key, or configured endpoints. "
"Pass api_key + model, or configure an endpoint in Admin.")
base_url = normalize_base(ep.base_url)
endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
model = body.model or "auto"
api_key = ep.api_key
if getattr(ep, "provider_auth_id", None):
try:
from src.endpoint_resolver import resolve_endpoint_runtime
base_url, api_key = resolve_endpoint_runtime(ep, owner=token_owner)
endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
except Exception:
raise HTTPException(500, "Could not resolve endpoint credentials")
if model == "auto":
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=5) as client:
models_url = build_models_url(base_url)
hdrs = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
if models_url:
resp = await client.get(models_url, headers=hdrs)
resp.raise_for_status()
data = resp.json()
items = data if isinstance(data, list) else (data.get("data") or [])
ids = [m.get("id") for m in items if isinstance(m, dict) and m.get("id")]
if not ids and isinstance(data, dict):
ids = [
m.get("name") or m.get("model")
for m in (data.get("models") or [])
if m.get("name") or m.get("model")
]
else:
import json as _json
ids = _json.loads(ep.cached_models or "[]")
model = ids[0] if ids else "auto"
except Exception:
raise HTTPException(500, "Could not discover models from endpoint")
if not session_manager:
raise HTTPException(500, "Session manager not available")
sid = str(uuid.uuid4())
sess = session_manager.create_session(
session_id=sid, name="API Chat", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
model=model, owner=token_owner,
)
if api_key:
sess.headers = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
session_manager.save_sessions()
session_id = sid
# --- Send message and get response ---
sess.add_message(ChatMessage("user", message))
messages = [{"role": m.role, "content": m.content} for m in sess.history]
reply = await llm_call_async(
sess.endpoint_url, sess.model, messages,
headers=sess.headers, timeout=120,
)
sess.add_message(ChatMessage("assistant", reply))
session_manager.save_sessions()
webhook_manager.fire_and_forget("chat.completed", {
"session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model,
"user_message": message[:2000], "response": reply[:2000],
})
return {"response": reply, "session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model}
return router
+391 -12
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,395 @@
"""Backward-compat shim — canonical location is routes/webhook/webhook_routes.py.
"""Webhook, API Token, and sync chat routes."""
This module is replaced in ``sys.modules`` by the canonical module object so
that ``import routes.webhook_routes``, ``from routes.webhook_routes import X``,
``importlib.import_module("routes.webhook_routes")``, and the
``__import__("routes.webhook_routes", fromlist=[...])`` + ``setattr(wh_mod,
...)`` pattern used by test_null_owner_gates.py all operate on the *same*
object. Keeps existing import paths working after slice 2l (#4082/#4071).
Source-introspection tests read the canonical file by path.
"""
import uuid
import logging
from typing import Optional
import sys as _sys
import httpx
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request, Form
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
from routes.webhook import webhook_routes as _canonical # noqa: F401
from core.database import SessionLocal, Webhook, ModelEndpoint
from src.auth_helpers import owner_filter
from src.url_security import validate_public_http_url
from src.webhook_manager import WebhookManager, validate_webhook_url, validate_events
_sys.modules[__name__] = _canonical
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api", tags=["webhooks"])
# Input limits
MAX_NAME_LEN = 100
MAX_URL_LEN = 2048
MAX_SECRET_LEN = 256
MAX_MESSAGE_LEN = 32_000
from core.middleware import require_admin as _require_admin
def _select_api_chat_fallback_endpoint(db, token_owner: Optional[str]):
"""First enabled ModelEndpoint visible to token_owner — their own rows plus
legacy null-owner ("shared") rows. Owner-scoped: an unscoped .first() would
let a chat-scoped token fall back onto another user's private endpoint and
silently spend that owner's API key/quota. Prefer owner rows before shared
rows. Fails closed to null-owner rows only when token_owner is absent.
Does not validate base_url — admin-configured local/LAN endpoints remain allowed.
"""
query = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True) # noqa: E712
if token_owner:
query = owner_filter(query, ModelEndpoint, token_owner)
return query.order_by(ModelEndpoint.owner.desc(), ModelEndpoint.created_at).first()
return query.filter(ModelEndpoint.owner == None).order_by(ModelEndpoint.created_at).first() # noqa: E711
def _caller_owns_session(sess_owner, caller) -> bool:
"""Strict session-ownership gate for the token-authenticated sync-chat
endpoint (`POST /api/v1/chat`).
Mirrors ``_verify_session_owner`` in session_routes.py and the null-owner
gates in notes/calendar/gallery: a caller may resume a session ONLY when
its owner matches them exactly. A null/empty session owner (legacy or
migrated rows) is deliberately NOT resumable by an arbitrary token — the
old ``sess_owner and sess_owner != caller`` form skipped the check whenever
``sess_owner`` was falsy, so any chat-scoped token (e.g. a paired mobile
device) could resume such a session, inject a message, and read back its
history and reuse the owner's endpoint credentials. Fail closed: an
unresolvable caller also returns False.
"""
if not caller:
return False
return sess_owner == caller
def setup_webhook_routes(
webhook_manager: WebhookManager,
auth_manager,
session_manager=None,
api_key_manager=None,
) -> APIRouter:
@router.get("/webhooks")
def list_webhooks(request: Request):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
hooks = db.query(Webhook).all()
return [
{
"id": w.id,
"name": w.name,
"url": w.url,
"has_secret": bool(w.secret),
"events": w.events.split(",") if w.events else [],
"is_active": w.is_active,
"last_triggered_at": w.last_triggered_at.isoformat() if w.last_triggered_at else None,
"last_status_code": w.last_status_code,
"last_error": w.last_error,
"created_at": w.created_at.isoformat() if w.created_at else None,
}
for w in hooks
]
finally:
db.close()
@router.post("/webhooks")
def create_webhook(
request: Request,
name: str = Form(""),
url: str = Form(""),
secret: str = Form(""),
events: str = Form(""),
):
_require_admin(request)
name = name.strip()[:MAX_NAME_LEN]
if not name:
raise HTTPException(400, "Webhook name is required")
try:
url = validate_webhook_url(url)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
try:
events = validate_events(events)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
secret_val = secret.strip()[:MAX_SECRET_LEN] or None
# Encrypt the secret at rest using the same Fernet key as API keys
encrypted_secret = None
if secret_val and api_key_manager:
encrypted_secret = api_key_manager.encrypt_api_key(secret_val)
elif secret_val:
encrypted_secret = secret_val # Fallback if no encryption available
webhook_id = str(uuid.uuid4())[:8]
db = SessionLocal()
try:
db.add(Webhook(
id=webhook_id,
name=name,
url=url,
secret=encrypted_secret,
events=events,
is_active=True,
))
db.commit()
finally:
db.close()
return {"id": webhook_id, "name": name}
@router.post("/webhooks/{webhook_id}/test")
async def test_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
wh = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).first()
if not wh:
raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
url, secret = wh.url, wh.secret
finally:
db.close()
await webhook_manager.deliver_test(webhook_id, url, secret)
return {"status": "sent"}
@router.patch("/webhooks/{webhook_id}")
def toggle_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
wh = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).first()
if not wh:
raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
wh.is_active = not wh.is_active
db.commit()
return {"id": webhook_id, "is_active": wh.is_active}
finally:
db.close()
@router.delete("/webhooks/{webhook_id}")
def delete_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
_require_admin(request)
db = SessionLocal()
try:
deleted = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).delete()
db.commit()
if not deleted:
raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
finally:
db.close()
return {"status": "deleted"}
# ================================================================
# Sync Chat Endpoint (for n8n / Make / Activepieces)
# ================================================================
# Known provider base URLs — auto-resolved from api_key prefix or model name
KNOWN_PROVIDERS = {
"deepseek": "https://api.deepseek.com/v1",
"openai": "https://api.openai.com/v1",
"mistral": "https://api.mistral.ai/v1",
"groq": "https://api.groq.com/openai/v1",
"together": "https://api.together.xyz/v1",
"openrouter": "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1",
"ollama": "https://ollama.com/api",
"opencode-zen": "https://opencode.ai/zen/v1",
"opencode-go": "https://opencode.ai/zen/go/v1",
"fireworks": "https://api.fireworks.ai/inference/v1",
"venice": "https://api.venice.ai/api/v1",
"kimi-code": "https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1",
"kimicode": "https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1",
}
# Model prefix → provider mapping for auto-detection
MODEL_PROVIDER_MAP = {
"deepseek": "deepseek",
"gpt-": "openai",
"o1": "openai",
"o3": "openai",
"o4": "openai",
"mistral": "mistral",
"llama": "groq",
"mixtral": "groq",
"kimi-for-coding": "kimi-code",
"kimi": "kimi-code",
}
def _resolve_base_url(model: Optional[str], provider: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Try to auto-resolve a base URL from provider name or model prefix."""
if provider and provider.lower() in KNOWN_PROVIDERS:
return KNOWN_PROVIDERS[provider.lower()]
if model:
model_lower = model.lower()
for prefix, prov in MODEL_PROVIDER_MAP.items():
if model_lower.startswith(prefix):
return KNOWN_PROVIDERS[prov]
return None
class SyncChatRequest(BaseModel):
message: str = Field(..., max_length=MAX_MESSAGE_LEN)
model: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=200)
session: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=100)
api_key: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=256)
base_url: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=MAX_URL_LEN)
provider: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=50)
@router.post("/v1/chat")
async def sync_chat(request: Request, body: SyncChatRequest):
if not getattr(request.state, "api_token", False):
raise HTTPException(403, "This endpoint requires an API token")
scopes = set(getattr(request.state, "api_token_scopes", []) or [])
if "chat" not in scopes:
raise HTTPException(403, "API token is not scoped for chat")
token_owner = getattr(request.state, "api_token_owner", None)
from core.models import ChatMessage
from src.llm_core import llm_call_async
from src.endpoint_resolver import build_chat_url, build_headers, build_models_url, normalize_base
message = body.message.strip()
if not message:
raise HTTPException(400, "Message is required")
session_id = body.session
sess = None
# --- Case 1: Resume an existing session ---
if session_id and session_manager:
try:
sess = session_manager.get_session(session_id)
except (KeyError, Exception):
raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
# SECURITY: verify the API-token's user owns this session — without
# this any token holder could resume any user's chat by passing its
# ID. The token's user is on request.state.user (set by API-token
# middleware); fall back to require_user if not present.
try:
from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user as _gcu
_tok_user = token_owner or getattr(request.state, "user", None) or _gcu(request)
except Exception:
_tok_user = None
# Strict ownership (see _caller_owns_session): fail closed so a
# null-owner / cross-owner session can't be resumed by an arbitrary
# chat-scoped token.
_sess_owner = getattr(sess, "owner", None)
if not _caller_owns_session(_sess_owner, _tok_user):
raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
# --- Case 2: Direct API key + model (no pre-configured endpoint needed) ---
if not sess and body.api_key:
api_key = body.api_key.strip()
model = body.model or "deepseek-chat"
# Validate only token-supplied direct base_url; auto-resolved known-provider
# URLs are not subject to extra local/LAN blocking beyond existing provider logic.
direct_base_url = body.base_url.strip().rstrip("/") if body.base_url else None
if direct_base_url:
try:
base_url = validate_public_http_url(direct_base_url)
except ValueError as e:
detail = str(e).replace("URL", "base_url", 1)
raise HTTPException(400, detail)
else:
base_url = _resolve_base_url(model, body.provider)
if not base_url:
raise HTTPException(400,
"Could not auto-detect provider. Pass base_url (e.g. 'https://api.deepseek.com/v1') "
"or provider ('deepseek', 'openai', 'groq', etc.)")
base_url = normalize_base(base_url)
endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
if not session_manager:
raise HTTPException(500, "Session manager not available")
sid = str(uuid.uuid4())
sess = session_manager.create_session(
session_id=sid, name="API Chat", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
model=model, owner=token_owner,
)
sess.headers = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
session_manager.save_sessions()
session_id = sid
# --- Case 3: Fall back to first configured ModelEndpoint ---
if not sess:
db = SessionLocal()
try:
ep = _select_api_chat_fallback_endpoint(db, token_owner)
finally:
db.close()
if not ep:
raise HTTPException(400,
"No session, api_key, or configured endpoints. "
"Pass api_key + model, or configure an endpoint in Admin.")
base_url = normalize_base(ep.base_url)
endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
model = body.model or "auto"
api_key = ep.api_key
if getattr(ep, "provider_auth_id", None):
try:
from src.endpoint_resolver import resolve_endpoint_runtime
base_url, api_key = resolve_endpoint_runtime(ep, owner=token_owner)
endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
except Exception:
raise HTTPException(500, "Could not resolve endpoint credentials")
if model == "auto":
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=5) as client:
models_url = build_models_url(base_url)
hdrs = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
if models_url:
resp = await client.get(models_url, headers=hdrs)
resp.raise_for_status()
data = resp.json()
items = data if isinstance(data, list) else (data.get("data") or [])
ids = [m.get("id") for m in items if isinstance(m, dict) and m.get("id")]
if not ids and isinstance(data, dict):
ids = [
m.get("name") or m.get("model")
for m in (data.get("models") or [])
if m.get("name") or m.get("model")
]
else:
import json as _json
ids = _json.loads(ep.cached_models or "[]")
model = ids[0] if ids else "auto"
except Exception:
raise HTTPException(500, "Could not discover models from endpoint")
if not session_manager:
raise HTTPException(500, "Session manager not available")
sid = str(uuid.uuid4())
sess = session_manager.create_session(
session_id=sid, name="API Chat", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
model=model, owner=token_owner,
)
if api_key:
sess.headers = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
session_manager.save_sessions()
session_id = sid
# --- Send message and get response ---
sess.add_message(ChatMessage("user", message))
messages = [{"role": m.role, "content": m.content} for m in sess.history]
reply = await llm_call_async(
sess.endpoint_url, sess.model, messages,
headers=sess.headers, timeout=120,
)
sess.add_message(ChatMessage("assistant", reply))
session_manager.save_sessions()
webhook_manager.fire_and_forget("chat.completed", {
"session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model,
"user_message": message[:2000], "response": reply[:2000],
})
return {"response": reply, "session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model}
return router
+3 -172
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,11 @@
import ipaddress
import json
import os
import time
import uuid
import logging
import re
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Any
from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse, urlunparse
import httpcore
import httpx
from fastapi import HTTPException
@@ -357,152 +354,6 @@ def _find_integration(identifier: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
return None
# httpcore raises its own exception hierarchy; map the ones a simple request can
# surface back to their httpx equivalents so the caller's `except httpx.*` blocks
# below behave exactly as they did with the default transport.
_HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC = {
httpcore.ConnectError: httpx.ConnectError,
httpcore.ConnectTimeout: httpx.ConnectTimeout,
httpcore.NetworkError: httpx.NetworkError,
httpcore.PoolTimeout: httpx.PoolTimeout,
httpcore.ProtocolError: httpx.ProtocolError,
httpcore.ReadError: httpx.ReadError,
httpcore.ReadTimeout: httpx.ReadTimeout,
httpcore.RemoteProtocolError: httpx.RemoteProtocolError,
httpcore.TimeoutException: httpx.TimeoutException,
httpcore.WriteError: httpx.WriteError,
httpcore.WriteTimeout: httpx.WriteTimeout,
}
class _PinnedAsyncBackend(httpcore.AsyncNetworkBackend):
"""Network backend that connects only to the pre-validated IPs, in order.
Every address here came out of the single SSRF resolution, so moving to the
next one after a connect failure is not re-resolution — it's ordinary
multi-address fallback restricted to the set the guard already approved.
httpcore takes TLS SNI and the ``Host`` header from the request URL rather
than the connect host, so pinning the socket destination leaves certificate
validation and vhost routing pointed at the original hostname.
"""
def __init__(self, ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]):
self._ips = [str(ip) for ip in ips]
self._real = httpcore.AnyIOBackend()
async def connect_tcp(self, host, port, timeout=None, local_address=None,
socket_options=None):
# One shared connect budget: each attempt gets the time left until the
# original deadline, so N dead addresses can't stretch the connect
# phase to N * timeout.
deadline = None if timeout is None else time.monotonic() + timeout
last_exc: Optional[Exception] = None
for ip in self._ips:
remaining = None if deadline is None else max(0.0, deadline - time.monotonic())
try:
return await self._real.connect_tcp(
ip, port, remaining, local_address, socket_options
)
except (httpcore.ConnectError, httpcore.ConnectTimeout) as exc:
last_exc = exc
if deadline is not None and time.monotonic() >= deadline:
break
raise last_exc
async def connect_unix_socket(self, path, timeout=None, socket_options=None):
return await self._real.connect_unix_socket(path, timeout, socket_options)
async def sleep(self, seconds: float) -> None:
return await self._real.sleep(seconds)
class _PinnedAsyncTransport(httpx.AsyncBaseTransport):
"""httpx transport that pins the TCP connect to the pre-resolved IP(s).
Kept local, mirroring the per-module pinned transports web fetch and
webhook delivery already carry, rather than coupling api_call to the
webhook subsystem. The request URL passes through unchanged, so SNI and the
``Host`` header stay the original hostname; only the socket destination is
pinned, which is what closes the rebinding window.
"""
def __init__(self, ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]):
self._pinned_ips = list(ips)
self._pool = httpcore.AsyncConnectionPool(
# Reuse the CA trust the default httpx client would build (certifi
# plus SSL_CERT_FILE / SSL_CERT_DIR when trust_env is set) so
# swapping in this transport doesn't quietly change which chains
# verify. ssl.create_default_context() would use system roots.
ssl_context=httpx.create_ssl_context(),
http1=True,
http2=False,
network_backend=_PinnedAsyncBackend(ips),
)
async def handle_async_request(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
core_req = httpcore.Request(
method=request.method,
url=httpcore.URL(
scheme=request.url.raw_scheme,
host=request.url.raw_host,
port=request.url.port,
target=request.url.raw_path,
),
headers=request.headers.raw,
content=request.stream,
extensions=request.extensions,
)
try:
core_resp = await self._pool.handle_async_request(core_req)
content = b"".join([chunk async for chunk in core_resp.aiter_stream()])
await core_resp.aclose()
except Exception as exc:
mapped = _HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC.get(type(exc))
if mapped is not None:
raise mapped(str(exc)) from exc
raise
return httpx.Response(
status_code=core_resp.status,
headers=core_resp.headers,
content=content,
extensions=core_resp.extensions,
)
async def aclose(self) -> None:
await self._pool.aclose()
def _validated_ips(raw_ips: List[str]) -> List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]:
"""Return every entry that parses as an IP address, de-duplicated, order
preserved.
check_outbound_url only reports ok when *all* of these classify as safe, so
the whole list is guard-approved and any of them is a legitimate connect
target. Skipping unparseable entries mirrors how the guard walks the same
resolver output.
De-duplication matters because the resolver is getaddrinfo(host, None) with
no socktype filter, so glibc reports the same address once per socktype
(SOCK_STREAM/SOCK_DGRAM/SOCK_RAW) — a single-homed host comes back three
times. Without this, the connect fallback would spend the shared deadline
retrying one dead address instead of moving on to a genuinely different one.
"""
ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress] = []
seen = set()
for raw in raw_ips:
if not isinstance(raw, str):
continue
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(raw.split("%")[0]) # strip IPv6 zone id
except ValueError:
continue
if ip in seen:
continue
seen.add(ip)
ips.append(ip)
return ips
async def execute_api_call(
integration_id: str,
method: str,
@@ -558,31 +409,13 @@ async def execute_api_call(
# loopback for locked-down deployments. Private stays allowed by default
# because LAN integrations (Home Assistant, Miniflux, ntfy) are the
# primary use case.
from src.url_safety import check_outbound_url, _default_resolver
from src.url_safety import check_outbound_url
block_private = os.getenv(
"INTEGRATION_API_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS", "false"
).lower() == "true"
# Resolve the host exactly once and remember the IPs the guard validated so
# the request below can be pinned to them. check_outbound_url only reports
# (ok, reason); a plain httpx client re-resolves the host at connect time,
# which reopens a DNS-rebinding TOCTOU — a base_url host that answers with a
# public IP for the guard and then flips to 169.254.169.254 for the connect
# would reach cloud metadata with the integration's auth headers attached.
resolved_ips: List[str] = []
def _recording_resolver(host: str) -> List[str]:
ips = _default_resolver(host)
resolved_ips[:] = ips
return ips
ok, reason = check_outbound_url(
url, block_private=block_private, resolver=_recording_resolver
)
ok, reason = check_outbound_url(url, block_private=block_private)
if not ok:
return {"error": f"URL rejected: {reason}", "exit_code": 1}
pinned_ips = _validated_ips(resolved_ips)
if not pinned_ips:
return {"error": "URL rejected: host did not resolve to a usable address", "exit_code": 1}
method = method.upper()
@@ -622,9 +455,7 @@ async def execute_api_call(
auth = httpx.BasicAuth(parts[0], parts[1])
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(
timeout=30.0, transport=_PinnedAsyncTransport(pinned_ips)
) as client:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client:
response = await client.request(
method,
url,
+2 -4
View File
@@ -46,9 +46,7 @@ async def do_manage_skills(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
except ValueError:
return {"error": "Invalid JSON arguments", "exit_code": 1}
action = (args.get("action") or "").strip().lower()
if not action:
return {"error": "action is required (list|view|view_ref|add|edit|patch|publish|delete|search)", "exit_code": 1}
action = (args.get("action") or "").lower()
from services.memory.skills import SkillsManager
from services.memory.skill_format import Skill, slugify
from src.constants import DATA_DIR
@@ -57,7 +55,7 @@ async def do_manage_skills(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
# Accept legacy `skill_id` as an alias for `name`.
name = (args.get("name") or args.get("skill_id") or "").strip()
if action in ("list", "index"):
if action in ("list", "index", ""):
all_skills = sm.load(owner=owner)
if not all_skills:
return {"results": "No skills yet. Create one with action='add'."}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ def _load_webhook_routes_for_test(monkeypatch):
module_name = "routes.webhook_routes_under_test"
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
module_name,
Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "routes" / "webhook" / "webhook_routes.py",
Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "routes" / "webhook_routes.py",
)
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
-29
View File
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
"""Regression test for the document route shim (slice 2m, #4082/#4071).
The backward-compat shims at ``routes/document_routes.py`` and
``routes/document_helpers.py`` use ``sys.modules`` replacement so the legacy
import paths and the canonical ``routes.document.*`` paths resolve to the
*same* module objects. This is required because multiple tests do
``import routes.document_routes as droutes`` followed by
``droutes.SessionLocal = ...`` / ``monkeypatch.setattr(droutes, ...)`` and
``sys.modules.pop("routes.document_helpers")`` + re-import — for those to
take effect at runtime, the legacy and canonical module objects must be
identical.
"""
import importlib
import routes.document_routes as _shim_routes # noqa: F401
import routes.document_helpers as _shim_helpers # noqa: F401
def test_legacy_and_canonical_routes_are_same_object():
legacy = importlib.import_module("routes.document_routes")
canonical = importlib.import_module("routes.document.document_routes")
assert legacy is canonical
def test_legacy_and_canonical_helpers_are_same_object():
legacy = importlib.import_module("routes.document_helpers")
canonical = importlib.import_module("routes.document.document_helpers")
assert legacy is canonical
+1 -1
View File
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ def test_known_imap_mailbox_call_sites_are_quoted():
assert "conn.select(sent_name" not in pollers
assert "imap.append(sent_folder" not in pollers
document_routes = Path("routes/document/document_routes.py").read_text()
document_routes = Path("routes/document_routes.py").read_text()
assert "conn.select(doc.source_email_folder" not in document_routes
-240
View File
@@ -9,13 +9,8 @@ link-local/metadata is always rejected; RFC-1918/loopback only when
INTEGRATION_API_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true (LAN integrations are the primary
use case, so private stays allowed by default).
"""
import asyncio
import ipaddress
import ssl
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
import httpcore
import httpx
import pytest
from src import integrations
@@ -102,238 +97,3 @@ async def test_private_base_url_allowed_by_default_blocked_with_knob(monkeypatch
assert result["exit_code"] == 1
assert "rejected" in result["error"].lower()
client.request.assert_not_called()
async def _call_capturing_transport(base_url, path="/items"):
"""Drive execute_api_call and return (result, transport) where transport is
the object passed to httpx.AsyncClient(transport=...)."""
resp = MagicMock()
resp.status_code = 200
resp.headers = {"content-type": "application/json"}
resp.json.return_value = {"ok": True}
resp.text = '{"ok": true}'
client = AsyncMock()
client.__aenter__ = AsyncMock(return_value=client)
client.__aexit__ = AsyncMock(return_value=None)
client.request = AsyncMock(return_value=resp)
captured = {}
def _fake_async_client(*args, **kwargs):
captured.update(kwargs)
return client
with (
patch.object(integrations, "_find_integration",
return_value=_integration(base_url)),
patch("httpx.AsyncClient", side_effect=_fake_async_client),
):
result = await integrations.execute_api_call("test_integ", "GET", path)
return result, captured.get("transport"), client
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_connection_is_pinned_to_the_validated_ip(monkeypatch):
"""DNS-rebinding defense: the guard resolves the host once to a benign
public IP, and the request must be pinned to *that* IP so a host that
rebinds to the metadata range at connect time can't be reached with the
integration's auth headers. Static resolution passing the guard is not
enough — a plain client would re-resolve at connect."""
monkeypatch.setattr("src.url_safety._default_resolver",
lambda host: ["93.184.216.34"])
result, transport, client = await _call_capturing_transport(
"http://rebinding.attacker.example")
assert result.get("exit_code") == 0
client.request.assert_called_once()
assert isinstance(transport, integrations._PinnedAsyncTransport)
assert [str(ip) for ip in transport._pinned_ips] == ["93.184.216.34"]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_pin_carries_the_whole_validated_ip_set(monkeypatch):
"""When a host resolves to several records the transport keeps all of them
(check_outbound_url validated every one), in resolver order, so it can fall
back past a dead first address instead of failing the whole call."""
monkeypatch.setattr("src.url_safety._default_resolver",
lambda host: ["93.184.216.34", "198.51.100.7"])
result, transport, _ = await _call_capturing_transport("http://multi.example")
assert result.get("exit_code") == 0
assert [str(ip) for ip in transport._pinned_ips] == ["93.184.216.34", "198.51.100.7"]
class _FakeStream:
"""Stand-in for the connected socket the real backend returns."""
class _RecordingBackend:
"""Fake httpcore backend: connect_tcp fails for the addresses in `dead`
and succeeds for the rest, recording the order it was asked to connect."""
def __init__(self, dead):
self.dead = set(dead)
self.attempts = []
async def connect_tcp(self, host, port, timeout=None, local_address=None,
socket_options=None):
self.attempts.append((host, timeout))
if host in self.dead:
raise httpcore.ConnectError(f"connection refused: {host}")
return _FakeStream()
def _pinned_backend(ips, dead):
"""A _PinnedAsyncBackend whose underlying connect is the recording fake."""
backend = integrations._PinnedAsyncBackend(ips)
backend._real = _RecordingBackend(dead)
return backend
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_connect_falls_back_from_dead_first_to_live_second():
"""first-dead / second-live: the pinned backend must try the next validated
address when the first refuses, rather than surfacing the failure. It also
ignores the `host` httpcore passes (the original hostname) and connects to
the pinned IPs, which is what keeps TLS SNI / Host on the real hostname."""
ips = [ipaddress.ip_address("203.0.113.10"), ipaddress.ip_address("198.51.100.7")]
backend = _pinned_backend(ips, dead={"203.0.113.10"})
stream = await backend.connect_tcp("original.hostname.example", 443, timeout=5.0)
assert isinstance(stream, _FakeStream)
# Tried the dead address first, then the live one — never the hostname.
assert [host for host, _ in backend._real.attempts] == ["203.0.113.10", "198.51.100.7"]
# Fallback shared one budget: the second attempt got the time left, not a fresh 5s.
assert backend._real.attempts[1][1] <= 5.0
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_connect_raises_when_every_validated_address_is_dead():
ips = [ipaddress.ip_address("203.0.113.10"), ipaddress.ip_address("198.51.100.7")]
backend = _pinned_backend(ips, dead={"203.0.113.10", "198.51.100.7"})
with pytest.raises(httpcore.ConnectError):
await backend.connect_tcp("original.hostname.example", 443, timeout=5.0)
assert [host for host, _ in backend._real.attempts] == ["203.0.113.10", "198.51.100.7"]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_pinned_transport_reuses_httpx_ca_trust(monkeypatch):
"""TLS trust must come from the same builder the default httpx client uses
(certifi + SSL_CERT_FILE / SSL_CERT_DIR via trust_env), not from
ssl.create_default_context()'s system roots — otherwise chains that verified
under the old default client can silently stop verifying."""
sentinel = ssl.create_default_context()
calls = []
def _fake_create(*args, **kwargs):
calls.append(kwargs)
return sentinel
monkeypatch.setattr(httpx, "create_ssl_context", _fake_create)
transport = integrations._PinnedAsyncTransport([ipaddress.ip_address("93.184.216.34")])
try:
assert calls, "transport did not build its context via httpx.create_ssl_context"
assert transport._pool._ssl_context is sentinel
finally:
await transport.aclose()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_real_socket_falls_back_from_dead_first_to_live_second():
"""End-to-end over real loopback sockets: pin [127.0.0.2 (nothing
listening), 127.0.0.1 (live)], and the request must succeed by falling back
to the second address while the Host header stays the original hostname —
i.e. only the socket destination moved, vhost/SNI routing did not."""
captured = {}
async def handle(reader, writer):
request = await reader.read(4096)
for line in request.split(b"\r\n"):
if line.lower().startswith(b"host:"):
captured["host"] = line.split(b":", 1)[1].strip().decode()
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 2\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\nhi")
await writer.drain()
writer.close()
server = await asyncio.start_server(handle, "127.0.0.1", 0)
port = server.sockets[0].getsockname()[1]
async with server:
await server.start_serving()
transport = integrations._PinnedAsyncTransport(
[ipaddress.ip_address("127.0.0.2"), ipaddress.ip_address("127.0.0.1")]
)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=transport) as client:
resp = await client.get(f"http://pinned.example:{port}/health")
finally:
await transport.aclose()
assert resp.status_code == 200
assert resp.text == "hi"
assert captured.get("host") == f"pinned.example:{port}"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ip_literal_base_url_still_pins_and_is_not_rejected():
"""A base_url that is already an IP has nothing to rebind, but it must not
trip the "did not resolve" guard either.
check_outbound_url resolves even a literal (getaddrinfo returns the address
itself), so the captured list is populated and the pin is a no-op rather
than a rejection. Uses the real resolver on purpose — no monkeypatch — so
this would catch the fail-closed branch firing on a literal.
"""
result, transport, client = await _call_capturing_transport(
"http://93.184.216.34")
assert result.get("exit_code") == 0
assert isinstance(transport, integrations._PinnedAsyncTransport)
assert [str(ip) for ip in transport._pinned_ips] == ["93.184.216.34"]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_ipv6_base_url_pins_every_validated_address(monkeypatch):
"""IPv6 goes down the same path as v4.
Resolution is stubbed rather than using a literal so this doesn't depend on
the runner having IPv6 configured.
"""
v6 = "2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946"
monkeypatch.setattr("src.url_safety._default_resolver", lambda host: [v6])
result, transport, client = await _call_capturing_transport("http://v6.example")
assert result.get("exit_code") == 0
assert isinstance(transport, integrations._PinnedAsyncTransport)
assert [str(ip) for ip in transport._pinned_ips] == [v6]
def test_validated_ips_strips_zone_id_and_drops_junk():
"""getaddrinfo can hand back a scoped v6 address like 'fe80::1%eth0'."""
got = integrations._validated_ips(
["93.184.216.34", "fe80::1%eth0", "not-an-ip", None, "2001:db8::5"]
)
assert [str(ip) for ip in got] == ["93.184.216.34", "fe80::1", "2001:db8::5"]
def test_validated_ips_deduplicates_repeated_addresses():
"""The resolver is getaddrinfo(host, None) with no socktype filter, so glibc
returns one record per socktype and a single-homed host arrives three times
over. Duplicates must collapse (first-seen order kept) or the connect
fallback wastes its shared deadline retrying one dead address."""
got = integrations._validated_ips(
["93.184.216.34", "93.184.216.34", "93.184.216.34"]
)
assert [str(ip) for ip in got] == ["93.184.216.34"]
# Order is first-seen, and distinct addresses all survive.
got = integrations._validated_ips(
["198.51.100.7", "93.184.216.34", "198.51.100.7", "2001:db8::5"]
)
assert [str(ip) for ip in got] == ["198.51.100.7", "93.184.216.34", "2001:db8::5"]
# A zone-id variant is the same address once stripped, so it collapses too.
got = integrations._validated_ips(["fe80::1%eth0", "fe80::1%eth1", "fe80::1"])
assert [str(ip) for ip in got] == ["fe80::1"]
@@ -83,10 +83,9 @@ async def _call(json_data, status=200):
with (
patch.object(integrations, "_find_integration", return_value=DUMMY_INTEGRATION),
patch("httpx.AsyncClient", return_value=mock_client),
# api.example.com doesn't resolve. Point the resolver at a public
# address instead of stubbing the guard open, so the real check (and
# the connect-IP pinning that reads its result) still runs.
patch("src.url_safety._default_resolver", lambda host: ["93.184.216.34"]),
# api.example.com doesn't resolve; the SSRF guard would fail closed.
# These tests are about truncation, so stub the guard open.
patch("src.url_safety.check_outbound_url", return_value=(True, "ok")),
):
return await integrations.execute_api_call("test_integ", "GET", "/items")
@@ -102,10 +101,9 @@ async def _call_with_integration(integration, path="/items"):
with (
patch.object(integrations, "_find_integration", return_value=integration),
patch("httpx.AsyncClient", return_value=mock_client),
# api.example.com doesn't resolve. Point the resolver at a public
# address instead of stubbing the guard open, so the real check (and
# the connect-IP pinning that reads its result) still runs.
patch("src.url_safety._default_resolver", lambda host: ["93.184.216.34"]),
# api.example.com doesn't resolve; the SSRF guard would fail closed.
# These tests are about URL joining, so stub the guard open.
patch("src.url_safety.check_outbound_url", return_value=(True, "ok")),
):
result = await integrations.execute_api_call("test_integ", "GET", path)
return result, mock_client
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
import json
import pytest
from src.tools.system import do_manage_skills
@pytest.mark.asyncio
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"payload",
[
{},
{"action": ""},
{"action": " "},
{"name": "demo", "description": "x", "procedure": ["step"]},
],
)
async def test_manage_skills_requires_action(payload):
result = await do_manage_skills(json.dumps(payload), owner="test")
assert result == {
"error": "action is required (list|view|view_ref|add|edit|patch|publish|delete|search)",
"exit_code": 1,
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ def _function_source(path: str, name: str) -> str:
def test_document_ai_tidy_resolves_with_owner_scope():
body = _function_source("routes/document/document_routes.py", "ai_tidy_documents")
body = _function_source("routes/document_routes.py", "ai_tidy_documents")
assert "resolve_task_endpoint(owner=user or None)" in body
assert 'resolve_endpoint("default", owner=user or None)' in body
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
"""Regression test for the vault route shim (slice 2k, #4082/#4071)."""
import importlib
import routes.vault_routes as _shim_vault # noqa: F401
def test_legacy_and_canonical_vault_module_are_same_object():
legacy = importlib.import_module("routes.vault_routes")
canonical = importlib.import_module("routes.vault.vault_routes")
assert legacy is canonical
+1 -1
View File
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ def test_request_vision_call_sites_pass_owner():
chat_source = (ROOT / "src" / "chat_handler.py").read_text()
processor_source = (ROOT / "src" / "document_processor.py").read_text()
upload_source = (ROOT / "routes" / "upload_routes.py").read_text()
document_source = (ROOT / "routes" / "document" / "document_routes.py").read_text()
document_source = (ROOT / "routes" / "document_routes.py").read_text()
gallery_source = (ROOT / "routes" / "gallery" / "gallery_routes.py").read_text()
memory_source = (ROOT / "routes" / "memory" / "memory_routes.py").read_text()
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
"""Regression test for the webhook route shim (slice 2l, #4082/#4071)."""
import importlib
import routes.webhook_routes as _shim_webhook # noqa: F401
def test_legacy_and_canonical_webhook_module_are_same_object():
legacy = importlib.import_module("routes.webhook_routes")
canonical = importlib.import_module("routes.webhook.webhook_routes")
assert legacy is canonical