Files
odysseus/.github/workflows/workflow-security.yml
T
dependabot[bot] 109750bebc chore(deps): bump actions/setup-python in the actions group
Bumps the actions group with 1 update: [actions/setup-python](https://github.com/actions/setup-python).


Updates `actions/setup-python` from 6.2.0 to 6.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/setup-python/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/setup-python/compare/a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405...ece7cb06caefa5fff74198d8649806c4678c61a1)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/setup-python
  dependency-version: 6.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: actions
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2026-06-25 17:34:35 +00:00

81 lines
2.8 KiB
YAML

# Workflow security (CI that audits the CI)
#
# Purpose: the GitHub Actions workflows themselves are an attack surface. A
# poorly written workflow can leak the repository token, run attacker-supplied
# code from a pull request, or pull in a tampered third-party action. These two
# tools check every workflow file in this repo for those mistakes:
#
# - actionlint: catches workflow syntax errors and shell-script bugs inside
# `run:` steps before they reach main.
# - zizmor: a security linter for Actions. Flags template-injection holes,
# unpinned actions, credential persistence, and over-broad token
# permissions -- exactly the patterns the rest of this CI is built to avoid.
#
# Add this early: it then audits every workflow added after it.
name: Workflow security
on:
pull_request:
push:
branches: [main]
workflow_dispatch:
# Default-deny token; each job grants only read access to the code.
permissions: {}
concurrency:
group: workflow-security-${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
actionlint:
name: actionlint
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
# Pinned version + checksum so a tampered binary cannot run here.
- name: Run actionlint (pinned, checksum-verified)
env:
ACTIONLINT_VERSION: 1.7.12
ACTIONLINT_SHA256: 8aca8db96f1b94770f1b0d72b6dddcb1ebb8123cb3712530b08cc387b349a3d8
run: |
set -euo pipefail
TARBALL="actionlint_${ACTIONLINT_VERSION}_linux_amd64.tar.gz"
curl -fsSL -o "${TARBALL}" \
"https://github.com/rhysd/actionlint/releases/download/v${ACTIONLINT_VERSION}/${TARBALL}"
echo "${ACTIONLINT_SHA256} ${TARBALL}" | sha256sum -c -
tar -xzf "${TARBALL}" actionlint
./actionlint -color
zizmor:
name: zizmor (Actions SAST)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@ece7cb06caefa5fff74198d8649806c4678c61a1 # v6.3.0
with:
python-version: '3.12'
# Pinned zizmor release. --offline keeps the audit hermetic (no network
# calls about the actions it inspects); --min-severity=low surfaces
# everything so nothing slips through under the gate.
- name: Run zizmor
run: |
set -euo pipefail
pip install zizmor==1.25.2
zizmor --offline --min-severity=low .github/workflows/