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* ci: add security scanning suite and governance
Consolidates the security CI work into one reviewable change. Adds, as
separate workflow files under .github/workflows/:
- secret-scan.yml gitleaks (pinned + checksum-verified), full history
- workflow-security.yml actionlint + zizmor, audits the workflows themselves
- dependency-review.yml PR dependency gate + advisory pip-audit
- container-scan.yml hadolint (blocking) + Trivy image scan (advisory)
- codeql.yml CodeQL for Python and JS, main + weekly
Plus .github/dependabot.yml (pip/npm/actions/docker), .github/CODEOWNERS,
and docs/security-ci.md explaining each check and the one-time settings.
All additive: no existing files are modified. Actions are pinned to commit
SHAs, tokens default-deny (permissions: {}), advisory scans never block,
and SARIF upload is gated to push so fork PRs do not fail on a read-only
token. Composes with the correctness CI in #1015.
* ci(security): isolate Trivy from the Dockerfile lint gate
Address review on #1314 (points 2 and 3).
container-scan.yml now runs only hadolint (the blocking Dockerfile lint)
and keeps the broad pull_request + push:[main] trigger so the required
check always reports and never hangs a PR.
The advisory image scan moves to container-trivy.yml, split by event:
- pull_request / workflow_dispatch: build and scan under contents:read
only, no SARIF upload. The image build runs PR-supplied Dockerfile
instructions, so this path holds no write scope.
- push to main: build, scan, and upload SARIF with security-events:write.
Only this trusted path is granted write.
This stops PR jobs from requesting security-events:write they never use,
and a paths-ignore (matching docker-publish.yml) skips the image rebuild
on docs-only changes.
docs/security-ci.md: correct the trigger description to "every pull
request and every push to main", matching the workflows and the existing
ci.yml convention.
Verified locally: zizmor --offline --min-severity=low and actionlint are
clean on the changed and new workflow files.
---------
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <111787685+alteixeira20@users.noreply.github.com>
61 lines
2.4 KiB
YAML
61 lines
2.4 KiB
YAML
# Secret scanning
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#
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# Purpose: stop credentials (API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys) from
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# ever living in the Git history. Odysseus deliberately keeps real secrets in
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# files that are gitignored (.env, data/), but a slip in a future commit -- or a
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# malicious pull request that sneaks one in -- would otherwise go unnoticed.
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# This job reads the repository and the full commit history and fails if it
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# finds anything that looks like a secret.
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#
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# It runs the official gitleaks BINARY directly (pinned to an exact version and
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# verified against the project's published SHA-256 checksum) rather than the
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# gitleaks GitHub Action, because the Action asks for a paid license on
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# organization-owned repos. The binary is free and behaves identically.
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name: Secret scan
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on:
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pull_request:
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push:
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branches: [main]
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workflow_dispatch:
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# Start with zero permissions; the single job opts back in to read-only.
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permissions: {}
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concurrency:
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group: secret-scan-${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
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cancel-in-progress: true
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jobs:
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gitleaks:
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name: gitleaks
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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permissions:
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contents: read
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steps:
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- name: Checkout repository
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uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
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with:
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# Full history so a secret committed in an earlier commit (and later
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# deleted) is still caught -- deletion does not remove it from Git.
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fetch-depth: 0
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persist-credentials: false
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# Pinned version + checksum so a tampered release binary cannot run here.
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# Bump VERSION/SHA256 together; the checksum comes from the matching
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# gitleaks_<version>_checksums.txt on the GitHub release.
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- name: Run gitleaks (pinned, checksum-verified)
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env:
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GITLEAKS_VERSION: 8.30.1
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GITLEAKS_SHA256: 551f6fc83ea457d62a0d98237cbad105af8d557003051f41f3e7ca7b3f2470eb
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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TARBALL="gitleaks_${GITLEAKS_VERSION}_linux_x64.tar.gz"
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curl -fsSL -o "${TARBALL}" \
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"https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v${GITLEAKS_VERSION}/${TARBALL}"
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echo "${GITLEAKS_SHA256} ${TARBALL}" | sha256sum -c -
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tar -xzf "${TARBALL}" gitleaks
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# Scan the whole history. Findings print to the log and fail the job.
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./gitleaks git --no-banner --redact --verbose .
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