Files
odysseus/mcp_servers
Ashvin c8a012d4d2 fix(memory): don't let an unreadable store get overwritten with an empty one (#5831)
* fix(memory): don't let an unreadable store get overwritten with an empty one

load_all() answered a failed read the same way it answered an empty store:
with []. Every mutation path is a read-modify-write (load the whole file,
change it, save it back), so a failed read became

    load_all() -> []  ->  [].append(new)  ->  save([new])

and save() is atomic, so the replacement stuck.

The case that actually destroys data is a store that is READABLE but not
parseable - a truncated file, or one holding {} instead of []. Nothing
obstructs the write, so adding a memory returns HTTP 200 and every memory
already stored is gone. Verified end-to-end against a running instance: on the
current code a truncated memory.json plus one add leaves the file holding only
the new entry. Truncation is reachable - core/database.py rewrites memory.json
during migration with a plain open(.., "w") + json.dump, which is not atomic.

A live exclusive lock is not the dangerous case: it blocks the read and the
os.replace alike, so the save fails too and the store survives. That path
currently 500s and loses nothing.

_read_entries() now returns [] only when the file genuinely does not exist and
raises MemoryStoreUnreadable for every other failure, including a store that
parses but is not a JSON array. load_all() keeps the old lenient behaviour so
display, search and context injection still degrade quietly instead of
breaking chat. The read-modify-write callers switch to load_all_for_update(),
which propagates the error: the memory routes turn it into a 503 and change
nothing, backup import refuses rather than saving only the incoming rows, and
auto-extraction and the audit merge skip the write. The audit merge mattered
most - it rebuilds the whole file from one owner's slice plus everyone else's
rows, so an empty read there dropped every other tenant's memories.

The corrupt-JSON path still gets its one shot at the legacy memory.txt
migration before raising, so that recovery is unchanged.

The two updated fakes gained load_all_for_update because the real class has it;
MagicMock would otherwise hand the import path a Mock instead of the seeded list.

Fixes #5673

* fix(memory): fail closed on the remaining read-modify-write add paths

The strict loader landed with the routes, the backup import and the extractor
converted, but three read-modify-write sinks still called load_all(), which
degrades an unreadable store to []. Two of them are the paths users actually
reach, so the data loss in #5673 stayed reproducible:

- src/ai_interaction.py do_manage_memory, action "add" — reached from ordinary
  chat via src/tool_execution.py:793 -> dispatch_ai_tool. "Remember that I
  prefer X" against an unreadable store wrote a one-entry file over it and
  reported success.
- mcp_servers/memory_server.py, action "add" — the same shape through
  _scope_entries(), registered as a built-in in src/builtin_mcp.py.
- src/memory_provider.py NativeMemoryProvider.remember and .delete — wired
  into app state in src/app_initializer.py but not consumed outside tests yet,
  converted here so the pattern is uniform before it goes live.

The MCP server takes _scope_entries(for_update=True) so list keeps the lenient
read. The edit and delete branches on both tool paths were already fail-closed
by accident — an empty view matches nothing and returns before the save — so
they are left alone.

The three new tests drive the real entry points rather than replaying the
shape, and use a truncated store, which is the case that reads back fine so
nothing stops the save. Each asserts memory.json is byte-identical afterwards;
all three fail on the previous commit with the store overwritten.
2026-08-06 02:33:50 -06:00
..
2026-05-31 23:58:26 +09:00
2026-07-23 14:49:02 +00:00