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* ci: add security scanning suite and governance
Consolidates the security CI work into one reviewable change. Adds, as
separate workflow files under .github/workflows/:
- secret-scan.yml gitleaks (pinned + checksum-verified), full history
- workflow-security.yml actionlint + zizmor, audits the workflows themselves
- dependency-review.yml PR dependency gate + advisory pip-audit
- container-scan.yml hadolint (blocking) + Trivy image scan (advisory)
- codeql.yml CodeQL for Python and JS, main + weekly
Plus .github/dependabot.yml (pip/npm/actions/docker), .github/CODEOWNERS,
and docs/security-ci.md explaining each check and the one-time settings.
All additive: no existing files are modified. Actions are pinned to commit
SHAs, tokens default-deny (permissions: {}), advisory scans never block,
and SARIF upload is gated to push so fork PRs do not fail on a read-only
token. Composes with the correctness CI in #1015.
* ci(security): isolate Trivy from the Dockerfile lint gate
Address review on #1314 (points 2 and 3).
container-scan.yml now runs only hadolint (the blocking Dockerfile lint)
and keeps the broad pull_request + push:[main] trigger so the required
check always reports and never hangs a PR.
The advisory image scan moves to container-trivy.yml, split by event:
- pull_request / workflow_dispatch: build and scan under contents:read
only, no SARIF upload. The image build runs PR-supplied Dockerfile
instructions, so this path holds no write scope.
- push to main: build, scan, and upload SARIF with security-events:write.
Only this trusted path is granted write.
This stops PR jobs from requesting security-events:write they never use,
and a paths-ignore (matching docker-publish.yml) skips the image rebuild
on docs-only changes.
docs/security-ci.md: correct the trigger description to "every pull
request and every push to main", matching the workflows and the existing
ci.yml convention.
Verified locally: zizmor --offline --min-severity=low and actionlint are
clean on the changed and new workflow files.
---------
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <111787685+alteixeira20@users.noreply.github.com>
81 lines
2.8 KiB
YAML
81 lines
2.8 KiB
YAML
# Workflow security (CI that audits the CI)
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#
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# Purpose: the GitHub Actions workflows themselves are an attack surface. A
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# poorly written workflow can leak the repository token, run attacker-supplied
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# code from a pull request, or pull in a tampered third-party action. These two
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# tools check every workflow file in this repo for those mistakes:
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#
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# - actionlint: catches workflow syntax errors and shell-script bugs inside
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# `run:` steps before they reach main.
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# - zizmor: a security linter for Actions. Flags template-injection holes,
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# unpinned actions, credential persistence, and over-broad token
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# permissions -- exactly the patterns the rest of this CI is built to avoid.
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#
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# Add this early: it then audits every workflow added after it.
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name: Workflow security
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on:
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pull_request:
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push:
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branches: [main]
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workflow_dispatch:
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# Default-deny token; each job grants only read access to the code.
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permissions: {}
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concurrency:
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group: workflow-security-${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
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cancel-in-progress: true
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jobs:
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actionlint:
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name: actionlint
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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permissions:
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contents: read
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steps:
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- name: Checkout repository
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uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
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with:
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persist-credentials: false
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# Pinned version + checksum so a tampered binary cannot run here.
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- name: Run actionlint (pinned, checksum-verified)
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env:
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ACTIONLINT_VERSION: 1.7.12
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ACTIONLINT_SHA256: 8aca8db96f1b94770f1b0d72b6dddcb1ebb8123cb3712530b08cc387b349a3d8
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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TARBALL="actionlint_${ACTIONLINT_VERSION}_linux_amd64.tar.gz"
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curl -fsSL -o "${TARBALL}" \
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"https://github.com/rhysd/actionlint/releases/download/v${ACTIONLINT_VERSION}/${TARBALL}"
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echo "${ACTIONLINT_SHA256} ${TARBALL}" | sha256sum -c -
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tar -xzf "${TARBALL}" actionlint
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./actionlint -color
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zizmor:
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name: zizmor (Actions SAST)
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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permissions:
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contents: read
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steps:
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- name: Checkout repository
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uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
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with:
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persist-credentials: false
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- name: Set up Python
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uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6.2.0
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with:
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python-version: '3.12'
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# Pinned zizmor release. --offline keeps the audit hermetic (no network
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# calls about the actions it inspects); --min-severity=low surfaces
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# everything so nothing slips through under the gate.
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- name: Run zizmor
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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pip install zizmor==1.25.2
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zizmor --offline --min-severity=low .github/workflows/
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