Fix: CORS preflight 401'd by AuthMiddleware before CORSMiddleware (#3262)

AuthMiddleware is the outermost middleware, so a credential-less CORS preflight
(OPTIONS + Access-Control-Request-Method) was rejected with 401 before
CORSMiddleware could answer it. That blocks every cross-origin browser/WebView
client: the preflight fails, so the real request is never sent.

Let a genuine preflight through at the top of AuthMiddleware.dispatch via a pure,
unit-tested predicate (core.middleware.is_cors_preflight). Precise -- only
OPTIONS carrying Access-Control-Request-Method; a credentialed request is never
matched -- and no data access.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Marius
2026-06-07 14:23:23 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent a3784da172
commit 04d6a5ccaa
3 changed files with 49 additions and 1 deletions
+10 -1
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@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ from core.constants import (
REQUEST_TIMEOUT, OPENAI_API_KEY,
)
from core.database import SessionLocal, ApiToken
from core.middleware import SecurityHeadersMiddleware
from core.middleware import SecurityHeadersMiddleware, is_cors_preflight
from core.auth import AuthManager
from core.exceptions import (
SessionNotFoundError, InvalidFileUploadError,
@@ -253,6 +253,15 @@ if AUTH_ENABLED:
class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
path = request.url.path
# A genuine CORS preflight (OPTIONS + Access-Control-Request-Method)
# carries no credentials by design and must reach CORSMiddleware to be
# answered. AuthMiddleware is the outermost middleware, so gating the
# preflight on auth 401s it before CORS can respond -- which blocks
# every cross-origin browser/WebView client before the real request
# is sent. Let real preflights through (only OPTIONS w/ the ACRM
# header; never a credentialed request).
if is_cors_preflight(request.method, request.headers):
return await call_next(request)
if _is_auth_exempt(path):
return await call_next(request)
# In-process internal-tool token bypass. Used by the agent
+9
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@@ -17,6 +17,15 @@ INTERNAL_TOOL_TOKEN = os.environ.get("ODYSSEUS_INTERNAL_TOKEN") or secrets.token
INTERNAL_TOOL_HEADER = "X-Odysseus-Internal-Token"
def is_cors_preflight(method: str, headers) -> bool:
"""True for a genuine CORS preflight: an OPTIONS request carrying the
Access-Control-Request-Method header. Such requests are credential-less by
design and must reach CORSMiddleware to be answered -- gating them on auth
401s the preflight and breaks every cross-origin browser/WebView client.
Pure so it can be unit-tested without standing up the app."""
return method == "OPTIONS" and "access-control-request-method" in headers
def require_admin(request: Request):
"""Raise 403 if the current user isn't an admin.
Allows access when auth is explicitly disabled, or when the request carries
+30
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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
"""Regression test for the CORS-preflight auth bypass.
AuthMiddleware is the outermost middleware, so it used to 401 the credential-less
OPTIONS preflight before CORSMiddleware could answer it -- which blocks every
cross-origin browser/WebView client before the real request is ever sent. The
fix lets a genuine preflight through; `is_cors_preflight` is the pure predicate
it uses. Guard it so the bypass can't silently regress.
"""
import os
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
from core.middleware import is_cors_preflight
def test_genuine_preflight_is_detected():
assert is_cors_preflight("OPTIONS", {"access-control-request-method": "POST"}) is True
def test_bare_options_is_not_a_preflight():
# OPTIONS without Access-Control-Request-Method must NOT bypass auth.
assert is_cors_preflight("OPTIONS", {}) is False
def test_real_methods_are_never_preflight():
headers = {"access-control-request-method": "POST"}
for method in ("GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH"):
assert is_cors_preflight(method, headers) is False