refactor(tools): migrate config/integration admin tools to the registry (#4742)

Part of #3629 (the `admin_tools.py` bullet). Moves the config/integration admin
tools off the legacy elif dispatch chain in tool_implementations.py onto the
agent_tools registry:

  manage_endpoints, manage_mcp, manage_webhooks, manage_tokens, manage_settings

The do_* implementations (and manage_mcp's command-allowlist / RCE guard:
_validate_mcp_command, _mcp_allowed_commands, and the _MCP_* constants) move
verbatim into the new src/agent_tools/admin_tools.py. They register through a
single ADMIN_TOOL_HANDLERS map that TOOL_HANDLERS.update()s, and the five elif
branches plus their imports are dropped from tool_execution.py, so these tools
now flow through _direct_fallback like the other migrated clusters. The names
are re-exported from src.agent_tools for back-compat.

Dedup:
  - _parse_tool_args was duplicated in tool_implementations.py and
    document_tools.py. It now lives once in src.tool_utils (which imports nothing
    from the project beyond src.constants, so this introduces no cycle) and both
    call sites import it from there. The orphaned `import json` in document_tools
    is removed with it.
  - The five tools share one _owner_adapter(fn) factory that threads ctx["owner"]
    into the owner-taking do_* signature, instead of five near-identical wrappers.

Tests: new tests/test_admin_tools_registry.py pins the registration, the
re-export back-compat, the owner-threading adapter, and the single-source
_parse_tool_args (across admin_tools and document_tools). Existing MCP /
settings / webhook suites are repointed at the new module.
This commit is contained in:
Kenny Van de Maele
2026-06-24 09:29:10 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent e0ccf250a4
commit 5ce2056521
12 changed files with 912 additions and 848 deletions
+7 -5
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@ from .document_tools import CreateDocumentTool, UpdateDocumentTool, EditDocument
from .model_interaction_tools import ChatWithModelTool, AskTeacherTool, ListModelsTool
from .bg_job_tools import ManageBgJobsTool
from .session_tools import CreateSessionTool, ListSessionsTool, SendToSessionTool, ManageSessionTool
from .admin_tools import (
ADMIN_TOOL_HANDLERS,
do_manage_endpoints, do_manage_mcp, do_manage_webhooks,
do_manage_tokens, do_manage_settings,
)
TOOL_HANDLERS = {
"bash": BashTool().execute,
@@ -52,6 +57,8 @@ TOOL_HANDLERS = {
"send_to_session": SendToSessionTool().execute,
"manage_session": ManageSessionTool().execute,
}
# Config/integration admin tools (manage_endpoints/mcp/webhooks/tokens/settings).
TOOL_HANDLERS.update(ADMIN_TOOL_HANDLERS)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Constants (re-exported for backward compatibility — single source of truth
@@ -138,10 +145,5 @@ from src.tool_implementations import ( # noqa: E402, F401
do_search_chats,
do_manage_skills,
do_manage_tasks,
do_manage_endpoints,
do_manage_mcp,
do_manage_webhooks,
do_manage_tokens,
do_manage_settings,
do_api_call,
)
+784
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,784 @@
"""Config/integration admin agent tools (TOOL_HANDLERS).
Moved verbatim from tool_implementations.py as part of the tool-registry
migration (#3629, the `admin_tools.py` bullet): manage_endpoints / manage_mcp /
manage_webhooks / manage_tokens / manage_settings, plus manage_mcp's
command-allowlist guard. Each impl keeps its `do_*(content, owner)` shape;
ADMIN_TOOL_HANDLERS wraps them into registry `execute(content, ctx)` adapters
via one factory.
"""
import json
import os
import re
import logging
from typing import Optional, Dict
from src.tool_utils import get_mcp_manager, _parse_tool_args
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
async def do_manage_endpoints(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
"""Manage model endpoints: list, add, delete, enable, disable."""
from core.database import SessionLocal, ModelEndpoint
try:
args = _parse_tool_args(content)
except ValueError:
return {"error": "Invalid JSON arguments", "exit_code": 1}
action = args.get("action", "list")
db = SessionLocal()
try:
if action == "list":
eps = db.query(ModelEndpoint).all()
items = [{"id": e.id, "name": e.name, "base_url": e.base_url,
"is_enabled": e.is_enabled} for e in eps]
return {"response": f"{len(items)} endpoints", "endpoints": items, "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "add":
import uuid as _uuid
name = args.get("name", "")
base_url = args.get("base_url", "")
api_key = args.get("api_key", "")
if not base_url:
return {"error": "base_url is required", "exit_code": 1}
eid = str(_uuid.uuid4())[:8]
from datetime import datetime
ep = ModelEndpoint(id=eid, name=name or base_url, base_url=base_url,
api_key=api_key, is_enabled=True,
created_at=datetime.utcnow(), updated_at=datetime.utcnow())
db.add(ep)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Added endpoint '{name or base_url}' (id: {eid})", "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "delete":
eid = args.get("endpoint_id", "")
ep = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.id == eid).first()
if not ep:
return {"error": f"Endpoint {eid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
name = ep.name
db.delete(ep)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Deleted endpoint '{name}'", "exit_code": 0}
elif action in ("enable", "disable"):
eid = args.get("endpoint_id", "")
ep = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.id == eid).first()
if not ep:
return {"error": f"Endpoint {eid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
ep.is_enabled = (action == "enable")
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Endpoint '{ep.name}' {action}d", "exit_code": 0}
else:
return {"error": f"Unknown action: {action}", "exit_code": 1}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"manage_endpoints error: {e}")
return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}
finally:
db.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# MCP server management tool
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Parallel to routes/cookbook_helpers._validate_serve_cmd but deliberately the
# opposite policy: that gate guards an admin-only serve command and allows
# interpreters (python3/etc) because model-serving needs them, whereas this is
# the model/prompt-injection-reachable manage_mcp path, so interpreters and
# runners are denied here.
#
# Commands that can execute arbitrary code regardless of their arguments. These
# are NEVER accepted on the manage_mcp agent path, even if an operator lists one
# in ODYSSEUS_MCP_ALLOWED_COMMANDS -- a stdio server that genuinely needs an
# interpreter or package runner must be registered via the trusted admin route.
_MCP_DENIED_COMMANDS = frozenset({
"sh", "bash", "zsh", "fish", "dash", "ksh", "csh", "tcsh", "ash", "busybox",
"cmd", "command.com", "powershell", "pwsh",
"python", "pypy", "node", "nodejs", "deno", "bun", "ruby", "jruby",
"perl", "raku", "php", "lua", "luajit", "tclsh", "wish", "expect", "rscript",
"groovy", "scala", "elixir", "erl", "iex", "java", "javac", "jshell", "jbang",
"kotlin", "kotlinc", "dotnet", "mono", "swift", "osascript", "tsx", "ts-node",
"npx", "bunx", "uvx", "pipx", "npm", "pnpm", "yarn", "pip", "uv",
"gem", "cargo", "go", "bundle", "poetry", "conda", "mamba", "brew",
"apt", "apt-get", "yum", "dnf", "pacman", "apk",
"env", "xargs", "nohup", "setsid", "nice", "ionice", "time", "timeout",
"watch", "stdbuf", "unbuffer", "script", "ssh", "scp", "sshpass", "sudo",
"doas", "su", "make", "cmake", "docker", "podman", "kubectl", "find",
"awk", "gawk", "sed", "vi", "vim", "nvim", "emacs", "ed", "tee", "eval",
})
# Argv flags that make even an allowlisted binary execute inline code. Matched
# by prefix so glued forms (-cimport os, --eval=...) are caught, not just the
# exact-token form.
_MCP_CODE_EXEC_SHORT_FLAGS = ("-c", "-e", "-m")
_MCP_CODE_EXEC_LONG_FLAGS = ("--eval", "--exec", "--print", "--module", "--command", "--require")
_MCP_URL_SCHEMES = ("http://", "https://", "ftp://", "ftps://", "file://", "data:", "jar:", "blob:")
# Shell metacharacters refused in command/args. Args are passed as an argv list
# (no shell), but refusing these keeps the surface narrow and obvious.
_MCP_SHELL_METACHARS = set(";|&$`><\n\r")
# Env vars that let a child process load attacker-supplied code before main().
_MCP_DANGEROUS_ENV = frozenset({
"LD_PRELOAD", "LD_LIBRARY_PATH", "LD_AUDIT", "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES",
"DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH", "DYLD_FRAMEWORK_PATH", "PYTHONPATH", "PYTHONSTARTUP",
"PYTHONHOME", "PYTHONEXECUTABLE", "NODE_OPTIONS", "NODE_PATH", "BASH_ENV",
"ENV", "SHELLOPTS", "PERL5LIB", "PERL5OPT", "RUBYOPT", "RUBYLIB", "GEM_PATH",
"R_PROFILE", "R_HOME", "PATH", "IFS", "PROMPT_COMMAND",
})
def _mcp_allowed_commands() -> set:
"""Operator-configured allowlist of safe MCP launcher basenames for the agent
path. Empty by default; set ODYSSEUS_MCP_ALLOWED_COMMANDS (comma-separated)
to opt specific trusted binaries in. Denied commands are rejected even if
listed here."""
raw = os.environ.get("ODYSSEUS_MCP_ALLOWED_COMMANDS", "")
return {c.strip().lower() for c in raw.split(",") if c.strip()}
def _validate_mcp_command(command, args, env) -> Optional[str]:
"""Validate a model-supplied stdio MCP registration. Returns an error string
if it must be rejected, else None.
Closes the RCE where manage_mcp 'add' passed prompt-injection-controlled
command/args/env straight to a subprocess spawn (issue #438): a payload
smuggled into a skill description, memory entry, fetched page, or email body
could register a stdio server running arbitrary code as the app UID.
"""
if not isinstance(command, str) or not command.strip():
return "command must be a non-empty string"
command = command.strip()
if "/" in command or "\\" in command:
return "command must be a bare executable name, not a path"
if any(ch in _MCP_SHELL_METACHARS for ch in command):
return "command contains shell metacharacters"
base = command.lower()
if base.endswith(".exe") or base.endswith(".cmd") or base.endswith(".bat"):
base = base.rsplit(".", 1)[0]
# Canonicalize a trailing version suffix so versioned aliases collapse to the
# family name (python3.11 -> python, node18 -> node, pip3 -> pip); both the
# raw basename and the canonical form are denied, so an operator cannot
# accidentally allowlist a runtime alias back into the path.
canon = re.sub(r"[-_.]?\d+(?:\.\d+)*$", "", base)
if base in _MCP_DENIED_COMMANDS or canon in _MCP_DENIED_COMMANDS:
return (
f"command '{command}' is not allowed on the agent MCP path: "
"interpreters, runtimes, package runners, and shells can execute "
"arbitrary code. Register such a server via the admin route instead."
)
if base not in _mcp_allowed_commands():
return (
f"command '{command}' is not in the MCP allowlist. Add it to "
"ODYSSEUS_MCP_ALLOWED_COMMANDS if you trust it, or register the "
"server via the admin route."
)
if args is not None:
if isinstance(args, str):
try:
args = json.loads(args)
except Exception:
return "args must be a JSON list"
if not isinstance(args, list):
return "args must be a list"
for a in args:
if not isinstance(a, str):
return "args must all be strings"
s = a.strip()
low = s.lower()
if any(s == f or s.startswith(f) for f in _MCP_CODE_EXEC_SHORT_FLAGS):
return f"arg '{a}' is a code-execution flag and is not allowed"
if any(low == f or low.startswith(f + "=") for f in _MCP_CODE_EXEC_LONG_FLAGS):
return f"arg '{a}' is a code-execution flag and is not allowed"
if any(low.startswith(u) for u in _MCP_URL_SCHEMES):
return f"arg '{a}' is a remote URL and is not allowed"
if any(ch in _MCP_SHELL_METACHARS for ch in a):
return f"arg '{a}' contains shell metacharacters"
if env:
if isinstance(env, str):
try:
env = json.loads(env)
except Exception:
return "env must be a JSON object"
if not isinstance(env, dict):
return "env must be an object"
for k in env:
if str(k).strip().upper() in _MCP_DANGEROUS_ENV:
return f"env var '{k}' can inject code into the child process and is not allowed"
return None
async def do_manage_mcp(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
"""Manage MCP servers: list, add, delete, enable, disable, reconnect."""
try:
args = _parse_tool_args(content)
except ValueError:
return {"error": "Invalid JSON arguments", "exit_code": 1}
action = args.get("action", "list")
if action == "list":
mcp = get_mcp_manager()
if not mcp:
return {"response": "No MCP manager available", "servers": [], "exit_code": 0}
from core.database import SessionLocal, McpServer
db = SessionLocal()
try:
servers = db.query(McpServer).all()
items = []
for s in servers:
st = mcp.get_server_status(s.id)
status = st.get("status", "disconnected")
tool_count = st.get("tool_count", 0)
items.append({"id": s.id, "name": s.name, "transport": s.transport,
"is_enabled": s.is_enabled, "status": status,
"tool_count": tool_count})
return {"response": f"{len(items)} MCP servers", "servers": items, "exit_code": 0}
finally:
db.close()
elif action == "add":
from core.database import SessionLocal, McpServer
import uuid as _uuid
from datetime import datetime
name = args.get("name", "")
command = args.get("command", "")
cmd_args = args.get("args", [])
env = args.get("env", {})
if not name or not command:
return {"error": "name and command are required", "exit_code": 1}
# Validate BEFORE any DB write or spawn: a rejected registration must
# leave no enabled row (which would otherwise auto-reconnect on restart)
# and must not attempt a connection.
_mcp_err = _validate_mcp_command(command, cmd_args, env)
if _mcp_err:
return {"error": f"manage_mcp: refused unsafe server registration: {_mcp_err}", "exit_code": 1}
sid = str(_uuid.uuid4())[:8]
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = McpServer(id=sid, name=name, transport="stdio", command=command,
args=json.dumps(cmd_args) if isinstance(cmd_args, list) else cmd_args,
env=json.dumps(env) if isinstance(env, dict) else env,
is_enabled=True, created_at=datetime.utcnow(), updated_at=datetime.utcnow())
db.add(srv)
db.commit()
finally:
db.close()
# Try to connect
mcp = get_mcp_manager()
tool_count = 0
if mcp:
try:
await mcp.connect_server(
sid, name, "stdio", command=command,
args=cmd_args if isinstance(cmd_args, list) else json.loads(cmd_args),
env=env if isinstance(env, dict) else json.loads(env),
)
st = mcp.get_server_status(sid)
tool_count = st.get("tool_count", 0)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"MCP connect failed for {name}: {e}")
return {"response": f"Added MCP server '{name}' ({tool_count} tools)", "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "delete":
sid = args.get("server_id", "")
from core.database import SessionLocal, McpServer
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == sid).first()
if not srv:
return {"error": f"Server {sid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
name = srv.name
mcp = get_mcp_manager()
if mcp:
try:
await mcp.disconnect_server(sid)
except Exception:
pass
db.delete(srv)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Deleted MCP server '{name}'", "exit_code": 0}
finally:
db.close()
elif action == "reconnect":
sid = args.get("server_id", "")
mcp = get_mcp_manager()
if not mcp:
return {"error": "MCP manager not available", "exit_code": 1}
try:
await mcp.disconnect_server(sid)
from core.database import SessionLocal, McpServer
db2 = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db2.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == sid).first()
if srv:
_args = json.loads(srv.args) if srv.args else []
_env = json.loads(srv.env) if srv.env else {}
await mcp.connect_server(
server_id=sid,
name=srv.name,
transport=srv.transport,
command=srv.command,
args=_args,
env=_env,
url=srv.url,
)
st = mcp.get_server_status(sid)
return {"response": f"Reconnected '{srv.name}' ({st.get('tool_count', 0)} tools)", "exit_code": 0}
return {"error": f"Server {sid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
finally:
db2.close()
except Exception as e:
return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}
elif action in ("enable", "disable"):
sid = args.get("server_id", "")
from core.database import SessionLocal, McpServer
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == sid).first()
if not srv:
return {"error": f"Server {sid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
srv.is_enabled = (action == "enable")
db.commit()
return {"response": f"MCP server '{srv.name}' {action}d", "exit_code": 0}
finally:
db.close()
elif action == "list_tools":
mcp = get_mcp_manager()
if not mcp:
return {"response": "No MCP manager", "tools": [], "exit_code": 0}
tools = mcp.get_all_tools()
items = [{"name": t["name"], "server": t["server_name"],
"description": t.get("description", "")[:100]} for t in tools]
return {"response": f"{len(items)} MCP tools available", "tools": items, "exit_code": 0}
else:
return {"error": f"Unknown action: {action}", "exit_code": 1}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Webhook management tool
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def do_manage_webhooks(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
"""Manage webhooks: list, add, delete, enable, disable, test."""
from core.database import SessionLocal
try:
args = _parse_tool_args(content)
except ValueError:
return {"error": "Invalid JSON arguments", "exit_code": 1}
action = args.get("action", "list")
db = SessionLocal()
try:
from core.database import Webhook
if action == "list":
hooks = db.query(Webhook).all()
items = [{"id": h.id, "name": h.name, "url": h.url,
"events": h.events, "is_active": h.is_active} for h in hooks]
return {"response": f"{len(items)} webhooks", "webhooks": items, "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "add":
import uuid as _uuid
from datetime import datetime
from src.webhook_manager import validate_events, validate_webhook_url
name = args.get("name", "")
url = args.get("url", "")
events = args.get("events", "chat.completed")
if not url:
return {"error": "url is required", "exit_code": 1}
try:
url = validate_webhook_url(url)
events = validate_events(events)
except ValueError as e:
return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}
wid = str(_uuid.uuid4())[:8]
hook = Webhook(id=wid, name=name or url, url=url,
events=events, is_active=True,
created_at=datetime.utcnow(), updated_at=datetime.utcnow())
db.add(hook)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Added webhook '{name or url}'", "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "delete":
wid = args.get("webhook_id", "")
hook = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == wid).first()
if not hook:
return {"error": f"Webhook {wid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
name = hook.name
db.delete(hook)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Deleted webhook '{name}'", "exit_code": 0}
elif action in ("enable", "disable"):
wid = args.get("webhook_id", "")
hook = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == wid).first()
if not hook:
return {"error": f"Webhook {wid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
hook.is_active = (action == "enable")
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Webhook '{hook.name}' {action}d", "exit_code": 0}
else:
return {"error": f"Unknown action: {action}", "exit_code": 1}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"manage_webhooks error: {e}")
return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}
finally:
db.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# API token management tool
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def do_manage_tokens(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
"""Manage API tokens: list, create, delete."""
from core.database import SessionLocal, ApiToken
try:
args = _parse_tool_args(content)
except ValueError:
return {"error": "Invalid JSON arguments", "exit_code": 1}
action = args.get("action", "list")
db = SessionLocal()
try:
if action == "list":
tokens = db.query(ApiToken).all()
items = [{"id": t.id, "name": t.name, "token_prefix": t.token_prefix + "...",
"is_active": t.is_active} for t in tokens]
return {"response": f"{len(items)} API tokens", "tokens": items, "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "create":
import uuid as _uuid, secrets, bcrypt
from datetime import datetime
name = args.get("name", "API Token")
raw_token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
token_hash = bcrypt.hashpw(raw_token.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode()
tid = str(_uuid.uuid4())[:8]
t = ApiToken(id=tid, name=name, token_hash=token_hash,
token_prefix=raw_token[:8], is_active=True,
created_at=datetime.utcnow(), updated_at=datetime.utcnow())
db.add(t)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Created token '{name}'", "token": raw_token, "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "delete":
tid = args.get("token_id", "")
t = db.query(ApiToken).filter(ApiToken.id == tid).first()
if not t:
return {"error": f"Token {tid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
name = t.name
db.delete(t)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Deleted token '{name}'", "exit_code": 0}
else:
return {"error": f"Unknown action: {action}", "exit_code": 1}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"manage_tokens error: {e}")
return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}
finally:
db.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Settings/preferences management tool
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def do_manage_settings(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
"""Manage user settings and preferences."""
try:
args = _parse_tool_args(content)
except ValueError:
return {"error": "Invalid JSON arguments", "exit_code": 1}
action = args.get("action", "list")
from core.database import SessionLocal
db = SessionLocal()
try:
# set/get/list/delete operate on the REAL app settings (the same store
# the Settings panel writes), so changing a model / voice / search
# engine / reminder channel from chat actually takes effect.
from src.settings import load_settings, save_settings, DEFAULT_SETTINGS
# Secrets/credentials the agent must NOT write: kept read-only (masked)
# so API keys never flow through chat. User sets these in the panel.
_SECRET_KEYS = {
"brave_api_key", "google_pse_key", "google_pse_cx",
"tavily_api_key", "serper_api_key", "app_public_url",
}
def _is_secret(k):
# `token` must be a suffix, not a substring: otherwise the int
# setting `agent_input_token_budget` (which even has a "token budget"
# alias to set it from chat) is wrongly classified as a credential.
return (
k in _SECRET_KEYS
or k.endswith("token")
or any(t in k for t in ("api_key", "_key", "secret", "password"))
)
# Friendly aliases → real keys, so natural phrasing resolves.
_ALIASES_SET = {
"voice": "tts_voice", "tts voice": "tts_voice", "tts": "tts_enabled",
"text to speech": "tts_enabled", "tts provider": "tts_provider",
"speech speed": "tts_speed", "voice speed": "tts_speed",
"stt": "stt_enabled", "speech to text": "stt_enabled", "transcription": "stt_enabled",
"search engine": "search_provider", "search provider": "search_provider",
"search results": "search_result_count", "result count": "search_result_count",
"default model": "default_model", "chat model": "default_model",
"default endpoint": "default_endpoint_id",
"task model": "task_model", "background model": "task_model",
"teacher model": "teacher_model", "teacher": "teacher_enabled",
"utility model": "utility_model", "research model": "research_model",
"research max tokens": "research_max_tokens",
"vision model": "vision_model", "vision": "vision_enabled",
"image model": "image_model", "image quality": "image_quality",
"image gen": "image_gen_enabled", "image generation": "image_gen_enabled",
"reminder channel": "reminder_channel", "reminders": "reminder_channel",
"ntfy topic": "reminder_ntfy_topic",
"webhook integration": "reminder_webhook_integration_id",
"webhook template": "reminder_webhook_payload_template", "webhook payload": "reminder_webhook_payload_template",
"agent tool calls": "agent_max_tool_calls", "max tool calls": "agent_max_tool_calls",
"agent timeout": "agent_stream_timeout_seconds", "stream timeout": "agent_stream_timeout_seconds",
"token budget": "agent_input_token_budget", "input budget": "agent_input_token_budget",
"hard max": "agent_input_token_hard_max",
"token budget cap": "agent_input_token_hard_max",
"input budget cap": "agent_input_token_hard_max",
}
def _resolve(k):
k2 = (k or "").strip().lower()
if k2 in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
return k2
return _ALIASES_SET.get(k2, (k or "").strip())
_ENUMS = {
"image_quality": ["low", "medium", "high"],
"reminder_channel": ["browser", "email", "ntfy", "webhook"],
}
def _coerce(value, default):
if isinstance(default, bool):
return value if isinstance(value, bool) else str(value).strip().lower() in ("true", "on", "yes", "1", "enable", "enabled")
if isinstance(default, int):
return int(value)
return value
def _model_slug(value: str) -> str:
import re as _re
return _re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "", (value or "").lower())
def _endpoint_model_from_cache(model_query: str):
"""Resolve friendly model text to an enabled endpoint + real model id.
The Settings UI stores both `<prefix>_endpoint_id` and
`<prefix>_model`; writing only the model leaves the runtime on the
old endpoint. Prefer cached model lists so this stays fast/offline.
"""
import json as _json
import re as _re
from core.database import ModelEndpoint
wanted = (model_query or "").strip()
wanted_slug = _model_slug(wanted)
wanted_tokens = [_model_slug(t) for t in _re.findall(r"[A-Za-z0-9]+", wanted)]
wanted_tokens = [t for t in wanted_tokens if t]
if not wanted_slug:
return None
best = None
for ep in db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True).all():
raw_models = []
try:
raw_models = _json.loads(ep.cached_models or "[]") or []
except Exception:
raw_models = []
# If cache is empty, still allow matching against endpoint name
# for callers using model@endpoint elsewhere later.
for mid in raw_models:
mid = str(mid)
mid_slug = _model_slug(mid)
if not mid_slug:
continue
exact = mid.lower() == wanted.lower()
compact_match = wanted_slug in mid_slug or mid_slug in wanted_slug
token_match = bool(wanted_tokens) and all(tok in mid_slug for tok in wanted_tokens)
if exact or compact_match or token_match:
score = 3 if exact else (2 if compact_match else 1)
if not best or score > best[0]:
best = (score, ep.id, mid)
if best:
return {"endpoint_id": best[1], "model": best[2]}
return None
def _mask(k, v):
return "••••• (set in panel)" if _is_secret(k) and v else v
if action == "list":
s = load_settings()
shown = {k: _mask(k, v) for k, v in s.items() if k in DEFAULT_SETTINGS and not isinstance(v, dict)}
return {"response": f"{len(shown)} settings (use get/set with a key)", "settings": shown, "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "get":
key = _resolve(args.get("key", ""))
if not key:
return {"error": "key is required", "exit_code": 1}
if key not in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
return {"error": f"Unknown setting '{args.get('key')}'. Use action='list' to see them.", "exit_code": 1}
val = load_settings().get(key, DEFAULT_SETTINGS.get(key))
return {"response": f"{key} = {_mask(key, val)}", "value": _mask(key, val), "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "set":
raw = args.get("key", "")
value = args.get("value")
if not raw:
return {"error": "key is required", "exit_code": 1}
key = _resolve(raw)
if key not in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
return {"error": f"Unknown setting '{raw}'. Use action='list' to see available settings.", "exit_code": 1}
if _is_secret(key):
return {"response": f"'{key}' is a credential/secret. For security I can't set it from chat. Open Settings and set it there.", "exit_code": 0}
# Structured settings (dicts/lists like keybinds, default_model_fallbacks)
# have no safe scalar coercion; _coerce would pass a bare string
# straight through and clobber the structure. Refuse them here; they're
# edited in their dedicated panels. (reset/delete still restore the
# default structure, which is safe.)
if isinstance(DEFAULT_SETTINGS[key], (dict, list)):
return {"response": f"'{key}' is a structured setting. Edit it in its panel, not from chat. (You can reset it to default here.)", "exit_code": 0}
try:
value = _coerce(value, DEFAULT_SETTINGS[key])
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return {"error": f"'{value}' isn't a valid value for {key} (expected {type(DEFAULT_SETTINGS[key]).__name__}).", "exit_code": 1}
if key in _ENUMS and str(value).lower() not in _ENUMS[key]:
return {"error": f"{key} must be one of: {', '.join(_ENUMS[key])}.", "exit_code": 1}
s = load_settings()
s[key] = value
if key in {"default_model", "research_model", "utility_model", "task_model", "vision_model", "image_model"}:
resolved = _endpoint_model_from_cache(str(value))
if resolved:
prefix = key[:-6]
s[f"{prefix}_endpoint_id"] = resolved["endpoint_id"]
s[key] = resolved["model"]
value = resolved["model"]
save_settings(s)
if key.endswith("_model") and s.get(f"{key[:-6]}_endpoint_id"):
return {"response": f"Set {key} = {value} (endpoint {s.get(f'{key[:-6]}_endpoint_id')}).", "exit_code": 0}
return {"response": f"Set {key} = {value}.", "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "delete" or action == "reset":
key = _resolve(args.get("key", ""))
if key not in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
return {"error": f"Unknown setting '{args.get('key')}'.", "exit_code": 1}
if _is_secret(key):
return {"response": f"'{key}' is a credential. Reset it in the panel.", "exit_code": 0}
s = load_settings()
s[key] = DEFAULT_SETTINGS[key]
save_settings(s)
return {"response": f"Reset {key} to default ({DEFAULT_SETTINGS[key]}).", "exit_code": 0}
elif action in ("disable_tool", "enable_tool", "list_tools"):
# Tool-toggle actions. These edit settings.json:disabled_tools
# (the global list read on every chat request) rather than
# prefs.json. Friendly aliases accepted: "shell" -> "bash",
# "search" -> "web_search", "browser" -> "builtin_browser",
# "documents" -> the document tool set, "memory" ->
# manage_memory, etc.
from src.settings import get_setting, save_settings, load_settings
_ALIASES = {
"shell": ["bash"],
"terminal": ["bash"],
"search": ["web_search", "web_fetch"],
"web": ["web_search", "web_fetch"],
"browser": ["builtin_browser"],
"documents": ["create_document", "edit_document", "update_document", "suggest_document"],
"doc": ["create_document", "edit_document", "update_document", "suggest_document"],
"memory": ["manage_memory"],
"skills": ["manage_skills"],
"images": ["generate_image"],
"image": ["generate_image"],
"tasks": ["manage_tasks"],
"notes": ["manage_notes"],
"calendar": ["manage_calendar"],
"email": ["mcp__email__list_emails", "mcp__email__read_email", "mcp__email__send_email"],
"research": ["web_search", "web_fetch"], # research is a per-request flag, not a tool (closest analog)
}
if action == "list_tools":
current = get_setting("disabled_tools", []) or []
return {
"response": (
f"Currently disabled: {', '.join(current) if current else '(none)'}.\n"
"Common toggles: shell (bash), search (web_search), browser, documents, "
"memory, skills, images, tasks, notes, calendar, email."
),
"disabled": list(current),
"exit_code": 0,
}
tool_name = (args.get("tool") or args.get("name") or "").strip().lower()
if not tool_name:
return {"error": "tool name required (e.g. 'shell', 'search', 'bash')", "exit_code": 1}
targets = _ALIASES.get(tool_name, [tool_name])
settings = load_settings()
current = list(settings.get("disabled_tools") or [])
before = set(current)
if action == "disable_tool":
for t in targets:
if t not in current:
current.append(t)
else: # enable_tool
current = [t for t in current if t not in targets]
after = set(current)
settings["disabled_tools"] = current
save_settings(settings)
verb = "Disabled" if action == "disable_tool" else "Enabled"
changed = sorted(after.symmetric_difference(before))
return {
"response": (
f"{verb} {tool_name} ({', '.join(targets)}). "
f"Now disabled: {', '.join(current) if current else '(none)'}."
),
"changed": changed,
"disabled": list(current),
"exit_code": 0,
}
else:
return {"error": f"Unknown action: {action}", "exit_code": 1}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"manage_settings error: {e}")
return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}
finally:
db.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# API call tool
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ── registry adapters ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _owner_adapter(fn):
"""Wrap a do_*(content, owner) impl as a registry execute(content, ctx)."""
async def _execute(content: str, ctx: dict) -> dict:
return await fn(content, ctx.get("owner"))
return _execute
ADMIN_TOOL_HANDLERS = {
"manage_endpoints": _owner_adapter(do_manage_endpoints),
"manage_mcp": _owner_adapter(do_manage_mcp),
"manage_webhooks": _owner_adapter(do_manage_webhooks),
"manage_tokens": _owner_adapter(do_manage_tokens),
"manage_settings": _owner_adapter(do_manage_settings),
}
+1 -33
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
import logging
import re
import json
from src.constants import MAX_READ_CHARS
from src.tool_utils import _parse_tool_args
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -154,38 +154,6 @@ def _coerce_email_document_content(existing: str, incoming: str) -> str:
body = new
return header.rstrip() + "\n---\n" + body
def _parse_tool_args(content):
"""Parse a tool-call argument blob.
Accepts either a JSON string or an already-decoded dict. Unwraps the
common `{"body": {...}}` envelope that smaller models emit when they
read tool descriptions like "Body is JSON: {...}" literally — they
pass `body` as a field name rather than treating it as a noun.
Returns a dict on success, raises ValueError on bad JSON.
"""
if isinstance(content, str):
try:
args = json.loads(content) if content.strip() else {}
except (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError) as e:
raise ValueError(str(e))
elif isinstance(content, dict):
args = content
else:
args = {}
# Unwrap {"body": {...}} envelope — but only if `body` is the sole key
# and points at a dict. We don't want to clobber a legitimate `body`
# field on tools where it's a real arg (e.g. send_email body text).
if (
isinstance(args, dict)
and len(args) == 1
and "body" in args
and isinstance(args["body"], dict)
and "action" in args["body"] # extra safety: only unwrap if the inner dict looks like a tool call
):
args = args["body"]
return args
def parse_edit_blocks(content: str) -> list:
"""Parse <<<FIND>>>...<<<REPLACE>>>...<<<END>>> blocks."""
edits = []
+6 -18
View File
@@ -563,9 +563,7 @@ async def _execute_tool_block_impl(
"""
from src.tool_implementations import (
do_search_chats, do_manage_tasks,
do_manage_skills, do_api_call, do_manage_endpoints,
do_manage_mcp, do_manage_webhooks, do_manage_tokens,
do_manage_settings, do_manage_notes,
do_manage_skills, do_api_call, do_manage_notes,
do_manage_calendar,
do_download_model, do_serve_model, do_list_served_models, do_stop_served_model,
do_tail_serve_output,
@@ -808,21 +806,11 @@ async def _execute_tool_block_impl(
first_line = content.split("\n")[0].strip()[:60]
desc = f"api_call: {first_line}"
result = await do_api_call(content)
elif tool == "manage_endpoints":
desc = "manage_endpoints"
result = await do_manage_endpoints(content, owner=owner)
elif tool == "manage_mcp":
desc = "manage_mcp"
result = await do_manage_mcp(content, owner=owner)
elif tool == "manage_webhooks":
desc = "manage_webhooks"
result = await do_manage_webhooks(content, owner=owner)
elif tool == "manage_tokens":
desc = "manage_tokens"
result = await do_manage_tokens(content, owner=owner)
elif tool == "manage_settings":
desc = "manage_settings"
result = await do_manage_settings(content, owner=owner)
elif tool in ("manage_endpoints", "manage_mcp", "manage_webhooks", "manage_tokens", "manage_settings"):
# Registry-dispatched (agent_tools.admin_tools); owner threaded for ownership/admin checks.
desc = tool
result = await _direct_fallback(tool, content, owner=owner) \
or {"error": f"{tool}: execution failed", "exit_code": 1}
elif tool == "manage_notes":
desc = "manage_notes"
result = await do_manage_notes(content, owner=owner)
+2 -785
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
from fastapi import HTTPException
from src.constants import MAX_READ_CHARS, DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR, VAULT_FILE
from src.tool_utils import get_mcp_manager
from src.tool_utils import get_mcp_manager, _parse_tool_args
from core.constants import internal_api_base
from routes._validators import validate_remote_host, validate_ssh_port
@@ -68,38 +68,6 @@ def clear_active_email() -> None:
# Argument parsing
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _parse_tool_args(content):
"""Parse a tool-call argument blob.
Accepts either a JSON string or an already-decoded dict. Unwraps the
common `{"body": {...}}` envelope that smaller models emit when they
read tool descriptions like "Body is JSON: {...}" literally — they
pass `body` as a field name rather than treating it as a noun.
Returns a dict on success, raises ValueError on bad JSON.
"""
if isinstance(content, str):
try:
args = json.loads(content) if content.strip() else {}
except (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError) as e:
raise ValueError(str(e))
elif isinstance(content, dict):
args = content
else:
args = {}
# Unwrap {"body": {...}} envelope — but only if `body` is the sole key
# and points at a dict. We don't want to clobber a legitimate `body`
# field on tools where it's a real arg (e.g. send_email body text).
if (
isinstance(args, dict)
and len(args) == 1
and "body" in args
and isinstance(args["body"], dict)
and "action" in args["body"] # extra safety: only unwrap if the inner dict looks like a tool call
):
args = args["body"]
return args
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Search chats
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -588,757 +556,6 @@ async def do_manage_tasks(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
db.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Endpoint management tool
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def do_manage_endpoints(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
"""Manage model endpoints: list, add, delete, enable, disable."""
from core.database import SessionLocal, ModelEndpoint
try:
args = _parse_tool_args(content)
except ValueError:
return {"error": "Invalid JSON arguments", "exit_code": 1}
action = args.get("action", "list")
db = SessionLocal()
try:
if action == "list":
eps = db.query(ModelEndpoint).all()
items = [{"id": e.id, "name": e.name, "base_url": e.base_url,
"is_enabled": e.is_enabled} for e in eps]
return {"response": f"{len(items)} endpoints", "endpoints": items, "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "add":
import uuid as _uuid
name = args.get("name", "")
base_url = args.get("base_url", "")
api_key = args.get("api_key", "")
if not base_url:
return {"error": "base_url is required", "exit_code": 1}
eid = str(_uuid.uuid4())[:8]
from datetime import datetime
ep = ModelEndpoint(id=eid, name=name or base_url, base_url=base_url,
api_key=api_key, is_enabled=True,
created_at=datetime.utcnow(), updated_at=datetime.utcnow())
db.add(ep)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Added endpoint '{name or base_url}' (id: {eid})", "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "delete":
eid = args.get("endpoint_id", "")
ep = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.id == eid).first()
if not ep:
return {"error": f"Endpoint {eid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
name = ep.name
db.delete(ep)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Deleted endpoint '{name}'", "exit_code": 0}
elif action in ("enable", "disable"):
eid = args.get("endpoint_id", "")
ep = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.id == eid).first()
if not ep:
return {"error": f"Endpoint {eid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
ep.is_enabled = (action == "enable")
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Endpoint '{ep.name}' {action}d", "exit_code": 0}
else:
return {"error": f"Unknown action: {action}", "exit_code": 1}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"manage_endpoints error: {e}")
return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}
finally:
db.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# MCP server management tool
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Parallel to routes/cookbook_helpers._validate_serve_cmd but deliberately the
# opposite policy: that gate guards an admin-only serve command and allows
# interpreters (python3/etc) because model-serving needs them, whereas this is
# the model/prompt-injection-reachable manage_mcp path, so interpreters and
# runners are denied here.
#
# Commands that can execute arbitrary code regardless of their arguments. These
# are NEVER accepted on the manage_mcp agent path, even if an operator lists one
# in ODYSSEUS_MCP_ALLOWED_COMMANDS -- a stdio server that genuinely needs an
# interpreter or package runner must be registered via the trusted admin route.
_MCP_DENIED_COMMANDS = frozenset({
"sh", "bash", "zsh", "fish", "dash", "ksh", "csh", "tcsh", "ash", "busybox",
"cmd", "command.com", "powershell", "pwsh",
"python", "pypy", "node", "nodejs", "deno", "bun", "ruby", "jruby",
"perl", "raku", "php", "lua", "luajit", "tclsh", "wish", "expect", "rscript",
"groovy", "scala", "elixir", "erl", "iex", "java", "javac", "jshell", "jbang",
"kotlin", "kotlinc", "dotnet", "mono", "swift", "osascript", "tsx", "ts-node",
"npx", "bunx", "uvx", "pipx", "npm", "pnpm", "yarn", "pip", "uv",
"gem", "cargo", "go", "bundle", "poetry", "conda", "mamba", "brew",
"apt", "apt-get", "yum", "dnf", "pacman", "apk",
"env", "xargs", "nohup", "setsid", "nice", "ionice", "time", "timeout",
"watch", "stdbuf", "unbuffer", "script", "ssh", "scp", "sshpass", "sudo",
"doas", "su", "make", "cmake", "docker", "podman", "kubectl", "find",
"awk", "gawk", "sed", "vi", "vim", "nvim", "emacs", "ed", "tee", "eval",
})
# Argv flags that make even an allowlisted binary execute inline code. Matched
# by prefix so glued forms (-cimport os, --eval=...) are caught, not just the
# exact-token form.
_MCP_CODE_EXEC_SHORT_FLAGS = ("-c", "-e", "-m")
_MCP_CODE_EXEC_LONG_FLAGS = ("--eval", "--exec", "--print", "--module", "--command", "--require")
_MCP_URL_SCHEMES = ("http://", "https://", "ftp://", "ftps://", "file://", "data:", "jar:", "blob:")
# Shell metacharacters refused in command/args. Args are passed as an argv list
# (no shell), but refusing these keeps the surface narrow and obvious.
_MCP_SHELL_METACHARS = set(";|&$`><\n\r")
# Env vars that let a child process load attacker-supplied code before main().
_MCP_DANGEROUS_ENV = frozenset({
"LD_PRELOAD", "LD_LIBRARY_PATH", "LD_AUDIT", "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES",
"DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH", "DYLD_FRAMEWORK_PATH", "PYTHONPATH", "PYTHONSTARTUP",
"PYTHONHOME", "PYTHONEXECUTABLE", "NODE_OPTIONS", "NODE_PATH", "BASH_ENV",
"ENV", "SHELLOPTS", "PERL5LIB", "PERL5OPT", "RUBYOPT", "RUBYLIB", "GEM_PATH",
"R_PROFILE", "R_HOME", "PATH", "IFS", "PROMPT_COMMAND",
})
def _mcp_allowed_commands() -> set:
"""Operator-configured allowlist of safe MCP launcher basenames for the agent
path. Empty by default; set ODYSSEUS_MCP_ALLOWED_COMMANDS (comma-separated)
to opt specific trusted binaries in. Denied commands are rejected even if
listed here."""
raw = os.environ.get("ODYSSEUS_MCP_ALLOWED_COMMANDS", "")
return {c.strip().lower() for c in raw.split(",") if c.strip()}
def _validate_mcp_command(command, args, env) -> Optional[str]:
"""Validate a model-supplied stdio MCP registration. Returns an error string
if it must be rejected, else None.
Closes the RCE where manage_mcp 'add' passed prompt-injection-controlled
command/args/env straight to a subprocess spawn (issue #438): a payload
smuggled into a skill description, memory entry, fetched page, or email body
could register a stdio server running arbitrary code as the app UID.
"""
if not isinstance(command, str) or not command.strip():
return "command must be a non-empty string"
command = command.strip()
if "/" in command or "\\" in command:
return "command must be a bare executable name, not a path"
if any(ch in _MCP_SHELL_METACHARS for ch in command):
return "command contains shell metacharacters"
base = command.lower()
if base.endswith(".exe") or base.endswith(".cmd") or base.endswith(".bat"):
base = base.rsplit(".", 1)[0]
# Canonicalize a trailing version suffix so versioned aliases collapse to the
# family name (python3.11 -> python, node18 -> node, pip3 -> pip); both the
# raw basename and the canonical form are denied, so an operator cannot
# accidentally allowlist a runtime alias back into the path.
canon = re.sub(r"[-_.]?\d+(?:\.\d+)*$", "", base)
if base in _MCP_DENIED_COMMANDS or canon in _MCP_DENIED_COMMANDS:
return (
f"command '{command}' is not allowed on the agent MCP path: "
"interpreters, runtimes, package runners, and shells can execute "
"arbitrary code. Register such a server via the admin route instead."
)
if base not in _mcp_allowed_commands():
return (
f"command '{command}' is not in the MCP allowlist. Add it to "
"ODYSSEUS_MCP_ALLOWED_COMMANDS if you trust it, or register the "
"server via the admin route."
)
if args is not None:
if isinstance(args, str):
try:
args = json.loads(args)
except Exception:
return "args must be a JSON list"
if not isinstance(args, list):
return "args must be a list"
for a in args:
if not isinstance(a, str):
return "args must all be strings"
s = a.strip()
low = s.lower()
if any(s == f or s.startswith(f) for f in _MCP_CODE_EXEC_SHORT_FLAGS):
return f"arg '{a}' is a code-execution flag and is not allowed"
if any(low == f or low.startswith(f + "=") for f in _MCP_CODE_EXEC_LONG_FLAGS):
return f"arg '{a}' is a code-execution flag and is not allowed"
if any(low.startswith(u) for u in _MCP_URL_SCHEMES):
return f"arg '{a}' is a remote URL and is not allowed"
if any(ch in _MCP_SHELL_METACHARS for ch in a):
return f"arg '{a}' contains shell metacharacters"
if env:
if isinstance(env, str):
try:
env = json.loads(env)
except Exception:
return "env must be a JSON object"
if not isinstance(env, dict):
return "env must be an object"
for k in env:
if str(k).strip().upper() in _MCP_DANGEROUS_ENV:
return f"env var '{k}' can inject code into the child process and is not allowed"
return None
async def do_manage_mcp(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
"""Manage MCP servers: list, add, delete, enable, disable, reconnect."""
try:
args = _parse_tool_args(content)
except ValueError:
return {"error": "Invalid JSON arguments", "exit_code": 1}
action = args.get("action", "list")
if action == "list":
mcp = get_mcp_manager()
if not mcp:
return {"response": "No MCP manager available", "servers": [], "exit_code": 0}
from core.database import SessionLocal, McpServer
db = SessionLocal()
try:
servers = db.query(McpServer).all()
items = []
for s in servers:
st = mcp.get_server_status(s.id)
status = st.get("status", "disconnected")
tool_count = st.get("tool_count", 0)
items.append({"id": s.id, "name": s.name, "transport": s.transport,
"is_enabled": s.is_enabled, "status": status,
"tool_count": tool_count})
return {"response": f"{len(items)} MCP servers", "servers": items, "exit_code": 0}
finally:
db.close()
elif action == "add":
from core.database import SessionLocal, McpServer
import uuid as _uuid
from datetime import datetime
name = args.get("name", "")
command = args.get("command", "")
cmd_args = args.get("args", [])
env = args.get("env", {})
if not name or not command:
return {"error": "name and command are required", "exit_code": 1}
# Validate BEFORE any DB write or spawn: a rejected registration must
# leave no enabled row (which would otherwise auto-reconnect on restart)
# and must not attempt a connection.
_mcp_err = _validate_mcp_command(command, cmd_args, env)
if _mcp_err:
return {"error": f"manage_mcp: refused unsafe server registration: {_mcp_err}", "exit_code": 1}
sid = str(_uuid.uuid4())[:8]
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = McpServer(id=sid, name=name, transport="stdio", command=command,
args=json.dumps(cmd_args) if isinstance(cmd_args, list) else cmd_args,
env=json.dumps(env) if isinstance(env, dict) else env,
is_enabled=True, created_at=datetime.utcnow(), updated_at=datetime.utcnow())
db.add(srv)
db.commit()
finally:
db.close()
# Try to connect
mcp = get_mcp_manager()
tool_count = 0
if mcp:
try:
await mcp.connect_server(
sid, name, "stdio", command=command,
args=cmd_args if isinstance(cmd_args, list) else json.loads(cmd_args),
env=env if isinstance(env, dict) else json.loads(env),
)
st = mcp.get_server_status(sid)
tool_count = st.get("tool_count", 0)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"MCP connect failed for {name}: {e}")
return {"response": f"Added MCP server '{name}' ({tool_count} tools)", "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "delete":
sid = args.get("server_id", "")
from core.database import SessionLocal, McpServer
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == sid).first()
if not srv:
return {"error": f"Server {sid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
name = srv.name
mcp = get_mcp_manager()
if mcp:
try:
await mcp.disconnect_server(sid)
except Exception:
pass
db.delete(srv)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Deleted MCP server '{name}'", "exit_code": 0}
finally:
db.close()
elif action == "reconnect":
sid = args.get("server_id", "")
mcp = get_mcp_manager()
if not mcp:
return {"error": "MCP manager not available", "exit_code": 1}
try:
await mcp.disconnect_server(sid)
from core.database import SessionLocal, McpServer
db2 = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db2.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == sid).first()
if srv:
_args = json.loads(srv.args) if srv.args else []
_env = json.loads(srv.env) if srv.env else {}
await mcp.connect_server(
server_id=sid,
name=srv.name,
transport=srv.transport,
command=srv.command,
args=_args,
env=_env,
url=srv.url,
)
st = mcp.get_server_status(sid)
return {"response": f"Reconnected '{srv.name}' ({st.get('tool_count', 0)} tools)", "exit_code": 0}
return {"error": f"Server {sid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
finally:
db2.close()
except Exception as e:
return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}
elif action in ("enable", "disable"):
sid = args.get("server_id", "")
from core.database import SessionLocal, McpServer
db = SessionLocal()
try:
srv = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.id == sid).first()
if not srv:
return {"error": f"Server {sid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
srv.is_enabled = (action == "enable")
db.commit()
return {"response": f"MCP server '{srv.name}' {action}d", "exit_code": 0}
finally:
db.close()
elif action == "list_tools":
mcp = get_mcp_manager()
if not mcp:
return {"response": "No MCP manager", "tools": [], "exit_code": 0}
tools = mcp.get_all_tools()
items = [{"name": t["name"], "server": t["server_name"],
"description": t.get("description", "")[:100]} for t in tools]
return {"response": f"{len(items)} MCP tools available", "tools": items, "exit_code": 0}
else:
return {"error": f"Unknown action: {action}", "exit_code": 1}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Webhook management tool
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def do_manage_webhooks(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
"""Manage webhooks: list, add, delete, enable, disable, test."""
from core.database import SessionLocal
try:
args = _parse_tool_args(content)
except ValueError:
return {"error": "Invalid JSON arguments", "exit_code": 1}
action = args.get("action", "list")
db = SessionLocal()
try:
from core.database import Webhook
if action == "list":
hooks = db.query(Webhook).all()
items = [{"id": h.id, "name": h.name, "url": h.url,
"events": h.events, "is_active": h.is_active} for h in hooks]
return {"response": f"{len(items)} webhooks", "webhooks": items, "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "add":
import uuid as _uuid
from datetime import datetime
from src.webhook_manager import validate_events, validate_webhook_url
name = args.get("name", "")
url = args.get("url", "")
events = args.get("events", "chat.completed")
if not url:
return {"error": "url is required", "exit_code": 1}
try:
url = validate_webhook_url(url)
events = validate_events(events)
except ValueError as e:
return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}
wid = str(_uuid.uuid4())[:8]
hook = Webhook(id=wid, name=name or url, url=url,
events=events, is_active=True,
created_at=datetime.utcnow(), updated_at=datetime.utcnow())
db.add(hook)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Added webhook '{name or url}'", "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "delete":
wid = args.get("webhook_id", "")
hook = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == wid).first()
if not hook:
return {"error": f"Webhook {wid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
name = hook.name
db.delete(hook)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Deleted webhook '{name}'", "exit_code": 0}
elif action in ("enable", "disable"):
wid = args.get("webhook_id", "")
hook = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == wid).first()
if not hook:
return {"error": f"Webhook {wid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
hook.is_active = (action == "enable")
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Webhook '{hook.name}' {action}d", "exit_code": 0}
else:
return {"error": f"Unknown action: {action}", "exit_code": 1}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"manage_webhooks error: {e}")
return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}
finally:
db.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# API token management tool
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def do_manage_tokens(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
"""Manage API tokens: list, create, delete."""
from core.database import SessionLocal, ApiToken
try:
args = _parse_tool_args(content)
except ValueError:
return {"error": "Invalid JSON arguments", "exit_code": 1}
action = args.get("action", "list")
db = SessionLocal()
try:
if action == "list":
tokens = db.query(ApiToken).all()
items = [{"id": t.id, "name": t.name, "token_prefix": t.token_prefix + "...",
"is_active": t.is_active} for t in tokens]
return {"response": f"{len(items)} API tokens", "tokens": items, "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "create":
import uuid as _uuid, secrets, bcrypt
from datetime import datetime
name = args.get("name", "API Token")
raw_token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
token_hash = bcrypt.hashpw(raw_token.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode()
tid = str(_uuid.uuid4())[:8]
t = ApiToken(id=tid, name=name, token_hash=token_hash,
token_prefix=raw_token[:8], is_active=True,
created_at=datetime.utcnow(), updated_at=datetime.utcnow())
db.add(t)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Created token '{name}'", "token": raw_token, "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "delete":
tid = args.get("token_id", "")
t = db.query(ApiToken).filter(ApiToken.id == tid).first()
if not t:
return {"error": f"Token {tid} not found", "exit_code": 1}
name = t.name
db.delete(t)
db.commit()
return {"response": f"Deleted token '{name}'", "exit_code": 0}
else:
return {"error": f"Unknown action: {action}", "exit_code": 1}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"manage_tokens error: {e}")
return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}
finally:
db.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Settings/preferences management tool
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def do_manage_settings(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
"""Manage user settings and preferences."""
try:
args = _parse_tool_args(content)
except ValueError:
return {"error": "Invalid JSON arguments", "exit_code": 1}
action = args.get("action", "list")
from core.database import SessionLocal
db = SessionLocal()
try:
# set/get/list/delete operate on the REAL app settings (the same store
# the Settings panel writes), so changing a model / voice / search
# engine / reminder channel from chat actually takes effect.
from src.settings import load_settings, save_settings, DEFAULT_SETTINGS
# Secrets/credentials the agent must NOT write — kept read-only (masked)
# so API keys never flow through chat. User sets these in the panel.
_SECRET_KEYS = {
"brave_api_key", "google_pse_key", "google_pse_cx",
"tavily_api_key", "serper_api_key", "app_public_url",
}
def _is_secret(k):
# `token` must be a suffix, not a substring: otherwise the int
# setting `agent_input_token_budget` (which even has a "token budget"
# alias to set it from chat) is wrongly classified as a credential.
return (
k in _SECRET_KEYS
or k.endswith("token")
or any(t in k for t in ("api_key", "_key", "secret", "password"))
)
# Friendly aliases → real keys, so natural phrasing resolves.
_ALIASES_SET = {
"voice": "tts_voice", "tts voice": "tts_voice", "tts": "tts_enabled",
"text to speech": "tts_enabled", "tts provider": "tts_provider",
"speech speed": "tts_speed", "voice speed": "tts_speed",
"stt": "stt_enabled", "speech to text": "stt_enabled", "transcription": "stt_enabled",
"search engine": "search_provider", "search provider": "search_provider",
"search results": "search_result_count", "result count": "search_result_count",
"default model": "default_model", "chat model": "default_model",
"default endpoint": "default_endpoint_id",
"task model": "task_model", "background model": "task_model",
"teacher model": "teacher_model", "teacher": "teacher_enabled",
"utility model": "utility_model", "research model": "research_model",
"research max tokens": "research_max_tokens",
"vision model": "vision_model", "vision": "vision_enabled",
"image model": "image_model", "image quality": "image_quality",
"image gen": "image_gen_enabled", "image generation": "image_gen_enabled",
"reminder channel": "reminder_channel", "reminders": "reminder_channel",
"ntfy topic": "reminder_ntfy_topic",
"webhook integration": "reminder_webhook_integration_id",
"webhook template": "reminder_webhook_payload_template", "webhook payload": "reminder_webhook_payload_template",
"agent tool calls": "agent_max_tool_calls", "max tool calls": "agent_max_tool_calls",
"agent timeout": "agent_stream_timeout_seconds", "stream timeout": "agent_stream_timeout_seconds",
"token budget": "agent_input_token_budget", "input budget": "agent_input_token_budget",
"hard max": "agent_input_token_hard_max",
"token budget cap": "agent_input_token_hard_max",
"input budget cap": "agent_input_token_hard_max",
}
def _resolve(k):
k2 = (k or "").strip().lower()
if k2 in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
return k2
return _ALIASES_SET.get(k2, (k or "").strip())
_ENUMS = {
"image_quality": ["low", "medium", "high"],
"reminder_channel": ["browser", "email", "ntfy", "webhook"],
}
def _coerce(value, default):
if isinstance(default, bool):
return value if isinstance(value, bool) else str(value).strip().lower() in ("true", "on", "yes", "1", "enable", "enabled")
if isinstance(default, int):
return int(value)
return value
def _model_slug(value: str) -> str:
import re as _re
return _re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "", (value or "").lower())
def _endpoint_model_from_cache(model_query: str):
"""Resolve friendly model text to an enabled endpoint + real model id.
The Settings UI stores both `<prefix>_endpoint_id` and
`<prefix>_model`; writing only the model leaves the runtime on the
old endpoint. Prefer cached model lists so this stays fast/offline.
"""
import json as _json
import re as _re
from core.database import ModelEndpoint
wanted = (model_query or "").strip()
wanted_slug = _model_slug(wanted)
wanted_tokens = [_model_slug(t) for t in _re.findall(r"[A-Za-z0-9]+", wanted)]
wanted_tokens = [t for t in wanted_tokens if t]
if not wanted_slug:
return None
best = None
for ep in db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True).all():
raw_models = []
try:
raw_models = _json.loads(ep.cached_models or "[]") or []
except Exception:
raw_models = []
# If cache is empty, still allow matching against endpoint name
# for callers using model@endpoint elsewhere later.
for mid in raw_models:
mid = str(mid)
mid_slug = _model_slug(mid)
if not mid_slug:
continue
exact = mid.lower() == wanted.lower()
compact_match = wanted_slug in mid_slug or mid_slug in wanted_slug
token_match = bool(wanted_tokens) and all(tok in mid_slug for tok in wanted_tokens)
if exact or compact_match or token_match:
score = 3 if exact else (2 if compact_match else 1)
if not best or score > best[0]:
best = (score, ep.id, mid)
if best:
return {"endpoint_id": best[1], "model": best[2]}
return None
def _mask(k, v):
return "••••• (set in panel)" if _is_secret(k) and v else v
if action == "list":
s = load_settings()
shown = {k: _mask(k, v) for k, v in s.items() if k in DEFAULT_SETTINGS and not isinstance(v, dict)}
return {"response": f"{len(shown)} settings (use get/set with a key)", "settings": shown, "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "get":
key = _resolve(args.get("key", ""))
if not key:
return {"error": "key is required", "exit_code": 1}
if key not in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
return {"error": f"Unknown setting '{args.get('key')}'. Use action='list' to see them.", "exit_code": 1}
val = load_settings().get(key, DEFAULT_SETTINGS.get(key))
return {"response": f"{key} = {_mask(key, val)}", "value": _mask(key, val), "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "set":
raw = args.get("key", "")
value = args.get("value")
if not raw:
return {"error": "key is required", "exit_code": 1}
key = _resolve(raw)
if key not in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
return {"error": f"Unknown setting '{raw}'. Use action='list' to see available settings.", "exit_code": 1}
if _is_secret(key):
return {"response": f"'{key}' is a credential/secret — for security I can't set it from chat. Open Settings and set it there.", "exit_code": 0}
# Structured settings (dicts/lists like keybinds, default_model_fallbacks)
# have no safe scalar coercion — _coerce would pass a bare string
# straight through and clobber the structure. Refuse them here; they're
# edited in their dedicated panels. (reset/delete still restore the
# default structure, which is safe.)
if isinstance(DEFAULT_SETTINGS[key], (dict, list)):
return {"response": f"'{key}' is a structured setting — edit it in its panel, not from chat. (You can reset it to default here.)", "exit_code": 0}
try:
value = _coerce(value, DEFAULT_SETTINGS[key])
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return {"error": f"'{value}' isn't a valid value for {key} (expected {type(DEFAULT_SETTINGS[key]).__name__}).", "exit_code": 1}
if key in _ENUMS and str(value).lower() not in _ENUMS[key]:
return {"error": f"{key} must be one of: {', '.join(_ENUMS[key])}.", "exit_code": 1}
s = load_settings()
s[key] = value
if key in {"default_model", "research_model", "utility_model", "task_model", "vision_model", "image_model"}:
resolved = _endpoint_model_from_cache(str(value))
if resolved:
prefix = key[:-6]
s[f"{prefix}_endpoint_id"] = resolved["endpoint_id"]
s[key] = resolved["model"]
value = resolved["model"]
save_settings(s)
if key.endswith("_model") and s.get(f"{key[:-6]}_endpoint_id"):
return {"response": f"Set {key} = {value} (endpoint {s.get(f'{key[:-6]}_endpoint_id')}).", "exit_code": 0}
return {"response": f"Set {key} = {value}.", "exit_code": 0}
elif action == "delete" or action == "reset":
key = _resolve(args.get("key", ""))
if key not in DEFAULT_SETTINGS:
return {"error": f"Unknown setting '{args.get('key')}'.", "exit_code": 1}
if _is_secret(key):
return {"response": f"'{key}' is a credential — reset it in the panel.", "exit_code": 0}
s = load_settings()
s[key] = DEFAULT_SETTINGS[key]
save_settings(s)
return {"response": f"Reset {key} to default ({DEFAULT_SETTINGS[key]}).", "exit_code": 0}
elif action in ("disable_tool", "enable_tool", "list_tools"):
# Tool-toggle actions. These edit settings.json:disabled_tools
# (the global list read on every chat request) rather than
# prefs.json. Friendly aliases accepted: "shell" -> "bash",
# "search" -> "web_search", "browser" -> "builtin_browser",
# "documents" -> the document tool set, "memory" ->
# manage_memory, etc.
from src.settings import get_setting, save_settings, load_settings
_ALIASES = {
"shell": ["bash"],
"terminal": ["bash"],
"search": ["web_search", "web_fetch"],
"web": ["web_search", "web_fetch"],
"browser": ["builtin_browser"],
"documents": ["create_document", "edit_document", "update_document", "suggest_document"],
"doc": ["create_document", "edit_document", "update_document", "suggest_document"],
"memory": ["manage_memory"],
"skills": ["manage_skills"],
"images": ["generate_image"],
"image": ["generate_image"],
"tasks": ["manage_tasks"],
"notes": ["manage_notes"],
"calendar": ["manage_calendar"],
"email": ["mcp__email__list_emails", "mcp__email__read_email", "mcp__email__send_email"],
"research": ["web_search", "web_fetch"], # research is a per-request flag, not a tool — closest analog
}
if action == "list_tools":
current = get_setting("disabled_tools", []) or []
return {
"response": (
f"Currently disabled: {', '.join(current) if current else '(none)'}.\n"
"Common toggles: shell (bash), search (web_search), browser, documents, "
"memory, skills, images, tasks, notes, calendar, email."
),
"disabled": list(current),
"exit_code": 0,
}
tool_name = (args.get("tool") or args.get("name") or "").strip().lower()
if not tool_name:
return {"error": "tool name required (e.g. 'shell', 'search', 'bash')", "exit_code": 1}
targets = _ALIASES.get(tool_name, [tool_name])
settings = load_settings()
current = list(settings.get("disabled_tools") or [])
before = set(current)
if action == "disable_tool":
for t in targets:
if t not in current:
current.append(t)
else: # enable_tool
current = [t for t in current if t not in targets]
after = set(current)
settings["disabled_tools"] = current
save_settings(settings)
verb = "Disabled" if action == "disable_tool" else "Enabled"
changed = sorted(after.symmetric_difference(before))
return {
"response": (
f"{verb} {tool_name} ({', '.join(targets)}). "
f"Now disabled: {', '.join(current) if current else '(none)'}."
),
"changed": changed,
"disabled": list(current),
"exit_code": 0,
}
else:
return {"error": f"Unknown action: {action}", "exit_code": 1}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"manage_settings error: {e}")
return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}
finally:
db.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# API call tool
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def do_api_call(content: str) -> Dict:
"""Execute an API call to a registered integration."""
from src.integrations import execute_api_call, load_integrations
@@ -3452,7 +2669,7 @@ async def do_adopt_served_model(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Di
host_only = host.split("@", 1)[-1] if host else "localhost"
endpoint_url = f"http://{host_only}:{int(port)}/v1"
try:
from src.tool_implementations import do_manage_endpoints # avoid forward ref issues
from src.agent_tools.admin_tools import do_manage_endpoints # moved in #3629
except Exception:
do_manage_endpoints = None
if do_manage_endpoints is not None:
+35
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ src.constants which imports nothing from src). Adding a project import here
will reintroduce the circular dependency that this module exists to break.
"""
import json
from src.constants import MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS
_mcp_manager = None
@@ -37,3 +39,36 @@ def _truncate(text: str, limit: int = MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS) -> str:
if len(text) > limit:
return text[:limit] + f"\n... (truncated, {len(text)} chars total)"
return text
def _parse_tool_args(content):
"""Parse a tool-call argument blob.
Accepts either a JSON string or an already-decoded dict. Unwraps the
common `{"body": {...}}` envelope that smaller models emit when they
read tool descriptions like "Body is JSON: {...}" literally and
pass `body` as a field name rather than treating it as a noun.
Returns a dict on success, raises ValueError on bad JSON.
"""
if isinstance(content, str):
try:
args = json.loads(content) if content.strip() else {}
except (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError) as e:
raise ValueError(str(e))
elif isinstance(content, dict):
args = content
else:
args = {}
# Unwrap {"body": {...}} envelope, but only if `body` is the sole key
# and points at a dict. We don't want to clobber a legitimate `body`
# field on tools where it's a real arg (e.g. send_email body text).
if (
isinstance(args, dict)
and len(args) == 1
and "body" in args
and isinstance(args["body"], dict)
and "action" in args["body"] # extra safety: only unwrap if the inner dict looks like a tool call
):
args = args["body"]
return args
+69
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
"""Registry wiring for the config/integration admin tools (#3629).
manage_endpoints/mcp/webhooks/tokens/settings moved from tool_implementations
into agent_tools.admin_tools. These pin the registration + the single
owner-threading adapter factory, without touching the DB (the do_* impls
themselves are exercised by their own suites).
"""
import asyncio
from src.agent_tools import TOOL_HANDLERS
from src.agent_tools.admin_tools import (
ADMIN_TOOL_HANDLERS, _owner_adapter,
do_manage_endpoints, do_manage_mcp, do_manage_webhooks,
do_manage_tokens, do_manage_settings,
)
_NAMES = ["manage_endpoints", "manage_mcp", "manage_webhooks", "manage_tokens", "manage_settings"]
def test_all_registered_in_tool_handlers():
for n in _NAMES:
assert n in TOOL_HANDLERS, f"{n} missing from TOOL_HANDLERS"
assert n in ADMIN_TOOL_HANDLERS
def test_re_exported_from_agent_tools():
# Back-compat: importers that used `from src.agent_tools import do_manage_*`
# keep working after the move.
from src.agent_tools import ( # noqa: F401
do_manage_endpoints, do_manage_mcp, do_manage_webhooks,
do_manage_tokens, do_manage_settings,
)
def test_owner_adapter_threads_owner_from_ctx():
seen = {}
async def _spy(content, owner):
seen["content"] = content
seen["owner"] = owner
return {"response": "ok", "exit_code": 0}
handler = _owner_adapter(_spy)
res = asyncio.run(handler('{"action":"list"}', {"owner": "alice", "session_id": "s1"}))
assert res["exit_code"] == 0
assert seen == {"content": '{"action":"list"}', "owner": "alice"}
def test_owner_adapter_defaults_owner_to_none():
captured = {}
async def _spy(content, owner):
captured["owner"] = owner
return {"exit_code": 0}
asyncio.run(_owner_adapter(_spy)("{}", {})) # ctx without owner
assert captured["owner"] is None
def test_parse_tool_args_lives_in_tool_utils_single_source():
# The helper was de-duplicated into tool_utils; admin_tools imports it
# from there rather than carrying its own copy.
from src.tool_utils import _parse_tool_args
from src.agent_tools import admin_tools, document_tools
assert admin_tools._parse_tool_args is _parse_tool_args
assert document_tools._parse_tool_args is _parse_tool_args
assert _parse_tool_args('{"action":"add"}') == {"action": "add"}
# body-envelope unwrap still works
assert _parse_tool_args('{"body":{"action":"x"}}') == {"action": "x"}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ def test_default_settings_registers_hard_max_key():
def test_alias_map_registers_friendly_names():
"""`manage_settings` should accept 'hard max' and friends."""
from pathlib import Path
src = Path("src/tool_implementations.py").read_text()
# manage_settings (and its alias map) moved to agent_tools/admin_tools.py in #3629.
src = Path("src/agent_tools/admin_tools.py").read_text()
assert '"hard max": "agent_input_token_hard_max"' in src
assert '"token budget cap": "agent_input_token_hard_max"' in src
assert '"input budget cap": "agent_input_token_hard_max"' in src
+2 -2
View File
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ clear_fake_database_modules()
import core.database as cdb
from core.database import McpServer
import src.tool_implementations as ti
from src.tool_implementations import _validate_mcp_command
import src.agent_tools.admin_tools as ti # do_manage_mcp/get_mcp_manager moved here in the registry migration
from src.agent_tools.admin_tools import _validate_mcp_command
_TS, _ENGINE, _TMPDB = make_temp_sqlite(cdb.Base.metadata)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import asyncio
import json
import src.settings as settings_mod
from src.tool_implementations import do_manage_settings
from src.agent_tools.admin_tools import do_manage_settings
def test_set_token_budget_is_not_refused_as_secret(monkeypatch):
+2 -2
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ from types import SimpleNamespace
def test_reconnect_passes_full_server_config():
"""do_manage_mcp reconnect must pass name/transport/command/args/env/url."""
from src.tool_implementations import do_manage_mcp
from src.agent_tools.admin_tools import do_manage_mcp
fake_mcp = MagicMock()
fake_mcp.disconnect_server = AsyncMock()
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ def test_reconnect_passes_full_server_config():
fake_db = MagicMock()
fake_db.query.return_value.filter.return_value.first.return_value = fake_srv
with patch("src.tool_implementations.get_mcp_manager", return_value=fake_mcp), \
with patch("src.agent_tools.admin_tools.get_mcp_manager", return_value=fake_mcp), \
patch("core.database.SessionLocal", return_value=fake_db):
result = asyncio.run(do_manage_mcp(
json.dumps({"action": "reconnect", "server_id": "srv-123"})
+1 -1
View File
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ async def test_webhook_tool_reuses_private_url_validation():
monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "core.database", fake_core_db)
monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "src.database", fake_src_db)
from src.tool_implementations import do_manage_webhooks
from src.agent_tools.admin_tools import do_manage_webhooks
try:
result = await do_manage_webhooks(