fix(security): gate codex cookbook routes behind admin check for cookie sessions (#4554)

The Codex cookbook bridge authorized cookie sessions with require_user()
only, allowing non-admin accounts to read cookbook task state, server
topology, task logs, tmux sessions, and model presets. The stop/adopt
routes also execute local or SSH-backed tmux commands.

Add _require_cookbook_scope() that enforces require_admin() for
cookie-session callers while preserving the existing API-token scope
checks. Apply it to all nine /api/codex/cookbook/* routes.

Fixes #4542

Co-authored-by: michaelxer <michaelxer@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Michael
2026-06-27 20:09:32 +07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 8888819d74
commit e3ecdd3207
2 changed files with 142 additions and 9 deletions
+24 -9
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ from typing import Any
from fastapi import APIRouter, BackgroundTasks, Body, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import StreamingResponse
from core.middleware import require_admin
from src.auth_helpers import require_authenticated_request, require_user
from src.tool_implementations import do_manage_notes
from src.constants import COOKBOOK_STATE_FILE
@@ -109,6 +110,20 @@ def _scope_owner_all(request: Request, required: set[str]) -> str:
return require_user(request)
def _require_cookbook_scope(request: Request, allowed: set[str]) -> str:
"""Authorize a Codex cookbook route.
For API-token callers, enforce the given scope set.
For cookie-session callers, additionally require admin privileges
because cookbook surfaces expose host topology, task logs, tmux
commands, and model-serving controls.
"""
owner = _scope_owner(request, allowed)
if not getattr(request.state, "api_token", False):
require_admin(request)
return owner
def _find_endpoint(router: APIRouter | None, method: str, path: str):
if router is None:
return None
@@ -532,14 +547,14 @@ def setup_codex_routes(
@router.get("/cookbook/tasks")
async def codex_cookbook_tasks(request: Request):
_scope_owner(request, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
_require_cookbook_scope(request, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
state = _read_cookbook_state()
tasks = state.get("tasks") or []
return {"tasks": [_redact_task(t) for t in tasks]}
@router.get("/cookbook/servers")
async def codex_cookbook_servers(request: Request):
_scope_owner(request, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
_require_cookbook_scope(request, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
state = _read_cookbook_state()
servers = state.get("env", {}).get("servers") or []
# Strip ssh creds / passwords; keep only what's needed to pick a host.
@@ -558,7 +573,7 @@ def setup_codex_routes(
@router.get("/cookbook/output/{session_id}")
async def codex_cookbook_output(request: Request, session_id: str, tail: int = 400):
_scope_owner(request, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
_require_cookbook_scope(request, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
# Defensive: session_id must be the tmux-style id we issue
# (`serve-XXXX` / `cookbook-XXXX` / `queue-XXXX`); anything else
# would let the agent run arbitrary `tmux capture-pane` targets.
@@ -600,7 +615,7 @@ def setup_codex_routes(
@router.post("/cookbook/serve")
async def codex_cookbook_serve(request: Request, body: dict[str, Any] = Body(default_factory=dict)):
_scope_owner(request, COOKBOOK_LAUNCH_SCOPES)
_require_cookbook_scope(request, COOKBOOK_LAUNCH_SCOPES)
# Wraps /api/model/serve with the SAME validation the UI uses.
# _validate_serve_cmd (called inside model_serve) rejects shell
# metachars and requires the leading binary to be in the
@@ -639,7 +654,7 @@ def setup_codex_routes(
@router.post("/cookbook/stop/{session_id}")
async def codex_cookbook_stop(request: Request, session_id: str):
_scope_owner(request, COOKBOOK_LAUNCH_SCOPES)
_require_cookbook_scope(request, COOKBOOK_LAUNCH_SCOPES)
import re as _re
if not _re.fullmatch(r"[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+", session_id):
raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid session id")
@@ -659,7 +674,7 @@ def setup_codex_routes(
"""List cached models on a configured server (or local if host is omitted).
Mirrors `list_cached_models` from the chat agent so external agents have
the same inventory view before deciding what to serve/download."""
_scope_owner(request, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
_require_cookbook_scope(request, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
# Hit /api/model/cached internally, with the same modelDirs the chat
# agent's list_cached_models would resolve from cookbook state.
state = _read_cookbook_state()
@@ -721,7 +736,7 @@ def setup_codex_routes(
"""List saved serve presets (model + host + port + launch cmd).
Counterpart to `list_serve_presets`. Use BEFORE composing a `serve`
body — the user's saved preset usually has the working cmd already."""
_scope_owner(request, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
_require_cookbook_scope(request, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
state = _read_cookbook_state()
presets = state.get("presets") or []
out = []
@@ -741,7 +756,7 @@ def setup_codex_routes(
async def codex_cookbook_serve_preset(request: Request, name: str):
"""Launch a saved preset by name. Reuses the working cmd + host the
user already saved, avoiding the cmd-allowlist trial-and-error loop."""
_scope_owner(request, COOKBOOK_LAUNCH_SCOPES)
_require_cookbook_scope(request, COOKBOOK_LAUNCH_SCOPES)
import re as _re
if not _re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9 _.:@\-]+", name):
raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid preset name")
@@ -793,7 +808,7 @@ def setup_codex_routes(
cookbook tracking. Needed when serve_model rejects a cmd and the
agent falls back to direct ssh — without adoption the session is
invisible to the UI. Body: {tmux_session, model, host?, port?}."""
_scope_owner(request, COOKBOOK_LAUNCH_SCOPES)
_require_cookbook_scope(request, COOKBOOK_LAUNCH_SCOPES)
norm = dict(body or {})
sess = (norm.get("tmux_session") or norm.get("session_id") or "").strip()
model = (norm.get("model") or norm.get("repo_id") or "").strip()
+118
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
"""Codex cookbook routes require admin for cookie-session callers.
Regression test for issue #4542: non-admin users could reach cookbook
routes (tasks, servers, output, stop, adopt, presets, etc.) through
normal cookie sessions because _scope_owner only checked login status,
not admin privileges.
After the fix, cookie-session callers must be admin; API-token callers
are still governed by scope checks only.
"""
import pytest
from types import SimpleNamespace
from fastapi import HTTPException
from routes.codex_routes import _require_cookbook_scope
COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES = {"cookbook:read", "cookbook:launch"}
COOKBOOK_LAUNCH_SCOPES = {"cookbook:launch"}
def _cookie_request(*, current_user="bob", is_admin=False):
"""Simulate a cookie-session request (no api_token)."""
auth_mgr = SimpleNamespace(
is_configured=True,
is_admin=lambda user: is_admin and user == "bob",
)
return SimpleNamespace(
state=SimpleNamespace(
current_user=current_user,
api_token=False,
),
app=SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(auth_manager=auth_mgr)),
headers={},
)
def _api_token_request(*, scopes=None, owner="alice"):
"""Simulate an API-token request."""
return SimpleNamespace(
state=SimpleNamespace(
current_user="api",
api_token=True,
api_token_scopes=scopes or [],
api_token_owner=owner,
),
app=SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(auth_manager=None)),
headers={},
)
class TestCookieSessionAdminGate:
"""Non-admin cookie sessions must be rejected; admin sessions allowed."""
def test_non_admin_rejected_read(self, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
req = _cookie_request(is_admin=False)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
_require_cookbook_scope(req, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
assert exc.value.status_code == 403
def test_non_admin_rejected_launch(self, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
req = _cookie_request(is_admin=False)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
_require_cookbook_scope(req, COOKBOOK_LAUNCH_SCOPES)
assert exc.value.status_code == 403
def test_admin_allowed_read(self, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
req = _cookie_request(is_admin=True)
owner = _require_cookbook_scope(req, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
assert owner == "bob"
def test_admin_allowed_launch(self, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
req = _cookie_request(is_admin=True)
owner = _require_cookbook_scope(req, COOKBOOK_LAUNCH_SCOPES)
assert owner == "bob"
class TestApiTokenScopeGate:
"""API-token callers are governed by scope, not admin status."""
def test_token_with_scope_allowed(self, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
req = _api_token_request(scopes=["cookbook:read"])
owner = _require_cookbook_scope(req, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
assert owner == "alice"
def test_token_missing_scope_rejected(self, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
req = _api_token_request(scopes=["unrelated:scope"])
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
_require_cookbook_scope(req, COOKBOOK_READ_SCOPES)
assert exc.value.status_code == 403
class TestSourceCodeGate:
"""Static checks: all cookbook routes use _require_cookbook_scope."""
def test_no_raw_scope_owner_in_cookbook_routes(self):
from pathlib import Path
source = Path("routes/codex_routes.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
# _scope_owner should NOT appear inside cookbook route handlers.
# Find lines between cookbook route defs that still call _scope_owner.
in_cookbook = False
violations = []
for i, line in enumerate(source.splitlines(), 1):
if "@router." in line and "/cookbook/" in line:
in_cookbook = True
elif "@router." in line and "/cookbook/" not in line:
in_cookbook = False
if in_cookbook and "_scope_owner(request" in line:
violations.append((i, line.strip()))
assert violations == [], (
f"Cookbook routes still use _scope_owner instead of _require_cookbook_scope: {violations}"
)