* fix(rag): skip hidden and junk directories when indexing (#5559)
index_personal_documents walked the whole tree with no pruning, so
pointing RAG at a real-world folder silently swept in .obsidian/ plugin
JS, .git/ internals, node_modules/, and __pycache__/ — multiplying
indexing time and polluting retrieval with junk chunks.
Prune hidden directories and well-known junk directories from the walk,
and skip hidden files. The explicitly passed root is exempt, so a user
who deliberately indexes a hidden directory still gets its contents.
* fix(rag): prune hidden/junk dirs in the keyword index too, via a shared helper
The #5559 fix pruned only VectorRAG.index_personal_documents (the vector index).
The parallel keyword index built by PersonalDocsManager.refresh_index ->
load_personal_index walked the same tree unpruned, so .obsidian/, .git/,
node_modules/ etc. still swept into keyword retrieval and the file listing —
the 'end-to-end' guarantee was only half true.
Single-source the pruning policy in src/index_walk (prune_index_dirs +
is_indexable_file) and use it from both walkers so they cannot drift again.
The junk-dir match is now case-insensitive, so a Node_Modules on a
case-insensitive filesystem is pruned too.
Tests: keyword-path regressions covering hidden/junk dirs, hidden files, junk
at depth (not just top level), case-insensitive junk, and the explicit-hidden-
root exemption. The existing vector tests still pass against the shared helper.
* fix(email): use XOAUTH2 in test-connection for Google OAuth accounts
The test-connection endpoint was password-only and had no awareness of
OAuth accounts. For Google-connected accounts this caused two failures:
- IMAP: "Need IMAP host, username, and password" because imap_pass is
empty (no password is stored for OAuth accounts)
- SMTP: 535 BadCredentials because smtp.login() was called with an
empty password instead of an XOAUTH2 token
Fix: include oauth_provider and token fields in saved_body when hydrating
from the DB, then use conn.authenticate("XOAUTH2") / smtp.auth("XOAUTH2")
for Google accounts in both the IMAP and SMTP test paths, mirroring what
_send_smtp_message already does for real sends.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(email): add OAuth2 tests for test-connection endpoint
Covers the XOAUTH2 changes made to routes/email_routes.py:
- Google OAuth accounts must not be rejected with 'Need IMAP host,
username, and password' (no stored password for OAuth accounts)
- IMAP and SMTP test paths must use conn.authenticate('XOAUTH2')
for Google accounts
- Password accounts must still use conn.login() / smtp.login()
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(email): bind OAuth account tests to Google transport
---------
Co-authored-by: TNTBA <trynottobreakanything@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(config): forward Google OAuth env vars into Docker container and document setup
GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, and GOOGLE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI
were read by the app but never forwarded through docker-compose.yml's explicit
environment allowlist, causing the "not set" error even when the vars existed in .env.
Also adds a documented section to .env.example with step-by-step GCP setup instructions
so users know where to get the credentials.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(config): cover OAuth in standalone compose files
* test(config): parse OAuth compose service env
* test(config): keep checkout skip wording neutral
---------
Co-authored-by: TNTBA <trynottobreakanything@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Slice 2i of the route-domain reorganization (#4082/#4071). Moves
compare_routes.py into routes/compare/, leaving a backward-compat
sys.modules shim at the old path. Pure file reorganization, no behavior
change.
The shim uses sys.modules replacement so the `import ... as cr` +
`monkeypatch.setattr(cr, "SessionLocal", ...)` / `"_owned_endpoint_by_url"`
/ `"_owned_endpoint_by_id"` pattern in test_endpoint_owner_scope_followup.py
reaches the canonical module.
Canonical module imports only from core/, src/, and routes.session_routes
(zero dependency on the legacy shim). One source-introspection test site
repointed: test_endpoint_owner_scope_followup.py (shared with other domains;
only the compare entry repointed here).
Adds tests/test_compare_routes_shim.py to pin the sys.modules shim
contract. Verified: compileall clean; targeted tests pass.
Slice 2h of the route-domain reorganization (#4082/#4071). Moves
admin_wipe_routes.py into routes/admin_wipe/, leaving a backward-compat
sys.modules shim at the old path. Pure file reorganization, no behavior
change.
The shim uses sys.modules replacement so the `import ... as
admin_wipe_routes` + `monkeypatch.setattr(admin_wipe_routes, "SessionLocal",
...)` / `"require_admin"` pattern in test_admin_wipe_gallery.py reaches
the canonical module.
Canonical module imports only from core/, src/, and stdlib (zero internal
routes/ coupling). Zero source-introspection landmines.
Adds tests/test_admin_wipe_routes_shim.py to pin the sys.modules shim
contract. Verified: compileall clean; targeted tests pass.
Slice 2g of the route-domain reorganization (#4082/#4071). Moves
cleanup_routes.py into routes/cleanup/, leaving a backward-compat
sys.modules shim at the old path. Pure file reorganization, no behavior
change.
The shim uses sys.modules replacement so string-targeted
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.cleanup_routes.*", ...) in
test_cleanup_owner_scope.py reaches the canonical module.
Canonical module imports only from src/ and stdlib (zero internal
routes/ coupling). Zero source-introspection landmines.
Adds tests/test_cleanup_routes_shim.py to pin the sys.modules shim
contract. Verified: compileall clean; targeted tests pass.
Slice 2f of the route-domain reorganization (#4082/#4071, per
specs/architecture-runtime-inventory.md §6.3). Moves note_routes.py into
routes/note/, leaving a backward-compat sys.modules shim at the old path.
Pure file reorganization, no behavior change.
The shim uses sys.modules replacement (same pattern as the merged gallery
#4903, research #4975, memory #5007, history #5090, and contacts #5227
slices) so that `import routes.note_routes`, `from routes.note_routes import
X`, `importlib.import_module(...)`, and the `import ... as note_routes` +
`monkeypatch.setattr(note_routes, "SessionLocal", ...)` pattern used by
test_note_reminder_fire_scope.py / test_notes_fail_closed_auth.py all
operate on the same module object the application uses.
The canonical module does NOT depend on the shim — routes/note/note_routes.py
imports only from core/, src/, and stdlib. The outbound email cross-domain
imports (routes.email_routes._get_email_config, routes.email_helpers.
_send_smtp_message) are function-local lazy imports that keep resolving
through the email module's own path (email is not yet migrated).
One source-introspection test site repointed to the new canonical path:
- test_model_helper_owner_scope.py (shared with history; history entry
already repointed in #5090, note entry repointed here)
Adds tests/test_note_routes_shim.py to pin the sys.modules shim contract
(legacy and canonical paths resolve to the same module object; monkeypatch
via legacy alias reaches the canonical module).
Verified: compileall clean; full suite 4487 passed, 3 skipped.
* security(url-safety): reject RFC 6598 shared address space in strict mode
Strict mode (block_private=True) is a full SSRF lockdown, but it only
rejected is_private and is_loopback targets. CPython does not classify RFC
6598 shared/CGNAT space (100.64.0.0/10) as is_private (it is "shared", not
"private"), so a public redirect into 100.64.0.1 passed the per-hop guard
and still issued the request to a potentially internal CGNAT service.
not is_global would also exclude it, but only on CPython 3.11.10+/3.12.4+/
3.13+; the CI matrix runs 3.11/3.12, so reject the range explicitly to stay
correct across patch levels and the 3.14 runtime image. Default local-first
mode is unchanged. Adds strict-mode coverage for shared, non-global, and
public targets.
* docs(url-safety): correct CGNAT is_global rationale in strict-mode comment
The prior comment claimed `not is_global` catches 100.64.0.0/10 only on
CPython 3.11.10+/3.12.4+/3.13+. That is inaccurate for CGNAT: is_global
is False for 100.64.0.1 on every supported version (verified 3.10-3.14).
The version-fragility applies to other ranges gh-113171 touched, not CGNAT.
The explicit range reject is still the right choice; restate the reason as
is_private not covering shared space, and not coupling strict mode to
is_global's broader, cross-version definition. No behavior change.
* feat(models): define capability schema and readers
* fix(models): harden Google catalog probing
Restrict native catalog probing to the Gemini host, keep provider keys out of request URLs, filter non-chat model resources, and preserve the manual refresh default in the built-in Google add flow.
Add Arch-specific package installation and NVIDIA runtime configuration
to the Docker setup guide. Cover passthrough verification, the NVIDIA
Compose overlay, and the distinction between GPU passthrough and
CUDA-backed model serving
Refs #831
* Harden skill importer against SSRF: block private targets + revalidate redirects per hop
The skill importer validated only the initial URL with the lenient SSRF guard
(block_private=False) and then fetched with follow_redirects=True, so a 3xx to
an internal/metadata address (169.254.169.254, 127.0.0.1, RFC-1918) was still
connected to — inconsistent with the hardened services/search/content.py
:_get_public_url path.
Add a _get_checked() helper that follows redirects manually and re-runs the
SSRF guard with block_private=True on every hop, and route all three fetch
sites (skills.sh unwrap, _fetch_bytes, _list_github_dir) through it. GitHub's
own redirects and the final-host _assert_github_url checks are preserved.
Adds hermetic regression tests (IP-literal hosts, faked HTTP layer) and updates
the existing mock signature for the new block_private kwarg.
Defense-in-depth: the endpoint is admin-gated (require_admin) and admins are
trusted per THREAT_MODEL.md, so this is not a cross-boundary vulnerability.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: enforce follow_redirects=False invariant in mock client
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
chat_stream() references `_explicit_web_intent` in three places
(disabled-tools gating, global-disabled web allowance, and the
per-turn tool filter) but the assignment was dropped during a
branch merge. Every chat request raised
NameError: name '_explicit_web_intent' is not defined
at routes/chat_routes.py, surfacing to the client as a bare
"Internal Server Error" before any LLM call was made — chat was
fully broken on dev and main.
Restore the original definition, computed from the already-derived
tool intent, immediately before its first use:
_explicit_web_intent = bool(_tool_intent and _tool_intent.category == "web")
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 30e87e3b82)
* fix(db): restrict data/app.db to 0600
app.db holds bearer-token hashes, bcrypt password hashes, and encrypted
provider keys but was created under the default umask (0644 -> world-readable),
unlike .app_key/vault/integrations which are already 0600 via safe_chmod.
init_db() now chmods the SQLite file to 0600 right after create_all (POSIX
only; no-op on Windows, skipped for Postgres / in-memory). Unconditional and
idempotent, so it also re-locks already-deployed 0644 installs on next
startup. The transient rollback journal inherits 0600 from the parent file at
creation - no sidecar handling needed; -wal/-shm don't exist until WAL is
enabled (#4409 C4) and inherit the same mode then.
Satisfies Rule B, unblocking #4413 and the vault/integration secret moves.
Mirrors src/secret_storage.py:43-45.
Verified: security + DB-permission suites pass; 6 pre-existing visual_report
failures (missing markdown/nh3 deps) are unrelated.
Closes#4407
* fix(db): harden SQLite path parsing and re-lock sidecars
Address review feedback on #4420.
P2: derive the file to chmod from engine.url (SQLAlchemy's parsed URL)
via _sqlite_db_path(), instead of DATABASE_URL.replace("sqlite:///", "").
A driver-qualified URL (sqlite+pysqlite://) or one carrying query args
(?cache=shared) previously slipped past the prefix check / string slice
and left the DB world-readable; the parsed path resolves correctly and
drops the query.
P3: re-lock stale -wal/-shm/-journal sidecars to 0o600 at startup. The
main file is chmod'd first, so any sidecar SQLite creates afterward
inherits 0o600, but a -wal/-shm left world-readable by an older 0o644
install (once WAL was enabled) could still expose DB pages. Absent
sidecars are the normal case, not an error.
Tests: unit-test _sqlite_db_path across driver/query/memory/postgres URL
forms, and a subprocess test asserting stale 0o644 -wal/-shm are
re-locked on startup.
* fix(db): handle sqlite file URI app db permissions
* fix(db): close remaining SQLite permission bypasses
---------
Co-authored-by: Ethan <23321960+0xLeathery@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <alexandremagteixeira@gmail.com>
* docs: update static/js/MODULE_SUMMARY.md to reflect current ES6 frontend
Rewrite the stale module summary to match the current no-build,
ES6-module frontend architecture. Adds coverage of app.js orchestration,
the chat/SSE pipeline (chat.js, chatStream.js, chatRenderer.js,
streamingRenderer.js), new subsystems (research/, compare/, document
streaming, cookbook*, skills.js), and removes the obsolete <script> load
order assumptions.
* cleanup: remove dead MEMORY_DOC / memory_doc paths (closes#4411)
Removes the unused MEMORY_DOC constant and the matching DataConfig
memory_doc field / set_data_paths entry. No runtime code imports or
references these paths, so this is a no-behavior-change dead-code
cleanup under the storage-architecture tracker #4377.
conn.search() / conn.fetch() operate on volatile positional sequence
numbers that shift whenever messages are deleted or expunged. Three call
sites in the sig-learner (_pull_headers, _fetch_bodies) and morning-brief
email section were storing these as "uid" and reusing them in subsequent
fetches — causing wrong-message returns or NO responses if another client
modified the mailbox concurrently.
Replaced with conn.uid("SEARCH", ...) / conn.uid("FETCH", ...), which use
persistent RFC 3501 UIDs. _scan_one (urgency action) already did this
correctly; these were the remaining callers.
The reproduction window is narrow (requires concurrent deletion between
search and fetch), so the fix is verified by regression tests rather than
manual end-to-end: _SpyImap raises AssertionError if conn.search() or
conn.fetch() are called instead of conn.uid().
Boody