Make src.youtube_handler a compatibility wrapper around services.youtube.youtube_handler so transcript state, URL parsing, and timeout behavior no longer diverge.
Resolve remove_directory_from_rag paths through the same PERSONAL_DIR confinement helper used by add_directory_to_rag before removal sinks are reached.
Lock the API key encryption key file to owner-only permissions on creation and when reading existing keys, with regression coverage for permissions and encryption roundtrip.
Clarify in the Docker install section that Apple Silicon Docker cannot use Metal GPU acceleration for Cookbook model serving and point users to the native Apple Silicon path.
Fixes#4232
Convert email search and archive handlers from async def to sync def so FastAPI runs their blocking IMAP I/O in the threadpool instead of the event loop.
load_settings() already catches PermissionError, but load_features() caught only
FileNotFoundError/JSONDecodeError/ValueError. An existing-but-unreadable
data/features.json (e.g. root-owned after a deploy) therefore raised instead of
falling back to DEFAULT_FEATURES, taking down GET /api/auth/features and anything
that reads feature flags. Add PermissionError to the except tuple to match
load_settings().
Adds tests/test_load_features_permission_error.py.
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <111787685+alteixeira20@users.noreply.github.com>
* ci: add security scanning suite and governance
Consolidates the security CI work into one reviewable change. Adds, as
separate workflow files under .github/workflows/:
- secret-scan.yml gitleaks (pinned + checksum-verified), full history
- workflow-security.yml actionlint + zizmor, audits the workflows themselves
- dependency-review.yml PR dependency gate + advisory pip-audit
- container-scan.yml hadolint (blocking) + Trivy image scan (advisory)
- codeql.yml CodeQL for Python and JS, main + weekly
Plus .github/dependabot.yml (pip/npm/actions/docker), .github/CODEOWNERS,
and docs/security-ci.md explaining each check and the one-time settings.
All additive: no existing files are modified. Actions are pinned to commit
SHAs, tokens default-deny (permissions: {}), advisory scans never block,
and SARIF upload is gated to push so fork PRs do not fail on a read-only
token. Composes with the correctness CI in #1015.
* ci(security): isolate Trivy from the Dockerfile lint gate
Address review on #1314 (points 2 and 3).
container-scan.yml now runs only hadolint (the blocking Dockerfile lint)
and keeps the broad pull_request + push:[main] trigger so the required
check always reports and never hangs a PR.
The advisory image scan moves to container-trivy.yml, split by event:
- pull_request / workflow_dispatch: build and scan under contents:read
only, no SARIF upload. The image build runs PR-supplied Dockerfile
instructions, so this path holds no write scope.
- push to main: build, scan, and upload SARIF with security-events:write.
Only this trusted path is granted write.
This stops PR jobs from requesting security-events:write they never use,
and a paths-ignore (matching docker-publish.yml) skips the image rebuild
on docs-only changes.
docs/security-ci.md: correct the trigger description to "every pull
request and every push to main", matching the workflows and the existing
ci.yml convention.
Verified locally: zizmor --offline --min-severity=low and actionlint are
clean on the changed and new workflow files.
---------
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <111787685+alteixeira20@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: read allow_bash/allow_web_search from JSON body (#3229)
API callers using Content-Type: application/json had bash and web
tools silently disabled because allow_bash / allow_web_search were
only read from FormData (which is empty for JSON requests).
Changes:
- Fall back to JSON body for allow_bash and allow_web_search values
- Only add bash/web_search to disabled_tools when explicitly set to a
falsy value; when unset (None), defer to per-user privilege checks
- Admins with can_use_bash=True now get bash enabled by default
Fixes#3229
* fix: always send explicit allow_bash/allow_web_search from frontend
The backend 'is not None' guard (from prior commit) is correct for API
callers, but the frontend only sent allow_bash=true when the toggle was
ON — omission meant 'unspecified' which the backend treated as 'don't
disable'. Now the frontend always sends an explicit true/false value:
- allow_bash: sent on every request (checked ? 'true' : 'false')
- allow_web_search: explicit 'false' when toggle is off in agent mode
With explicit frontend values, the 'is not None' guard is safe:
- explicit true → tool enabled
- explicit false → tool disabled
- None (API caller omission) → defer to per-user privilege
---------
Co-authored-by: michaelxer <michaelxer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <111787685+alteixeira20@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: expand cookbook error output tail from 12 to 50 lines
When a task reaches status 'error', the status endpoint was returning
only the last 12 lines of the subprocess log. The existing context-menu
'Copy last 50 lines' action was therefore copying the same 12 lines,
making it useless for diagnosing failures that produce long stack traces
or build output.
- Set _tail_lines = 50 when status == 'error', keep 12 for running tasks
- Initialise exit_code = None before the status-classification block so
it is always defined in the result dict (was only set inside the
is_alive branch, potential NameError in the dead-session path)
- Include exit_code in the task-status response dict
- JS poller captures exit_code from live data into local task state
The frontend output panel and 'Copy last 50 lines' now show the actual
error context without any UI changes.
* refactor: extract output-tail logic to testable helper + behavioral tests
Addresses review feedback on #1538: the previous tests were source-level
string guards. Extract the tail-slicing into a dependency-free helper
(routes/cookbook_output.error_aware_output_tail) and replace the guards
with behavioral tests that exercise the actual logic:
- error status with a 200-line snapshot -> exactly the last 50 lines
- running/ready/completed/stopped/unknown -> last 12 lines
- short snapshot -> all lines, no padding
- empty snapshot -> empty string
- error tail is a strict superset (suffix-compatible) of the non-error tail
The helper has no FastAPI/SQLAlchemy imports so it unit-tests without
standing up the app.
---------
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <111787685+alteixeira20@users.noreply.github.com>
Add a documentation-only test layout inventory for the first low-risk split of the flat tests directory.
Records the current 28-file area_cli set, including tests/test_research_cli_status.py, and documents validation/non-goals for the future mechanical move.
Closes#3712
Part of #2523
* feat(agent): workspace confinement via context-local binding + get_workspace tool
Bind the per-turn workspace once in execute_tool_block; the shared path
resolvers (_resolve_tool_path / _resolve_search_root) and the subprocess cwd
helper (agent_cwd) read it, so file tools + bash/python are confined centrally
and a new tool that uses the shared helpers cannot accidentally bypass it.
Adds the admin-gated /api/workspace/browse picker, a workspace pill + directory
modal (reusing existing modal/button CSS), the /workspace slash command, and a
get_workspace tool (replaces a system-prompt block). Confinement is OS-agnostic
(realpath/normcase/commonpath) and docker-safe (container paths, no host
assumptions). Reopens#2023.
* ux(workspace): clarify workspace is not a sandbox
Picker modal note + pill tooltip + get_workspace tool/output wording now state
plainly: read_file/write_file/edit_file/grep/glob/ls are confined to the folder,
but bash/python only start there (cwd) and are not sandboxed. Modal note reuses
the existing .muted class.
* fix(agent): treat an active workspace as file-work intent
A vague low-signal message (e.g. "look at the local project") matches no
domain keywords, so tool retrieval is skipped and only always-available tools
are offered — leaving the agent with no file access even though a workspace is
set. When a workspace is active, include the file/code tools (incl.
get_workspace) on low-signal turns so the agent can act on the folder.
Also requires the tool index (ChromaDB) to be reachable for normal retrieval;
that is an environment dependency, not part of this change.
* ux(workspace): hide pill + overflow entry in chat mode
Workspace only scopes the agent's file/shell tools, so the pill and the
overflow 'Workspace' entry are agent-only now — hidden in chat mode like the
bash toggle. Mode read from the DOM in syncWorkspaceIndicator; applyMode() is
called from the agent/chat setMode handler.
* prompt(tools): steer bash/python to defer to the dedicated file tools
bash/python schema descriptions (what native-tool-calling models read) were
bare and gave no steer, so models would do file ops via the shell (e.g. writing
SVG/HTML, which then dumps raw markup into the tool preview). Tell bash/python
in the schema + tool-index + prompt section to prefer read_file/write_file/
edit_file/grep/glob/ls and only be used for what those do not cover.
* prompt(tools): keep bash/python deferral generic (no hardcoded tool names)
Reference 'a dedicated tool' rather than listing read_file/write_file/grep/etc.
by name, so the guidance does not go stale if those tools are renamed.
* style(workspace): drop em-dashes from added code comments/strings
* ux(workspace): terser non-sandbox note in picker (no tool-name list)
* ux(workspace): mirror terse non-sandbox wording in pill tooltip
* chore: untrack local venv symlink (run-only, not part of the feature)
* prompt(workspace): keep get_workspace text generic (no hardcoded tool names)
* fix(agent): low-signal + workspace surfaces only read-only file tools
Intersect the files tool group with PLAN_MODE_READONLY_TOOLS so a vague message
in a workspace exposes read_file/grep/glob/ls/get_workspace for exploration, but
not write_file/edit_file/bash/python -- those wait for a request that actually
calls for them (RAG retrieval still adds them on a real ask).
* feat(workspace): cap browse listing at 500 dirs with a truncated hint
Mirror the filesystem_tools._CODENAV_MAX_HITS pattern with a module-local
_MAX_BROWSE_DIRS so a directory with thousands of children does not dump every
row into the picker; the response carries a truncated flag and the modal tells
the user to type a path to jump in.
* chore: untrack local venv symlink (run-only artifact)
* fix(workspace): vet the workspace root against the sensitive-path deny list at bind time
The in-workspace resolver deny-lists sensitive paths inside the workspace,
but the empty-path search root is the workspace itself, so a workspace of
~/.ssh could be listed via ls with no path. vet_workspace() (public, in
tool_execution next to the resolvers) rejects non-directories and sensitive
roots before the path is ever bound; chat_routes uses it instead of its
inline isdir check.
* fix(workspace): reject filesystem roots and stop showing rejected workspaces as active
Review findings from #3665:
P2: vet_workspace accepted / (and would accept drive/UNC roots), which makes
every absolute path 'inside' the workspace and collapses confinement into
host-wide file access. A root is its own dirname, so reject when
dirname(resolved) == resolved; the browse response now carries a selectable
flag and the picker disables 'Use this folder' on unselectable dirs.
P3: /workspace set stored any string client-side and the chat route silently
dropped rejected values, so the pill could claim a confinement that was not
in effect. New admin-gated /api/workspace/vet validates manual paths before
they persist (canonical path returned), and when a posted workspace is
rejected at send time the stream emits workspace_rejected so the client
clears the stored value and toasts instead of continuing silently.
* fix(workspace): check caller privilege before vetting the posted workspace
Review finding: /api/chat_stream called vet_workspace() on the posted value
for every caller and emitted workspace_rejected on failure, so a non-admin
who can chat but cannot use file/shell tools could distinguish existing
directories from missing/file/sensitive/root paths by whether the event
appeared. The resolution now lives in _resolve_request_workspace, which
drops the submitted value uniformly for non-admin callers, with no vetting
and no event, before the path ever touches the filesystem. Admin and
single-user behavior is unchanged. Test pins that valid and invalid paths
are indistinguishable for a non-admin and that vet_workspace is never
invoked for them.
Replace hardcoded [:2000] and [:4000] slicing with the shared _truncate
helper from tool_utils, which uses MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS and adds an explicit
truncation indicator when content is cut.
Scoped down from the original PR: only agent/tool-output display
behavior, no integrations.py changes.
Co-authored-by: michaelxer <michaelxer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alexandre Teixeira <111787685+alteixeira20@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(llm): stop sending llama.cpp slot-affinity fields to cloud providers
_apply_local_cache_affinity adds session_id + cache_prompt for llama.cpp
KV-cache slot affinity (#2927), gated on _is_self_hosted_openai_compatible,
which treated any unknown OpenAI-compatible host as self-hosted. Strict
cloud providers added as custom endpoints (Mistral at api.mistral.ai)
reject unknown body fields, so every request failed with 422
extra_forbidden. Self-hosted now also requires the endpoint to resolve as
local via model_context.is_local_endpoint: loopback/private/tailscale
host, or endpoint kind explicitly configured as "local" (the escape hatch
for tunneled self-hosted servers). is_local_endpoint is promoted to a
public name since llm_core now shares it.
Fixes#3793
* test(llm): sweep cloud OpenAI-compatible hosts in affinity gating
Parametrized cases adapted from #3839 (credit: Shabablinchikow): deepseek,
x.ai, together, fireworks, and the Gemini OpenAI-compat endpoint must all
stay free of the llama.cpp extras, not just the Mistral host from #3793.
* fix(llm): narrow the Tailscale range to 100.64.0.0/10 in is_local_endpoint
Review finding on #3945: _PRIVATE_PREFIXES carried a bare "100." prefix,
treating all of 100.0.0.0/8 as local while Tailscale only uses the CGNAT
block 100.64.0.0/10. Public 100.x hosts (e.g. AWS ranges outside the
block) were classified local and still received the llama.cpp extras
this PR exists to keep away from strict providers. Match the narrowed
classification routes/model_routes.py already uses, with boundary tests
just below, inside, and just above the range.
cyq