2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexandre Teixeira bd0c67b6d3 fix(agent): preserve loop guard stream behavior 2026-06-15 17:17:16 +01:00
Alexandre Teixeira ff5bcd9864 fix(agent): surface early loop-guard stops 2026-06-15 17:07:15 +01:00
29 changed files with 652 additions and 667 deletions
+7 -6
View File
@@ -331,8 +331,8 @@ if AUTH_ENABLED:
request.state.current_user = "internal-tool"
request.state.api_token = False
return await call_next(request)
except Exception as _e:
logger.warning("Internal tool auth header check failed", exc_info=_e)
except Exception:
pass
# Allow DIRECT localhost requests (internal service calls from
# heartbeats etc.). Tunnel/proxy-forwarded requests are excluded by
# _is_trusted_loopback so LOCALHOST_BYPASS can't be abused over a
@@ -385,10 +385,11 @@ if AUTH_ENABLED:
_db.close()
try:
await _asyncio.to_thread(_do)
except Exception as _e:
logger.debug("Failed to update token last_used_at", exc_info=_e)
except Exception:
pass
_asyncio.create_task(_touch_last_used(matched_id))
# Keep bearer-token callers out of normal cookie/user
# routes. API-aware routes can read api_token_owner.
request.state.current_user = "api"
request.state.api_token = True
request.state.api_token_id = matched_id
@@ -463,8 +464,8 @@ async def serve_generated_image(filename: str, request: Request):
_db.close()
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as _e:
logger.warning("Image ownership verification failed for %r", filename, exc_info=_e)
except Exception:
pass
ext = filename.rsplit('.', 1)[-1].lower()
mime = {
"png": "image/png", "jpg": "image/jpeg", "jpeg": "image/jpeg",
+2 -22
View File
@@ -2,15 +2,12 @@ import os
import logging
import sqlite3
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from sqlalchemy import event, create_engine, Column, String, Text, Boolean, DateTime, Integer, ForeignKey, JSON, Index, func, text
from sqlalchemy.engine import Engine
from sqlalchemy.types import TypeDecorator
from sqlalchemy.ext.declarative import declarative_base, declared_attr
from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship, sessionmaker, backref
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Create base class for declarative models
@@ -32,26 +29,9 @@ class TimestampMixin:
def updated_at(cls):
return Column(DateTime, default=utcnow_naive, onupdate=utcnow_naive, nullable=False)
# Ensure the writable data directory exists before SQLite connects.
from src.constants import DATA_DIR, AUTH_FILE, MEMORY_FILE, USER_PREFS_FILE, SETTINGS_FILE
Path(DATA_DIR).mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
def _default_database_url() -> str:
return f"sqlite:///{Path(DATA_DIR) / 'app.db'}"
def _normalize_sqlite_url(url: str) -> str:
if not url.startswith("sqlite:///"):
return url
db_path = url.replace("sqlite:///", "", 1)
if db_path == ":memory:" or os.path.isabs(db_path):
return url
return f"sqlite:///{(Path(get_app_root()) / db_path).resolve().as_posix()}"
# Get database URL from environment, default to SQLite in DATA_DIR
DATABASE_URL = _normalize_sqlite_url(os.getenv("DATABASE_URL", _default_database_url()))
from src.constants import DATA_DIR, AUTH_FILE, MEMORY_FILE, USER_PREFS_FILE, SETTINGS_FILE
DATABASE_URL = os.getenv("DATABASE_URL", f"sqlite:///{DATA_DIR}/app.db")
# Create engine
engine = create_engine(
-2
View File
@@ -160,8 +160,6 @@ def setup_api_token_routes() -> APIRouter:
payload = await request.json()
except Exception:
payload = {}
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
payload = {}
with get_db_session() as db:
token = db.query(ApiToken).filter(ApiToken.id == token_id).first()
if not token:
+7 -8
View File
@@ -126,8 +126,7 @@ def _clear_orphaned_session_endpoint(sess, owner: str | None = None) -> bool:
sess.model = ""
sess.headers = {}
return True
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to clear orphaned session endpoint", exc_info=e)
except Exception:
db.rollback()
return False
finally:
@@ -145,8 +144,7 @@ def _endpoint_cache_contains_model(endpoint, model: str) -> bool:
return True
try:
models = json.loads(raw) if isinstance(raw, str) else raw
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to parse cached models list, treating as containing model", exc_info=e)
except Exception:
return True
if not isinstance(models, list) or not models:
return True
@@ -238,8 +236,7 @@ def _recover_empty_session_model(sess, session_id: str, owner: str | None = None
is_chatgpt_subscription = False
try:
cached = json.loads(ep.cached_models) if isinstance(ep.cached_models, str) else (ep.cached_models or [])
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to parse cached_models for endpoint %r", getattr(ep, "id", "?"), exc_info=e)
except Exception:
cached = []
if not cached:
visible = []
@@ -649,8 +646,8 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
elif attachments:
try:
att_ids = [str(x) for x in json.loads(attachments)]
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to parse attachments JSON, ignoring attachments", exc_info=e)
except Exception:
pass
no_memory = str(form_data.get("no_memory", "")).lower() == "true"
pre_context_tool_policy = build_effective_tool_policy(
@@ -1300,6 +1297,8 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
"doc_stream_open", "doc_stream_delta",
"doc_update", "doc_suggestions", "ui_control",
"rounds_exhausted",
"loop_breaker_triggered",
"intent_nudge_exhausted",
"ask_user",
"plan_update",
):
+3 -4
View File
@@ -503,8 +503,7 @@ def setup_document_routes(session_manager, upload_handler=None) -> APIRouter:
user = get_current_user(request)
try:
data = await request.json()
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to parse export request body, defaulting to empty", exc_info=e)
except Exception:
data = {}
ids = data.get("ids") or []
if not ids:
@@ -646,8 +645,8 @@ def setup_document_routes(session_manager, upload_handler=None) -> APIRouter:
try:
from src.agent_tools.document_tools import clear_active_document
clear_active_document(doc_id)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to clear active document %r on detach", doc_id, exc_info=e)
except Exception:
pass
db.commit()
db.refresh(doc)
return _doc_to_dict(doc)
+3 -4
View File
@@ -79,16 +79,15 @@ def _email_tag_owner_aliases(account_id: str | None, owner: str = "") -> list[st
cfg.get("smtp_user") or "",
cfg.get("from_address") or "",
])
except Exception as _e:
logger.warning("Failed to resolve email account alias", exc_info=_e)
except Exception:
resolved_account_id = None
row = db.get(_EA, resolved_account_id) if resolved_account_id else None
if row:
aliases.extend([row.owner or "", row.imap_user or "", row.from_address or ""])
finally:
db.close()
except Exception as _e:
logger.warning("Failed to load email aliases", exc_info=_e)
except Exception:
pass
out = []
for a in aliases:
a = (a or "").strip()
-1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ from pathlib import Path
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Form, Depends
from core.constants import EMBEDDING_ENDPOINT_FILE, FASTEMBED_CACHE_DIR
from core.middleware import require_admin
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-4
View File
@@ -19,10 +19,6 @@ GPU_BANDWIDTH = {
"6950 xt": 576, "6900 xt": 512, "6800 xt": 512, "6800": 512, "6700 xt": 384, "6600 xt": 256, "6600": 224,
"mi300x": 5300, "mi300": 5300, "mi250x": 3277, "mi250": 3277, "mi210": 1638, "mi100": 1229,
"9070 xt": 624, "9070": 488, "9060 xt": 322, "9060": 322,
# NVIDIA GB10 Grace-Blackwell superchip (DGX Spark). Unified LPDDR5X memory,
# not Apple Silicon, so it lives in the generic GPU table — the Apple-only
# lookup never matches it (its name carries no "apple").
"gb10": 273,
}
# Pre-sort keys by length descending for correct substring matching
+13 -162
View File
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse
import httpx
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
from src.constants import WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES
from .analytics import RateLimitError, error_logger
from .cache import (
CONTENT_CACHE_DIR,
@@ -91,128 +89,18 @@ def _public_http_url(url: str) -> bool:
return False
class BodyTooLargeError(Exception):
"""The server declared a body larger than the hard fetch ceiling."""
def __init__(self, url: str, declared_bytes: int):
self.url = url
self.declared_bytes = declared_bytes
super().__init__(
f"response body is {declared_bytes:,} bytes, over the "
f"{WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:,}-byte hard cap"
)
class _CappedFetch:
"""Result of a size-capped streaming GET.
Carries just what fetch_webpage_content needs from an httpx.Response,
plus the cap bookkeeping: the (possibly truncated) body, whether the
cap cut it short, and the size the server declared via Content-Length
(wire bytes; None when absent).
"""
__slots__ = ("status_code", "headers", "content", "truncated",
"declared_bytes", "encoding", "url")
def __init__(self, status_code, headers, content, truncated,
declared_bytes, encoding, url):
self.status_code = status_code
self.headers = headers
self.content = content
self.truncated = truncated
self.declared_bytes = declared_bytes
self.encoding = encoding
self.url = url
@property
def text(self) -> str:
return self.content.decode(self.encoding or "utf-8", errors="replace")
def raise_for_status(self):
if self.status_code >= 400:
request = httpx.Request("GET", self.url)
raise httpx.HTTPStatusError(
f"HTTP {self.status_code} for {self.url}",
request=request,
response=httpx.Response(self.status_code, request=request),
)
def _get_public_url(url: str, headers: dict, timeout: int, max_redirects: int = 5,
max_bytes: int = None) -> "_CappedFetch":
"""Capped streaming GET with SSRF-guarded manual redirects.
The body is streamed and buffering stops at ``max_bytes`` (default: the
soft cap), so an oversized resource cannot be pulled into memory or the
content cache in full. When Content-Length already declares a body over
the hard ceiling, the fetch is refused before any body bytes are read.
"""
cap = min(max_bytes or WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES)
def _get_public_url(url: str, headers: dict, timeout: int, max_redirects: int = 5) -> httpx.Response:
current = url
for _ in range(max_redirects + 1):
if not _public_http_url(current):
raise httpx.RequestError("Blocked private/internal URL", request=httpx.Request("GET", current))
# Force identity transfer-encoding. With gzip/deflate the wire bytes
# (and Content-Length) can be a small fraction of the decoded body, so
# a tiny compressed response could pass the hard-cap preflight and then
# expand past the ceiling in a single decoded chunk before the streamed
# cap below can slice it. Identity makes Content-Length the true body
# size and keeps each streamed chunk bounded by the network read.
req_headers = dict(headers or {})
req_headers["Accept-Encoding"] = "identity"
with httpx.stream("GET", current, headers=req_headers, timeout=timeout,
follow_redirects=False) as response:
if response.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
location = response.headers.get("location")
if not location:
return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers, b"",
False, None, response.encoding, str(response.url))
current = urljoin(str(response.url), location)
continue
# A server can ignore the identity request and still return a
# compressed body; httpx.iter_bytes would then decode it, and a tiny
# gzip can balloon into one decoded chunk far past the cap before we
# slice. Refuse a compressed Content-Encoding so the streamed cap
# stays a real memory bound (Content-Length is the compressed wire
# length here, so the preflight and size metadata are unreliable too).
enc = (response.headers.get("content-encoding") or "").strip().lower()
if enc and enc != "identity":
raise httpx.RequestError(
f"Refusing compressed response (Content-Encoding: {enc}) after "
"requesting identity: cannot bound decoded body size",
request=httpx.Request("GET", current),
)
declared = None
raw_len = response.headers.get("content-length")
if raw_len and raw_len.isdigit():
declared = int(raw_len)
# Refuse before buffering anything when the server already tells
# us the body exceeds the absolute ceiling (Content-Length is wire
# bytes; the decompressed body can only be larger).
if declared is not None and declared > WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:
raise BodyTooLargeError(current, declared)
chunks = []
read = 0
truncated = False
# We requested identity above, so iter_bytes yields the raw body in
# network-read-sized chunks (no decompression expansion); the cap
# therefore bounds what we actually buffer.
for chunk in response.iter_bytes():
read += len(chunk)
if read > cap:
keep = cap - (read - len(chunk))
if keep > 0:
chunks.append(chunk[:keep])
truncated = True
break
chunks.append(chunk)
return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers,
b"".join(chunks), truncated, declared,
response.encoding, str(response.url))
response = httpx.get(current, headers=headers, timeout=timeout, follow_redirects=False)
if response.status_code not in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
return response
location = response.headers.get("location")
if not location:
return response
current = urljoin(str(response.url), location)
raise httpx.RequestError("Too many redirects", request=httpx.Request("GET", current))
# PDF extraction (optional dependency)
@@ -334,19 +222,9 @@ def _empty_result(url: str, error: str = "") -> dict:
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Main content fetcher
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0,
max_bytes: int = None) -> dict:
"""Fetch and extract meaningful content from a webpage with caching.
``max_bytes`` raises the download budget per call (clamped to the hard
cap); the default is the soft cap. When the body is cut short the result
carries ``truncated``/``fetched_bytes``/``total_bytes`` so callers can
tell the model the content is partial (#3812).
"""
effective_cap = min(max_bytes or WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES)
# The cap is part of the cache identity: a truncated soft-cap fetch must
# not be served to a later full-budget request for the same URL.
cache_key = generate_cache_key(f"{url}#cap={effective_cap}")
def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0) -> dict:
"""Fetch and extract meaningful content from a webpage with caching."""
cache_key = generate_cache_key(url)
cache_file = CONTENT_CACHE_DIR / f"{cache_key}.cache"
# Check cache
@@ -372,21 +250,15 @@ def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0,
"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.124 Safari/537.36",
"Accept": "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8",
"Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.5",
# identity so the streamed size cap in _get_public_url stays honest
# (a compressed body can decode to far more than Content-Length).
"Accept-Encoding": "identity",
"Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate",
"Connection": "keep-alive",
}
response = _get_public_url(url, headers=headers, timeout=timeout,
max_bytes=effective_cap)
response = _get_public_url(url, headers=headers, timeout=timeout)
if response.status_code == 429:
raise RateLimitError(f"Rate limit hit for {url} (attempt {retry_attempt})")
response.raise_for_status()
except BodyTooLargeError as e:
error_logger.warning(f"Refused oversized body for {url}: {e}")
return _empty_result(url, f"TooLarge: {e}")
except httpx.HTTPStatusError as e:
error_logger.warning(f"HTTP {e.response.status_code} fetching {url}: {e}")
return _empty_result(url, f"HTTP {e.response.status_code}: {e}")
@@ -397,27 +269,9 @@ def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0,
error_logger.error(str(e))
return _empty_result(url, str(e))
# Size bookkeeping shared by every content branch below. getattr keeps
# plain httpx.Response stand-ins (tests) working without the cap fields.
_size_fields = {
"truncated": getattr(response, "truncated", False),
"fetched_bytes": len(response.content),
"total_bytes": getattr(response, "declared_bytes", None),
}
# PDF handling
content_type = response.headers.get("Content-Type", "").lower()
if "application/pdf" in content_type or url.lower().endswith(".pdf"):
if _size_fields["truncated"]:
# A PDF cut mid-stream is not parseable; unlike text there is no
# useful partial result, so report the budget problem instead.
_declared = _size_fields["total_bytes"]
return _empty_result(
url,
f"TooLarge: PDF exceeds the {effective_cap:,}-byte fetch budget"
+ (f" (size {_declared:,} bytes)" if _declared else "")
+ "; retry with a larger budget if it fits under the hard cap",
)
if pdf_extract_text is None:
logger.error("pdfminer.six is not installed; cannot extract PDF text.")
pdf_text = ""
@@ -441,7 +295,6 @@ def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0,
"js_message": "",
"success": bool(pdf_text),
"error": "" if pdf_text else "Failed to extract PDF text",
**_size_fields,
}
_cache_result(cache_file, cache_key, result, url)
return result
@@ -476,7 +329,6 @@ def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0,
"js_message": "",
"success": bool(text_body),
"error": "" if text_body else "Empty response body",
**_size_fields,
}
_cache_result(cache_file, cache_key, result, url)
return result
@@ -539,7 +391,6 @@ def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0,
"js_message": js_message,
"success": True,
"error": "",
**_size_fields,
}
_cache_result(cache_file, cache_key, result, url)
return result
+3 -1
View File
@@ -9,12 +9,14 @@ from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse, parse_qs
import httpx
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
from src.constants import SEARXNG_INSTANCE, REQUEST_TIMEOUT
from src.constants import SEARXNG_INSTANCE
from .analytics import RateLimitError, error_logger
from .query import build_enhanced_query
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
REQUEST_TIMEOUT = 20
# Provider registry — maps setting value to (label, needs_key, needs_url)
PROVIDER_INFO = {
"searxng": ("SearXNG", False, True),
+228 -19
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,167 @@ from src.agent_tools import (
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Redaction patterns for common secret-bearing shapes. Explicit and tested
# (see tests/test_loop_guard_signals.py) rather than one clever broad regex —
# safety first, but we try not to mangle harmless prose. Applied in order.
_REDACTED = "[redacted]"
# Cookie: ... / Set-Cookie: ... — redact the rest of the line (cookies hold spaces).
_SENSITIVE_COOKIE_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)\b((?:set-)?cookie\s*[:=]\s*)[^\r\n]+"
)
# URL credentials, e.g. postgres://user:pass@host/db. The password half allows
# inner colons (postgres://user:pa:ss@host/db) but still stops at / and @.
_SENSITIVE_URL_CRED_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)\b([a-z][a-z0-9+.\-]*://)[^\s:/@]+:[^\s/@]+@"
)
# Prefix-only discovery regexes. Each matches the key and its separator (the part
# we KEEP); the value that follows is found by a linear scanner rather than by a
# regex, so there is no backtracking-prone quantifier over uncontrolled input.
#
# Authorization: Bearer <tok> / Authorization: Basic "two word secret"
_AUTH_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)authorization\s*[:=]\s*(?:bearer|basic)\s+"
)
# Provider-prefixed env names, e.g. OPENAI_API_KEY=..., AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=...,
# GITHUB_TOKEN=... — require a sensitive suffix preceded by `_` so benign names
# that merely end in KEY (MONKEY, TURKEY) are left alone.
_ENV_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(
r"(?:export\s+)?\b[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*"
r"_(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|PWD|CREDENTIALS?)\s*=\s*"
)
# Generic sensitive key, e.g. password=..., api_key: ..., client_secret=...
_KEY_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)\b(?:password|passwd|pwd|token|api[_-]?key|client_secret|secret)\b\s*[:=]\s*"
)
# Obvious provider-shaped bare tokens (no surrounding key needed).
_SENSITIVE_BARE_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(
r"\b("
r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}" # OpenAI / Anthropic style
r"|gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}" # GitHub PAT
r"|xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9\-]{10,}" # Slack
r"|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}" # AWS access key id
r"|hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}" # Hugging Face token
r"|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_\-]{20,}" # Google API key
r")\b"
)
def _consume_secret_value_end(text: str, start: int) -> int:
"""Return the exclusive end index of the secret value beginning at ``start``.
If the value is quoted, scan to the matching unescaped quote (backslash
escapes are skipped two chars at a time). Otherwise scan to the first
whitespace, comma, or semicolon. The scan is linear in the length of the
input, so it cannot exhibit catastrophic backtracking.
"""
n = len(text)
if start >= n:
return start
quote = text[start]
if quote in ("'", '"'):
i = start + 1
while i < n:
ch = text[i]
if ch == "\\":
i += 2
continue
if ch == quote:
return i + 1
i += 1
return n # unterminated quote: redact to the end
i = start
while i < n and not text[i].isspace() and text[i] not in (",", ";"):
i += 1
return i
def _redact_after_prefix(text: str, prefix_re: "re.Pattern") -> str:
"""Redact the value following each ``prefix_re`` match using a linear scan."""
result = []
pos = 0
n = len(text)
while pos < n:
match = prefix_re.search(text, pos)
if match is None:
result.append(text[pos:])
break
result.append(text[pos:match.end()])
value_end = _consume_secret_value_end(text, match.end())
if value_end > match.end():
result.append(_REDACTED)
pos = value_end
else:
# Empty value: nothing to redact; step past the prefix and continue.
pos = match.end()
if pos < n:
result.append(text[pos])
pos += 1
return "".join(result)
def _redact_private_keys(text: str) -> str:
"""Replace PEM private-key blocks with a placeholder via linear scanning.
Finds ``-----BEGIN `` markers, verifies the header names a PRIVATE KEY,
locates the matching ``-----END `` marker, and collapses the whole block.
No regex is used, so the (multi-line, uncontrolled) body cannot trigger
polynomial matching.
"""
begin_marker = "-----BEGIN "
end_marker = "-----END "
dash = "-----"
max_header = 64 # generous bound on "[TYPE ]PRIVATE KEY"
result = []
pos = 0
while True:
begin = text.find(begin_marker, pos)
if begin == -1:
result.append(text[pos:])
return "".join(result)
header_start = begin + len(begin_marker)
header_close = text.find(dash, header_start)
if (
header_close == -1
or header_close - header_start > max_header
or not text[header_start:header_close].endswith("PRIVATE KEY")
):
result.append(text[pos:header_start])
pos = header_start
continue
end = text.find(end_marker, header_close)
if end == -1:
result.append(text[pos:])
return "".join(result)
end_header_start = end + len(end_marker)
end_close = text.find(dash, end_header_start)
if (
end_close == -1
or end_close - end_header_start > max_header
or not text[end_header_start:end_close].endswith("PRIVATE KEY")
):
result.append(text[pos:header_start])
pos = header_start
continue
result.append(text[pos:begin])
result.append("[redacted private key]")
pos = end_close + len(dash)
def _redact_sensitive_text(value: object) -> str:
"""Redact obvious credential values before surfacing tool output."""
if value is None:
return ""
text = str(value)
text = _redact_private_keys(text)
text = _redact_after_prefix(text, _AUTH_PREFIX_RE)
text = _SENSITIVE_COOKIE_RE.sub(r"\1" + _REDACTED, text)
text = _SENSITIVE_URL_CRED_RE.sub(r"\1" + _REDACTED + "@", text)
text = _redact_after_prefix(text, _ENV_PREFIX_RE)
text = _redact_after_prefix(text, _KEY_PREFIX_RE)
return _SENSITIVE_BARE_TOKEN_RE.sub(_REDACTED, text)
def _load_mcp_disabled_map() -> Dict[str, set]:
"""Load per-server disabled tool sets from the database."""
@@ -524,7 +685,7 @@ def get_builtin_overrides() -> dict:
ov = get_setting("builtin_tool_overrides", {})
return ov if isinstance(ov, dict) else {}
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to load builtin tool overrides, using defaults", exc_info=e)
logger.warning('Failed to load builtin tool overrides: %s', e)
return {}
@@ -929,8 +1090,8 @@ def _build_system_prompt(
try:
from src.user_time import current_datetime_context_message
_datetime_message = current_datetime_context_message()
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to build datetime context message", exc_info=e)
except Exception:
pass
# Document context is kept as a SEPARATE message (not merged into the tool
# prompt) so the context trimmer doesn't destroy it when truncating the
@@ -973,8 +1134,8 @@ def _build_system_prompt(
try:
from src.pdf_form_doc import find_source_upload_id
_is_form_backed = bool(find_source_upload_id(active_document.current_content or ""))
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to detect if document is form-backed, assuming plain", exc_info=e)
except Exception:
pass
if _is_form_backed:
doc_ctx = (
@@ -2215,6 +2376,7 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
# signatures + consecutive no-text tool rounds to bail early.
_recent_call_sigs = collections.deque(maxlen=6)
_stuck_rounds = 0
_MAX_STUCK_ROUNDS = 4 # consecutive no-progress rounds before loop-breaker bails
# Frequency of each exact call signature (tool + args), for the runaway
# backstop. Counting identical repeats — not distinct same-tool calls —
# lets a legit batch (e.g. 18 calendar events at once) through.
@@ -2637,17 +2799,22 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
# promise: short response (<400 chars), no fenced code/answer,
# and an action-intent phrase was matched. Long answers that
# happen to contain "let me know" are not stalls.
_looks_like_promise = (
_promise_shape = (
not guide_only
and _intent_match is not None
and len(_intent_text) < 400
and "```" not in _intent_text
and _intent_nudge_count < _MAX_INTENT_NUDGES
)
_looks_like_promise = _promise_shape and _intent_nudge_count < _MAX_INTENT_NUDGES
if _looks_like_promise:
_intent_nudge_count += 1
_matched_phrase = _intent_match.group(0).strip()
logger.info(f"[agent] intent-without-action nudge #{_intent_nudge_count} on round {round_num}: {_matched_phrase!r}")
# Don't log the matched phrase — it's raw model text that may
# carry credentials. Structural metadata only.
logger.info(
"[agent] intent-without-action nudge #%d on round %d",
_intent_nudge_count, round_num,
)
messages.append({
"role": "system",
"content": (
@@ -2663,6 +2830,24 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
# Visible signal in the stream so the user knows we caught it.
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "agent_step", "round": round_num + 1})}\n\n'
continue
# The model keeps announcing actions it never takes and we've spent
# every nudge — surface why the turn is ending instead of letting it
# look like a clean completion.
if _promise_shape and _intent_nudge_count >= _MAX_INTENT_NUDGES:
_matched_phrase = _intent_match.group(0).strip()
_matched_phrase_safe = _redact_sensitive_text(_matched_phrase)
_in_message = (
f"Intent-nudge cap reached on round {round_num}: the model "
f"announced an action ({_matched_phrase_safe!r}) without a tool call "
f"after {_intent_nudge_count} nudge(s); ending the turn."
)
# Do not log the matched phrase, even redacted. It is raw model
# text and may contain credentials; keep logs structural only.
logger.warning(
"[agent] intent-nudge cap exhausted on round %d (%d/%d)",
round_num, _intent_nudge_count, _MAX_INTENT_NUDGES,
)
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "intent_nudge_exhausted", "round": round_num, "nudges": _intent_nudge_count, "max_nudges": _MAX_INTENT_NUDGES, "message": _in_message})}\n\n'
break # no tools — done
# ── Loop-breaker (Terminus-style stall detector) ──────────────
@@ -2695,10 +2880,23 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
# Distinct calls to one tool (a real batch) are legitimate work, so we
# count identical call signatures, not raw per-tool-type totals.
_runaway = _detect_runaway_call(_call_freq)
if _stuck_rounds >= 4 or _runaway:
if _stuck_rounds >= _MAX_STUCK_ROUNDS or _runaway:
reason = (f"calling {_runaway} with identical arguments over and over" if _runaway
else "repeating the same tool calls without new progress")
logger.warning(f"[agent] loop-breaker tripped on round {round_num} ({reason}); sig={_sig[:80]!r}")
_lb_message = (
f"Loop-breaker stopped the agent on round {round_num}: {reason}. "
"Forced one tool-free round to converge on an answer or state what's blocked."
)
# Log structural metadata only — `_sig` is raw tool-call content
# that may carry credentials.
logger.warning(
"[agent] loop-breaker tripped on round %d (%s); "
"stuck_rounds=%d/%d runaway=%r",
round_num, reason, _stuck_rounds, _MAX_STUCK_ROUNDS, _runaway,
)
# Surface the stop cause to the stream so the user (and journalctl)
# can tell a guard fired, not a clean completion.
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "loop_breaker_triggered", "round": round_num, "reason": reason, "stuck_rounds": _stuck_rounds, "max_stuck_rounds": _MAX_STUCK_ROUNDS, "runaway": _runaway, "message": _lb_message})}\n\n'
# The model has been executing tools, so its results are already
# in context. Force ONE tool-free round to converge: write the
# answer from what it has, or state plainly what's blocking it.
@@ -2777,6 +2975,10 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
cmd_display = block.content.split("\n")[0].strip()[:80]
else:
cmd_display = block.content.strip()
# The display string is streamed (tool_start/tool_output) and persisted;
# redact any secrets in it. block.content itself is left untouched so
# tool execution still sees the real command.
cmd_display = _redact_sensitive_text(cmd_display)
if tool_policy and tool_policy.blocks(block.tool_type):
desc = f"{block.tool_type}: BLOCKED"
@@ -2822,8 +3024,15 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
evt = await _progress_q.get()
if evt is None:
break
# Redact secrets in the live tail before streaming — the
# final tool_output is redacted, so the progress tail must
# be too, or a secret could flash by mid-run. Copy so we
# don't mutate the tool's own event payload.
_evt = dict(evt)
if isinstance(_evt.get("tail"), str):
_evt["tail"] = _redact_sensitive_text(_evt["tail"])
yield (
f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "tool_progress", "tool": block.tool_type, "round": round_num, **evt})}\n\n'
f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "tool_progress", "tool": block.tool_type, "round": round_num, **_evt})}\n\n'
)
desc, result = await _tool_task
@@ -2889,7 +3098,7 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
result["results"] = _clean
elif "stdout" in result:
result["stdout"] = _clean
except (json.JSONDecodeError, Exception):
except Exception:
pass
# Emit doc-specific event for document tools — the frontend
@@ -2958,29 +3167,29 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
# empty) stdout/stderr; fall back to the error so the "timed
# out" reason reaches the UI instead of a blank result.
raw = result["stdout"] or result["stderr"] or result.get("error", "")
output_text = _truncate(raw)
output_text = _truncate(_redact_sensitive_text(raw))
elif "output" in result:
# bash / python canonical result: {"output": ..., "exit_code": ...}
raw = result["output"] or ""
output_text = _truncate(raw)
output_text = _truncate(_redact_sensitive_text(raw))
elif "response" in result:
# AI interaction tools (chat_with_model, send_to_session)
label = result.get("model", result.get("session_name", "AI"))
output_text = _truncate(f"{label}: {result['response']}")
output_text = _truncate(_redact_sensitive_text(f"{label}: {result['response']}"))
elif "content" in result:
output_text = _truncate(result["content"])
output_text = _truncate(_redact_sensitive_text(result["content"]))
elif "results" in result:
output_text = _truncate(result["results"])
output_text = _truncate(_redact_sensitive_text(result["results"]))
elif "session_id" in result and "name" in result:
output_text = f"Session created: {result['name']} (id: {result['session_id']})"
elif "success" in result:
output_text = (
f"Written: {result.get('path', '')}"
if result["success"]
else f"Error: {result.get('error', '')}"
else f"Error: {_redact_sensitive_text(result.get('error', ''))}"
)
elif "error" in result:
output_text = _truncate(result["error"])
output_text = _truncate(_redact_sensitive_text(result["error"]))
# Emit tool_output (include ui_event data if present)
tool_output_data = {"type": "tool_output", "tool": block.tool_type, "command": cmd_display, "output": output_text, "exit_code": result.get("exit_code")}
+2 -32
View File
@@ -57,23 +57,13 @@ class WebSearchTool:
class WebFetchTool:
async def execute(self, content: str, ctx: dict) -> dict:
from src.search.content import fetch_webpage_content
from src.constants import WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES
raw = content.strip()
url = ""
max_bytes = None
if raw.startswith("{"):
try:
parsed = json.loads(raw)
if isinstance(parsed, dict):
url = str(parsed.get("url") or "").strip()
# Download-budget override (#3812): "full": true raises the
# budget to the hard cap; an explicit max_bytes is clamped
# to the hard cap downstream. Default stays the soft cap.
if parsed.get("full") is True:
max_bytes = WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES
mb = parsed.get("max_bytes")
if isinstance(mb, int) and mb > 0:
max_bytes = mb
except json.JSONDecodeError:
url = ""
if not url:
@@ -88,7 +78,7 @@ class WebFetchTool:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
try:
result = await asyncio.wait_for(
loop.run_in_executor(None, lambda: fetch_webpage_content(url, timeout=10, max_bytes=max_bytes)),
loop.run_in_executor(None, lambda: fetch_webpage_content(url, timeout=10)),
timeout=30,
)
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
@@ -104,28 +94,8 @@ class WebFetchTool:
return {"error": f"web_fetch: {url}: {err}", "exit_code": 1}
return {"error": f"web_fetch: {url}: no readable text content (not HTML, or the page needs JS/login)", "exit_code": 1}
# Tell the model when the download budget cut the body short and how
# to get the rest, instead of silently presenting a partial page as
# the whole thing.
size_note = ""
if result.get("truncated"):
fetched = result.get("fetched_bytes") or 0
total = result.get("total_bytes")
total_txt = f" of {total:,} bytes" if total else ""
size_note = (
f"[partial content: download stopped at {fetched:,} bytes{total_txt}. "
f'Re-call with {{"url": "{url}", "full": true}} to fetch up to '
f"{WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:,} bytes.]\n\n"
)
# The notice must lead the output so the MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS trim below can
# never drop it. The title is untrusted, uncapped page content, so a
# giant title ahead of the notice could push it out of range; keep the
# notice first and cap the title as a second guard.
if len(title) > 300:
title = title[:300] + "..."
header = (f"# {title}\n" if title else "") + f"Source: {url}\n\n"
output = size_note + header + text
output = header + text
if len(output) > MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS:
output = output[:MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS] + "\n\n[...truncated]"
return {"output": output, "exit_code": 0}
+2 -3
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import subprocess
import sys
from core.platform_compat import IS_WINDOWS, which_tool
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -82,7 +81,7 @@ _BUILTIN_NPX_SERVERS = {
"name": "Built-in: Browser",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@playwright/mcp@latest", "--headless", "--caps", "vision"],
}
},
}
# Global flag to disable MCP if there are compatibility issues
@@ -95,7 +94,7 @@ async def register_builtin_servers(mcp_manager):
logger.info("Built-in MCP servers disabled via ODYSSEUS_DISABLE_MCP")
return
base_dir = get_app_root()
base_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
python = sys.executable
async def _connect_python_server(server_id: str, script_path: str, name: str):
+2 -3
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
from pydantic import Field, field_validator
from src.constants import DATA_DIR as _DATA_DIR_CONST
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
# Cross-platform OS flag, exposed here so callers can `from src.config import
# IS_WINDOWS`. Defined locally (a trivial `os.name == "nt"`) rather than imported
@@ -20,7 +19,7 @@ IS_WINDOWS = os.name == "nt"
class DataConfig(BaseSettings):
"""Configuration for data storage and file handling."""
# Base directory
base_dir: Path = Field(default=Path(get_app_root()), description="Base directory for the application")
base_dir: Path = Field(default=Path(__file__).parent.parent, description="Base directory for the application")
# Data paths
data_dir: Path = Field(default=Path(_DATA_DIR_CONST), description="Main data directory")
@@ -139,7 +138,7 @@ class AppConfig(BaseSettings):
if isinstance(v, dict) and "base_dir" in v:
base_dir = v["base_dir"]
else:
base_dir = Path(get_app_root())
base_dir = Path(__file__).parent.parent
# Convert string paths to Path objects relative to base_dir
data_dir = Path(_DATA_DIR_CONST)
+2 -12
View File
@@ -2,14 +2,12 @@
"""Application-wide constants and configuration values."""
import os
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root, get_default_data_dir
APP_VERSION = "1.0.0"
# Base paths
BASE_DIR = os.path.join(get_app_root(), "")
BASE_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))) + "/"
STATIC_DIR = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, "static")
DATA_DIR = os.getenv("ODYSSEUS_DATA_DIR", get_default_data_dir())
DATA_DIR = os.getenv("ODYSSEUS_DATA_DIR", os.path.join(BASE_DIR, "data"))
# Data file paths
# Single source of truth: every persisted file/dir lives under DATA_DIR, which
@@ -65,14 +63,6 @@ MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS = 10_000 # cap for bash/python/web_search/web_fetch outpu
MAX_READ_CHARS = 20_000 # cap for read_file / document preview
MAX_DIFF_LINES = 400 # cap for edit_file unified-diff display
# web_fetch response-size policy (#3812). MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS above only trims
# what the agent SEES; these caps bound what the server downloads, parses,
# and writes to the content cache. The soft cap is the default download
# budget; the agent can raise it per call (full/max_bytes) but never past
# the hard cap, so a model can't decide to pull a multi-GB file.
WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES = 2_000_000 # default download budget (2 MB)
WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES = 20_000_000 # absolute ceiling, even with override (20 MB)
# API Configuration
MAX_CONTEXT_MESSAGES = 90
REQUEST_TIMEOUT = 20
-2
View File
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@ import numpy as np
import httpx
from typing import List, Optional
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_DEFAULT_MODEL = "all-minilm:l6-v2"
+3 -4
View File
@@ -283,8 +283,7 @@ def _is_ollama_native_url(url: str) -> bool:
"""Return True for native Ollama API URLs, including Ollama Cloud."""
try:
parsed = urlparse(url or "")
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to parse URL for Ollama detection", exc_info=e)
except Exception:
return False
host = parsed.hostname or ""
path = (parsed.path or "").rstrip("/")
@@ -1346,8 +1345,8 @@ def list_model_ids(
r = httpx.get(root + "/api/tags", timeout=timeout)
r.raise_for_status()
return [m.get("name") or m.get("model") for m in (r.json().get("models") or []) if m.get("name") or m.get("model")]
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to fetch model list from configured endpoint", exc_info=e)
except Exception:
pass
return []
def normalize_model_id(
+1 -3
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@ import os
import re
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _format_mcp_connection_error(name: str, command: str = "", args: Optional[List[str]] = None, error: Exception = None) -> str:
@@ -510,7 +508,7 @@ class McpManager:
return False
script_rel, name = _BUILTIN_SERVERS[server_id]
base_dir = get_app_root()
base_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
script_path = os.path.join(base_dir, script_rel)
# Clean up old connection
-1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import time
from pathlib import Path
from src.constants import RAG_DIR
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-30
View File
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
"""Helpers for resolving runtime paths in source and frozen builds."""
import os
import sys
def get_app_root() -> str:
"""Return the app root directory.
In normal source runs, this is the repository root. In a frozen Windows
build, it is the bundle content root (PyInstaller's internal directory)
so bundled runtime folders like `static/`, `scripts/`, and `data/` stay
together with the executable payload.
"""
if getattr(sys, "frozen", False):
return getattr(sys, "_MEIPASS", os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(sys.executable)))
return os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
def get_default_data_dir() -> str:
"""Return the default path to the data directory.
In normal runs, this is a 'data' subdirectory under the app root.
In frozen builds, it is a persistent user directory (~/.odysseus/data)
to prevent SQLite databases and other persistent files from being
written to the ephemeral, temporary extraction bundle directory.
"""
if getattr(sys, "frozen", False):
return os.path.join(os.path.expanduser("~"), ".odysseus", "data")
return os.path.join(get_app_root(), "data")
+2 -3
View File
@@ -68,12 +68,11 @@ FUNCTION_TOOL_SCHEMAS = [
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "web_fetch",
"description": "Fetch and read the text content of a specific URL the user names (e.g. 'check example.com', 'what's on this page <url>'). Use when you already have a concrete URL/domain. NOT for open-ended searches (use web_search) or 'research X' jobs (use trigger_research). Downloads are size-budgeted; a '[partial content: ...]' notice in the result means the body was cut short and you can re-call with full=true for the rest.",
"description": "Fetch and read the text content of a specific URL the user names (e.g. 'check example.com', 'what's on this page <url>'). Use when you already have a concrete URL/domain. NOT for open-ended searches (use web_search) or 'research X' jobs (use trigger_research).",
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"url": {"type": "string", "description": "The URL or domain to fetch (http/https; a bare domain like example.com is fine)"},
"full": {"type": "boolean", "description": "Raise the download budget to the hard cap for large pages/files. Use only after a result reported partial content."}
"url": {"type": "string", "description": "The URL or domain to fetch (http/https; a bare domain like example.com is fine)"}
},
"required": ["url"]
}
+17
View File
@@ -1911,6 +1911,23 @@ import { wireArrowUpRecall, getLastUserMessageFromChatHistory } from './composer
_chatBox.appendChild(note);
try { note.scrollIntoView({ block: 'end', behavior: 'smooth' }); } catch (_) { uiModule.scrollHistory && uiModule.scrollHistory(); }
}
} else if (json.type === 'loop_breaker_triggered' || json.type === 'intent_nudge_exhausted') {
// A loop guard ended the turn — surface why so it isn't mistaken
// for a clean completion or a silent stall.
const _chatBox = document.getElementById('chat-history');
if (!_isBg && _chatBox) {
const note = document.createElement('div');
note.className = 'stopped-indicator loop-guard-stop';
const label = document.createElement('span');
label.className = 'rounds-exhausted-label';
label.textContent = json.message ||
(json.type === 'loop_breaker_triggered'
? 'Stopped by the loop-breaker (no new progress).'
: 'Stopped: announced an action but never called the tool.');
note.appendChild(label);
_chatBox.appendChild(note);
try { note.scrollIntoView({ block: 'end', behavior: 'smooth' }); } catch (_) { uiModule.scrollHistory && uiModule.scrollHistory(); }
}
} else if (json.type === 'model_actual') {
if (!_isBg && holder) {
holder._requestedModel = json.requested_model || holder._requestedModel || modelName;
-74
View File
@@ -502,77 +502,3 @@ def test_delete_token_owner_check_skipped_when_auth_disabled(monkeypatch, token_
resp = delete_token(request=req, token_id="tok123")
assert resp == {"status": "deleted"}
fake_session.delete.assert_called_once_with(fake_token)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 7. PATCH /api/tokens/{id} — non-object JSON bodies must not 500
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_update_token_with_array_body_does_not_500(monkeypatch, token_routes_mod):
"""PATCH body of [] must be normalised to {} and not raise."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
mod = token_routes_mod
token = SimpleNamespace(
id="tok123", name="original", owner="alice",
token_prefix="ody_orig", scopes="email:read", is_active=True,
)
fake_session = MagicMock()
fake_session.query.return_value.filter.return_value.first.return_value = token
monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "get_db_session", lambda: _db_ctx(fake_session))
invalidator = MagicMock()
req = _patch_request(invalidator, [])
update_token = _get_handler(mod, "PATCH", "/tokens/{token_id}")
resp = asyncio.run(update_token(request=req, token_id="tok123"))
# Name and scopes must be unchanged — payload was normalised to {}
assert token.name == "original"
assert token.scopes == "email:read"
assert resp["name"] == "original"
def test_update_token_with_null_body_does_not_500(monkeypatch, token_routes_mod):
"""PATCH body of null must be normalised to {} and not raise."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
mod = token_routes_mod
token = SimpleNamespace(
id="tok123", name="original", owner="alice",
token_prefix="ody_orig", scopes="chat", is_active=True,
)
fake_session = MagicMock()
fake_session.query.return_value.filter.return_value.first.return_value = token
monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "get_db_session", lambda: _db_ctx(fake_session))
invalidator = MagicMock()
req = _patch_request(invalidator, None)
update_token = _get_handler(mod, "PATCH", "/tokens/{token_id}")
resp = asyncio.run(update_token(request=req, token_id="tok123"))
assert token.name == "original"
assert token.scopes == "chat"
def test_update_token_normal_object_still_works(monkeypatch, token_routes_mod):
"""Normal dict payload continues to update fields as before."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
mod = token_routes_mod
token = SimpleNamespace(
id="tok123", name="original", owner="alice",
token_prefix="ody_orig", scopes="email:read", is_active=True,
)
fake_session = MagicMock()
fake_session.query.return_value.filter.return_value.first.return_value = token
monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "get_db_session", lambda: _db_ctx(fake_session))
invalidator = MagicMock()
req = _patch_request(invalidator, {"name": "updated"})
update_token = _get_handler(mod, "PATCH", "/tokens/{token_id}")
resp = asyncio.run(update_token(request=req, token_id="tok123"))
assert token.name == "updated"
assert resp["name"] == "updated"
invalidator.assert_called_once()
+350
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
"""Regression: stream_agent_loop surfaces *why* a guard ended the turn.
Two internal guards used to stop the agent in ways that looked like a clean
completion or a vague blocked message:
* the loop-breaker stall detector -> now emits `loop_breaker_triggered`
* the intent-without-action nudge cap -> now emits `intent_nudge_exhausted`
These tests run the real loop body against a fake LLM stream (no model calls,
no sleeps) and assert the structured stop event is emitted.
"""
import asyncio
import json
import logging
import pytest
import src.agent_loop as al
def _collect(gen):
async def _run():
return [c async for c in gen]
return asyncio.run(_run())
def _types(chunks):
out = []
for c in chunks:
if c.startswith("data: ") and not c.startswith("data: [DONE]"):
try:
out.append(json.loads(c[6:]))
except Exception:
pass
return out
def _patch_common(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "get_setting", lambda key, default=None: default, raising=False)
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "get_mcp_manager", lambda: None, raising=False)
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "estimate_tokens", lambda *a, **k: 10, raising=False)
async def _fake_exec(block, *a, **k):
return ("bash", {"output": "ok", "exit_code": 0})
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "execute_tool_block", _fake_exec, raising=False)
def _run_loop(monkeypatch, round_text, max_rounds, relevant_tools={"bash"}):
async def _fake_stream(_candidates, messages, **kwargs):
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"delta": round_text})}\n\n'
yield "data: [DONE]\n\n"
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "stream_llm_with_fallback", _fake_stream, raising=False)
gen = al.stream_agent_loop(
"http://x/v1", "m",
[{"role": "user", "content": "do a long multi-step task"}],
max_rounds=max_rounds,
relevant_tools=relevant_tools,
)
return _types(_collect(gen))
def test_emits_loop_breaker_triggered_on_repeated_no_progress(monkeypatch):
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
# Same exact tool call every round, no answer text -> stuck-round streak
# trips the loop-breaker once the cap is reached.
events = _run_loop(monkeypatch, "```bash\necho hi\n```", max_rounds=8)
lb = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "loop_breaker_triggered"]
assert lb, events
e = lb[0]
assert e["reason"]
assert e["max_stuck_rounds"] == 4
assert e["stuck_rounds"] >= 4
assert "message" in e
def test_no_loop_breaker_on_normal_finish(monkeypatch):
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
events = _run_loop(monkeypatch, "All done, here is your answer.", max_rounds=8)
assert not any(e.get("type") == "loop_breaker_triggered" for e in events), events
def test_emits_intent_nudge_exhausted_when_cap_reached(monkeypatch):
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
# The model keeps announcing an action with no tool call. After the nudge
# cap is spent, the turn ends with an explicit intent_nudge_exhausted event.
events = _run_loop(monkeypatch, "Let me check the logs now", max_rounds=5)
inx = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "intent_nudge_exhausted"]
assert inx, events
e = inx[0]
assert e["max_nudges"] == 2
assert e["nudges"] >= 2
assert "message" in e
def test_no_intent_nudge_exhausted_on_normal_finish(monkeypatch):
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
events = _run_loop(monkeypatch, "Here is the complete answer to your question.", max_rounds=5)
assert not any(e.get("type") == "intent_nudge_exhausted" for e in events), events
def _assert_guard_log_safe(caplog, *, structural, secret="secret123"):
"""The guard's own structural log line fired, and that record carries no raw
secret. Scoped to the guard's records on purpose: an unrelated, pre-existing
round-summary log echoes raw model text and is out of scope for this PR."""
records = [r for r in caplog.records if structural in r.getMessage()]
assert records, caplog.text
for r in records:
assert secret not in r.getMessage(), r.getMessage()
def test_intent_nudge_logging_does_not_leak_secret(monkeypatch, caplog):
# The model announces an action (no tool call) with a secret in the text.
# The nudge logger must record only structural metadata, never the matched
# phrase — so the credential never lands in journalctl.
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
with caplog.at_level(logging.INFO, logger="src.agent_loop"):
events = _run_loop(monkeypatch, "Let me check api_key=secret123 now", max_rounds=5)
assert any(e.get("type") == "intent_nudge_exhausted" for e in events), events
_assert_guard_log_safe(caplog, structural="intent-without-action nudge")
def test_loop_breaker_logging_does_not_leak_secret(monkeypatch, caplog):
# A repeated tool command carrying a secret trips the loop-breaker. The
# structural log must not contain `_sig` / raw tool-call content.
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
with caplog.at_level(logging.INFO, logger="src.agent_loop"):
events = _run_loop(monkeypatch, "```bash\necho api_key=secret123\n```", max_rounds=8)
assert any(e.get("type") == "loop_breaker_triggered" for e in events), events
_assert_guard_log_safe(caplog, structural="loop-breaker tripped")
def test_redacts_sensitive_tool_output_before_surfacing():
text = al._redact_sensitive_text(
"password: private-value\n"
"api_key=private-key\n"
"Authorization: Bearer private-token\n"
"normal output"
)
assert "private-value" not in text
assert "private-key" not in text
assert "private-token" not in text
assert "password: [redacted]" in text
assert "api_key=[redacted]" in text
assert "Authorization: Bearer [redacted]" in text
assert "normal output" in text
_GCP_API_KEY_SAMPLE = "AI" + "za" + ("A" * 35)
# (input, secret substring that must be gone, expected substring that must remain)
_REDACTION_CASES = [
("Authorization: Bearer abc123tok", "abc123tok", "Authorization: Bearer [redacted]"),
("Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz", "dXNlcjpwYXNz", "Authorization: Basic [redacted]"),
# Quoted Authorization value (spaces) must be redacted whole.
('Authorization: Bearer "two word secret"', "two word secret", "Authorization: Bearer [redacted]"),
# Escaped quote inside a quoted secret must not leak the tail.
(r'password="abc\"def secret"', "def secret", "password=[redacted]"),
# URL password containing a colon must still be redacted whole.
("postgres://user:pa:ss@host/db", "pa:ss", "postgres://[redacted]@host/db"),
# Provider-shaped bare tokens.
("token is hf_abcdefghij1234567890XYZ", "hf_abcdefghij1234567890XYZ", "[redacted]"),
("key " + _GCP_API_KEY_SAMPLE, _GCP_API_KEY_SAMPLE, "[redacted]"),
("Cookie: session=abc123secret", "abc123secret", "Cookie: [redacted]"),
("Set-Cookie: sid=xyz789; HttpOnly", "xyz789", "Set-Cookie: [redacted]"),
("postgres://user:pa55word@host/db", "pa55word", "postgres://[redacted]@host/db"),
("client_secret=supersecretvalue", "supersecretvalue", "client_secret=[redacted]"),
("OPENAI_API_KEY=abcd1234deadbeef", "abcd1234deadbeef", "OPENAI_API_KEY=[redacted]"),
# Quoted multi-word env value must be fully redacted, not clipped at the space.
('OPENAI_API_KEY="two word secret"', "two word secret", "OPENAI_API_KEY=[redacted]"),
('password: "my secret value"', "my secret value", "password: [redacted]"),
("here is sk-abcdefghij1234567890", "sk-abcdefghij1234567890", "[redacted]"),
(
"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIfakeKEYbody\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----",
"MIIfakeKEYbody",
"[redacted private key]",
),
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("raw, secret, expected", _REDACTION_CASES)
def test_redaction_covers_requested_secret_shapes(raw, secret, expected):
out = al._redact_sensitive_text(raw)
assert secret not in out, out
assert expected in out, out
@pytest.mark.parametrize("raw", [
"the build completed in 3.2s with 0 errors",
"password reset email sent to the user",
"Listing 5 files: a.py b.py c.py d.py e.py",
"https://example.com/path?page=2",
# Benign uppercase names that merely end in KEY must not be redacted.
"MONKEY=banana",
"TURKEY=dinner",
])
def test_redaction_keeps_normal_output_readable(raw):
assert al._redact_sensitive_text(raw) == raw
def test_redacts_before_truncating():
# A secret near the start must be gone even if truncation would otherwise
# only clip the tail — redaction runs first.
raw = "api_key=topsecretvalue " + ("x" * 50_000)
out = al._truncate(al._redact_sensitive_text(raw))
assert "topsecretvalue" not in out
assert "api_key=[redacted]" in out
def _run_tool_result(monkeypatch, tool, exec_result, max_rounds=2):
"""Drive one tool round whose execution returns `exec_result`, and collect
the streamed events. Used to assert restored per-tool-result emissions."""
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
async def _fake_exec(block, *a, **k):
return (tool, exec_result)
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "execute_tool_block", _fake_exec, raising=False)
round_text = f"```{tool}\n{{}}\n```"
async def _fake_stream(_candidates, messages, **kwargs):
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"delta": round_text})}\n\n'
yield "data: [DONE]\n\n"
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "stream_llm_with_fallback", _fake_stream, raising=False)
gen = al.stream_agent_loop(
"http://x/v1", "m",
[{"role": "user", "content": "do something"}],
max_rounds=max_rounds,
relevant_tools={tool},
)
return _types(_collect(gen))
def test_restores_doc_suggestions_event(monkeypatch):
events = _run_tool_result(
monkeypatch, "suggest_document",
{"action": "suggest", "doc_id": "d1", "suggestions": [{"text": "x"}], "exit_code": 0},
)
assert any(e.get("type") == "doc_suggestions" for e in events), events
def test_restores_doc_update_event(monkeypatch):
events = _run_tool_result(
monkeypatch, "edit_document",
{"action": "edit", "doc_id": "d1", "content": "body", "version": 2,
"title": "T", "language": "md", "exit_code": 0},
)
# A native document block also emits doc_update AFTER tool_output, so a plain
# "any doc_update" check would pass even if the restored generic block were
# gone. Prove the restored block fires BEFORE the first tool_output.
types = [e.get("type") for e in events]
assert "doc_update" in types, events
assert "tool_output" in types, events
assert types.index("doc_update") < types.index("tool_output"), types
def test_restores_ui_control_event(monkeypatch):
events = _run_tool_result(
monkeypatch, "ui_control",
{"ui_event": "toggle", "toggle_name": "bash", "state": "off", "exit_code": 0},
)
assert any(e.get("type") == "ui_control" for e in events), events
def test_restores_plan_update_event(monkeypatch):
events = _run_tool_result(
monkeypatch, "update_plan",
{"plan_update": {"steps": [{"text": "step", "done": True}]}, "exit_code": 0},
)
assert any(e.get("type") == "plan_update" for e in events), events
def test_restores_ask_user_event_and_persists_question(monkeypatch):
events = _run_tool_result(
monkeypatch, "ask_user",
{"ask_user": {"question": "Which option?", "options": [{"label": "A"}, {"label": "B"}]},
"exit_code": 0},
)
# Exactly one ask_user event — not re-emitted on a follow-up round.
_ask_events = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "ask_user"]
assert len(_ask_events) == 1, events
# The question is streamed as assistant text so it persists for replay.
# Upstream prepends "\n\n" when full_response already holds streamed text,
# so match on containment — and it must be streamed exactly once.
_q_deltas = [e for e in events if "Which option?" in (e.get("delta") or "")]
assert len(_q_deltas) == 1, events
# Setting `_awaiting_user` breaks the loop, so the turn does NOT advance into
# another agent round (which would emit an agent_step event) after the ask.
assert not any(e.get("type") == "agent_step" for e in events), events
def test_redacts_command_display_in_streamed_events(monkeypatch):
# A tool command line can carry a secret. The streamed command display
# (tool_start / tool_output) must be redacted, even though the real command
# passed to execution is left untouched.
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
round_text = "```bash\necho api_key=secret123\n```"
async def _fake_stream(_candidates, messages, **kwargs):
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"delta": round_text})}\n\n'
yield "data: [DONE]\n\n"
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "stream_llm_with_fallback", _fake_stream, raising=False)
gen = al.stream_agent_loop(
"http://x/v1", "m",
[{"role": "user", "content": "run it"}],
max_rounds=2,
relevant_tools={"bash"},
)
events = _types(_collect(gen))
cmds = [e for e in events if e.get("type") in ("tool_start", "tool_output")]
assert cmds, events
assert all("secret123" not in (e.get("command") or "") for e in cmds), cmds
assert any("api_key=[redacted]" in (e.get("command") or "") for e in cmds), cmds
def test_redacts_live_tool_progress_tail(monkeypatch):
# A secret in the live progress tail must be redacted before streaming —
# otherwise it flashes by before the (already redacted) final tool_output.
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
async def _fake_exec(block, *a, **k):
await k["progress_cb"]({"tail": "api_key=secret123", "elapsed_s": 1})
return ("bash", {"output": "done", "exit_code": 0})
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "execute_tool_block", _fake_exec, raising=False)
round_text = "```bash\necho hi\n```"
async def _fake_stream(_candidates, messages, **kwargs):
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"delta": round_text})}\n\n'
yield "data: [DONE]\n\n"
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "stream_llm_with_fallback", _fake_stream, raising=False)
gen = al.stream_agent_loop(
"http://x/v1", "m",
[{"role": "user", "content": "run it"}],
max_rounds=2,
relevant_tools={"bash"},
)
events = _types(_collect(gen))
prog = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_progress"]
assert prog, events
assert all("secret123" not in (e.get("tail") or "") for e in prog), prog
assert any("api_key=[redacted]" in (e.get("tail") or "") for e in prog), prog
# Other fields are preserved.
assert any(e.get("elapsed_s") == 1 for e in prog), prog
-50
View File
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
import os
import sys
from unittest import mock
import pytest
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root, get_default_data_dir
def test_get_app_root_normal_run():
"""Verify that get_app_root returns the repository root parent of src/ when not frozen."""
with mock.patch.object(sys, "frozen", False, create=True):
app_root = get_app_root()
# Verify it is a valid directory path and matches expected parent structure
assert os.path.isdir(app_root)
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(app_root, "src"))
def test_get_app_root_frozen_with_meipass():
"""Verify that get_app_root returns the sys._MEIPASS directory when frozen by PyInstaller."""
mock_meipass = os.path.abspath("mock_meipass_dir")
with mock.patch.object(sys, "frozen", True, create=True), \
mock.patch.object(sys, "_MEIPASS", mock_meipass, create=True):
app_root = get_app_root()
assert app_root == mock_meipass
def test_get_app_root_frozen_without_meipass():
"""Verify that get_app_root falls back to the sys.executable parent directory when frozen but _MEIPASS is absent."""
mock_exe_path = os.path.join(os.path.abspath("mock_exe_dir"), "Odysseus.exe")
with mock.patch.object(sys, "frozen", True, create=True), \
mock.patch.object(sys, "executable", mock_exe_path, create=True):
# Remove sys._MEIPASS if it exists in the test process environment
if hasattr(sys, "_MEIPASS"):
delattr(sys, "_MEIPASS")
app_root = get_app_root()
assert app_root == os.path.abspath("mock_exe_dir")
def test_get_default_data_dir_normal():
"""Verify that get_default_data_dir resolves to get_app_root() / 'data' when not frozen."""
with mock.patch.object(sys, "frozen", False, create=True):
res = get_default_data_dir()
assert res == os.path.join(get_app_root(), "data")
def test_get_default_data_dir_frozen():
"""Verify that get_default_data_dir resolves to a persistent user path under ~ when frozen."""
with mock.patch.object(sys, "frozen", True, create=True):
res = get_default_data_dir()
expected = os.path.join(os.path.expanduser("~"), ".odysseus", "data")
assert res == expected
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ def test_content_fetcher_extracts_og_image_and_body_fallback(module, tmp_path, m
monkeypatch.setattr(module, "CONTENT_CACHE_DIR", tmp_path)
module.content_cache_index.clear()
monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_get_public_url", lambda url, headers, timeout, **kwargs: _FakeResponse(html))
monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_get_public_url", lambda url, headers, timeout: _FakeResponse(html))
result = module.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/parity-test")
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ def test_fetch_webpage_content_returns_empty_result_on_http_status_error(status_
monkeypatch.setattr(
service_content,
"_get_public_url",
lambda url, headers, timeout, **kwargs: _FakeErrorResponse(status_code),
lambda url, headers, timeout: _FakeErrorResponse(status_code),
)
result = service_content.fetch_webpage_content(f"https://example.com/status-{status_code}")
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ def test_fetch_webpage_content_429_takes_distinct_rate_limit_path(tmp_path, monk
monkeypatch.setattr(
service_content,
"_get_public_url",
lambda url, headers, timeout, **kwargs: _FakeRateLimitResponse(),
lambda url, headers, timeout: _FakeRateLimitResponse(),
)
result = service_content.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/rate-limited")
+1 -7
View File
@@ -904,13 +904,7 @@ def test_web_fetch_guard_blocks_redirect_into_private(monkeypatch):
url = "http://public.example/start"
headers = {"location": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}
from contextlib import contextmanager
@contextmanager
def _fake_stream(method, url, **kwargs):
yield _Resp()
monkeypatch.setattr(httpx, "stream", _fake_stream)
monkeypatch.setattr(httpx, "get", lambda url, **kwargs: _Resp())
with _pytest.raises(httpx.RequestError) as exc:
content._get_public_url("http://public.example/start", headers={}, timeout=5)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ def _patch_fetch(monkeypatch, text, content_type):
monkeypatch.setattr(
content_mod,
"_get_public_url",
lambda url, headers=None, timeout=5, **kwargs: _FakeResponse(text, content_type),
lambda url, headers=None, timeout=5: _FakeResponse(text, content_type),
)
-206
View File
@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
"""web_fetch download budgets (#3812).
MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS only trims what the agent sees; these caps bound what the
server downloads, parses, and caches. Soft cap by default with a truncation
notice, per-call override clamped to the hard cap, and a pre-buffer refusal
when Content-Length already exceeds the hard ceiling.
"""
import json
from contextlib import contextmanager
import pytest
from src.constants import WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES
from services.search import content as content_mod
class _FakeStream:
"""Stands in for the httpx.stream(...) context manager."""
def __init__(self, body: bytes, content_type="text/plain", content_length=None,
status_code=200, chunk=8192):
self._body = body
self._chunk = chunk
self.status_code = status_code
self.encoding = "utf-8"
self.url = "https://example.com/x"
self.headers = {"Content-Type": content_type}
if content_length is not None:
self.headers["content-length"] = str(content_length)
self.body_reads = 0
def iter_bytes(self):
for i in range(0, len(self._body), self._chunk):
self.body_reads += 1
yield self._body[i:i + self._chunk]
@pytest.fixture
def no_cache(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
monkeypatch.setattr(content_mod, "CONTENT_CACHE_DIR", tmp_path)
monkeypatch.setattr(content_mod, "_cache_result", lambda *a, **k: None)
monkeypatch.setattr(content_mod, "_public_http_url", lambda u: True)
def _patch_stream(monkeypatch, fake):
@contextmanager
def fake_stream(method, url, **kwargs):
yield fake
monkeypatch.setattr(content_mod.httpx, "stream", fake_stream)
return fake
def test_body_under_cap_is_untouched(monkeypatch, no_cache):
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, _FakeStream(b"hello world"))
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/a.txt")
assert r["success"] is True
assert r["content"] == "hello world"
assert r["truncated"] is False
assert r["fetched_bytes"] == len(b"hello world")
def test_body_over_soft_cap_truncates_with_flags(monkeypatch, no_cache):
body = b"x" * (WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES + 50_000)
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, _FakeStream(body, content_length=len(body)))
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/big.txt")
assert r["truncated"] is True
assert r["fetched_bytes"] == WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES
assert r["total_bytes"] == len(body)
assert len(r["content"]) == WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES
def test_max_bytes_override_raises_budget(monkeypatch, no_cache):
body = b"y" * (WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES + 50_000)
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, _FakeStream(body))
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content(
"https://example.com/big.txt", max_bytes=len(body) + 1
)
assert r["truncated"] is False
assert r["fetched_bytes"] == len(body)
def test_override_is_clamped_to_hard_cap(monkeypatch, no_cache):
# Ask for more than the ceiling; the effective budget must be the ceiling.
fake = _patch_stream(monkeypatch, _FakeStream(b"z" * 10, chunk=4))
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content(
"https://example.com/a.txt", max_bytes=WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES * 10
)
assert r["success"] is True
# The clamp itself: effective cap recorded in the cache key path is the
# hard cap, and a declared body over the ceiling is refused regardless.
big = _FakeStream(b"", content_length=WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES + 1)
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, big)
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content(
"https://example.com/huge.bin", max_bytes=WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES * 10
)
assert r["success"] is False
assert "TooLarge" in r["error"]
assert big.body_reads == 0 # refused before buffering
def test_declared_over_hard_cap_refused_before_buffering(monkeypatch, no_cache):
fake = _FakeStream(b"irrelevant", content_length=WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES + 1)
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, fake)
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/huge.iso")
assert r["success"] is False
assert "TooLarge" in r["error"]
assert fake.body_reads == 0
def test_truncated_pdf_is_an_error_not_garbage(monkeypatch, no_cache):
body = b"%PDF-1.4 " + b"p" * (WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES + 10)
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, _FakeStream(body, content_type="application/pdf"))
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/big.pdf")
assert r["success"] is False
assert "TooLarge" in r["error"]
def test_fetch_requests_identity_encoding(monkeypatch, no_cache):
# Compressed responses can decode to far more than Content-Length, so the
# streamed cap and the hard-cap preflight are only honest when we refuse
# transfer compression. Pin that the fetch advertises identity, not gzip.
seen = {}
@contextmanager
def fake_stream(method, url, **kwargs):
seen["headers"] = kwargs.get("headers") or {}
yield _FakeStream(b"hello")
monkeypatch.setattr(content_mod.httpx, "stream", fake_stream)
content_mod.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/a.txt")
assert seen["headers"].get("Accept-Encoding") == "identity"
def test_rejects_compressed_response_that_ignored_identity(monkeypatch, no_cache):
# We request Accept-Encoding: identity, but a server can ignore it and send
# gzip anyway. httpx would decode it, so a tiny compressed body could balloon
# past the cap in one decoded chunk. Refuse before reading the body.
fake = _FakeStream(b"x" * 5000, content_length=40)
fake.headers["content-encoding"] = "gzip"
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, fake)
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/a.txt")
assert r["success"] is False
assert "Content-Encoding" in r["error"] or "compressed" in r["error"]
assert fake.body_reads == 0 # refused before decoding any body
def test_oversized_title_does_not_hide_partial_notice(monkeypatch):
# The partial-content notice is the PR's core contract; an untrusted,
# oversized page title must not push it past MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS.
import asyncio
from src.agent_tools.web_tools import WebFetchTool
from src.constants import MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS
def fake_fetch(url, timeout=10, max_bytes=None):
return {
"content": "partial body",
"title": "T" * (MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS + 5_000),
"error": "",
"truncated": True,
"fetched_bytes": WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES,
"total_bytes": 9_000_000,
}
import src.search.content as alias_mod
monkeypatch.setattr(alias_mod, "fetch_webpage_content", fake_fetch)
out = asyncio.run(WebFetchTool().execute(
json.dumps({"url": "https://example.com/big.txt"}), ctx={}
))
assert out["exit_code"] == 0
assert out["output"].startswith("[partial content:")
assert '"full": true' in out["output"]
def test_tool_layer_emits_partial_notice_and_parses_full(monkeypatch):
import asyncio
from src.agent_tools.web_tools import WebFetchTool
calls = {}
def fake_fetch(url, timeout=10, max_bytes=None):
calls["max_bytes"] = max_bytes
return {
"content": "partial body",
"title": "Big File",
"error": "",
"truncated": True,
"fetched_bytes": WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES,
"total_bytes": 5_000_000,
}
import src.search.content as alias_mod
monkeypatch.setattr(alias_mod, "fetch_webpage_content", fake_fetch)
out = asyncio.run(WebFetchTool().execute(
json.dumps({"url": "https://example.com/big.txt"}), ctx={}
))
assert out["exit_code"] == 0
assert "[partial content:" in out["output"]
assert '"full": true' in out["output"]
assert calls["max_bytes"] is None
asyncio.run(WebFetchTool().execute(
json.dumps({"url": "https://example.com/big.txt", "full": True}), ctx={}
))
assert calls["max_bytes"] == WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES