docs(discovery): move discovery to repository root

.env.example

@@ -189,7 +189,6 @@ SEARXNG_INSTANCE=http://localhost:8080
 # ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES=26214400       # email compose attachment (25 MB)
 # ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES=26214400                  # speech-to-text audio (25 MB)
 # ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES=10485760                        # calendar .ics import (10 MB)
-# ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES=524288000                 # TTS cache (500 MB)
 
 # ============================================================
 # Host Docker access (explicit opt-in)

.github/scripts/check-issue-description.js

@@ -153,16 +153,6 @@ module.exports = async ({ github, context, core }) => {
     }
   }
 
-  const LABEL_BAD  = 'needs more info';
-  const LABEL_GOOD = 'ready for review';
-
-  // Closed issues are no longer awaiting review.
-  // This also prevents later edits to closed issues from restoring the label.
-  if (issue.state === 'closed') {
-    await dropLabel(LABEL_GOOD);
-    return;
-  }
-
   // ── Find existing bot comment to update in-place ──────────────────────────
   const MARKER = '<!-- issue-description-check -->';
   const { data: comments } = await github.rest.issues.listComments({
@@ -170,6 +160,9 @@ module.exports = async ({ github, context, core }) => {
   });
   const existing = comments.find(c => c.user.type === 'Bot' && c.body.includes(MARKER));
 
+  const LABEL_BAD  = 'needs more info';
+  const LABEL_GOOD = 'ready for review';
+
   if (failures.length === 0) {
     if (existing) {
       await github.rest.issues.deleteComment({ owner, repo, comment_id: existing.id });

.github/workflows/issue-description-check.yml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: ci / issue description check
 
 on:
   issues:
-    types: [opened, edited, reopened, closed]
+    types: [opened, edited, reopened]
 
 permissions:
   issues: write

THREAT_MODEL.md

@@ -68,14 +68,14 @@ External content that reaches the LLM is treated as untrusted via `src/prompt_se
 - `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` everywhere.
 - **CSP:** nonce-based `script-src 'self' 'nonce-{nonce}' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net`. `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` is intentionally kept — `static/index.html` ships inline `<style>` blocks and JS modules set `style=""` attributes at runtime. Inline styles do not execute script so the risk is visual-only. Removing this requires templating the HTML files and auditing all JS-set style attributes.
 
+## Token-Supplied Model Endpoints
+
+Direct `/api/v1/chat` requests with a token-supplied `base_url` must use a public HTTP(S) endpoint. This restriction applies only to untrusted direct values; administrator-configured endpoints may intentionally use local or LAN URLs for private model providers.
+
 ## Known Gaps
 
 These are open, acknowledged, and contributor help is welcome:
 
 1. **No shell/filesystem sandbox.** The agent `bash` and `read_file`/`write_file` tools run as the app process user with no network egress filtering or filesystem confinement. A successful prompt-injection reaching a shell-enabled admin session can make outbound requests to internal services. See #1058 for the sandbox proposal.
 
-2. **SSRF via `/api/v1/chat` `base_url` parameter.** A chat-scoped API token can supply an arbitrary `base_url`; the server forwards the LLM request to that host without validating the scheme or address. PR #1039 fixes this.
-
-3. **`src/search/` partial consolidation.** `src.search.core` and `src.search.providers` correctly alias `services.search` via `sys.modules` replacement. `analytics`, `cache`, `content`, `query`, and `ranking` are still independent copies that can drift. The SSRF regression tests in `tests/test_webhook_ssrf_resilience.py` test `src.webhook_manager` directly (separate from search), so the safety net there is intact. See #1058.
-
-4. **Token scopes are coarse.** There is no way to grant a session a subset of the owning user's privileges. Companion/mobile tokens carry either `chat` or `admin` scope with no per-capability granularity.
+2. **Token scopes are coarse.** There is no way to grant a session a subset of the owning user's privileges. Companion/mobile tokens carry either `chat` or `admin` scope with no per-capability granularity.

app.py

@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ from routes.history.history_routes import setup_history_routes
 app.include_router(setup_history_routes(session_manager, upload_handler=upload_handler))
 
 # Search
-from routes.search.search_routes import setup_search_routes
+from routes.search_routes import setup_search_routes
 app.include_router(setup_search_routes(config))
 
 # Presets
@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ app.include_router(setup_stt_routes(stt_service))
 logger.info("STT service initialized (provider managed via settings)")
 
 # Documents (artifacts/canvas)
-from routes.document.document_routes import setup_document_routes
+from routes.document_routes import setup_document_routes
 document_router = setup_document_routes(session_manager, upload_handler)
 app.include_router(document_router)
 
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ set_ai_rag_manager(rag_manager, personal_docs_mgr)
 logger.info("AI interaction tools initialized (session, memory, RAG, UI control)")
 
 # Webhooks
-from routes.webhook.webhook_routes import setup_webhook_routes
+from routes.webhook_routes import setup_webhook_routes
 app.include_router(setup_webhook_routes(webhook_manager, auth_manager, session_manager, api_key_manager))
 
 # API Tokens
@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ app.include_router(setup_codex_routes(
 ))
 app.include_router(setup_claude_routes())
 
-from routes.vault.vault_routes import setup_vault_routes
+from routes.vault_routes import setup_vault_routes
 app.include_router(setup_vault_routes())
 
 # Contacts (CardDAV)

discovery/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Odysseus discovery maps
+
+Compact, code-grounded discovery maps of cross-cutting systems in the checked-in Odysseus codebase. They preserve investigation context and open factual questions; they are not canonical subsystem specifications, a feature certification, or a substitute for normal testing.
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> Checked-in code is the source of truth for current behaviour. Mature subsystem specifications, where they exist, are the canonical documentation of accepted subsystem behaviour. Check code, tests, and configuration before reconciling a discovery finding. Discovery remains non-canonical.
+
+## Explore the maps
+
+| Document | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| [Current system map](system-map.md) | Records evidence locations, confirmed local observations, and factual open questions about subsystem boundaries. |
+| [Safety boundaries](safety-boundaries.md) | Records evidence about broad authority, safeguards, confirmed risks or gaps, and unverified behaviour. |
+
+## Working rules
+
+- **Trace the code first.** Confirm the current path in source before recording a claim.
+- **Promote selectively.** When an owning mature specification exists, add a fact only when it is verified, useful, and not already represented there.
+- **Record missing ownership.** When no owning specification exists, retain the verified finding in discovery and record missing documentation ownership as a follow-up.
+- **Retain uncertainty here.** Keep unresolved questions and useful investigation context in discovery rather than treating them as canonical truth.
+- **Keep specifications current-state only.** Do not record intentions, design direction, refactor plans, decision history, priority, ownership, or sequencing here.
+- **Investigate with cause.** Do not exhaustively revalidate existing functionality without a report, visible failure, relevant change, or high-authority review need.
+- **Review authority carefully.** Give execution, data access, external tools, credentials, destructive operations, and unattended work focused review.
+- **Use stable locations.** Cite modules, routes, classes, and functions instead of fragile line ranges or generated evidence tables.
+
+## Reconciliation flow
+
+1. Start with the relevant map and trace the cited code.
+2. Classify the finding against current source evidence and an owning mature specification where one exists.
+3. Promote only verified, useful facts that are missing from an existing owning specification.
+4. When no owning specification exists, retain the verified finding here and record missing documentation ownership as a follow-up; otherwise retain unresolved context here and correct stale wording.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> This package intentionally contains no generator, validator, maturity scale, feature database, or parallel work tracker. The [architecture runtime inventory](../specs/architecture-runtime-inventory.md) remains useful structural context, but is an explicitly draft snapshot.

discovery/safety-boundaries.md

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+# Safety boundaries
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> This non-canonical discovery map records code-grounded safeguards, confirmed risks or gaps, and unverified behaviour. Broad authority does not by itself establish a vulnerability. Verify the cited source before relying on a finding. No destructive test, external connection, or real credential was used for this map.
+
+## Navigate the boundaries
+
+- [Shell and subprocess execution](#shell-and-subprocess-execution)
+- [Filesystem access and workspace confinement](#filesystem-access-and-workspace-confinement)
+- [Agent-controlled tool dispatch](#agent-controlled-tool-dispatch)
+- [MCP and external tool servers](#mcp-and-external-tool-servers)
+- [Outbound network requests and URL validation](#outbound-network-requests-and-url-validation)
+- [Secrets, credentials, and vault sessions](#secrets-credentials-and-vault-sessions)
+- [Authentication and privileged administration](#authentication-and-privileged-administration)
+- [Deletion, wipe, backup, and restore](#deletion-wipe-backup-and-restore)
+- [Background jobs and unattended task execution](#background-jobs-and-unattended-task-execution)
+
+## Shell and subprocess execution
+
+- **Boundary:** Shell routes, agent `bash` and `python` tools, local model serving, and detached background jobs.
+
+- **Available authority:** Commands run as the application process user and can create child processes.
+
+- **User-controlled inputs:** Direct shell requests, model-produced tool arguments, scheduled-task prompts, and model-serving configuration.
+
+- **Current safeguards:** Agent dispatch applies owner/admin checks and tool policy; process helpers use timeouts or bounded background-job lifecycle where implemented.
+
+- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Intentional authority with a confirmed gap: the agent shell starts in its workspace but is not sandboxed to it, and has no egress sandbox. This is documented in source and the threat model; it is not a newly demonstrated bypass.
+
+- **Unverified behaviour:** Role-gate and disabled-tool outcomes, direct shell-route behaviour, and timeout, cancellation, and output handling for foreground and detached processes remain unverified.
+
+## Filesystem access and workspace confinement
+
+- **Boundary:** Agent read, write, patch, listing, glob, and grep tools.
+
+- **Available authority:** Read and modify files within active workspace confinement or fallback allowlisted roots.
+
+- **User-controlled inputs:** Tool paths, patches, file contents, search patterns, and workspace selection passed into the tool dispatcher.
+
+- **Current safeguards:** [`src/tool_execution.py`](../src/tool_execution.py) resolves paths, blocks sensitive subpaths, applies allowlist containment, and tightens paths to the active workspace when one is bound. File tools use those resolvers.
+
+- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Intentional authority with safeguards. The file-tool policy does not sandbox the shell; treating a workspace as a whole-process containment boundary would be incorrect.
+
+- **Unverified behaviour:** Traversal, symlink, sensitive-name, absolute-path, and workspace-switch behaviour remains unverified.
+
+## Agent-controlled tool dispatch
+
+- **Boundary:** Model output becomes native or parsed tool calls and is dispatched by the agent loop.
+
+- **Available authority:** The authority of every enabled tool, including privileged built-ins and external tools.
+
+- **User-controlled inputs:** Chat content, attached/retrieved content that may influence the model, tool arguments, per-request tool selection, and policy toggles.
+
+- **Current safeguards:** [`src/tool_security.py`](../src/tool_security.py) blocks protected tools for non-admin users and fails closed for malformed tool names; [`src/tool_policy.py`](../src/tool_policy.py) supports disabled and guide-only policy; prompt-security helpers label untrusted context.
+
+- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Credible risk requiring verification: aliases, legacy text tools, native function calls, and MCP-qualified names must all reach the same policy outcome. The code has specific alias handling for email/MCP names, which makes this a sensitive compatibility seam.
+
+- **Unverified behaviour:** The current policy outcomes for owner role, request mode, disabled state, native versus parsed invocation, qualified aliases, and external-content entry points remain unverified.
+
+## MCP and external tool servers
+
+- **Boundary:** Configured MCP servers and their tools are exposed to the agent through the MCP manager and routes.
+
+- **Available authority:** Depends on the server: external network access, local process access, messaging, or data mutation may be delegated outside the application.
+
+- **User-controlled inputs:** Server configuration, remote OAuth completion, tool arguments, and model-selected MCP calls.
+
+- **Current safeguards:** MCP routes are registered through [`routes/mcp_routes.py`](../routes/mcp_routes.py); MCP-qualified tools are denied to non-admin users by [`src/tool_security.py`](../src/tool_security.py). OAuth state and token persistence are handled in [`src/mcp_oauth.py`](../src/mcp_oauth.py).
+
+- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Credible risk requiring verification: an MCP server authority is broader than the application can infer from its tool name. This map does not establish a trust or approval model for server installation and individual tool invocation.
+
+- **Unverified behaviour:** Server onboarding, credential storage, server-origin trust, OAuth callback deployment, tool disablement, and invocation audit behaviour remain unverified.
+
+## Outbound network requests and URL validation
+
+- **Boundary:** Search/content fetch, research, webhooks, skill import, provider endpoints, and other HTTP clients.
+
+- **Available authority:** The application can make outbound requests from its network position.
+
+- **User-controlled inputs:** Search/fetch URLs, imported skill URLs, webhook configuration, and some endpoint settings.
+
+- **Current safeguards:** [`src/url_security.py`](../src/url_security.py) validates untrusted public HTTP URLs and fails closed on unsuitable schemes or private addresses. [`services/search/content.py`](../services/search/content.py) resolves and rejects non-public hosts, pins resolved addresses for fetches, caps bodies, and limits redirects.
+
+- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Intentional split: administrator-created model endpoints may target private providers, while untrusted URLs use public-address checks. That distinction is required for self-hosted deployments but needs explicit call-site review.
+
+- **Unverified behaviour:** The URL-source classification for outbound clients and the current handling of redirects and DNS changes remain unverified.
+
+## Secrets, credentials, and vault sessions
+
+- **Boundary:** Application-managed encrypted secrets, API keys, provider credentials, and Bitwarden/Vaultwarden CLI sessions.
+
+- **Available authority:** Credentials unlock remote providers and connected personal services.
+
+- **User-controlled inputs:** Administrative configuration, login/unlock requests, imported settings, and agent vault tool arguments.
+
+- **Current safeguards:** [`src/secret_storage.py`](../src/secret_storage.py) uses a locally stored Fernet key with restrictive permissions for supported database secrets. Vault routes require an administrator, avoid passing master passwords in command arguments, and set restrictive permissions on the vault-session file.
+
+- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Confirmed current boundary: vault session data is persisted through the vault path, not through [`src/secret_storage.py`](../src/secret_storage.py). This is an unresolved question about current security semantics, not a confirmed exposure.
+
+- **Unverified behaviour:** Current encryption-at-rest, owner scope, rotation, lock/logout, backup/restore, and log/tool-result exposure behaviour remains unverified.
+
+## Authentication and privileged administration
+
+- **Boundary:** Session authentication, API tokens, privileged routes, and internal tool loopback.
+
+- **Available authority:** Administrative identity can access execution, settings, integrations, data deletion, and secrets.
+
+- **User-controlled inputs:** Login/signup data, session cookies, API tokens, authentication configuration, and requests to privileged routes.
+
+- **Current safeguards:** [`core/auth.py`](../core/auth.py), [`core/middleware.py`](../core/middleware.py), and route-level checks establish identity and administrator gates. [`app.py`](../app.py) warns when localhost bypass is configured; [`SECURITY.md`](../SECURITY.md) documents deployment requirements.
+
+- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Intentional authority with safeguards. Security depends on deployments keeping authentication enabled and internal services private; this map does not audit reverse-proxy or environment configuration.
+
+- **Unverified behaviour:** Setup, anonymous, non-admin, admin, token, and internal-loopback behaviour, including privileged-route gate consistency, remains unverified.
+
+## Deletion, wipe, backup, and restore
+
+- **Boundary:** Administrative wipe, cleanup, backup import/export, and the backup restore command.
+
+- **Available authority:** Delete or replace user data and credentials.
+
+- **User-controlled inputs:** Administrative HTTP requests, cleanup choices, backup payloads, archive paths, and restore command options.
+
+- **Current safeguards:** Administrative wipe routes use the administrative boundary. Cleanup exposes a preview route before mutation. The documented backup tool requires explicit restore confirmation, stages the old data directory, and validates archive members before extraction.
+
+- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Intentional destructive authority. Backup archives contain secrets by design, as documented in [`docs/backup-restore.md`](../docs/backup-restore.md); this is an operator confidentiality responsibility, not a code defect established here.
+
+- **Unverified behaviour:** Role-gate, confirmation, archive-rejection, staged-recovery, and owner-isolation behaviour remains unverified. No destructive runtime test was performed.
+
+## Background jobs and unattended task execution
+
+- **Boundary:** Scheduled tasks, background-job monitor, startup tasks, and notification/delivery work that continue without an active browser request.
+
+- **Available authority:** Scheduled agent work can obtain model access and, for eligible owners, shell and file tools; task output can interact with connected services.
+
+- **User-controlled inputs:** Stored task prompt, schedule, model/crew selection, enabled-tool configuration, output target, and prior persisted state.
+
+- **Current safeguards:** [`src/task_scheduler.py`](../src/task_scheduler.py) serializes execution, records task runs, associates work with an owner, and applies the agent owner-based tool gate. [`src/bg_jobs.py`](../src/bg_jobs.py) keeps bounded state and can terminate overlong subprocess jobs.
+
+- **Confirmed risks or gaps:** Credible risk requiring verification: authority is inherited and exercised later, so changes to roles, task configuration, and disabled tools must be checked at execution time rather than assumed from task creation.
+
+- **Unverified behaviour:** Creation, editing, role-change, scheduling, cancellation, restart-recovery, and execution behaviour remains unverified, including whether current policy is re-evaluated before privileged action.

discovery/system-map.md

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+# Current system map
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> This non-canonical discovery map is an evidence guide, not an exhaustive feature catalog or runtime certification. Verify the cited source before relying on a finding. Each section records local implementation observations, evidence locations, confirmed current problems, and unresolved factual questions.
+
+## Navigate the system
+
+- [Startup and application composition](#startup-and-application-composition)
+- [Frontend shell and browser interaction](#frontend-shell-and-browser-interaction)
+- [Chat, sessions, and streaming](#chat-sessions-and-streaming)
+- [Agents, tools, and execution](#agents-tools-and-execution)
+- [Models, providers, and local serving](#models-providers-and-local-serving)
+- [Search and research](#search-and-research)
+- [Documents, retrieval, and personal knowledge](#documents-retrieval-and-personal-knowledge)
+- [Memory and skills](#memory-and-skills)
+- [Email, calendar, contacts, notes, and tasks](#email-calendar-contacts-notes-and-tasks)
+- [Media, speech, and image work](#media-speech-and-image-work)
+- [Authentication, secrets, and privileged administration](#authentication-secrets-and-privileged-administration)
+- [Persistence, background work, and operations](#persistence-background-work-and-operations)
+
+## Startup and application composition
+
+- **How it works:** [`app.py`](../app.py) creates the application, mounts static assets, constructs shared services, registers route factories, and owns lifespan startup and shutdown. [`src/app_initializer.py`](../src/app_initializer.py) prepares application state; [`core/`](../core/) provides persistence, authentication, middleware, sessions, and platform helpers.
+
+- **Evidence locations:** [`app.py`](../app.py); [`src/app_initializer.py`](../src/app_initializer.py); [`core/database.py`](../core/database.py); [`core/auth.py`](../core/auth.py); [`core/middleware.py`](../core/middleware.py); [`routes/`](../routes/).
+
+- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
+
+- **Open question:** Which component currently owns startup and shutdown for each long-lived service?
+
+## Frontend shell and browser interaction
+
+- **How it works:** [`static/index.html`](../static/index.html) is served by the root and SPA deep-link routes in [`app.py`](../app.py); [`static/app.js`](../static/app.js), [`static/style.css`](../static/style.css), and [`static/js/`](../static/js/) implement the client surface.
+
+- **Evidence locations:** [`static/index.html`](../static/index.html); [`static/app.js`](../static/app.js); [`static/js/`](../static/js/); [`static/style.css`](../static/style.css); [`app.py`](../app.py) deep-link handlers.
+
+- **Known problems:** The `/backgrounds` route in [`app.py`](../app.py) calls `serve_html_with_nonce` for `static/backgrounds.html`, but that file is absent from [`static/`](../static/). This is a confirmed broken prototype route, not evidence about the rest of the frontend.
+
+- **Open question:** Is `/backgrounds` currently an intentionally supported route or an obsolete prototype?
+
+## Chat, sessions, and streaming
+
+- **How it works:** [`routes/chat_routes.py`](../routes/chat_routes.py) and [`routes/chat_helpers.py`](../routes/chat_helpers.py) coordinate requests, session state, and SSE delivery. [`src/chat_handler.py`](../src/chat_handler.py), [`src/chat_processor.py`](../src/chat_processor.py), [`src/llm_core.py`](../src/llm_core.py), and [`src/session_actions.py`](../src/session_actions.py) provide message preparation, provider interaction, and session operations.
+
+- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/chat_routes.py`](../routes/chat_routes.py); [`routes/chat_helpers.py`](../routes/chat_helpers.py); [`routes/session_routes.py`](../routes/session_routes.py); [`src/chat_handler.py`](../src/chat_handler.py); [`src/chat_processor.py`](../src/chat_processor.py); [`src/llm_core.py`](../src/llm_core.py); [`core/session_manager.py`](../core/session_manager.py).
+
+- **Known problems:** [`src/agent_loop.py`](../src/agent_loop.py) annotates `_resolved_tool_event_name` with `Any` but imports no `Any` and does not enable postponed annotation evaluation. Python evaluates that annotation while importing the module, so this is an import-time defect at the checked baseline.
+
+- **Open question:** No end-to-end provider or browser streaming run was performed for this map.
+
+## Agents, tools, and execution
+
+- **How it works:** [`src/agent_loop.py`](../src/agent_loop.py) drives multi-round tool use. [`src/tool_execution.py`](../src/tool_execution.py) dispatches calls and binds workspace context. [`src/agent_tools/`](../src/agent_tools/) contains individual implementations; [`src/tool_security.py`](../src/tool_security.py) and [`src/tool_policy.py`](../src/tool_policy.py) apply role and request policies. Long-running command work is represented by [`src/bg_jobs.py`](../src/bg_jobs.py).
+
+- **Evidence locations:** [`src/agent_loop.py`](../src/agent_loop.py); [`src/tool_execution.py`](../src/tool_execution.py); [`src/agent_tools/`](../src/agent_tools/); [`src/tool_security.py`](../src/tool_security.py); [`src/tool_policy.py`](../src/tool_policy.py); [`src/tool_schemas.py`](../src/tool_schemas.py); [`src/bg_jobs.py`](../src/bg_jobs.py).
+
+- **Known problems:** The import-time annotation defect above blocks the main agent/tool path. The shell is intentionally not a filesystem or network sandbox; that is an authority boundary, not by itself a vulnerability claim.
+
+- **Open question:** Which native, legacy, and MCP-qualified invocation paths reach each policy gate?
+
+## Models, providers, and local serving
+
+- **How it works:** Model routes delegate to discovery, capabilities, endpoint resolution, and LLM core modules. Cookbook routes and hardware-fit services handle model lifecycle and local-serving support.
+
+- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/model_routes.py`](../routes/model_routes.py); [`src/model_discovery.py`](../src/model_discovery.py); [`src/model_capabilities.py`](../src/model_capabilities.py); [`src/endpoint_resolver.py`](../src/endpoint_resolver.py); [`src/llm_core.py`](../src/llm_core.py); [`routes/cookbook_routes.py`](../routes/cookbook_routes.py); [`src/cookbook_serve_lifecycle.py`](../src/cookbook_serve_lifecycle.py); [`services/hwfit/`](../services/hwfit/).
+
+- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
+
+- **Open question:** Which endpoint inputs are administrator-created and permitted to use private provider addresses?
+
+## Search and research
+
+- **How it works:** HTTP search routes use [`services/search/`](../services/search/); research is exposed through [`routes/research/`](../routes/research/) and implemented in [`services/research/`](../services/research/), [`src/deep_research.py`](../src/deep_research.py), and related helpers. [`src/search/`](../src/search/) remains an import-compatibility layer for callers not yet moved to `services.search`.
+
+- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/search_routes.py`](../routes/search_routes.py); [`services/search/`](../services/search/); [`routes/research/research_routes.py`](../routes/research/research_routes.py); [`services/research/`](../services/research/); [`src/deep_research.py`](../src/deep_research.py); [`src/search/`](../src/search/).
+
+- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
+
+- **Open question:** No live provider request was made; provider configuration and network access remain unverified.
+
+## Documents, retrieval, and personal knowledge
+
+- **How it works:** Document routes coordinate upload handling, document processing, and editor actions. Personal-document and RAG modules use Chroma and embedding clients. PDF viewing uses the optional-dependency loader in [`src/pdf_runtime.py`](../src/pdf_runtime.py); form extraction and filling live separately in [`src/pdf_forms.py`](../src/pdf_forms.py) and [`src/pdf_form_doc.py`](../src/pdf_form_doc.py).
+
+- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/document_routes.py`](../routes/document_routes.py); [`src/upload_handler.py`](../src/upload_handler.py); [`src/document_processor.py`](../src/document_processor.py); [`src/document_actions.py`](../src/document_actions.py); [`src/personal_docs.py`](../src/personal_docs.py); [`src/rag_manager.py`](../src/rag_manager.py); [`src/embeddings.py`](../src/embeddings.py); [`src/pdf_runtime.py`](../src/pdf_runtime.py); [`src/pdf_forms.py`](../src/pdf_forms.py); [`src/pdf_form_doc.py`](../src/pdf_form_doc.py).
+
+- **Known problems:** PDF viewing/runtime loading and PDF form processing are separate implementations. That separation is confirmed and intentional in the source; it is not a defect without a reported behavioural failure.
+
+- **Open question:** Optional PDF dependencies and representative uploaded documents were not exercised.
+
+## Memory and skills
+
+- **How it works:** Memory routes use [`services/memory/`](../services/memory/) and vector helpers. Skills are exposed through [`routes/skills_routes.py`](../routes/skills_routes.py), stored and managed in [`services/memory/skills.py`](../services/memory/skills.py), and may be imported through [`services/memory/skill_importer.py`](../services/memory/skill_importer.py).
+
+- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/memory/memory_routes.py`](../routes/memory/memory_routes.py); [`services/memory/`](../services/memory/); [`src/memory.py`](../src/memory.py); [`src/memory_vector.py`](../src/memory_vector.py); [`routes/skills_routes.py`](../routes/skills_routes.py); [`services/memory/skills.py`](../services/memory/skills.py); [`services/memory/skill_importer.py`](../services/memory/skill_importer.py).
+
+- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
+
+- **Open question:** Which imported skill content can reach execution-capable paths, and which validation occurs before that point?
+
+## Email, calendar, contacts, notes, and tasks
+
+- **How it works:** Dedicated route modules own email, CalDAV calendar, CardDAV contacts, notes, and tasks. Supporting modules include email helpers and pollers, CalDAV sync and writeback, and the task scheduler.
+
+- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/email_routes.py`](../routes/email_routes.py); [`routes/calendar_routes.py`](../routes/calendar_routes.py); [`routes/contacts/contacts_routes.py`](../routes/contacts/contacts_routes.py); [`routes/note/note_routes.py`](../routes/note/note_routes.py); [`routes/task_routes.py`](../routes/task_routes.py); [`routes/assistant_routes.py`](../routes/assistant_routes.py); [`src/caldav_sync.py`](../src/caldav_sync.py); [`src/caldav_writeback.py`](../src/caldav_writeback.py); [`src/task_scheduler.py`](../src/task_scheduler.py).
+
+- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
+
+- **Open question:** External account behaviour, writeback, and delivery require controlled credentials and are not runtime-validated here.
+
+## Media, speech, and image work
+
+- **How it works:** Gallery and image routes coordinate media features. Service modules own speech and media integrations; [`src/generated_images.py`](../src/generated_images.py) and [`src/visual_report.py`](../src/visual_report.py) support artifact handling and presentation.
+
+- **Evidence locations:** [`routes/gallery/gallery_routes.py`](../routes/gallery/gallery_routes.py); [`routes/stt_routes.py`](../routes/stt_routes.py); [`routes/tts_routes.py`](../routes/tts_routes.py); [`src/generated_images.py`](../src/generated_images.py); [`services/stt/`](../services/stt/); [`services/tts/`](../services/tts/); [`services/faces/`](../services/faces/); [`src/visual_report.py`](../src/visual_report.py).
+
+- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
+
+- **Open question:** Hardware- and provider-dependent media workflows were not exercised.
+
+## Authentication, secrets, and privileged administration
+
+- **How it works:** [`core/auth.py`](../core/auth.py) and [`core/middleware.py`](../core/middleware.py) provide identity and request gates. [`src/secret_storage.py`](../src/secret_storage.py) encrypts application-managed database secrets with a local Fernet key. Vault handling is separate: [`routes/vault_routes.py`](../routes/vault_routes.py) and [`src/tools/vault.py`](../src/tools/vault.py) invoke the Bitwarden CLI and persist its session data in the application data area.
+
+- **Evidence locations:** [`core/auth.py`](../core/auth.py); [`core/middleware.py`](../core/middleware.py); [`routes/auth_routes.py`](../routes/auth_routes.py); [`routes/api_token_routes.py`](../routes/api_token_routes.py); [`src/secret_storage.py`](../src/secret_storage.py); [`routes/vault_routes.py`](../routes/vault_routes.py); [`src/tools/vault.py`](../src/tools/vault.py); [`routes/admin_wipe/admin_wipe_routes.py`](../routes/admin_wipe/admin_wipe_routes.py).
+
+- **Known problems:** Vault-command handling and local application secret storage are distinct paths with different storage mechanisms. This is a source-confirmed boundary, not evidence that either path is compromised.
+
+- **Open question:** What are the current confidentiality, ownership, rotation, and backup semantics for vault session data?
+
+## Persistence, background work, and operations
+
+- **How it works:** SQLite models and persistence are centred in [`core/database.py`](../core/database.py); managers use application data paths. The scheduler and background-job monitor can continue work outside a live browser request. Operational routes cover cleanup, backup, and administrative wipe; the repository also provides a backup script and user documentation.
+
+- **Evidence locations:** [`core/database.py`](../core/database.py); [`src/runtime_paths.py`](../src/runtime_paths.py); [`src/task_scheduler.py`](../src/task_scheduler.py); [`src/bg_jobs.py`](../src/bg_jobs.py); [`src/bg_monitor.py`](../src/bg_monitor.py); [`routes/backup_routes.py`](../routes/backup_routes.py); [`routes/cleanup/cleanup_routes.py`](../routes/cleanup/cleanup_routes.py); [`routes/admin_wipe/admin_wipe_routes.py`](../routes/admin_wipe/admin_wipe_routes.py); [`scripts/odysseus-backup`](../scripts/odysseus-backup); [`docs/backup-restore.md`](../docs/backup-restore.md).
+
+- **Known problems:** None recorded by this mapping.
+
+- **Open question:** What current behaviour applies to background execution, cancellation, retries, and authority inheritance?

docker-compose.gpu-amd.yml

@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ services:
       - ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES:-26214400}
       - ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES:-26214400}
       - ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES:-10485760}
-      - ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES}
       - DATA_BRAVE_API_KEY=${DATA_BRAVE_API_KEY:-}
       - GOOGLE_API_KEY=${GOOGLE_API_KEY:-}
       - GOOGLE_PSE_CX=${GOOGLE_PSE_CX:-}

docker-compose.gpu-nvidia.yml

@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ services:
       - ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES:-26214400}
       - ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES:-26214400}
       - ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES:-10485760}
-      - ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES}
       - DATA_BRAVE_API_KEY=${DATA_BRAVE_API_KEY:-}
       - GOOGLE_API_KEY=${GOOGLE_API_KEY:-}
       - GOOGLE_PSE_CX=${GOOGLE_PSE_CX:-}

docker-compose.yml

@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ services:
       - ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_EMAIL_COMPOSE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES:-26214400}
       - ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_STT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES:-26214400}
       - ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_ICS_MAX_BYTES:-10485760}
-      - ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES=${ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES}
       - DATA_BRAVE_API_KEY=${DATA_BRAVE_API_KEY:-}
       - GOOGLE_API_KEY=${GOOGLE_API_KEY:-}
       - GOOGLE_PSE_CX=${GOOGLE_PSE_CX:-}

docs/setup.md

@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ uv pip sync requirements.lock                          # reproduce it exactly la
 ### Outlook / Office 365 email
 Odysseus email accounts currently use IMAP/SMTP username-password auth. Outlook
 and Microsoft 365 generally require OAuth instead, so normal Microsoft mailbox
-passwords will fail. See [docs/email-outlook.md](docs/email-outlook.md) for the
+passwords will fail. See [email-outlook.md](email-outlook.md) for the
 current limitation and the planned integration direction.
 
 ## Security Notes

requirements.txt

@@ -38,10 +38,7 @@ python-dateutil
 caldav
 cryptography
 bcrypt
-# Built-in servers use the v1 low-level Server decorator API. MCP SDK v2 is a
-# breaking rewrite, so keep fresh installs on the maintained v1 line until the
-# servers are migrated together.
-mcp<2
+mcp
 pyotp
 qrcode[pil]
 croniter

routes/document/__init__.py

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-"""Document route domain package (slice 2m, #4082/#4071).
-
-Contains document_routes.py and document_helpers.py, migrated from the flat
-routes/ directory. Backward-compat shims at routes/document_routes.py and
-routes/document_helpers.py re-export from here.
-"""

routes/document/document_helpers.py

@@ -1,243 +0,0 @@
-"""document_helpers.py — Pydantic models, doc serializers, owner gating, file-locator helpers shared with document_routes.py."""
-
-"""Document routes — CRUD for living documents with version history."""
-
-import logging
-import os
-import re
-from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
-
-from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
-from pydantic import BaseModel
-
-from core.database import Document, DocumentVersion
-from core.database import Session as DbSession
-from src.auth_helpers import _auth_disabled
-from src.upload_handler import UploadHandler
-
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
-
-# ---- Request schemas ----
-
-class DocumentCreate(BaseModel):
-    session_id: Optional[str] = None
-    title: str = "Untitled"
-    language: Optional[str] = None
-    content: str = ""
-
-class DocumentUpdate(BaseModel):
-    content: str
-    summary: Optional[str] = None
-    force_version: bool = False
-
-class DocumentPatch(BaseModel):
-    title: Optional[str] = None
-    language: Optional[str] = None
-    session_id: Optional[str] = None  # link/unlink document to a session
-
-
-# ---- Helpers ----
-
-def _doc_to_dict(doc: Document) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-    return {
-        "id": doc.id,
-        "session_id": doc.session_id,
-        "title": doc.title,
-        "language": doc.language,
-        "current_content": doc.current_content,
-        "version_count": doc.version_count,
-        "is_active": doc.is_active,
-        "archived": bool(getattr(doc, "archived", False)),
-        "created_at": (doc.created_at.isoformat() + "Z") if doc.created_at else None,
-        "updated_at": (doc.updated_at.isoformat() + "Z") if doc.updated_at else None,
-        # Source-email provenance (set when doc was created from an email
-        # attachment) — drives the "Send signed reply" menu item.
-        "source_email_uid":        getattr(doc, "source_email_uid", None),
-        "source_email_folder":     getattr(doc, "source_email_folder", None),
-        "source_email_account_id": getattr(doc, "source_email_account_id", None),
-        "source_email_message_id": getattr(doc, "source_email_message_id", None),
-    }
-
-def _version_to_dict(v: DocumentVersion) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-    return {
-        "id": v.id,
-        "document_id": v.document_id,
-        "version_number": v.version_number,
-        "content": v.content,
-        "summary": v.summary,
-        "source": v.source,
-        "created_at": v.created_at.isoformat() if v.created_at else None,
-    }
-
-
-def _verify_doc_owner(db, doc: Document, user: str):
-    """Verify `user` owns this document. Raise 404 if not.
-
-    Documents now carry their own `owner` column, so a doc whose session
-    was deleted (session_id → NULL) can still prove ownership and stay
-    openable / cloneable. We trust that column first and only fall back to
-    the session join for any not-yet-backfilled legacy row.
-    """
-    if user is None:
-        if _auth_disabled():
-            return  # Single-user / no-auth mode: allow access
-        raise HTTPException(403, "Authentication required")
-    if doc.owner is not None:
-        if doc.owner != user:
-            raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
-        return
-    # Legacy fallback: derive ownership from the linked session.
-    if not doc.session_id:
-        raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
-    session = db.query(DbSession).filter(DbSession.id == doc.session_id).first()
-    if not session or session.owner != user:
-        raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
-
-
-def _owner_session_filter(q, user):
-    """Restrict a documents query to those owned by `user`.
-
-    Documents now carry their own `owner` column (backfilled at boot from
-    the linked session, or assigned to the admin user for legacy/orphaned
-    docs). We filter on that directly rather than on a session join, so a
-    document whose session was deleted (session_id → NULL) still shows up
-    for its owner instead of silently vanishing from the Library + search.
-
-    The owner backfill runs in init_db before the app serves requests, so
-    by the time this filter is live there are no NULL-owner rows to leak;
-    we therefore match the owner strictly for authenticated callers."""
-    if not user:
-        if user == "" or _auth_disabled():
-            return q
-        return q.filter(False)
-    return q.filter(Document.owner == user)
-
-
-
-def _slug(name: str) -> str:
-    """Filesystem-friendly version of a document title.
-
-    Whitespace becomes underscores; other unsafe punctuation is dropped.
-    Preserves letters, digits, dot, hyphen, underscore. Idempotent.
-    """
-    import re as _re
-    s = (name or "").strip()
-    # Drop the trailing extension if the title happens to include one
-    s = _re.sub(r'\.pdf$', '', s, flags=_re.IGNORECASE)
-    s = _re.sub(r'\s+', '_', s)
-    s = _re.sub(r'[^A-Za-z0-9._-]', '', s)
-    s = _re.sub(r'_+', '_', s).strip('_')
-    return s or "form"
-
-
-# DPI scale for the interactive PDF view. ~150 DPI (2x of 72 PDF user-units).
-_PDF_RENDER_SCALE = 2.0
-
-
-def _upload_path_inside(upload_dir: str, path: str) -> bool:
-    base = os.path.realpath(upload_dir)
-    p = os.path.realpath(path)
-    try:
-        return os.path.commonpath([base, p]) == base
-    except Exception:
-        return False
-
-
-def _resolve_user_upload_path(
-    upload_handler: Any,
-    upload_id: str,
-    owner: Optional[str],
-    auth_manager=None,
-) -> Optional[str]:
-    """Resolve an upload id to a filesystem path the caller may read."""
-    if upload_handler is None:
-        return None
-    resolved = upload_handler.resolve_upload(
-        upload_id,
-        owner=owner,
-        auth_manager=auth_manager,
-    )
-    if not isinstance(resolved, dict) or not resolved:
-        return None
-    path = resolved.get("path")
-    upload_dir = getattr(upload_handler, "upload_dir", None)
-    if path and upload_dir and not _upload_path_inside(upload_dir, path):
-        logger.warning("Upload path outside upload directory: %s", path)
-        return None
-    return path
-
-
-def _locate_upload(
-    upload_dir: str,
-    file_id: str,
-    owner: Optional[str] = None,
-    auth_manager=None,
-    upload_handler: Any = None,
-):
-    """Find an upload by its filename ID via UploadHandler.resolve_upload."""
-    if upload_handler is None:
-        from src.upload_handler import UploadHandler
-
-        base_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(upload_dir))
-        upload_handler = UploadHandler(base_dir, upload_dir)
-    return _resolve_user_upload_path(upload_handler, file_id, owner, auth_manager)
-
-
-def _assert_pdf_marker_upload_owned(
-    request: Request,
-    content: str,
-    user: Optional[str],
-    upload_handler: Any,
-) -> None:
-    """Reject document content whose pdf_source marker points at another user's upload."""
-    if upload_handler is None:
-        return
-    from src.pdf_form_doc import find_source_upload_id
-
-    upload_id = find_source_upload_id(content or "")
-    if not upload_id:
-        return
-    auth_manager = getattr(getattr(request.app, "state", None), "auth_manager", None)
-    if not _resolve_user_upload_path(upload_handler, upload_id, user, auth_manager):
-        raise HTTPException(
-            400,
-            "Document PDF marker references an upload you do not own",
-        )
-
-
-def _derive_title(content: str) -> str:
-    """Derive a title from document content."""
-    import re
-    if not isinstance(content, str):
-        return "Untitled"
-    text = content.strip()
-    if not text:
-        return "Untitled"
-
-    # Markdown header
-    md = re.match(r'^#{1,3}\s+(.+)', text, re.MULTILINE)
-    if md:
-        title = md.group(1).strip()
-        if len(title) > 50:
-            title = title[:48] + "…"
-        return title
-
-    # HTML heading
-    html = re.search(r'<h[1-3][^>]*>([^<]+)</h[1-3]>', text, re.IGNORECASE)
-    if html:
-        title = html.group(1).strip()
-        if len(title) > 50:
-            title = title[:48] + "…"
-        return title
-
-    # First non-empty line (if short enough)
-    for line in text.split('\n'):
-        line = line.strip()
-        if line and 2 <= len(line) <= 60:
-            title = re.sub(r'[:#*`]+$', '', line).strip()
-            if title and len(title) > 50:
-                title = title[:48] + "…"
-            return title or "Untitled"
-
-    return "Untitled"

routes/document_helpers.py

@@ -1,14 +1,243 @@
-"""Backward-compat shim — canonical location is routes/document/document_helpers.py.
+"""document_helpers.py — Pydantic models, doc serializers, owner gating, file-locator helpers shared with document_routes.py."""
 
-This module is replaced in ``sys.modules`` by the canonical module object so
-that ``import routes.document_helpers``, ``from routes.document_helpers import
-X``, and the ``sys.modules.pop("routes.document_helpers")`` + re-import
-pattern used by test_security_regressions.py all operate on the *same* object.
-Keeps existing import paths working after slice 2m (#4082/#4071).
-"""
+"""Document routes — CRUD for living documents with version history."""
 
-import sys as _sys
+import logging
+import os
+import re
+from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
 
-from routes.document import document_helpers as _canonical  # noqa: F401
+from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
+from pydantic import BaseModel
 
-_sys.modules[__name__] = _canonical
+from core.database import Document, DocumentVersion
+from core.database import Session as DbSession
+from src.auth_helpers import _auth_disabled
+from src.upload_handler import UploadHandler
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+# ---- Request schemas ----
+
+class DocumentCreate(BaseModel):
+    session_id: Optional[str] = None
+    title: str = "Untitled"
+    language: Optional[str] = None
+    content: str = ""
+
+class DocumentUpdate(BaseModel):
+    content: str
+    summary: Optional[str] = None
+    force_version: bool = False
+
+class DocumentPatch(BaseModel):
+    title: Optional[str] = None
+    language: Optional[str] = None
+    session_id: Optional[str] = None  # link/unlink document to a session
+
+
+# ---- Helpers ----
+
+def _doc_to_dict(doc: Document) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "id": doc.id,
+        "session_id": doc.session_id,
+        "title": doc.title,
+        "language": doc.language,
+        "current_content": doc.current_content,
+        "version_count": doc.version_count,
+        "is_active": doc.is_active,
+        "archived": bool(getattr(doc, "archived", False)),
+        "created_at": (doc.created_at.isoformat() + "Z") if doc.created_at else None,
+        "updated_at": (doc.updated_at.isoformat() + "Z") if doc.updated_at else None,
+        # Source-email provenance (set when doc was created from an email
+        # attachment) — drives the "Send signed reply" menu item.
+        "source_email_uid":        getattr(doc, "source_email_uid", None),
+        "source_email_folder":     getattr(doc, "source_email_folder", None),
+        "source_email_account_id": getattr(doc, "source_email_account_id", None),
+        "source_email_message_id": getattr(doc, "source_email_message_id", None),
+    }
+
+def _version_to_dict(v: DocumentVersion) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "id": v.id,
+        "document_id": v.document_id,
+        "version_number": v.version_number,
+        "content": v.content,
+        "summary": v.summary,
+        "source": v.source,
+        "created_at": v.created_at.isoformat() if v.created_at else None,
+    }
+
+
+def _verify_doc_owner(db, doc: Document, user: str):
+    """Verify `user` owns this document. Raise 404 if not.
+
+    Documents now carry their own `owner` column, so a doc whose session
+    was deleted (session_id → NULL) can still prove ownership and stay
+    openable / cloneable. We trust that column first and only fall back to
+    the session join for any not-yet-backfilled legacy row.
+    """
+    if user is None:
+        if _auth_disabled():
+            return  # Single-user / no-auth mode: allow access
+        raise HTTPException(403, "Authentication required")
+    if doc.owner is not None:
+        if doc.owner != user:
+            raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
+        return
+    # Legacy fallback: derive ownership from the linked session.
+    if not doc.session_id:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
+    session = db.query(DbSession).filter(DbSession.id == doc.session_id).first()
+    if not session or session.owner != user:
+        raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")
+
+
+def _owner_session_filter(q, user):
+    """Restrict a documents query to those owned by `user`.
+
+    Documents now carry their own `owner` column (backfilled at boot from
+    the linked session, or assigned to the admin user for legacy/orphaned
+    docs). We filter on that directly rather than on a session join, so a
+    document whose session was deleted (session_id → NULL) still shows up
+    for its owner instead of silently vanishing from the Library + search.
+
+    The owner backfill runs in init_db before the app serves requests, so
+    by the time this filter is live there are no NULL-owner rows to leak;
+    we therefore match the owner strictly for authenticated callers."""
+    if not user:
+        if user == "" or _auth_disabled():
+            return q
+        return q.filter(False)
+    return q.filter(Document.owner == user)
+
+
+
+def _slug(name: str) -> str:
+    """Filesystem-friendly version of a document title.
+
+    Whitespace becomes underscores; other unsafe punctuation is dropped.
+    Preserves letters, digits, dot, hyphen, underscore. Idempotent.
+    """
+    import re as _re
+    s = (name or "").strip()
+    # Drop the trailing extension if the title happens to include one
+    s = _re.sub(r'\.pdf$', '', s, flags=_re.IGNORECASE)
+    s = _re.sub(r'\s+', '_', s)
+    s = _re.sub(r'[^A-Za-z0-9._-]', '', s)
+    s = _re.sub(r'_+', '_', s).strip('_')
+    return s or "form"
+
+
+# DPI scale for the interactive PDF view. ~150 DPI (2x of 72 PDF user-units).
+_PDF_RENDER_SCALE = 2.0
+
+
+def _upload_path_inside(upload_dir: str, path: str) -> bool:
+    base = os.path.realpath(upload_dir)
+    p = os.path.realpath(path)
+    try:
+        return os.path.commonpath([base, p]) == base
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+
+
+def _resolve_user_upload_path(
+    upload_handler: Any,
+    upload_id: str,
+    owner: Optional[str],
+    auth_manager=None,
+) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Resolve an upload id to a filesystem path the caller may read."""
+    if upload_handler is None:
+        return None
+    resolved = upload_handler.resolve_upload(
+        upload_id,
+        owner=owner,
+        auth_manager=auth_manager,
+    )
+    if not isinstance(resolved, dict) or not resolved:
+        return None
+    path = resolved.get("path")
+    upload_dir = getattr(upload_handler, "upload_dir", None)
+    if path and upload_dir and not _upload_path_inside(upload_dir, path):
+        logger.warning("Upload path outside upload directory: %s", path)
+        return None
+    return path
+
+
+def _locate_upload(
+    upload_dir: str,
+    file_id: str,
+    owner: Optional[str] = None,
+    auth_manager=None,
+    upload_handler: Any = None,
+):
+    """Find an upload by its filename ID via UploadHandler.resolve_upload."""
+    if upload_handler is None:
+        from src.upload_handler import UploadHandler
+
+        base_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(upload_dir))
+        upload_handler = UploadHandler(base_dir, upload_dir)
+    return _resolve_user_upload_path(upload_handler, file_id, owner, auth_manager)
+
+
+def _assert_pdf_marker_upload_owned(
+    request: Request,
+    content: str,
+    user: Optional[str],
+    upload_handler: Any,
+) -> None:
+    """Reject document content whose pdf_source marker points at another user's upload."""
+    if upload_handler is None:
+        return
+    from src.pdf_form_doc import find_source_upload_id
+
+    upload_id = find_source_upload_id(content or "")
+    if not upload_id:
+        return
+    auth_manager = getattr(getattr(request.app, "state", None), "auth_manager", None)
+    if not _resolve_user_upload_path(upload_handler, upload_id, user, auth_manager):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            400,
+            "Document PDF marker references an upload you do not own",
+        )
+
+
+def _derive_title(content: str) -> str:
+    """Derive a title from document content."""
+    import re
+    if not isinstance(content, str):
+        return "Untitled"
+    text = content.strip()
+    if not text:
+        return "Untitled"
+
+    # Markdown header
+    md = re.match(r'^#{1,3}\s+(.+)', text, re.MULTILINE)
+    if md:
+        title = md.group(1).strip()
+        if len(title) > 50:
+            title = title[:48] + "…"
+        return title
+
+    # HTML heading
+    html = re.search(r'<h[1-3][^>]*>([^<]+)</h[1-3]>', text, re.IGNORECASE)
+    if html:
+        title = html.group(1).strip()
+        if len(title) > 50:
+            title = title[:48] + "…"
+        return title
+
+    # First non-empty line (if short enough)
+    for line in text.split('\n'):
+        line = line.strip()
+        if line and 2 <= len(line) <= 60:
+            title = re.sub(r'[:#*`]+$', '', line).strip()
+            if title and len(title) > 50:
+                title = title[:48] + "…"
+            return title or "Untitled"
+
+    return "Untitled"

routes/search/__init__.py

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-"""Search route domain package (slice 2j, #4082/#4071).
-
-Contains search_routes.py, migrated from the flat routes/ directory.
-Backward-compat shim at routes/search_routes.py re-exports from here.
-"""

routes/search/search_routes.py

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-"""Search routes — /api/search/config GET, /api/search POST."""
-
-import logging
-from typing import Dict, Any
-
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
-
-import time
-
-from services.search import get_search_config, comprehensive_web_search, PROVIDER_INFO
-from services.search.core import _call_provider
-from services.search.providers import _get_provider_key, _get_search_instance
-
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
-
-async def _request_values(request: Request) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-    """Accept JSON, form data, or query params for search endpoints.
-
-    The browser UI posts FormData, while the agent's generic app_api tool
-    posts JSON. FastAPI Form(...) rejects JSON with a 422 before our handler
-    runs, which made the model think SearXNG was broken.
-    """
-    values: Dict[str, Any] = dict(request.query_params)
-    content_type = (request.headers.get("content-type") or "").lower()
-    try:
-        if "application/json" in content_type:
-            body = await request.json()
-            if isinstance(body, dict):
-                values.update(body)
-        else:
-            form = await request.form()
-            values.update(dict(form))
-    except Exception:
-        pass
-    return values
-
-
-def setup_search_routes(config) -> APIRouter:
-    router = APIRouter(tags=["search"])
-
-    @router.get("/api/search/config")
-    async def get_search_settings() -> Dict[str, Any]:
-        return get_search_config()
-
-    @router.post("/api/search")
-    async def do_web_search(request: Request) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-        """Standalone web search — returns context string + source list.
-
-        Used by Compare mode to pre-search once and share results across panes.
-        """
-        values = await _request_values(request)
-        query = str(values.get("query") or values.get("q") or "").strip()
-        if not query:
-            return {"context": "", "sources": [], "error": "query is required"}
-        time_filter = values.get("time_filter") or values.get("freshness")
-        if time_filter is not None:
-            time_filter = str(time_filter).strip() or None
-        try:
-            context, sources = comprehensive_web_search(
-                query, return_sources=True, time_filter=time_filter,
-            )
-            return {"context": context, "sources": sources}
-        except Exception as e:
-            logger.error(f"Standalone web search failed: {e}")
-            return {"context": "", "sources": [], "error": str(e)}
-
-    @router.get("/api/search/providers")
-    async def list_search_providers():
-        """Return available search providers with config status."""
-        providers = []
-        for pid, (label, needs_key, needs_url) in PROVIDER_INFO.items():
-            if pid == "disabled":
-                continue
-            available = True
-            if needs_key and not _get_provider_key(pid):
-                available = False
-            if needs_url and pid == "searxng" and not _get_search_instance():
-                available = False
-            providers.append({
-                "id": pid,
-                "label": label,
-                "available": available,
-            })
-        return providers
-
-    @router.post("/api/search/query")
-    async def search_with_provider(request: Request) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-        """Search using a specific provider. Used by compare search mode."""
-        values = await _request_values(request)
-        query = str(values.get("query") or values.get("q") or "").strip()
-        provider = str(values.get("provider") or "").strip()
-        try:
-            count = int(values.get("count") or values.get("limit") or 10)
-        except Exception:
-            count = 10
-        if not query:
-            return {"results": [], "provider": provider, "error": "query is required"}
-        if provider not in PROVIDER_INFO or provider == "disabled":
-            return {"results": [], "provider": provider, "error": "Unknown provider"}
-        t0 = time.time()
-        try:
-            results = _call_provider(provider, query, min(count, 20))
-            elapsed = round(time.time() - t0, 2)
-            return {"results": results, "provider": provider, "time": elapsed}
-        except Exception as e:
-            elapsed = round(time.time() - t0, 2)
-            logger.error(f"Search provider {provider} failed: {e}")
-            return {"results": [], "provider": provider, "time": elapsed, "error": str(e)}
-
-    return router

routes/search_routes.py

@@ -1,13 +1,111 @@
-"""Backward-compat shim — canonical location is routes/search/search_routes.py.
+"""Search routes — /api/search/config GET, /api/search POST."""
 
-This module is replaced in ``sys.modules`` by the canonical module object so
-that ``import routes.search_routes`` and ``from routes.search_routes import X``
-keep resolving to the canonical module. Keeps existing import paths working
-after slice 2j (#4082/#4071).
-"""
+import logging
+from typing import Dict, Any
 
-import sys as _sys
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
 
-from routes.search import search_routes as _canonical  # noqa: F401
+import time
 
-_sys.modules[__name__] = _canonical
+from services.search import get_search_config, comprehensive_web_search, PROVIDER_INFO
+from services.search.core import _call_provider
+from services.search.providers import _get_provider_key, _get_search_instance
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+async def _request_values(request: Request) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """Accept JSON, form data, or query params for search endpoints.
+
+    The browser UI posts FormData, while the agent's generic app_api tool
+    posts JSON. FastAPI Form(...) rejects JSON with a 422 before our handler
+    runs, which made the model think SearXNG was broken.
+    """
+    values: Dict[str, Any] = dict(request.query_params)
+    content_type = (request.headers.get("content-type") or "").lower()
+    try:
+        if "application/json" in content_type:
+            body = await request.json()
+            if isinstance(body, dict):
+                values.update(body)
+        else:
+            form = await request.form()
+            values.update(dict(form))
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    return values
+
+
+def setup_search_routes(config) -> APIRouter:
+    router = APIRouter(tags=["search"])
+
+    @router.get("/api/search/config")
+    async def get_search_settings() -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        return get_search_config()
+
+    @router.post("/api/search")
+    async def do_web_search(request: Request) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        """Standalone web search — returns context string + source list.
+
+        Used by Compare mode to pre-search once and share results across panes.
+        """
+        values = await _request_values(request)
+        query = str(values.get("query") or values.get("q") or "").strip()
+        if not query:
+            return {"context": "", "sources": [], "error": "query is required"}
+        time_filter = values.get("time_filter") or values.get("freshness")
+        if time_filter is not None:
+            time_filter = str(time_filter).strip() or None
+        try:
+            context, sources = comprehensive_web_search(
+                query, return_sources=True, time_filter=time_filter,
+            )
+            return {"context": context, "sources": sources}
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.error(f"Standalone web search failed: {e}")
+            return {"context": "", "sources": [], "error": str(e)}
+
+    @router.get("/api/search/providers")
+    async def list_search_providers():
+        """Return available search providers with config status."""
+        providers = []
+        for pid, (label, needs_key, needs_url) in PROVIDER_INFO.items():
+            if pid == "disabled":
+                continue
+            available = True
+            if needs_key and not _get_provider_key(pid):
+                available = False
+            if needs_url and pid == "searxng" and not _get_search_instance():
+                available = False
+            providers.append({
+                "id": pid,
+                "label": label,
+                "available": available,
+            })
+        return providers
+
+    @router.post("/api/search/query")
+    async def search_with_provider(request: Request) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        """Search using a specific provider. Used by compare search mode."""
+        values = await _request_values(request)
+        query = str(values.get("query") or values.get("q") or "").strip()
+        provider = str(values.get("provider") or "").strip()
+        try:
+            count = int(values.get("count") or values.get("limit") or 10)
+        except Exception:
+            count = 10
+        if not query:
+            return {"results": [], "provider": provider, "error": "query is required"}
+        if provider not in PROVIDER_INFO or provider == "disabled":
+            return {"results": [], "provider": provider, "error": "Unknown provider"}
+        t0 = time.time()
+        try:
+            results = _call_provider(provider, query, min(count, 20))
+            elapsed = round(time.time() - t0, 2)
+            return {"results": results, "provider": provider, "time": elapsed}
+        except Exception as e:
+            elapsed = round(time.time() - t0, 2)
+            logger.error(f"Search provider {provider} failed: {e}")
+            return {"results": [], "provider": provider, "time": elapsed, "error": str(e)}
+
+    return router

routes/skills_routes.py

@@ -1409,7 +1409,7 @@ def setup_skills_routes(skills_manager: SkillsManager) -> APIRouter:
 
         # Prefer the configured DEFAULT (→ Utility) model — not the current chat
         # session's model. Fall back to the caller's session model only if unset.
-        url, model, headers = resolve_endpoint("utility", owner=user)
+        url, model, headers = resolve_endpoint("default", owner=user)
         if not url or not model:
             url = url or ((body.get("endpoint_url") or "").strip() or None)
             model = model or ((body.get("model") or "").strip() or None)

routes/vault/__init__.py

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-"""Vault route domain package (slice 2k, #4082/#4071).
-
-Contains vault_routes.py, migrated from the flat routes/ directory.
-Backward-compat shim at routes/vault_routes.py re-exports from here.
-"""

routes/vault/vault_routes.py

@@ -1,242 +0,0 @@
-"""
-vault_routes.py
-
-Vaultwarden / Bitwarden CLI integration — config and unlock endpoints.
-Stores the BW_SESSION key in data/vault.json with restrictive permissions.
-"""
-
-import json
-import logging
-import os
-import shutil
-import asyncio
-from pathlib import Path
-from datetime import datetime
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
-from pydantic import BaseModel
-
-from core.middleware import require_admin
-from core.platform_compat import IS_WINDOWS, safe_chmod, which_tool
-from src.constants import VAULT_FILE as _VAULT_FILE
-
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
-VAULT_FILE = Path(_VAULT_FILE)
-
-
-def _find_bw() -> str:
-    """Locate the bw binary, checking PATH and common npm-global locations.
-
-    On Windows the Bitwarden CLI shim is `bw.cmd`/`bw.exe`, resolved by
-    which_tool via PATHEXT.
-    """
-    p = which_tool("bw")
-    if p:
-        return p
-    if IS_WINDOWS:
-        appdata = os.environ.get("APPDATA", os.path.expanduser("~"))
-        for candidate in (
-            os.path.join(appdata, "npm", "bw.cmd"),
-            os.path.join(appdata, "npm", "bw.exe"),
-        ):
-            if os.path.isfile(candidate):
-                return candidate
-        return "bw"
-    home = os.path.expanduser("~")
-    for candidate in (
-        f"{home}/.npm-global/bin/bw",
-        f"{home}/.nvm/versions/node/*/bin/bw",
-        "/usr/local/bin/bw",
-        "/opt/homebrew/bin/bw",
-    ):
-        if "*" in candidate:
-            import glob
-            for m in glob.glob(candidate):
-                if os.path.isfile(m) and os.access(m, os.X_OK):
-                    return m
-        elif os.path.isfile(candidate) and os.access(candidate, os.X_OK):
-            return candidate
-    return "bw"  # fall back to PATH lookup (will FileNotFoundError, handled below)
-
-
-def _load_config() -> dict:
-    if VAULT_FILE.exists():
-        try:
-            data = json.loads(VAULT_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-            return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-    return {}
-
-
-def _save_config(cfg: dict):
-    VAULT_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    VAULT_FILE.write_text(json.dumps(cfg, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
-    # POSIX: restrict the BW_SESSION store to 0o600. Windows: no-op (profile dir
-    # is ACL-restricted already).
-    safe_chmod(str(VAULT_FILE), 0o600)
-
-
-async def _run_bw(args: list, session: str = None, input_text: str = None,
-                  bw_password: str = None) -> tuple:
-    env = {}
-    env.update(os.environ)
-    if session:
-        env["BW_SESSION"] = session
-    # Secrets must never be passed as argv — process arguments are world-readable
-    # via `ps` / `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` to any local user. Keep --passwordenv
-    # support for bw commands that need it; unlock/login callers should prefer
-    # stdin so the master password is not left in the child environment either.
-    if bw_password is not None:
-        env["BW_PASSWORD"] = bw_password
-    bw_path = _find_bw()
-    try:
-        proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
-            bw_path, *args,
-            stdin=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE if input_text else None,
-            stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
-            stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
-            env=env,
-        )
-    except FileNotFoundError:
-        return "", "bw CLI not installed (install `nodejs-bitwarden-cli` or `bitwarden-cli`)", 127
-    except Exception as e:
-        return "", f"Failed to launch bw: {e}", 1
-    try:
-        stdout, stderr = await proc.communicate(input=input_text.encode() if input_text else None)
-    except Exception as e:
-        return "", f"bw subprocess error: {e}", 1
-    return stdout.decode(errors="replace").strip(), stderr.decode(errors="replace").strip(), proc.returncode
-
-
-class VaultConfig(BaseModel):
-    server_url: str = ""
-    email: str = ""
-
-
-class VaultUnlockRequest(BaseModel):
-    master_password: str
-
-
-class VaultLoginRequest(BaseModel):
-    email: str
-    master_password: str
-
-
-def setup_vault_routes():
-    router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/vault", tags=["vault"])
-
-    @router.get("/config")
-    async def get_config(request: Request):
-        """Return vault config (no sensitive fields)."""
-        require_admin(request)
-        cfg = _load_config()
-        return {
-            "server_url": cfg.get("server_url", ""),
-            "email": cfg.get("email", ""),
-            "unlocked": bool(cfg.get("session")),
-            "unlocked_at": cfg.get("unlocked_at", ""),
-            "bw_installed": await _check_bw_installed(),
-        }
-
-    @router.post("/config")
-    async def save_config(req: VaultConfig, request: Request):
-        """Save vault URL + email. Runs 'bw config server' to point at Vaultwarden."""
-        require_admin(request)
-        cfg = _load_config()
-        cfg["server_url"] = req.server_url.strip().rstrip("/")
-        cfg["email"] = req.email.strip()
-
-        if cfg["server_url"]:
-            _, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(["config", "server", cfg["server_url"]])
-            if rc != 0:
-                return {"ok": False, "error": f"bw config failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
-
-        _save_config(cfg)
-        return {"ok": True}
-
-    @router.post("/login")
-    async def login(req: VaultLoginRequest, request: Request):
-        """Log in to Vaultwarden (required once per account)."""
-        require_admin(request)
-        cfg = _load_config()
-        # Update email
-        cfg["email"] = req.email
-        _save_config(cfg)
-
-        stdout, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(
-            ["login", req.email, "--raw"],
-            input_text=req.master_password + "\n",
-        )
-        if rc != 0:
-            # Already logged in is OK
-            if "already logged in" in stderr.lower():
-                return {"ok": True, "already": True}
-            return {"ok": False, "error": f"Login failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
-        # bw login --raw prints session key on success (when 2FA disabled)
-        if stdout:
-            cfg["session"] = stdout
-            cfg["unlocked_at"] = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
-            _save_config(cfg)
-        return {"ok": True}
-
-    @router.post("/unlock")
-    async def unlock(req: VaultUnlockRequest, request: Request):
-        """Unlock the vault and save the session key."""
-        require_admin(request)
-        # Pass the master password on stdin, not argv. argv is visible through
-        # `ps` / /proc/<pid>/cmdline; stdin also avoids leaving the secret in
-        # the child process environment.
-        stdout, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(
-            ["unlock", "--raw"],
-            input_text=req.master_password + "\n",
-        )
-        if rc != 0:
-            return {"ok": False, "error": f"Unlock failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
-        session = stdout.strip()
-        if not session:
-            return {"ok": False, "error": "bw returned empty session"}
-        cfg = _load_config()
-        cfg["session"] = session
-        cfg["unlocked_at"] = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
-        _save_config(cfg)
-        return {"ok": True, "message": "Vault unlocked"}
-
-    @router.post("/lock")
-    async def lock(request: Request):
-        """Lock the vault (clear session from config)."""
-        require_admin(request)
-        cfg = _load_config()
-        cfg.pop("session", None)
-        cfg.pop("unlocked_at", None)
-        _save_config(cfg)
-        # Also tell bw to lock
-        await _run_bw(["lock"])
-        return {"ok": True, "message": "Vault locked"}
-
-    @router.post("/logout")
-    async def logout(request: Request):
-        """Log out of the Bitwarden CLI completely."""
-        require_admin(request)
-        await _run_bw(["logout"])
-        cfg = _load_config()
-        cfg.pop("session", None)
-        cfg.pop("email", None)
-        cfg.pop("unlocked_at", None)
-        _save_config(cfg)
-        return {"ok": True}
-
-    return router
-
-
-async def _check_bw_installed() -> bool:
-    try:
-        proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
-            _find_bw(), "--version",
-            stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
-            stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
-        )
-        await proc.communicate()
-        return proc.returncode == 0
-    except Exception:
-        return False

routes/vault_routes.py

@@ -1,14 +1,242 @@
-"""Backward-compat shim — canonical location is routes/vault/vault_routes.py.
+"""
+vault_routes.py
 
-This module is replaced in ``sys.modules`` by the canonical module object so
-that ``import routes.vault_routes``, ``from routes.vault_routes import X``,
-and the ``import ... as vr`` + ``monkeypatch.setattr(vr, ...)`` pattern used
-by test_vault_password_not_in_argv.py all operate on the *same* object.
-Keeps existing import paths working after slice 2k (#4082/#4071).
+Vaultwarden / Bitwarden CLI integration — config and unlock endpoints.
+Stores the BW_SESSION key in data/vault.json with restrictive permissions.
 """
 
-import sys as _sys
+import json
+import logging
+import os
+import shutil
+import asyncio
+from pathlib import Path
+from datetime import datetime
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
+from pydantic import BaseModel
 
-from routes.vault import vault_routes as _canonical  # noqa: F401
+from core.middleware import require_admin
+from core.platform_compat import IS_WINDOWS, safe_chmod, which_tool
+from src.constants import VAULT_FILE as _VAULT_FILE
 
-_sys.modules[__name__] = _canonical
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+VAULT_FILE = Path(_VAULT_FILE)
+
+
+def _find_bw() -> str:
+    """Locate the bw binary, checking PATH and common npm-global locations.
+
+    On Windows the Bitwarden CLI shim is `bw.cmd`/`bw.exe`, resolved by
+    which_tool via PATHEXT.
+    """
+    p = which_tool("bw")
+    if p:
+        return p
+    if IS_WINDOWS:
+        appdata = os.environ.get("APPDATA", os.path.expanduser("~"))
+        for candidate in (
+            os.path.join(appdata, "npm", "bw.cmd"),
+            os.path.join(appdata, "npm", "bw.exe"),
+        ):
+            if os.path.isfile(candidate):
+                return candidate
+        return "bw"
+    home = os.path.expanduser("~")
+    for candidate in (
+        f"{home}/.npm-global/bin/bw",
+        f"{home}/.nvm/versions/node/*/bin/bw",
+        "/usr/local/bin/bw",
+        "/opt/homebrew/bin/bw",
+    ):
+        if "*" in candidate:
+            import glob
+            for m in glob.glob(candidate):
+                if os.path.isfile(m) and os.access(m, os.X_OK):
+                    return m
+        elif os.path.isfile(candidate) and os.access(candidate, os.X_OK):
+            return candidate
+    return "bw"  # fall back to PATH lookup (will FileNotFoundError, handled below)
+
+
+def _load_config() -> dict:
+    if VAULT_FILE.exists():
+        try:
+            data = json.loads(VAULT_FILE.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+    return {}
+
+
+def _save_config(cfg: dict):
+    VAULT_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    VAULT_FILE.write_text(json.dumps(cfg, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
+    # POSIX: restrict the BW_SESSION store to 0o600. Windows: no-op (profile dir
+    # is ACL-restricted already).
+    safe_chmod(str(VAULT_FILE), 0o600)
+
+
+async def _run_bw(args: list, session: str = None, input_text: str = None,
+                  bw_password: str = None) -> tuple:
+    env = {}
+    env.update(os.environ)
+    if session:
+        env["BW_SESSION"] = session
+    # Secrets must never be passed as argv — process arguments are world-readable
+    # via `ps` / `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` to any local user. Keep --passwordenv
+    # support for bw commands that need it; unlock/login callers should prefer
+    # stdin so the master password is not left in the child environment either.
+    if bw_password is not None:
+        env["BW_PASSWORD"] = bw_password
+    bw_path = _find_bw()
+    try:
+        proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
+            bw_path, *args,
+            stdin=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE if input_text else None,
+            stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
+            stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
+            env=env,
+        )
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return "", "bw CLI not installed (install `nodejs-bitwarden-cli` or `bitwarden-cli`)", 127
+    except Exception as e:
+        return "", f"Failed to launch bw: {e}", 1
+    try:
+        stdout, stderr = await proc.communicate(input=input_text.encode() if input_text else None)
+    except Exception as e:
+        return "", f"bw subprocess error: {e}", 1
+    return stdout.decode(errors="replace").strip(), stderr.decode(errors="replace").strip(), proc.returncode
+
+
+class VaultConfig(BaseModel):
+    server_url: str = ""
+    email: str = ""
+
+
+class VaultUnlockRequest(BaseModel):
+    master_password: str
+
+
+class VaultLoginRequest(BaseModel):
+    email: str
+    master_password: str
+
+
+def setup_vault_routes():
+    router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/vault", tags=["vault"])
+
+    @router.get("/config")
+    async def get_config(request: Request):
+        """Return vault config (no sensitive fields)."""
+        require_admin(request)
+        cfg = _load_config()
+        return {
+            "server_url": cfg.get("server_url", ""),
+            "email": cfg.get("email", ""),
+            "unlocked": bool(cfg.get("session")),
+            "unlocked_at": cfg.get("unlocked_at", ""),
+            "bw_installed": await _check_bw_installed(),
+        }
+
+    @router.post("/config")
+    async def save_config(req: VaultConfig, request: Request):
+        """Save vault URL + email. Runs 'bw config server' to point at Vaultwarden."""
+        require_admin(request)
+        cfg = _load_config()
+        cfg["server_url"] = req.server_url.strip().rstrip("/")
+        cfg["email"] = req.email.strip()
+
+        if cfg["server_url"]:
+            _, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(["config", "server", cfg["server_url"]])
+            if rc != 0:
+                return {"ok": False, "error": f"bw config failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
+
+        _save_config(cfg)
+        return {"ok": True}
+
+    @router.post("/login")
+    async def login(req: VaultLoginRequest, request: Request):
+        """Log in to Vaultwarden (required once per account)."""
+        require_admin(request)
+        cfg = _load_config()
+        # Update email
+        cfg["email"] = req.email
+        _save_config(cfg)
+
+        stdout, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(
+            ["login", req.email, "--raw"],
+            input_text=req.master_password + "\n",
+        )
+        if rc != 0:
+            # Already logged in is OK
+            if "already logged in" in stderr.lower():
+                return {"ok": True, "already": True}
+            return {"ok": False, "error": f"Login failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
+        # bw login --raw prints session key on success (when 2FA disabled)
+        if stdout:
+            cfg["session"] = stdout
+            cfg["unlocked_at"] = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
+            _save_config(cfg)
+        return {"ok": True}
+
+    @router.post("/unlock")
+    async def unlock(req: VaultUnlockRequest, request: Request):
+        """Unlock the vault and save the session key."""
+        require_admin(request)
+        # Pass the master password on stdin, not argv. argv is visible through
+        # `ps` / /proc/<pid>/cmdline; stdin also avoids leaving the secret in
+        # the child process environment.
+        stdout, stderr, rc = await _run_bw(
+            ["unlock", "--raw"],
+            input_text=req.master_password + "\n",
+        )
+        if rc != 0:
+            return {"ok": False, "error": f"Unlock failed: {stderr[:300]}"}
+        session = stdout.strip()
+        if not session:
+            return {"ok": False, "error": "bw returned empty session"}
+        cfg = _load_config()
+        cfg["session"] = session
+        cfg["unlocked_at"] = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
+        _save_config(cfg)
+        return {"ok": True, "message": "Vault unlocked"}
+
+    @router.post("/lock")
+    async def lock(request: Request):
+        """Lock the vault (clear session from config)."""
+        require_admin(request)
+        cfg = _load_config()
+        cfg.pop("session", None)
+        cfg.pop("unlocked_at", None)
+        _save_config(cfg)
+        # Also tell bw to lock
+        await _run_bw(["lock"])
+        return {"ok": True, "message": "Vault locked"}
+
+    @router.post("/logout")
+    async def logout(request: Request):
+        """Log out of the Bitwarden CLI completely."""
+        require_admin(request)
+        await _run_bw(["logout"])
+        cfg = _load_config()
+        cfg.pop("session", None)
+        cfg.pop("email", None)
+        cfg.pop("unlocked_at", None)
+        _save_config(cfg)
+        return {"ok": True}
+
+    return router
+
+
+async def _check_bw_installed() -> bool:
+    try:
+        proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
+            _find_bw(), "--version",
+            stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
+            stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
+        )
+        await proc.communicate()
+        return proc.returncode == 0
+    except Exception:
+        return False

routes/webhook/__init__.py

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-"""Webhook route domain package (slice 2l, #4082/#4071).
-
-Contains webhook_routes.py, migrated from the flat routes/ directory.
-Backward-compat shim at routes/webhook_routes.py re-exports from here.
-"""

routes/webhook/webhook_routes.py

@@ -1,395 +0,0 @@
-"""Webhook, API Token, and sync chat routes."""
-
-import uuid
-import logging
-from typing import Optional
-
-import httpx
-from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request, Form
-from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
-
-from core.database import SessionLocal, Webhook, ModelEndpoint
-from src.auth_helpers import owner_filter
-from src.url_security import validate_public_http_url
-from src.webhook_manager import WebhookManager, validate_webhook_url, validate_events
-
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
-router = APIRouter(prefix="/api", tags=["webhooks"])
-
-# Input limits
-MAX_NAME_LEN = 100
-MAX_URL_LEN = 2048
-MAX_SECRET_LEN = 256
-MAX_MESSAGE_LEN = 32_000
-
-
-from core.middleware import require_admin as _require_admin
-
-
-def _select_api_chat_fallback_endpoint(db, token_owner: Optional[str]):
-    """First enabled ModelEndpoint visible to token_owner — their own rows plus
-    legacy null-owner ("shared") rows. Owner-scoped: an unscoped .first() would
-    let a chat-scoped token fall back onto another user's private endpoint and
-    silently spend that owner's API key/quota. Prefer owner rows before shared
-    rows. Fails closed to null-owner rows only when token_owner is absent.
-    Does not validate base_url — admin-configured local/LAN endpoints remain allowed.
-    """
-    query = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True)  # noqa: E712
-    if token_owner:
-        query = owner_filter(query, ModelEndpoint, token_owner)
-        return query.order_by(ModelEndpoint.owner.desc(), ModelEndpoint.created_at).first()
-    return query.filter(ModelEndpoint.owner == None).order_by(ModelEndpoint.created_at).first()  # noqa: E711
-
-
-def _caller_owns_session(sess_owner, caller) -> bool:
-    """Strict session-ownership gate for the token-authenticated sync-chat
-    endpoint (`POST /api/v1/chat`).
-
-    Mirrors ``_verify_session_owner`` in session_routes.py and the null-owner
-    gates in notes/calendar/gallery: a caller may resume a session ONLY when
-    its owner matches them exactly. A null/empty session owner (legacy or
-    migrated rows) is deliberately NOT resumable by an arbitrary token — the
-    old ``sess_owner and sess_owner != caller`` form skipped the check whenever
-    ``sess_owner`` was falsy, so any chat-scoped token (e.g. a paired mobile
-    device) could resume such a session, inject a message, and read back its
-    history and reuse the owner's endpoint credentials. Fail closed: an
-    unresolvable caller also returns False.
-    """
-    if not caller:
-        return False
-    return sess_owner == caller
-
-
-def setup_webhook_routes(
-    webhook_manager: WebhookManager,
-    auth_manager,
-    session_manager=None,
-    api_key_manager=None,
-) -> APIRouter:
-
-    @router.get("/webhooks")
-    def list_webhooks(request: Request):
-        _require_admin(request)
-        db = SessionLocal()
-        try:
-            hooks = db.query(Webhook).all()
-            return [
-                {
-                    "id": w.id,
-                    "name": w.name,
-                    "url": w.url,
-                    "has_secret": bool(w.secret),
-                    "events": w.events.split(",") if w.events else [],
-                    "is_active": w.is_active,
-                    "last_triggered_at": w.last_triggered_at.isoformat() if w.last_triggered_at else None,
-                    "last_status_code": w.last_status_code,
-                    "last_error": w.last_error,
-                    "created_at": w.created_at.isoformat() if w.created_at else None,
-                }
-                for w in hooks
-            ]
-        finally:
-            db.close()
-
-    @router.post("/webhooks")
-    def create_webhook(
-        request: Request,
-        name: str = Form(""),
-        url: str = Form(""),
-        secret: str = Form(""),
-        events: str = Form(""),
-    ):
-        _require_admin(request)
-        name = name.strip()[:MAX_NAME_LEN]
-        if not name:
-            raise HTTPException(400, "Webhook name is required")
-        try:
-            url = validate_webhook_url(url)
-        except ValueError as e:
-            raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
-        try:
-            events = validate_events(events)
-        except ValueError as e:
-            raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
-
-        secret_val = secret.strip()[:MAX_SECRET_LEN] or None
-        # Encrypt the secret at rest using the same Fernet key as API keys
-        encrypted_secret = None
-        if secret_val and api_key_manager:
-            encrypted_secret = api_key_manager.encrypt_api_key(secret_val)
-        elif secret_val:
-            encrypted_secret = secret_val  # Fallback if no encryption available
-
-        webhook_id = str(uuid.uuid4())[:8]
-        db = SessionLocal()
-        try:
-            db.add(Webhook(
-                id=webhook_id,
-                name=name,
-                url=url,
-                secret=encrypted_secret,
-                events=events,
-                is_active=True,
-            ))
-            db.commit()
-        finally:
-            db.close()
-
-        return {"id": webhook_id, "name": name}
-
-    @router.post("/webhooks/{webhook_id}/test")
-    async def test_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
-        _require_admin(request)
-        db = SessionLocal()
-        try:
-            wh = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).first()
-            if not wh:
-                raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
-            url, secret = wh.url, wh.secret
-        finally:
-            db.close()
-
-        await webhook_manager.deliver_test(webhook_id, url, secret)
-        return {"status": "sent"}
-
-    @router.patch("/webhooks/{webhook_id}")
-    def toggle_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
-        _require_admin(request)
-        db = SessionLocal()
-        try:
-            wh = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).first()
-            if not wh:
-                raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
-            wh.is_active = not wh.is_active
-            db.commit()
-            return {"id": webhook_id, "is_active": wh.is_active}
-        finally:
-            db.close()
-
-    @router.delete("/webhooks/{webhook_id}")
-    def delete_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
-        _require_admin(request)
-        db = SessionLocal()
-        try:
-            deleted = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).delete()
-            db.commit()
-            if not deleted:
-                raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
-        finally:
-            db.close()
-        return {"status": "deleted"}
-
-    # ================================================================
-    # Sync Chat Endpoint (for n8n / Make / Activepieces)
-    # ================================================================
-
-    # Known provider base URLs — auto-resolved from api_key prefix or model name
-    KNOWN_PROVIDERS = {
-        "deepseek": "https://api.deepseek.com/v1",
-        "openai": "https://api.openai.com/v1",
-        "mistral": "https://api.mistral.ai/v1",
-        "groq": "https://api.groq.com/openai/v1",
-        "together": "https://api.together.xyz/v1",
-        "openrouter": "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1",
-        "ollama": "https://ollama.com/api",
-        "opencode-zen": "https://opencode.ai/zen/v1",
-        "opencode-go": "https://opencode.ai/zen/go/v1",
-        "fireworks": "https://api.fireworks.ai/inference/v1",
-        "venice": "https://api.venice.ai/api/v1",
-        "kimi-code": "https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1",
-        "kimicode": "https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1",
-    }
-
-    # Model prefix → provider mapping for auto-detection
-    MODEL_PROVIDER_MAP = {
-        "deepseek": "deepseek",
-        "gpt-": "openai",
-        "o1": "openai",
-        "o3": "openai",
-        "o4": "openai",
-        "mistral": "mistral",
-        "llama": "groq",
-        "mixtral": "groq",
-        "kimi-for-coding": "kimi-code",
-        "kimi": "kimi-code",
-    }
-
-    def _resolve_base_url(model: Optional[str], provider: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
-        """Try to auto-resolve a base URL from provider name or model prefix."""
-        if provider and provider.lower() in KNOWN_PROVIDERS:
-            return KNOWN_PROVIDERS[provider.lower()]
-        if model:
-            model_lower = model.lower()
-            for prefix, prov in MODEL_PROVIDER_MAP.items():
-                if model_lower.startswith(prefix):
-                    return KNOWN_PROVIDERS[prov]
-        return None
-
-    class SyncChatRequest(BaseModel):
-        message: str = Field(..., max_length=MAX_MESSAGE_LEN)
-        model: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=200)
-        session: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=100)
-        api_key: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=256)
-        base_url: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=MAX_URL_LEN)
-        provider: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=50)
-
-    @router.post("/v1/chat")
-    async def sync_chat(request: Request, body: SyncChatRequest):
-        if not getattr(request.state, "api_token", False):
-            raise HTTPException(403, "This endpoint requires an API token")
-        scopes = set(getattr(request.state, "api_token_scopes", []) or [])
-        if "chat" not in scopes:
-            raise HTTPException(403, "API token is not scoped for chat")
-        token_owner = getattr(request.state, "api_token_owner", None)
-
-        from core.models import ChatMessage
-        from src.llm_core import llm_call_async
-        from src.endpoint_resolver import build_chat_url, build_headers, build_models_url, normalize_base
-
-        message = body.message.strip()
-        if not message:
-            raise HTTPException(400, "Message is required")
-
-        session_id = body.session
-        sess = None
-
-        # --- Case 1: Resume an existing session ---
-        if session_id and session_manager:
-            try:
-                sess = session_manager.get_session(session_id)
-            except (KeyError, Exception):
-                raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
-            # SECURITY: verify the API-token's user owns this session — without
-            # this any token holder could resume any user's chat by passing its
-            # ID. The token's user is on request.state.user (set by API-token
-            # middleware); fall back to require_user if not present.
-            try:
-                from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user as _gcu
-                _tok_user = token_owner or getattr(request.state, "user", None) or _gcu(request)
-            except Exception:
-                _tok_user = None
-            # Strict ownership (see _caller_owns_session): fail closed so a
-            # null-owner / cross-owner session can't be resumed by an arbitrary
-            # chat-scoped token.
-            _sess_owner = getattr(sess, "owner", None)
-            if not _caller_owns_session(_sess_owner, _tok_user):
-                raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
-
-        # --- Case 2: Direct API key + model (no pre-configured endpoint needed) ---
-        if not sess and body.api_key:
-            api_key = body.api_key.strip()
-            model = body.model or "deepseek-chat"
-
-            # Validate only token-supplied direct base_url; auto-resolved known-provider
-            # URLs are not subject to extra local/LAN blocking beyond existing provider logic.
-            direct_base_url = body.base_url.strip().rstrip("/") if body.base_url else None
-            if direct_base_url:
-                try:
-                    base_url = validate_public_http_url(direct_base_url)
-                except ValueError as e:
-                    detail = str(e).replace("URL", "base_url", 1)
-                    raise HTTPException(400, detail)
-            else:
-                base_url = _resolve_base_url(model, body.provider)
-            if not base_url:
-                raise HTTPException(400,
-                    "Could not auto-detect provider. Pass base_url (e.g. 'https://api.deepseek.com/v1') "
-                    "or provider ('deepseek', 'openai', 'groq', etc.)")
-            base_url = normalize_base(base_url)
-            endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
-
-            if not session_manager:
-                raise HTTPException(500, "Session manager not available")
-
-            sid = str(uuid.uuid4())
-            sess = session_manager.create_session(
-                session_id=sid, name="API Chat", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
-                model=model, owner=token_owner,
-            )
-            sess.headers = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
-            session_manager.save_sessions()
-            session_id = sid
-
-        # --- Case 3: Fall back to first configured ModelEndpoint ---
-        if not sess:
-            db = SessionLocal()
-            try:
-                ep = _select_api_chat_fallback_endpoint(db, token_owner)
-            finally:
-                db.close()
-
-            if not ep:
-                raise HTTPException(400,
-                    "No session, api_key, or configured endpoints. "
-                    "Pass api_key + model, or configure an endpoint in Admin.")
-
-            base_url = normalize_base(ep.base_url)
-            endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
-            model = body.model or "auto"
-            api_key = ep.api_key
-            if getattr(ep, "provider_auth_id", None):
-                try:
-                    from src.endpoint_resolver import resolve_endpoint_runtime
-                    base_url, api_key = resolve_endpoint_runtime(ep, owner=token_owner)
-                    endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
-                except Exception:
-                    raise HTTPException(500, "Could not resolve endpoint credentials")
-
-            if model == "auto":
-                try:
-                    async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=5) as client:
-                        models_url = build_models_url(base_url)
-                        hdrs = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
-                        if models_url:
-                            resp = await client.get(models_url, headers=hdrs)
-                            resp.raise_for_status()
-                            data = resp.json()
-                            items = data if isinstance(data, list) else (data.get("data") or [])
-                            ids = [m.get("id") for m in items if isinstance(m, dict) and m.get("id")]
-                            if not ids and isinstance(data, dict):
-                                ids = [
-                                    m.get("name") or m.get("model")
-                                    for m in (data.get("models") or [])
-                                    if m.get("name") or m.get("model")
-                                ]
-                        else:
-                            import json as _json
-                            ids = _json.loads(ep.cached_models or "[]")
-                        model = ids[0] if ids else "auto"
-                except Exception:
-                    raise HTTPException(500, "Could not discover models from endpoint")
-
-            if not session_manager:
-                raise HTTPException(500, "Session manager not available")
-
-            sid = str(uuid.uuid4())
-            sess = session_manager.create_session(
-                session_id=sid, name="API Chat", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
-                model=model, owner=token_owner,
-            )
-            if api_key:
-                sess.headers = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
-                session_manager.save_sessions()
-            session_id = sid
-
-        # --- Send message and get response ---
-        sess.add_message(ChatMessage("user", message))
-
-        messages = [{"role": m.role, "content": m.content} for m in sess.history]
-
-        reply = await llm_call_async(
-            sess.endpoint_url, sess.model, messages,
-            headers=sess.headers, timeout=120,
-        )
-        sess.add_message(ChatMessage("assistant", reply))
-        session_manager.save_sessions()
-
-        webhook_manager.fire_and_forget("chat.completed", {
-            "session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model,
-            "user_message": message[:2000], "response": reply[:2000],
-        })
-
-        return {"response": reply, "session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model}
-
-    return router

routes/webhook_routes.py

@@ -1,16 +1,395 @@
-"""Backward-compat shim — canonical location is routes/webhook/webhook_routes.py.
+"""Webhook, API Token, and sync chat routes."""
 
-This module is replaced in ``sys.modules`` by the canonical module object so
-that ``import routes.webhook_routes``, ``from routes.webhook_routes import X``,
-``importlib.import_module("routes.webhook_routes")``, and the
-``__import__("routes.webhook_routes", fromlist=[...])`` + ``setattr(wh_mod,
-...)`` pattern used by test_null_owner_gates.py all operate on the *same*
-object. Keeps existing import paths working after slice 2l (#4082/#4071).
-Source-introspection tests read the canonical file by path.
-"""
+import uuid
+import logging
+from typing import Optional
 
-import sys as _sys
+import httpx
+from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request, Form
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
 
-from routes.webhook import webhook_routes as _canonical  # noqa: F401
+from core.database import SessionLocal, Webhook, ModelEndpoint
+from src.auth_helpers import owner_filter
+from src.url_security import validate_public_http_url
+from src.webhook_manager import WebhookManager, validate_webhook_url, validate_events
 
-_sys.modules[__name__] = _canonical
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/api", tags=["webhooks"])
+
+# Input limits
+MAX_NAME_LEN = 100
+MAX_URL_LEN = 2048
+MAX_SECRET_LEN = 256
+MAX_MESSAGE_LEN = 32_000
+
+
+from core.middleware import require_admin as _require_admin
+
+
+def _select_api_chat_fallback_endpoint(db, token_owner: Optional[str]):
+    """First enabled ModelEndpoint visible to token_owner — their own rows plus
+    legacy null-owner ("shared") rows. Owner-scoped: an unscoped .first() would
+    let a chat-scoped token fall back onto another user's private endpoint and
+    silently spend that owner's API key/quota. Prefer owner rows before shared
+    rows. Fails closed to null-owner rows only when token_owner is absent.
+    Does not validate base_url — admin-configured local/LAN endpoints remain allowed.
+    """
+    query = db.query(ModelEndpoint).filter(ModelEndpoint.is_enabled == True)  # noqa: E712
+    if token_owner:
+        query = owner_filter(query, ModelEndpoint, token_owner)
+        return query.order_by(ModelEndpoint.owner.desc(), ModelEndpoint.created_at).first()
+    return query.filter(ModelEndpoint.owner == None).order_by(ModelEndpoint.created_at).first()  # noqa: E711
+
+
+def _caller_owns_session(sess_owner, caller) -> bool:
+    """Strict session-ownership gate for the token-authenticated sync-chat
+    endpoint (`POST /api/v1/chat`).
+
+    Mirrors ``_verify_session_owner`` in session_routes.py and the null-owner
+    gates in notes/calendar/gallery: a caller may resume a session ONLY when
+    its owner matches them exactly. A null/empty session owner (legacy or
+    migrated rows) is deliberately NOT resumable by an arbitrary token — the
+    old ``sess_owner and sess_owner != caller`` form skipped the check whenever
+    ``sess_owner`` was falsy, so any chat-scoped token (e.g. a paired mobile
+    device) could resume such a session, inject a message, and read back its
+    history and reuse the owner's endpoint credentials. Fail closed: an
+    unresolvable caller also returns False.
+    """
+    if not caller:
+        return False
+    return sess_owner == caller
+
+
+def setup_webhook_routes(
+    webhook_manager: WebhookManager,
+    auth_manager,
+    session_manager=None,
+    api_key_manager=None,
+) -> APIRouter:
+
+    @router.get("/webhooks")
+    def list_webhooks(request: Request):
+        _require_admin(request)
+        db = SessionLocal()
+        try:
+            hooks = db.query(Webhook).all()
+            return [
+                {
+                    "id": w.id,
+                    "name": w.name,
+                    "url": w.url,
+                    "has_secret": bool(w.secret),
+                    "events": w.events.split(",") if w.events else [],
+                    "is_active": w.is_active,
+                    "last_triggered_at": w.last_triggered_at.isoformat() if w.last_triggered_at else None,
+                    "last_status_code": w.last_status_code,
+                    "last_error": w.last_error,
+                    "created_at": w.created_at.isoformat() if w.created_at else None,
+                }
+                for w in hooks
+            ]
+        finally:
+            db.close()
+
+    @router.post("/webhooks")
+    def create_webhook(
+        request: Request,
+        name: str = Form(""),
+        url: str = Form(""),
+        secret: str = Form(""),
+        events: str = Form(""),
+    ):
+        _require_admin(request)
+        name = name.strip()[:MAX_NAME_LEN]
+        if not name:
+            raise HTTPException(400, "Webhook name is required")
+        try:
+            url = validate_webhook_url(url)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
+        try:
+            events = validate_events(events)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            raise HTTPException(400, str(e))
+
+        secret_val = secret.strip()[:MAX_SECRET_LEN] or None
+        # Encrypt the secret at rest using the same Fernet key as API keys
+        encrypted_secret = None
+        if secret_val and api_key_manager:
+            encrypted_secret = api_key_manager.encrypt_api_key(secret_val)
+        elif secret_val:
+            encrypted_secret = secret_val  # Fallback if no encryption available
+
+        webhook_id = str(uuid.uuid4())[:8]
+        db = SessionLocal()
+        try:
+            db.add(Webhook(
+                id=webhook_id,
+                name=name,
+                url=url,
+                secret=encrypted_secret,
+                events=events,
+                is_active=True,
+            ))
+            db.commit()
+        finally:
+            db.close()
+
+        return {"id": webhook_id, "name": name}
+
+    @router.post("/webhooks/{webhook_id}/test")
+    async def test_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
+        _require_admin(request)
+        db = SessionLocal()
+        try:
+            wh = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).first()
+            if not wh:
+                raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
+            url, secret = wh.url, wh.secret
+        finally:
+            db.close()
+
+        await webhook_manager.deliver_test(webhook_id, url, secret)
+        return {"status": "sent"}
+
+    @router.patch("/webhooks/{webhook_id}")
+    def toggle_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
+        _require_admin(request)
+        db = SessionLocal()
+        try:
+            wh = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).first()
+            if not wh:
+                raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
+            wh.is_active = not wh.is_active
+            db.commit()
+            return {"id": webhook_id, "is_active": wh.is_active}
+        finally:
+            db.close()
+
+    @router.delete("/webhooks/{webhook_id}")
+    def delete_webhook(request: Request, webhook_id: str):
+        _require_admin(request)
+        db = SessionLocal()
+        try:
+            deleted = db.query(Webhook).filter(Webhook.id == webhook_id).delete()
+            db.commit()
+            if not deleted:
+                raise HTTPException(404, "Webhook not found")
+        finally:
+            db.close()
+        return {"status": "deleted"}
+
+    # ================================================================
+    # Sync Chat Endpoint (for n8n / Make / Activepieces)
+    # ================================================================
+
+    # Known provider base URLs — auto-resolved from api_key prefix or model name
+    KNOWN_PROVIDERS = {
+        "deepseek": "https://api.deepseek.com/v1",
+        "openai": "https://api.openai.com/v1",
+        "mistral": "https://api.mistral.ai/v1",
+        "groq": "https://api.groq.com/openai/v1",
+        "together": "https://api.together.xyz/v1",
+        "openrouter": "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1",
+        "ollama": "https://ollama.com/api",
+        "opencode-zen": "https://opencode.ai/zen/v1",
+        "opencode-go": "https://opencode.ai/zen/go/v1",
+        "fireworks": "https://api.fireworks.ai/inference/v1",
+        "venice": "https://api.venice.ai/api/v1",
+        "kimi-code": "https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1",
+        "kimicode": "https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1",
+    }
+
+    # Model prefix → provider mapping for auto-detection
+    MODEL_PROVIDER_MAP = {
+        "deepseek": "deepseek",
+        "gpt-": "openai",
+        "o1": "openai",
+        "o3": "openai",
+        "o4": "openai",
+        "mistral": "mistral",
+        "llama": "groq",
+        "mixtral": "groq",
+        "kimi-for-coding": "kimi-code",
+        "kimi": "kimi-code",
+    }
+
+    def _resolve_base_url(model: Optional[str], provider: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
+        """Try to auto-resolve a base URL from provider name or model prefix."""
+        if provider and provider.lower() in KNOWN_PROVIDERS:
+            return KNOWN_PROVIDERS[provider.lower()]
+        if model:
+            model_lower = model.lower()
+            for prefix, prov in MODEL_PROVIDER_MAP.items():
+                if model_lower.startswith(prefix):
+                    return KNOWN_PROVIDERS[prov]
+        return None
+
+    class SyncChatRequest(BaseModel):
+        message: str = Field(..., max_length=MAX_MESSAGE_LEN)
+        model: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=200)
+        session: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=100)
+        api_key: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=256)
+        base_url: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=MAX_URL_LEN)
+        provider: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=50)
+
+    @router.post("/v1/chat")
+    async def sync_chat(request: Request, body: SyncChatRequest):
+        if not getattr(request.state, "api_token", False):
+            raise HTTPException(403, "This endpoint requires an API token")
+        scopes = set(getattr(request.state, "api_token_scopes", []) or [])
+        if "chat" not in scopes:
+            raise HTTPException(403, "API token is not scoped for chat")
+        token_owner = getattr(request.state, "api_token_owner", None)
+
+        from core.models import ChatMessage
+        from src.llm_core import llm_call_async
+        from src.endpoint_resolver import build_chat_url, build_headers, build_models_url, normalize_base
+
+        message = body.message.strip()
+        if not message:
+            raise HTTPException(400, "Message is required")
+
+        session_id = body.session
+        sess = None
+
+        # --- Case 1: Resume an existing session ---
+        if session_id and session_manager:
+            try:
+                sess = session_manager.get_session(session_id)
+            except (KeyError, Exception):
+                raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
+            # SECURITY: verify the API-token's user owns this session — without
+            # this any token holder could resume any user's chat by passing its
+            # ID. The token's user is on request.state.user (set by API-token
+            # middleware); fall back to require_user if not present.
+            try:
+                from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user as _gcu
+                _tok_user = token_owner or getattr(request.state, "user", None) or _gcu(request)
+            except Exception:
+                _tok_user = None
+            # Strict ownership (see _caller_owns_session): fail closed so a
+            # null-owner / cross-owner session can't be resumed by an arbitrary
+            # chat-scoped token.
+            _sess_owner = getattr(sess, "owner", None)
+            if not _caller_owns_session(_sess_owner, _tok_user):
+                raise HTTPException(404, "Session not found")
+
+        # --- Case 2: Direct API key + model (no pre-configured endpoint needed) ---
+        if not sess and body.api_key:
+            api_key = body.api_key.strip()
+            model = body.model or "deepseek-chat"
+
+            # Validate only token-supplied direct base_url; auto-resolved known-provider
+            # URLs are not subject to extra local/LAN blocking beyond existing provider logic.
+            direct_base_url = body.base_url.strip().rstrip("/") if body.base_url else None
+            if direct_base_url:
+                try:
+                    base_url = validate_public_http_url(direct_base_url)
+                except ValueError as e:
+                    detail = str(e).replace("URL", "base_url", 1)
+                    raise HTTPException(400, detail)
+            else:
+                base_url = _resolve_base_url(model, body.provider)
+            if not base_url:
+                raise HTTPException(400,
+                    "Could not auto-detect provider. Pass base_url (e.g. 'https://api.deepseek.com/v1') "
+                    "or provider ('deepseek', 'openai', 'groq', etc.)")
+            base_url = normalize_base(base_url)
+            endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
+
+            if not session_manager:
+                raise HTTPException(500, "Session manager not available")
+
+            sid = str(uuid.uuid4())
+            sess = session_manager.create_session(
+                session_id=sid, name="API Chat", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
+                model=model, owner=token_owner,
+            )
+            sess.headers = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
+            session_manager.save_sessions()
+            session_id = sid
+
+        # --- Case 3: Fall back to first configured ModelEndpoint ---
+        if not sess:
+            db = SessionLocal()
+            try:
+                ep = _select_api_chat_fallback_endpoint(db, token_owner)
+            finally:
+                db.close()
+
+            if not ep:
+                raise HTTPException(400,
+                    "No session, api_key, or configured endpoints. "
+                    "Pass api_key + model, or configure an endpoint in Admin.")
+
+            base_url = normalize_base(ep.base_url)
+            endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
+            model = body.model or "auto"
+            api_key = ep.api_key
+            if getattr(ep, "provider_auth_id", None):
+                try:
+                    from src.endpoint_resolver import resolve_endpoint_runtime
+                    base_url, api_key = resolve_endpoint_runtime(ep, owner=token_owner)
+                    endpoint_url = build_chat_url(base_url)
+                except Exception:
+                    raise HTTPException(500, "Could not resolve endpoint credentials")
+
+            if model == "auto":
+                try:
+                    async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=5) as client:
+                        models_url = build_models_url(base_url)
+                        hdrs = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
+                        if models_url:
+                            resp = await client.get(models_url, headers=hdrs)
+                            resp.raise_for_status()
+                            data = resp.json()
+                            items = data if isinstance(data, list) else (data.get("data") or [])
+                            ids = [m.get("id") for m in items if isinstance(m, dict) and m.get("id")]
+                            if not ids and isinstance(data, dict):
+                                ids = [
+                                    m.get("name") or m.get("model")
+                                    for m in (data.get("models") or [])
+                                    if m.get("name") or m.get("model")
+                                ]
+                        else:
+                            import json as _json
+                            ids = _json.loads(ep.cached_models or "[]")
+                        model = ids[0] if ids else "auto"
+                except Exception:
+                    raise HTTPException(500, "Could not discover models from endpoint")
+
+            if not session_manager:
+                raise HTTPException(500, "Session manager not available")
+
+            sid = str(uuid.uuid4())
+            sess = session_manager.create_session(
+                session_id=sid, name="API Chat", endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
+                model=model, owner=token_owner,
+            )
+            if api_key:
+                sess.headers = build_headers(api_key, base_url)
+                session_manager.save_sessions()
+            session_id = sid
+
+        # --- Send message and get response ---
+        sess.add_message(ChatMessage("user", message))
+
+        messages = [{"role": m.role, "content": m.content} for m in sess.history]
+
+        reply = await llm_call_async(
+            sess.endpoint_url, sess.model, messages,
+            headers=sess.headers, timeout=120,
+        )
+        sess.add_message(ChatMessage("assistant", reply))
+        session_manager.save_sessions()
+
+        webhook_manager.fire_and_forget("chat.completed", {
+            "session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model,
+            "user_message": message[:2000], "response": reply[:2000],
+        })
+
+        return {"response": reply, "session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model}
+
+    return router

services/memory/skill_format.py

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ import json
 import logging
 import re
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from datetime import datetime
 from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -441,4 +441,4 @@ class Skill:
 
 
 def _now_iso() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+    return datetime.utcnow().strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")

services/tts/tts_service.py

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 """Multi-provider TTS service — dispatches to local Kokoro, OpenAI-compatible API, or browser."""
 
 import io
-import os
 import wave
 import logging
 import hashlib
@@ -42,11 +41,6 @@ class TTSService:
         self.cache_dir = Path(cache_dir)
         self.cache_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
         self._kokoro = None  # lazy-init
-        
-        try:
-            self.max_cache_bytes = int(os.getenv("ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES", 500 * 1024 * 1024))
-        except ValueError:
-            self.max_cache_bytes = 500 * 1024 * 1024
 
     # ── Settings ──
 
@@ -95,53 +89,6 @@ class TTSService:
         ext = ".mp3" if (len(data) >= 3 and (data[:3] == b'ID3' or (data[0] == 0xff and (data[1] & 0xe0) == 0xe0))) else ".wav"
         (self.cache_dir / f"{key}{ext}").write_bytes(data)
 
-        self._enforce_cache_limit()
-
-    def _enforce_cache_limit(self):
-            """Evicts oldest files if the cache exceeds the configured byte limit."""
-            if self.max_cache_bytes <= 0:
-                return
-
-            try:
-                files = []
-                total_size = 0
-
-                # Safely scan files and sum sizes, ignoring files deleted mid-scan
-                for f in self.cache_dir.iterdir():
-                    try:
-                        if f.is_file() and f.suffix.lower() in (".mp3", ".wav"):
-                            files.append(f)
-                            total_size += f.stat().st_size
-                    except OSError:
-                        continue
-
-                if total_size > self.max_cache_bytes:
-                    logger.info(
-                        f"TTS cache ({total_size} bytes) exceeded limit ({self.max_cache_bytes} bytes). Evicting oldest files."
-                    )
-
-                    # Sort files by modification time (oldest first)
-                    try:
-                        files.sort(key=lambda f: f.stat().st_mtime)
-                    except OSError as e:
-                        logger.warning(f"Failed to sort cache files by mtime: {e}")
-
-                    # Trim down to 80% of max capacity
-                    target_size = self.max_cache_bytes * 0.8
-
-                    while files and total_size > target_size:
-                        f = files.pop(0)
-                        try:
-                            size = f.stat().st_size
-                            f.unlink()
-                            total_size -= size
-                        except OSError as e:
-                            logger.warning(f"Failed to evict cache file {f}: {e}")
-                            continue
-
-            except Exception as e:
-                logger.warning(f"Error enforcing TTS cache limit: {e}", exc_info=True)
-
     def clear_cache(self):
         count = 0
         for f in self.cache_dir.glob("*.*"):

src/agent_loop.py

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import json
 import re
 import time
 import logging
-from typing import Any, AsyncGenerator, List, Dict, Optional, Set
+from typing import AsyncGenerator, List, Dict, Optional, Set
 from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
 from src.llm_core import (

src/integrations.py

@@ -1,14 +1,11 @@
-import ipaddress
 import json
 import os
-import time
 import uuid
 import logging
 import re
 from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Any
 from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse, urlunparse
 
-import httpcore
 import httpx
 from fastapi import HTTPException
 
@@ -357,152 +354,6 @@ def _find_integration(identifier: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
     return None
 
 
-# httpcore raises its own exception hierarchy; map the ones a simple request can
-# surface back to their httpx equivalents so the caller's `except httpx.*` blocks
-# below behave exactly as they did with the default transport.
-_HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC = {
-    httpcore.ConnectError: httpx.ConnectError,
-    httpcore.ConnectTimeout: httpx.ConnectTimeout,
-    httpcore.NetworkError: httpx.NetworkError,
-    httpcore.PoolTimeout: httpx.PoolTimeout,
-    httpcore.ProtocolError: httpx.ProtocolError,
-    httpcore.ReadError: httpx.ReadError,
-    httpcore.ReadTimeout: httpx.ReadTimeout,
-    httpcore.RemoteProtocolError: httpx.RemoteProtocolError,
-    httpcore.TimeoutException: httpx.TimeoutException,
-    httpcore.WriteError: httpx.WriteError,
-    httpcore.WriteTimeout: httpx.WriteTimeout,
-}
-
-
-class _PinnedAsyncBackend(httpcore.AsyncNetworkBackend):
-    """Network backend that connects only to the pre-validated IPs, in order.
-
-    Every address here came out of the single SSRF resolution, so moving to the
-    next one after a connect failure is not re-resolution — it's ordinary
-    multi-address fallback restricted to the set the guard already approved.
-    httpcore takes TLS SNI and the ``Host`` header from the request URL rather
-    than the connect host, so pinning the socket destination leaves certificate
-    validation and vhost routing pointed at the original hostname.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self, ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]):
-        self._ips = [str(ip) for ip in ips]
-        self._real = httpcore.AnyIOBackend()
-
-    async def connect_tcp(self, host, port, timeout=None, local_address=None,
-                          socket_options=None):
-        # One shared connect budget: each attempt gets the time left until the
-        # original deadline, so N dead addresses can't stretch the connect
-        # phase to N * timeout.
-        deadline = None if timeout is None else time.monotonic() + timeout
-        last_exc: Optional[Exception] = None
-        for ip in self._ips:
-            remaining = None if deadline is None else max(0.0, deadline - time.monotonic())
-            try:
-                return await self._real.connect_tcp(
-                    ip, port, remaining, local_address, socket_options
-                )
-            except (httpcore.ConnectError, httpcore.ConnectTimeout) as exc:
-                last_exc = exc
-                if deadline is not None and time.monotonic() >= deadline:
-                    break
-        raise last_exc
-
-    async def connect_unix_socket(self, path, timeout=None, socket_options=None):
-        return await self._real.connect_unix_socket(path, timeout, socket_options)
-
-    async def sleep(self, seconds: float) -> None:
-        return await self._real.sleep(seconds)
-
-
-class _PinnedAsyncTransport(httpx.AsyncBaseTransport):
-    """httpx transport that pins the TCP connect to the pre-resolved IP(s).
-
-    Kept local, mirroring the per-module pinned transports web fetch and
-    webhook delivery already carry, rather than coupling api_call to the
-    webhook subsystem. The request URL passes through unchanged, so SNI and the
-    ``Host`` header stay the original hostname; only the socket destination is
-    pinned, which is what closes the rebinding window.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self, ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]):
-        self._pinned_ips = list(ips)
-        self._pool = httpcore.AsyncConnectionPool(
-            # Reuse the CA trust the default httpx client would build (certifi
-            # plus SSL_CERT_FILE / SSL_CERT_DIR when trust_env is set) so
-            # swapping in this transport doesn't quietly change which chains
-            # verify. ssl.create_default_context() would use system roots.
-            ssl_context=httpx.create_ssl_context(),
-            http1=True,
-            http2=False,
-            network_backend=_PinnedAsyncBackend(ips),
-        )
-
-    async def handle_async_request(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
-        core_req = httpcore.Request(
-            method=request.method,
-            url=httpcore.URL(
-                scheme=request.url.raw_scheme,
-                host=request.url.raw_host,
-                port=request.url.port,
-                target=request.url.raw_path,
-            ),
-            headers=request.headers.raw,
-            content=request.stream,
-            extensions=request.extensions,
-        )
-        try:
-            core_resp = await self._pool.handle_async_request(core_req)
-            content = b"".join([chunk async for chunk in core_resp.aiter_stream()])
-            await core_resp.aclose()
-        except Exception as exc:
-            mapped = _HTTPCORE_TO_HTTPX_EXC.get(type(exc))
-            if mapped is not None:
-                raise mapped(str(exc)) from exc
-            raise
-        return httpx.Response(
-            status_code=core_resp.status,
-            headers=core_resp.headers,
-            content=content,
-            extensions=core_resp.extensions,
-        )
-
-    async def aclose(self) -> None:
-        await self._pool.aclose()
-
-
-def _validated_ips(raw_ips: List[str]) -> List[ipaddress._BaseAddress]:
-    """Return every entry that parses as an IP address, de-duplicated, order
-    preserved.
-
-    check_outbound_url only reports ok when *all* of these classify as safe, so
-    the whole list is guard-approved and any of them is a legitimate connect
-    target. Skipping unparseable entries mirrors how the guard walks the same
-    resolver output.
-
-    De-duplication matters because the resolver is getaddrinfo(host, None) with
-    no socktype filter, so glibc reports the same address once per socktype
-    (SOCK_STREAM/SOCK_DGRAM/SOCK_RAW) — a single-homed host comes back three
-    times. Without this, the connect fallback would spend the shared deadline
-    retrying one dead address instead of moving on to a genuinely different one.
-    """
-    ips: List[ipaddress._BaseAddress] = []
-    seen = set()
-    for raw in raw_ips:
-        if not isinstance(raw, str):
-            continue
-        try:
-            ip = ipaddress.ip_address(raw.split("%")[0])  # strip IPv6 zone id
-        except ValueError:
-            continue
-        if ip in seen:
-            continue
-        seen.add(ip)
-        ips.append(ip)
-    return ips
-
-
 async def execute_api_call(
     integration_id: str,
     method: str,
@@ -558,31 +409,13 @@ async def execute_api_call(
     # loopback for locked-down deployments. Private stays allowed by default
     # because LAN integrations (Home Assistant, Miniflux, ntfy) are the
     # primary use case.
-    from src.url_safety import check_outbound_url, _default_resolver
+    from src.url_safety import check_outbound_url
     block_private = os.getenv(
         "INTEGRATION_API_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS", "false"
     ).lower() == "true"
-    # Resolve the host exactly once and remember the IPs the guard validated so
-    # the request below can be pinned to them. check_outbound_url only reports
-    # (ok, reason); a plain httpx client re-resolves the host at connect time,
-    # which reopens a DNS-rebinding TOCTOU — a base_url host that answers with a
-    # public IP for the guard and then flips to 169.254.169.254 for the connect
-    # would reach cloud metadata with the integration's auth headers attached.
-    resolved_ips: List[str] = []
-
-    def _recording_resolver(host: str) -> List[str]:
-        ips = _default_resolver(host)
-        resolved_ips[:] = ips
-        return ips
-
-    ok, reason = check_outbound_url(
-        url, block_private=block_private, resolver=_recording_resolver
-    )
+    ok, reason = check_outbound_url(url, block_private=block_private)
     if not ok:
         return {"error": f"URL rejected: {reason}", "exit_code": 1}
-    pinned_ips = _validated_ips(resolved_ips)
-    if not pinned_ips:
-        return {"error": "URL rejected: host did not resolve to a usable address", "exit_code": 1}
 
     method = method.upper()
 
@@ -622,9 +455,7 @@ async def execute_api_call(
             auth = httpx.BasicAuth(parts[0], parts[1])
 
     try:
-        async with httpx.AsyncClient(
-            timeout=30.0, transport=_PinnedAsyncTransport(pinned_ips)
-        ) as client:
+        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client:
             response = await client.request(
                 method,
                 url,

src/llm_core.py

@@ -1237,27 +1237,15 @@ def _anthropic_rejects_temperature(model: str) -> bool:
         return False
     # `(?<![a-z])` anchors "opus" to a word boundary so a substring match like
     # `oct-opus`/`octopus-4-8` can't be read as Opus (it would otherwise strip
-    # temperature). Both version components are capped at 1-2 digits and forbid a
-    # trailing digit, so an 8-digit date can never be read as a version number:
-    # `claude-opus-4-20250514` (Opus 4.0) parses as major-only rather than reading
-    # `20250514` as a giant minor, and `claude-3-opus-20240229` (legacy Claude 3
-    # Opus, date directly after "opus-") fails to match at all rather than reading
-    # the date as a giant major. Dated 4.7+ snapshots (`claude-opus-4-7-20260201`)
-    # keep their explicit minor and are still matched.
-    #
-    # The minor is optional and a missing minor reads as `.0`, so major-only ids
-    # like `claude-opus-5` are correctly treated as >= 4.7 (issue #5753). Without
-    # this, every Opus 5 call kept `temperature` and failed with HTTP 400 — visible
-    # only on paths that pass a temperature, e.g. scheduled tasks inheriting
-    # `stream_agent_loop`'s 0.3 default, which returned empty responses.
-    match = re.search(
-        r"(?<![a-z])opus[-_]?(\d{1,2})(?!\d)(?:[-_.](\d{1,2})(?!\d))?", model.lower()
-    )
+    # temperature). Cap the minor at 1-2 digits and forbid a trailing digit so a
+    # dated id like `claude-opus-4-20250514` (Opus 4.0) parses as major-only (no
+    # minor match, kept) instead of reading the date `20250514` as a giant minor
+    # that would falsely test >= 4.7. Dated 4.7+ snapshots (`claude-opus-4-7-
+    # 20260201`) keep their explicit minor and are still matched.
+    match = re.search(r"(?<![a-z])opus[-_]?(\d+)[-_.](\d{1,2})(?!\d)", model.lower())
     if not match:
         return False
-    major = int(match.group(1))
-    minor = int(match.group(2)) if match.group(2) else 0
-    return (major, minor) >= (4, 7)
+    return (int(match.group(1)), int(match.group(2))) >= (4, 7)
 
 # Reasoning effort level sent to Mistral thinking-capable models. Mistral's
 # API accepts "high", "medium", "low", "none" — see

src/tools/system.py

@@ -46,9 +46,7 @@ async def do_manage_skills(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
     except ValueError:
         return {"error": "Invalid JSON arguments", "exit_code": 1}
 
-    action = (args.get("action") or "").strip().lower()
-    if not action:
-        return {"error": "action is required (list|view|view_ref|add|edit|patch|publish|delete|search)", "exit_code": 1}
+    action = (args.get("action") or "").lower()
     from services.memory.skills import SkillsManager
     from services.memory.skill_format import Skill, slugify
     from src.constants import DATA_DIR
@@ -57,7 +55,7 @@ async def do_manage_skills(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
     # Accept legacy `skill_id` as an alias for `name`.
     name = (args.get("name") or args.get("skill_id") or "").strip()
 
-    if action in ("list", "index"):
+    if action in ("list", "index", ""):
         all_skills = sm.load(owner=owner)
         if not all_skills:
             return {"results": "No skills yet. Create one with action='add'."}

static/js/markdown.js

@@ -758,36 +758,30 @@ export function mdToHtml(src, opts) {
   // Remove empty paragraphs
   s = s.replace(/<p><\/p>/g, '');
 
-  // Every restore below passes a function replacer rather than the block string
-  // itself. With a string replacement, `String.replace` reads `$&`, `` $` ``,
-  // `$'` and `$$` in the *replacement* as substitution patterns, so a restored
-  // block containing them is corrupted: `$&` re-inserts the placeholder, `` $` ``
-  // and `$'` splice in the surrounding document, and `$$` collapses to `$`. Those
-  // sequences are ordinary content in fenced code (`perl -pe 's/x/$& y/'`,
-  // `echo "$$USD"`). A function replacer inserts its return value verbatim.
-
   // CRITICAL: Restore allowed HTML blocks first
   allowedHtmlBlocks.forEach((block, index) => {
-    s = s.replace(`___ALLOWED_HTML_${index}___`, () => block);
+    s = s.replace(`___ALLOWED_HTML_${index}___`, block);
   });
 
   // Restore math blocks
   mathBlocks.forEach((block, index) => {
-    s = s.replace(`___MATH_BLOCK_${index}___`, () => block);
+    s = s.replace(`___MATH_BLOCK_${index}___`, block);
   });
 
   // Restore mermaid diagram blocks
   mermaidBlocks.forEach((block, index) => {
-    s = s.replace(`___MERMAID_BLOCK_${index}___`, () => block);
+    s = s.replace(`___MERMAID_BLOCK_${index}___`, block);
   });
 
   // CRITICAL: Restore code blocks at the end
   codeBlocks.forEach((block, index) => {
-    s = s.replace(`___CODE_BLOCK_${index}___`, () => block);
+    s = s.replace(`___CODE_BLOCK_${index}___`, block);
   });
 
   // Restore inline code spans last, so placeholders carried inside restored
-  // <a>/allowed-HTML blocks are resolved too.
+  // <a>/allowed-HTML blocks are resolved too. The function replacer keeps the
+  // escaped code literal — e.g. a shell snippet like `echo $1` is not treated
+  // as a regex back-reference.
   inlineCodeBlocks.forEach((block, index) => {
     s = s.replace(`___INLINE_CODE_${index}___`, () => block);
   });

static/js/settings.js

@@ -3031,14 +3031,12 @@ async function initEmailAccountsSettings() {
       const body = {
         name: el('eaf-name').value.trim() || el('eaf-from').value.trim(),
         from_address: el('eaf-from').value.trim(),
-        display_name: el('eaf-display-name').value.trim(),
         imap_host: el('eaf-imap-host').value.trim(),
         imap_port: parseInt(el('eaf-imap-port').value) || 993,
         imap_user: el('eaf-imap-user').value.trim(),
         imap_starttls: el('eaf-imap-starttls').checked,
         smtp_host: el('eaf-smtp-host').value.trim(),
         smtp_port: parseInt(el('eaf-smtp-port').value) || 587,
-        smtp_security: el('eaf-smtp-security').value,
         smtp_user: el('eaf-imap-user').value.trim(),
       };
       if (!body.name) { el('eaf-msg').textContent = 'Enter a Name or Email first'; el('eaf-msg').style.color = 'var(--red)'; return; }
@@ -5790,30 +5788,29 @@ export function close() {
   window.history.replaceState(null, '', clean);
   const success = sp.has('email_oauth_success');
   const errMsg = sp.get('email_oauth_error') || '';
-  // Open settings → integrations once the document is ready. This module owns
-  // the open() API, so it does not need to wait for a window-level alias.
-  function _showResult() {
-    open('integrations');
-    // Brief toast-style banner.
-    const banner = document.createElement('div');
-    banner.textContent = success
-      ? 'Google account connected — email is ready'
-      : `Google OAuth failed: ${errMsg || 'unknown error'}`;
-    Object.assign(banner.style, {
-      position: 'fixed', bottom: '24px', left: '50%', transform: 'translateX(-50%)',
-      background: success ? 'var(--accent, #50fa7b)' : 'var(--red, #ff5555)',
-      color: '#000', padding: '8px 18px', borderRadius: '6px', fontSize: '12px',
-      fontWeight: '600', zIndex: '99999', pointerEvents: 'none',
-      boxShadow: '0 2px 12px rgba(0,0,0,0.3)',
-    });
-    document.body.appendChild(banner);
-    setTimeout(() => banner.remove(), 4000);
-  }
-  if (document.readyState === 'loading') {
-    document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', _showResult, { once: true });
-  } else {
-    _showResult();
+  // Open settings → integrations after the app has initialised.
+  function _tryOpen() {
+    if (window.settingsModule && typeof window.settingsModule.open === 'function') {
+      window.settingsModule.open('integrations');
+      // Brief toast-style banner.
+      const banner = document.createElement('div');
+      banner.textContent = success
+        ? '✓ Google account connected — email is ready'
+        : `Google OAuth failed: ${errMsg || 'unknown error'}`;
+      Object.assign(banner.style, {
+        position: 'fixed', bottom: '24px', left: '50%', transform: 'translateX(-50%)',
+        background: success ? 'var(--accent, #50fa7b)' : 'var(--red, #ff5555)',
+        color: '#000', padding: '8px 18px', borderRadius: '6px', fontSize: '12px',
+        fontWeight: '600', zIndex: '99999', pointerEvents: 'none',
+        boxShadow: '0 2px 12px rgba(0,0,0,0.3)',
+      });
+      document.body.appendChild(banner);
+      setTimeout(() => banner.remove(), 4000);
+    } else {
+      setTimeout(_tryOpen, 100);
+    }
   }
+  _tryOpen();
 })();
 
 const settingsModule = { open, close, initIntegrations, initUnifiedIntegrations, syncAdminVisibility, refreshAiModelEndpoints };

tests/test_api_chat_security.py

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ def _load_webhook_routes_for_test(monkeypatch):
     module_name = "routes.webhook_routes_under_test"
     spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
         module_name,
-        Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "routes" / "webhook" / "webhook_routes.py",
+        Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "routes" / "webhook_routes.py",
     )
     module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
     spec.loader.exec_module(module)

tests/test_document_routes_shim.py

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-"""Regression test for the document route shim (slice 2m, #4082/#4071).
-
-The backward-compat shims at ``routes/document_routes.py`` and
-``routes/document_helpers.py`` use ``sys.modules`` replacement so the legacy
-import paths and the canonical ``routes.document.*`` paths resolve to the
-*same* module objects. This is required because multiple tests do
-``import routes.document_routes as droutes`` followed by
-``droutes.SessionLocal = ...`` / ``monkeypatch.setattr(droutes, ...)`` and
-``sys.modules.pop("routes.document_helpers")`` + re-import — for those to
-take effect at runtime, the legacy and canonical module objects must be
-identical.
-"""
-
-import importlib
-
-import routes.document_routes as _shim_routes  # noqa: F401
-import routes.document_helpers as _shim_helpers  # noqa: F401
-
-
-def test_legacy_and_canonical_routes_are_same_object():
-    legacy = importlib.import_module("routes.document_routes")
-    canonical = importlib.import_module("routes.document.document_routes")
-    assert legacy is canonical
-
-
-def test_legacy_and_canonical_helpers_are_same_object():
-    legacy = importlib.import_module("routes.document_helpers")
-    canonical = importlib.import_module("routes.document.document_helpers")
-    assert legacy is canonical

tests/test_email_oauth_connect_smtp_security.py

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-"""Regression coverage for SMTP security saved before Google OAuth."""
-
-from pathlib import Path
-
-
-_REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
-
-
-def test_email_tab_oauth_connect_persists_selected_smtp_security():
-    source = (_REPO / "static" / "js" / "settings.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    start = source.index("el('eaf-oauth-btn').addEventListener")
-    handler_body = source[start:source.index("if (!body.name)", start)]
-
-    assert "smtp_security: el('eaf-smtp-security').value" in handler_body
-    assert "display_name: el('eaf-display-name').value.trim()" in handler_body

tests/test_email_oauth_settings_redirect.py

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-"""Regression coverage for the settings UI after Google OAuth redirects."""
-
-from pathlib import Path
-
-
-_REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
-
-
-def test_oauth_redirect_uses_the_module_local_settings_api():
-    source = (_REPO / "static" / "js" / "settings.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    handler = source[
-        source.index("(function _handleOauthRedirect"):
-        source.index("const settingsModule =")
-    ]
-
-    assert "open('integrations');" in handler
-    assert "window.settingsModule" not in handler
-    assert "window.__odysseusAppStarted" not in handler
-    assert "document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', _showResult, { once: true })" in handler

tests/test_imap_mailbox_quoting.py

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ def test_known_imap_mailbox_call_sites_are_quoted():
     assert "conn.select(sent_name" not in pollers
     assert "imap.append(sent_folder" not in pollers
 
-    document_routes = Path("routes/document/document_routes.py").read_text()
+    document_routes = Path("routes/document_routes.py").read_text()
     assert "conn.select(doc.source_email_folder" not in document_routes
 
 

tests/test_integration_api_call_ssrf.py

@@ -9,13 +9,8 @@ link-local/metadata is always rejected; RFC-1918/loopback only when
 INTEGRATION_API_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true (LAN integrations are the primary
 use case, so private stays allowed by default).
 """
-import asyncio
-import ipaddress
-import ssl
 from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
 
-import httpcore
-import httpx
 import pytest
 
 from src import integrations
@@ -102,238 +97,3 @@ async def test_private_base_url_allowed_by_default_blocked_with_knob(monkeypatch
     assert result["exit_code"] == 1
     assert "rejected" in result["error"].lower()
     client.request.assert_not_called()
-
-
-async def _call_capturing_transport(base_url, path="/items"):
-    """Drive execute_api_call and return (result, transport) where transport is
-    the object passed to httpx.AsyncClient(transport=...)."""
-    resp = MagicMock()
-    resp.status_code = 200
-    resp.headers = {"content-type": "application/json"}
-    resp.json.return_value = {"ok": True}
-    resp.text = '{"ok": true}'
-
-    client = AsyncMock()
-    client.__aenter__ = AsyncMock(return_value=client)
-    client.__aexit__ = AsyncMock(return_value=None)
-    client.request = AsyncMock(return_value=resp)
-
-    captured = {}
-
-    def _fake_async_client(*args, **kwargs):
-        captured.update(kwargs)
-        return client
-
-    with (
-        patch.object(integrations, "_find_integration",
-                     return_value=_integration(base_url)),
-        patch("httpx.AsyncClient", side_effect=_fake_async_client),
-    ):
-        result = await integrations.execute_api_call("test_integ", "GET", path)
-    return result, captured.get("transport"), client
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_connection_is_pinned_to_the_validated_ip(monkeypatch):
-    """DNS-rebinding defense: the guard resolves the host once to a benign
-    public IP, and the request must be pinned to *that* IP so a host that
-    rebinds to the metadata range at connect time can't be reached with the
-    integration's auth headers. Static resolution passing the guard is not
-    enough — a plain client would re-resolve at connect."""
-    monkeypatch.setattr("src.url_safety._default_resolver",
-                        lambda host: ["93.184.216.34"])
-    result, transport, client = await _call_capturing_transport(
-        "http://rebinding.attacker.example")
-
-    assert result.get("exit_code") == 0
-    client.request.assert_called_once()
-    assert isinstance(transport, integrations._PinnedAsyncTransport)
-    assert [str(ip) for ip in transport._pinned_ips] == ["93.184.216.34"]
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_pin_carries_the_whole_validated_ip_set(monkeypatch):
-    """When a host resolves to several records the transport keeps all of them
-    (check_outbound_url validated every one), in resolver order, so it can fall
-    back past a dead first address instead of failing the whole call."""
-    monkeypatch.setattr("src.url_safety._default_resolver",
-                        lambda host: ["93.184.216.34", "198.51.100.7"])
-    result, transport, _ = await _call_capturing_transport("http://multi.example")
-
-    assert result.get("exit_code") == 0
-    assert [str(ip) for ip in transport._pinned_ips] == ["93.184.216.34", "198.51.100.7"]
-
-
-class _FakeStream:
-    """Stand-in for the connected socket the real backend returns."""
-
-
-class _RecordingBackend:
-    """Fake httpcore backend: connect_tcp fails for the addresses in `dead`
-    and succeeds for the rest, recording the order it was asked to connect."""
-
-    def __init__(self, dead):
-        self.dead = set(dead)
-        self.attempts = []
-
-    async def connect_tcp(self, host, port, timeout=None, local_address=None,
-                          socket_options=None):
-        self.attempts.append((host, timeout))
-        if host in self.dead:
-            raise httpcore.ConnectError(f"connection refused: {host}")
-        return _FakeStream()
-
-
-def _pinned_backend(ips, dead):
-    """A _PinnedAsyncBackend whose underlying connect is the recording fake."""
-    backend = integrations._PinnedAsyncBackend(ips)
-    backend._real = _RecordingBackend(dead)
-    return backend
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_connect_falls_back_from_dead_first_to_live_second():
-    """first-dead / second-live: the pinned backend must try the next validated
-    address when the first refuses, rather than surfacing the failure. It also
-    ignores the `host` httpcore passes (the original hostname) and connects to
-    the pinned IPs, which is what keeps TLS SNI / Host on the real hostname."""
-    ips = [ipaddress.ip_address("203.0.113.10"), ipaddress.ip_address("198.51.100.7")]
-    backend = _pinned_backend(ips, dead={"203.0.113.10"})
-
-    stream = await backend.connect_tcp("original.hostname.example", 443, timeout=5.0)
-
-    assert isinstance(stream, _FakeStream)
-    # Tried the dead address first, then the live one — never the hostname.
-    assert [host for host, _ in backend._real.attempts] == ["203.0.113.10", "198.51.100.7"]
-    # Fallback shared one budget: the second attempt got the time left, not a fresh 5s.
-    assert backend._real.attempts[1][1] <= 5.0
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_connect_raises_when_every_validated_address_is_dead():
-    ips = [ipaddress.ip_address("203.0.113.10"), ipaddress.ip_address("198.51.100.7")]
-    backend = _pinned_backend(ips, dead={"203.0.113.10", "198.51.100.7"})
-
-    with pytest.raises(httpcore.ConnectError):
-        await backend.connect_tcp("original.hostname.example", 443, timeout=5.0)
-    assert [host for host, _ in backend._real.attempts] == ["203.0.113.10", "198.51.100.7"]
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_pinned_transport_reuses_httpx_ca_trust(monkeypatch):
-    """TLS trust must come from the same builder the default httpx client uses
-    (certifi + SSL_CERT_FILE / SSL_CERT_DIR via trust_env), not from
-    ssl.create_default_context()'s system roots — otherwise chains that verified
-    under the old default client can silently stop verifying."""
-    sentinel = ssl.create_default_context()
-    calls = []
-
-    def _fake_create(*args, **kwargs):
-        calls.append(kwargs)
-        return sentinel
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(httpx, "create_ssl_context", _fake_create)
-    transport = integrations._PinnedAsyncTransport([ipaddress.ip_address("93.184.216.34")])
-    try:
-        assert calls, "transport did not build its context via httpx.create_ssl_context"
-        assert transport._pool._ssl_context is sentinel
-    finally:
-        await transport.aclose()
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_real_socket_falls_back_from_dead_first_to_live_second():
-    """End-to-end over real loopback sockets: pin [127.0.0.2 (nothing
-    listening), 127.0.0.1 (live)], and the request must succeed by falling back
-    to the second address while the Host header stays the original hostname —
-    i.e. only the socket destination moved, vhost/SNI routing did not."""
-    captured = {}
-
-    async def handle(reader, writer):
-        request = await reader.read(4096)
-        for line in request.split(b"\r\n"):
-            if line.lower().startswith(b"host:"):
-                captured["host"] = line.split(b":", 1)[1].strip().decode()
-        writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 2\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\nhi")
-        await writer.drain()
-        writer.close()
-
-    server = await asyncio.start_server(handle, "127.0.0.1", 0)
-    port = server.sockets[0].getsockname()[1]
-    async with server:
-        await server.start_serving()
-        transport = integrations._PinnedAsyncTransport(
-            [ipaddress.ip_address("127.0.0.2"), ipaddress.ip_address("127.0.0.1")]
-        )
-        try:
-            async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=transport) as client:
-                resp = await client.get(f"http://pinned.example:{port}/health")
-        finally:
-            await transport.aclose()
-
-    assert resp.status_code == 200
-    assert resp.text == "hi"
-    assert captured.get("host") == f"pinned.example:{port}"
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_ip_literal_base_url_still_pins_and_is_not_rejected():
-    """A base_url that is already an IP has nothing to rebind, but it must not
-    trip the "did not resolve" guard either.
-
-    check_outbound_url resolves even a literal (getaddrinfo returns the address
-    itself), so the captured list is populated and the pin is a no-op rather
-    than a rejection. Uses the real resolver on purpose — no monkeypatch — so
-    this would catch the fail-closed branch firing on a literal.
-    """
-    result, transport, client = await _call_capturing_transport(
-        "http://93.184.216.34")
-
-    assert result.get("exit_code") == 0
-    assert isinstance(transport, integrations._PinnedAsyncTransport)
-    assert [str(ip) for ip in transport._pinned_ips] == ["93.184.216.34"]
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_ipv6_base_url_pins_every_validated_address(monkeypatch):
-    """IPv6 goes down the same path as v4.
-
-    Resolution is stubbed rather than using a literal so this doesn't depend on
-    the runner having IPv6 configured.
-    """
-    v6 = "2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946"
-    monkeypatch.setattr("src.url_safety._default_resolver", lambda host: [v6])
-    result, transport, client = await _call_capturing_transport("http://v6.example")
-
-    assert result.get("exit_code") == 0
-    assert isinstance(transport, integrations._PinnedAsyncTransport)
-    assert [str(ip) for ip in transport._pinned_ips] == [v6]
-
-
-def test_validated_ips_strips_zone_id_and_drops_junk():
-    """getaddrinfo can hand back a scoped v6 address like 'fe80::1%eth0'."""
-    got = integrations._validated_ips(
-        ["93.184.216.34", "fe80::1%eth0", "not-an-ip", None, "2001:db8::5"]
-    )
-    assert [str(ip) for ip in got] == ["93.184.216.34", "fe80::1", "2001:db8::5"]
-
-
-def test_validated_ips_deduplicates_repeated_addresses():
-    """The resolver is getaddrinfo(host, None) with no socktype filter, so glibc
-    returns one record per socktype and a single-homed host arrives three times
-    over. Duplicates must collapse (first-seen order kept) or the connect
-    fallback wastes its shared deadline retrying one dead address."""
-    got = integrations._validated_ips(
-        ["93.184.216.34", "93.184.216.34", "93.184.216.34"]
-    )
-    assert [str(ip) for ip in got] == ["93.184.216.34"]
-
-    # Order is first-seen, and distinct addresses all survive.
-    got = integrations._validated_ips(
-        ["198.51.100.7", "93.184.216.34", "198.51.100.7", "2001:db8::5"]
-    )
-    assert [str(ip) for ip in got] == ["198.51.100.7", "93.184.216.34", "2001:db8::5"]
-
-    # A zone-id variant is the same address once stripped, so it collapses too.
-    got = integrations._validated_ips(["fe80::1%eth0", "fe80::1%eth1", "fe80::1"])
-    assert [str(ip) for ip in got] == ["fe80::1"]

tests/test_integrations_api_call_truncation.py

@@ -83,10 +83,9 @@ async def _call(json_data, status=200):
     with (
         patch.object(integrations, "_find_integration", return_value=DUMMY_INTEGRATION),
         patch("httpx.AsyncClient", return_value=mock_client),
-        # api.example.com doesn't resolve. Point the resolver at a public
-        # address instead of stubbing the guard open, so the real check (and
-        # the connect-IP pinning that reads its result) still runs.
-        patch("src.url_safety._default_resolver", lambda host: ["93.184.216.34"]),
+        # api.example.com doesn't resolve; the SSRF guard would fail closed.
+        # These tests are about truncation, so stub the guard open.
+        patch("src.url_safety.check_outbound_url", return_value=(True, "ok")),
     ):
         return await integrations.execute_api_call("test_integ", "GET", "/items")
 
@@ -102,10 +101,9 @@ async def _call_with_integration(integration, path="/items"):
     with (
         patch.object(integrations, "_find_integration", return_value=integration),
         patch("httpx.AsyncClient", return_value=mock_client),
-        # api.example.com doesn't resolve. Point the resolver at a public
-        # address instead of stubbing the guard open, so the real check (and
-        # the connect-IP pinning that reads its result) still runs.
-        patch("src.url_safety._default_resolver", lambda host: ["93.184.216.34"]),
+        # api.example.com doesn't resolve; the SSRF guard would fail closed.
+        # These tests are about URL joining, so stub the guard open.
+        patch("src.url_safety.check_outbound_url", return_value=(True, "ok")),
     ):
         result = await integrations.execute_api_call("test_integ", "GET", path)
     return result, mock_client

tests/test_issue_description_check.py

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-"""Regression coverage for issue-description label lifecycle events."""
-
-import json
-import shutil
-import subprocess
-from pathlib import Path
-
-import pytest
-
-
-_REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
-_CHECKER = _REPO / ".github" / "scripts" / "check-issue-description.js"
-_WORKFLOW = _REPO / ".github" / "workflows" / "issue-description-check.yml"
-pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(not shutil.which("node"), reason="node not on PATH")
-
-
-def _run_closed_issue(action):
-    harness = r"""
-const checkIssueDescription = require(process.argv[1]);
-const action = process.argv[2];
-const calls = [];
-const unexpected = (name) => async () => {
-  throw new Error(`${name} should not be called for a closed issue`);
-};
-
-const github = {
-  rest: {
-    issues: {
-      removeLabel: async (params) => calls.push({ method: 'removeLabel', params }),
-      getLabel: unexpected('getLabel'),
-      addLabels: unexpected('addLabels'),
-      listComments: unexpected('listComments'),
-      createComment: unexpected('createComment'),
-      updateComment: unexpected('updateComment'),
-      deleteComment: unexpected('deleteComment'),
-    },
-  },
-};
-const context = {
-  payload: {
-    action,
-    issue: { number: 42, state: 'closed', body: '', labels: [] },
-  },
-  repo: { owner: 'odysseus-dev', repo: 'odysseus' },
-};
-const core = {
-  warning: unexpected('core.warning'),
-  setFailed: unexpected('core.setFailed'),
-};
-
-checkIssueDescription({ github, context, core })
-  .then(() => process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(calls)))
-  .catch((error) => {
-    console.error(error);
-    process.exitCode = 1;
-  });
-"""
-    proc = subprocess.run(
-        ["node", "-e", harness, str(_CHECKER), action],
-        capture_output=True,
-        text=True,
-        cwd=str(_REPO),
-        timeout=30,
-    )
-    assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
-    return json.loads(proc.stdout)
-
-
-def test_workflow_handles_issue_closures():
-    workflow = _WORKFLOW.read_text()
-    assert "types: [opened, edited, reopened, closed]" in workflow
-
-
-@pytest.mark.parametrize("action", ["closed", "edited"])
-def test_closed_issue_only_drops_ready_for_review(action):
-    assert _run_closed_issue(action) == [
-        {
-            "method": "removeLabel",
-            "params": {
-                "owner": "odysseus-dev",
-                "repo": "odysseus",
-                "issue_number": 42,
-                "name": "ready for review",
-            },
-        }
-    ]

tests/test_llm_core_anthropic_temp_omit.py

@@ -29,13 +29,6 @@ from src.llm_core import _anthropic_rejects_temperature, _build_anthropic_payloa
         "anthropic/claude-opus-4-7",  # tolerate a provider-prefixed id
         "claude-opus-4-10",  # future minor still >= 4.7
         "claude-opus-5-0",  # future major
-        # Major-only ids: a missing minor reads as `.0`, so these are >= 4.7 too
-        # (issue #5753). Before the fix the version pattern required a minor, so
-        # these fell through to "accepts temperature" and every call 400'd.
-        "claude-opus-5",
-        "claude-opus-5-20260101",  # major-only + dated snapshot
-        "anthropic/claude-opus-5",  # major-only behind a provider prefix
-        "claude-opus-6",  # future major-only
     ],
 )
 def test_opus_47_plus_rejects_temperature(model):
@@ -55,10 +48,7 @@ def test_opus_47_plus_rejects_temperature(model):
         "claude-opus-4-6-20251201",  # dated 4.6 snapshot — older, still keeps temperature
         "claude-sonnet-4-6",
         "claude-3-5-sonnet",
-        "claude-3-opus-20240229",  # legacy Claude 3 Opus — date directly after
-        # "opus-", so the major must not swallow it as version 20240229 (that is
-        # what makes capping the major at 1-2 digits necessary once the minor
-        # became optional in #5753).
+        "claude-3-opus-20240229",  # legacy Claude 3 Opus — no opus-N-M pattern, kept
         "claude-haiku-4-5",
         "claude-x",
         "octopus-4-8",  # "opus" only as a substring of another word — must not match
@@ -97,20 +87,6 @@ def test_payload_keeps_temperature_for_older_models():
     assert _payload("claude-3-5-sonnet", 1.2)["temperature"] == 1.0
 
 
-def test_payload_omits_temperature_for_major_only_opus_5():
-    # Issue #5753: the scheduled-task path calls stream_agent_loop() without a
-    # temperature and inherits its 0.3 default, so `claude-opus-5` 400'd on every
-    # run and surfaced as "the model returned an empty response". Interactive chat
-    # leaves temperature None and never hit it.
-    assert "temperature" not in _payload("claude-opus-5", 0.3)
-
-
-def test_payload_keeps_temperature_for_legacy_claude_3_opus():
-    # Guards the major-digit cap: `opus-20240229` must not parse as version
-    # 20240229, or Claude 3 Opus would silently lose the caller's temperature.
-    assert _payload("claude-3-opus-20240229", 0.5)["temperature"] == 0.5
-
-
 def test_payload_keeps_temperature_for_dated_opus_4_0():
     # Anthropic's dated id for Opus 4.0 (claude-opus-4-20250514) is in this repo's
     # ANTHROPIC_MODELS list. The date must not be misread as a >= 4.7 minor, or the

tests/test_manage_skills_action_required.py

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-import json
-
-import pytest
-
-from src.tools.system import do_manage_skills
-
-
-@pytest.mark.asyncio
-@pytest.mark.parametrize(
-    "payload",
-    [
-        {},
-        {"action": ""},
-        {"action": "   "},
-        {"name": "demo", "description": "x", "procedure": ["step"]},
-    ],
-)
-async def test_manage_skills_requires_action(payload):
-    result = await do_manage_skills(json.dumps(payload), owner="test")
-
-    assert result == {
-        "error": "action is required (list|view|view_ref|add|edit|patch|publish|delete|search)",
-        "exit_code": 1,
-    }

tests/test_markdown_rendering_js.py

@@ -214,50 +214,6 @@ def test_inline_code_content_is_html_escaped(node_available):
     assert "<b>" not in html
 
 
-def test_fenced_code_keeps_dollar_ampersand(node_available):
-    # Issue #5663: the block-restore pass used a string replacement, so `$&` in a
-    # restored block was read as "the matched text" and re-inserted the
-    # placeholder. `perl -pe 's/world/$& again/'` rendered as
-    # "s/world/___CODE_BLOCK_0___amp; again/" — the trailing "amp;" is the orphan
-    # left behind after `$&` consumed the `$&` of the escaped `$&amp;`.
-    html = _run_markdown_case(
-        "```sh\necho \"hello world\" | perl -pe 's/world/$& again/'\n```"
-    )
-
-    assert "___CODE_BLOCK_" not in html
-    assert "s/world/$&amp; again/" in html
-    assert "amp; again" not in html.replace("$&amp; again", "")
-
-
-def test_fenced_code_keeps_dollar_backtick_and_quote(node_available):
-    # `` $` `` and `$'` splice the text before/after the placeholder into the
-    # block. Unlike `$&` these leave no placeholder behind — the characters just
-    # vanish — so assert the content survives verbatim.
-    html = _run_markdown_case("```sh\nsed \"s/$`/x/\" && sed \"s/$'/y/\"\n```")
-
-    assert "___CODE_BLOCK_" not in html
-    assert "s/$`/x/" in html
-    assert "s/$&#39;/y/" in html
-
-
-def test_fenced_code_keeps_double_dollar(node_available):
-    # `$$` collapsed to a single `$` in the restored block.
-    html = _run_markdown_case('```sh\necho "$$USD and $$"\n```')
-
-    assert "$$USD and $$" in html
-
-
-def test_mermaid_block_keeps_dollar_ampersand(node_available):
-    # The mermaid restore site had the same hazard: a node label containing `$&`
-    # re-inserted the ___MERMAID_BLOCK_n___ placeholder into the diagram source,
-    # which then fails to parse. The math and allowed-HTML sites are fixed the
-    # same way; they need KaTeX/sanitizer conditions this harness doesn't set up.
-    html = _run_markdown_case('```mermaid\ngraph TD; A["$&"] --> B;\n```')
-
-    assert "___MERMAID_BLOCK_" not in html
-    assert "$&amp;" in html
-
-
 def test_currency_dollar_amounts_are_not_rendered_as_math(node_available):
     # "$5 to $10" used to pair the two dollar signs as inline-math delimiters
     # and render "5 to" through KaTeX. Pandoc-style rules now reject it: the

tests/test_mcp_dependency_compatibility.py

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-"""Regression coverage for the built-in MCP servers' SDK compatibility line."""
-
-from pathlib import Path
-
-
-REQUIREMENTS = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "requirements.txt"
-
-
-def test_mcp_requirement_excludes_breaking_v2_sdk():
-    requirements = [
-        line.split("#", 1)[0].strip().replace(" ", "")
-        for line in REQUIREMENTS.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
-    ]
-
-    assert "mcp<2" in requirements

tests/test_model_helper_owner_scope.py

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ def _function_source(path: str, name: str) -> str:
 
 
 def test_document_ai_tidy_resolves_with_owner_scope():
-    body = _function_source("routes/document/document_routes.py", "ai_tidy_documents")
+    body = _function_source("routes/document_routes.py", "ai_tidy_documents")
     assert "resolve_task_endpoint(owner=user or None)" in body
     assert 'resolve_endpoint("default", owner=user or None)' in body
 

tests/test_search_routes_shim.py

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-"""Regression test for the search route shim (slice 2j, #4082/#4071)."""
-
-import importlib
-
-import routes.search_routes as _shim_search  # noqa: F401
-
-
-def test_legacy_and_canonical_search_module_are_same_object():
-    legacy = importlib.import_module("routes.search_routes")
-    canonical = importlib.import_module("routes.search.search_routes")
-    assert legacy is canonical

tests/test_skill_format_timestamp.py

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-"""Regression for issue #5697 — skill timestamps must not use ``datetime.utcnow()``.
-
-``_now_iso()`` builds the ``created`` value in skill frontmatter. ``utcnow()``
-returns a *naive* datetime and has been deprecated since Python 3.12, scheduled
-for removal. The replacement must stay timezone-aware while keeping the
-serialized ``YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ`` shape, so skill files written by older
-versions keep parsing.
-
-The UTC check matters on its own: a bare ``datetime.now()`` also produces the
-right shape, but emits local wall time, which would silently backdate or
-postdate skills for every user outside UTC.
-"""
-
-import os
-import re
-import time
-import warnings
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-
-import pytest
-
-from services.memory.skill_format import _now_iso
-
-_ISO_Z = re.compile(r"^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}Z$")
-
-
-def test_now_iso_keeps_serialized_shape():
-    assert _ISO_Z.match(_now_iso())
-
-
-def test_now_iso_emits_no_deprecation_warning():
-    with warnings.catch_warnings(record=True) as caught:
-        warnings.simplefilter("always")
-        _now_iso()
-    assert not [w for w in caught if issubclass(w.category, DeprecationWarning)]
-
-
-@pytest.mark.skipif(
-    not hasattr(time, "tzset"),
-    reason="time.tzset is unavailable on this platform",
-)
-def test_now_iso_is_utc_not_local_time():
-    """Pin UTC under a non-UTC local timezone, where the two visibly diverge."""
-    original_tz = os.environ.get("TZ")
-    os.environ["TZ"] = "Asia/Amman"  # UTC+3, never UTC
-    time.tzset()
-    try:
-        emitted = datetime.strptime(_now_iso(), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ").replace(
-            tzinfo=timezone.utc
-        )
-        drift = abs((emitted - datetime.now(timezone.utc)).total_seconds())
-        assert drift < 60, f"timestamp is {drift}s off UTC — local time leaked in"
-    finally:
-        if original_tz is None:
-            os.environ.pop("TZ", None)
-        else:
-            os.environ["TZ"] = original_tz
-        time.tzset()

tests/test_tts_service_enforce_cache_limit.py

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-import os
-import time
-from pathlib import Path
-import pytest
-
-# Adjust the import path if your file is directly in ./services instead of ./services/tts
-from services.tts.tts_service import TTSService
-
-def test_cache_under_limit(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
-    """Test that writing a file under the size limit does not trigger eviction."""
-    # Set a tiny limit: 100 bytes
-    monkeypatch.setenv("ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES", "100")
-    
-    # Initialize service with pytest's temporary directory
-    service = TTSService(cache_dir=str(tmp_path))
-    
-    # Write a 40-byte file (under the 100-byte limit)
-    service._put_cache("test_key", b"x" * 40)
-    
-    # Verify the file was written and nothing was deleted
-    files = list(tmp_path.glob("*.*"))
-    assert len(files) == 1
-    assert sum(f.stat().st_size for f in files) == 40
-
-def test_cache_exceeds_limit_triggers_eviction(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
-    """Test that exceeding the limit evicts the oldest files down to 80% capacity."""
-    # Set limit to 100 bytes. 80% target capacity will be 80 bytes.
-    monkeypatch.setenv("ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES", "100")
-    service = TTSService(cache_dir=str(tmp_path))
-    
-    # 1. Setup: Manually create two older files (40 bytes each)
-    file1 = tmp_path / "oldest.wav"
-    file2 = tmp_path / "middle.wav"
-    
-    file1.write_bytes(b"a" * 40)
-    file2.write_bytes(b"b" * 40)
-    
-    # Spoof timestamps so file1 is explicitly older than file2
-    now = time.time()
-    os.utime(file1, (now - 100, now - 100)) # 100 seconds ago
-    os.utime(file2, (now - 50, now - 50))   # 50 seconds ago
-    
-    # 2. Action: Write a 3rd file using the service method (40 bytes)
-    # Total cache is now 120 bytes, which exceeds 100.
-    # It should delete oldest (file1) to drop to 80 bytes (which matches the 80% target).
-    service._put_cache("newest", b"c" * 40)
-    
-    # 3. Assertions
-    # The newest file should exist (saved as .wav because it lacks MP3 magic bytes)
-    newest_file = tmp_path / "newest.wav"
-    
-    assert not file1.exists(), "The oldest file should have been evicted."
-    assert file2.exists(), "The middle file should still exist."
-    assert newest_file.exists(), "The newest file should have been saved."
-    
-    # Verify the final directory size is <= 80 bytes
-    total_size = sum(f.stat().st_size for f in tmp_path.glob("*.*"))
-    assert total_size <= 80
-
-def test_cache_limit_disabled(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
-    """Test that setting max bytes to 0 disables eviction."""
-    monkeypatch.setenv("ODYSSEUS_TTS_CACHE_MAX_BYTES", "0")
-    service = TTSService(cache_dir=str(tmp_path))
-    
-    # Write 3 large files that would normally trigger eviction
-    service._put_cache("file1", b"x" * 1000)
-    service._put_cache("file2", b"x" * 1000)
-    service._put_cache("file3", b"x" * 1000)
-    
-    # Ensure nothing was deleted
-    files = list(tmp_path.glob("*.*"))
-    assert len(files) == 3
-    assert sum(f.stat().st_size for f in files) == 3000
-
-def test_cache_eviction_handles_unlink_error_gracefully(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
-    """Test that if unlinking a file fails, _put_cache still succeeds without raising."""
-    service = TTSService(cache_dir=str(tmp_path))
-    service.max_cache_bytes = 50
-
-    # Create a file to evict
-    old_file = tmp_path / "old.wav"
-    old_file.write_bytes(b"x" * 40)
-
-    # Monkeypatch unlink on Path objects to simulate a PermissionError / file-lock failure
-    def mock_unlink(self_path):
-        raise OSError("Permission denied / file locked")
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "unlink", mock_unlink)
-
-    # Writing a new file triggers eviction which encounters the mocked unlink error
-    try:
-        service._put_cache("new_key", b"y" * 40)
-    except Exception as e:
-        pytest.fail(f"_put_cache raised an exception during failed eviction: {e}")
-
-    # The new file should still be written successfully
-    assert (tmp_path / "new_key.wav").exists()

tests/test_vault_routes_shim.py

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-"""Regression test for the vault route shim (slice 2k, #4082/#4071)."""
-
-import importlib
-
-import routes.vault_routes as _shim_vault  # noqa: F401
-
-
-def test_legacy_and_canonical_vault_module_are_same_object():
-    legacy = importlib.import_module("routes.vault_routes")
-    canonical = importlib.import_module("routes.vault.vault_routes")
-    assert legacy is canonical

tests/test_vision_owner_scope.py

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ def test_request_vision_call_sites_pass_owner():
     chat_source = (ROOT / "src" / "chat_handler.py").read_text()
     processor_source = (ROOT / "src" / "document_processor.py").read_text()
     upload_source = (ROOT / "routes" / "upload_routes.py").read_text()
-    document_source = (ROOT / "routes" / "document" / "document_routes.py").read_text()
+    document_source = (ROOT / "routes" / "document_routes.py").read_text()
     gallery_source = (ROOT / "routes" / "gallery" / "gallery_routes.py").read_text()
     memory_source = (ROOT / "routes" / "memory" / "memory_routes.py").read_text()
 

tests/test_webhook_routes_shim.py

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-"""Regression test for the webhook route shim (slice 2l, #4082/#4071)."""
-
-import importlib
-
-import routes.webhook_routes as _shim_webhook  # noqa: F401
-
-
-def test_legacy_and_canonical_webhook_module_are_same_object():
-    legacy = importlib.import_module("routes.webhook_routes")
-    canonical = importlib.import_module("routes.webhook.webhook_routes")
-    assert legacy is canonical