16 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexandre Teixeira 68f19a889a test: add fire_and_forget to API chat webhook stub 2026-06-16 03:24:48 +01:00
RaresKeY 422f23fb12 fix(mcp): scope memory server by owner (#4315) 2026-06-16 03:18:17 +01:00
TheDragonTail 0f966d6b9f fix(embeddings): fall back to default cache dir when FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH is empty (#3434)
docker-compose.yml injects FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH=${FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH:-},
which sets the variable to an empty string when the host has not defined it.
FASTEMBED_CACHE_DIR used os.getenv("FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH", default), and
os.getenv only returns the default when the variable is ABSENT -- so the empty
value won and FASTEMBED_CACHE_DIR became "". os.makedirs("") then raised
[Errno 2] No such file or directory: '', FastEmbed failed to initialise, and
every vector feature (RAG, semantic memory, tool index) silently degraded on
the default Docker stack.

Treat an empty value like an absent one via `os.getenv(...) or default`.
Add a regression test covering the empty, unset, and explicit cases.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-16 03:11:48 +01:00
Afonso Coutinho 7b09491557 fix: check-in calendar digest leaks every user's events (missing owner scope) (#1925)
* fix: check-in calendar digest leaks every user's events (no owner scope)

* Seed dtend on calendar events in digest test so the NOT NULL column is satisfied
2026-06-16 02:42:41 +01:00
Kenny Van de Maele fafaf089c5 refactor(search): centralize the web-scraping User-Agent into one constant (#4325)
The outbound UA for web_fetch / web_search was inlined in four places with
two different values and nothing keeping them current: content.py pinned a
mid-2021 Chrome 91 build, and providers.py sent a bare Mozilla/5.0 in three
spots. Some sites serve a degraded or blocked page to a UA that old.

Add WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT to src/constants.py (env-overridable, matching the
existing Copilot/Kimi UA-constant pattern) and import it in content.py and
providers.py. Default to a current, common desktop UA so pages return their
normal HTML: the market-leading desktop OS (Windows; NT 10.0 covers Windows
10 and 11) and browser (Chrome) on a current stable build. The version is now
bumped in one place.

Service-specific self-identifying agents (Copilot, Kimi, webhooks, cookbook)
are intentionally left separate. Adds a regression pinning the constant shape,
the env override, and a guard against a new inline Mozilla literal in the
search sources.

Closes #4324
2026-06-16 01:33:47 +00:00
RaresKeY b58af4267b fix(companion): require chat scope for model inventory (#4319) 2026-06-16 01:15:05 +02:00
AkioKoneko 8ff76f083c fix(cookbook): avoid launching Ollama during Windows cache scan (#4368) 2026-06-16 01:00:40 +02:00
Wei Hong 2196869c86 fix(webhooks): route public emitters through fire_and_forget (#3964) (#4336)
The three public webhook emitters in chat_helpers and webhook_routes
schedule deliveries via asyncio.create_task(webhook_manager.fire(...)),
which bypasses WebhookManager._bg_tasks. asyncio only holds a weak
reference to the outer task, so the GC can collect it mid-delivery and
the webhook is silently dropped.

Route all three through webhook_manager.fire_and_forget() so the task
is tracked by _spawn_tracked() and the manager owns the full lifecycle.

Adds an AST-level guard test that scans routes/ for direct
asyncio.create_task wrapping webhook_manager.fire(...) to prevent
regressions.
2026-06-16 00:41:45 +02:00
holden093 dd2e23c9af fix(agent): report phone numbers from resolve_contact when a matched contact has no email (#4327)
When a CardDAV contact matched the search query but had no email
address (only phone numbers), the tool silently dropped it and
returned 'No contacts found'.  Fall back to the contact's phone
number(s) so the caller still receives usable information.

Refs: #4178 (the contacts-domain classifier fix that made the model
actually call resolve_contact for contacts queries, surfacing this
pre-existing gap)
2026-06-16 00:03:33 +02:00
Fahim facc50cb0f fix(api): attribute bearer-token actions to the token owner on owner-scoped routes (#4054)
* fix(api): attribute bearer-token actions to the token owner on owner-scoped routes

Owner-scoped chat, session, and upload routes called
get_current_user(), which resolves a bearer ody_ API token to the
sandboxed "api" pseudo-user. A paired API-token client (companion, CLI,
IDE extension) therefore saw and created a separate "api"-owned silo
instead of the owner's data.

effective_user() already exists for exactly this: it attributes a token's
actions to request.state.api_token_owner, is identical to
get_current_user() for cookie sessions, and falls back safely when a
token has no owner. session_routes.py was already migrated; this
completes the migration for the remaining owner-scoped routes:

- chat_helpers.py: chat-privilege enforcement, message attribution, prefs/context
- chat_routes.py: orphaned-endpoint owner, session-auth owner, message search
- upload_routes.py: upload owner attribution + access checks

The /api/models swap is intentionally omitted: #4292 already migrated it
to effective_user (plus the chat-scope gate and ownerless-token 403), so
this PR keeps dev's version of routes/model_routes.py unchanged.

chat_routes.py keeps importing get_current_user for the workspace owner
gate; session_routes.py drops the now-unused import.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: target effective_user in auth monkeypatches and owner-scope assertion

The owner-scoped routes now call effective_user() instead of
get_current_user(), so the tests that stubbed get_current_user (or
asserted on it) follow suit:

- test_chat_helpers.py, test_review_regressions.py,
  test_kv_cache_invalidation_2927.py: monkeypatch effective_user
- test_session_endpoint_owner_scope.py: assert the owner-scope guard uses
  effective_user(request)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 23:56:22 +02:00
Kenny Van de Maele 074a1e6eff fix(search): add download budgets to web_fetch with truncation notice and hard ceiling (#3955)
* fix(search): add download budgets to web_fetch with truncation notice and hard ceiling

MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS only trims what the agent sees; fetch_webpage_content
buffered and cached the entire response body first, so a large or hostile
URL could pull arbitrarily many bytes into memory and the content cache.

The fetch is now a capped streaming GET (SSRF redirect guard unchanged):
a soft default budget (WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, 2 MB), a per-call
override via full/max_bytes on the web_fetch tool, and a hard ceiling
(WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES, 20 MB) that the override can never exceed.
When Content-Length already declares a body over the ceiling the fetch
is refused before any body bytes are buffered. Truncated results carry
truncated/fetched_bytes/total_bytes, the tool output leads with a
partial-content notice telling the model how to re-fetch with full=true,
and the tool schema documents the flag. A truncated PDF is reported as
a budget error since a cut PDF is unparseable. The effective cap is part
of the content-cache key so a truncated fetch is never served to a
full-budget request.

Existing tests that faked httpx.get or the old _get_public_url signature
are adapted to the streaming interface; behavior pins are unchanged.

Fixes #3812

* fix(search): close compressed-body cap bypass and protect the partial notice

Addresses RaresKeY's review on #3955:

- Force Accept-Encoding: identity for the capped fetch. With gzip/deflate the
  wire bytes (and Content-Length) can be a fraction of the decoded body, so a
  tiny compressed response could pass the hard-cap preflight and then expand
  past the ceiling in a single decoded chunk before the streamed cap could
  slice it. Identity makes Content-Length the true body size and keeps each
  streamed chunk bounded by the network read, so the hard ceiling actually
  bounds memory.
- Lead web_fetch output with the partial-content notice and cap the page
  title. The notice is the user-facing contract for partial fetches, but the
  title is untrusted, uncapped page content; placed ahead of the notice a giant
  title could push it past MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS and drop it. The notice now leads
  and the title is capped as a second guard.

Adds regressions: the fetch advertises identity encoding, and a truncated
result with an oversized title still surfaces the partial notice.

* fix(search): reject compressed responses that ignore the identity request

Requesting Accept-Encoding: identity is not enough on its own: a server can
ignore it and still return Content-Encoding: gzip, and httpx.iter_bytes would
decode that, so a tiny compressed body could balloon into one decoded chunk
far past the hard cap before the streamed loop slices it (and Content-Length,
the compressed wire length, makes the preflight and size metadata unreliable).

Refuse a non-identity Content-Encoding before reading the body. Adds a
regression where the server ignores the identity request and returns gzip;
the fetch is refused before any body is decoded.
2026-06-15 17:38:09 +00:00
Kenny Van de Maele 2fab378c6a refactor(search): import REQUEST_TIMEOUT from constants in providers.py (#4331)
providers.py redefined REQUEST_TIMEOUT = 20 locally, shadowing the same
value in src/constants.py and risking drift if the constant is bumped.
Import it from src.constants and drop the local copy; same value, one
source of truth.

Closes #4329
2026-06-15 17:22:08 +00:00
Michael 5bafc30622 fix(api): normalize non-object JSON bodies to empty dict in token PATCH (#3976)
* fix(api): normalize non-object JSON bodies to empty dict in token PATCH

Valid non-dict JSON (e.g. [] or null) reaches payload.get(...) and
raises AttributeError. Normalize to {} so the route returns a controlled
response instead of an unhandled 500.

Fixes #3966

* test(api): add regression tests for PATCH with non-object JSON bodies

Covers array body ([]), null body, and normal object body as requested
in alteixeira20's review of #3976.

---------

Co-authored-by: michaelxer <michaelxer@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-15 18:05:15 +01:00
darius-f96 d6d2e17214 fix(hwfit): add GB10 unified-memory bandwidth so speed scores are real (#4270)
NVIDIA Grace Blackwell GB10 / DGX Spark was missing from GPU_BANDWIDTH, so
_lookup_bandwidth() returned None for it and _estimate_speed() fell through
to the crude FALLBACK_K path (k/active-params). That over-stated tok/s and
let speed scores saturate regardless of the box's real ~273 GB/s LPDDR5X
pool — distorting model ranking on these 128GB unified-memory rigs.

Add "gb10": 273 (GB/s). nvidia-smi reports the device name as "NVIDIA GB10",
which substring-matches the new key, so detected GB10 boxes now estimate
speed from the real bandwidth instead of the fallback.
2026-06-15 18:55:15 +02:00
Lucas Daniel f4e8990635 chore: add warnings to silent except Exception blocks (#3212)
* log(app): add warnings to silent except Exception blocks

- Internal tool auth header failure now logs a warning instead of
  silently passing, making auth bypass easier to spot in logs.
- Token last_used_at update failure now logs at DEBUG (fire-and-forget,
  non-critical, but useful when debugging token tracking issues).
- Image ownership verification failure now logs a warning so unexpected
  access-check errors surface instead of silently allowing the request.

* log(chat_routes): add warnings to silent except Exception blocks

- clear_orphaned_session_endpoint: log before rollback so failures
  appear in traces when users see stale/deleted model options.
- _endpoint_has_model (JSON parse): log malformed cached_models instead
  of silently treating endpoint as valid.
- _has_any_visible_model (JSON parse): log malformed cached_models
  instead of silently returning empty list.
- timezone header parse: log failure so time-zone-related tool bugs
  (wrong scheduled times, calendar events) are traceable.
- attachments JSON parse: log failure so silently-dropped attachments
  are visible in server logs.

* log(email_routes): add warnings to silent except Exception blocks

- Email alias resolution failure now logs a warning instead of silently
  returning an empty list, making broken account configs diagnosable.

* log(document_routes): add warnings to silent except Exception blocks

- Export ZIP request body parse failure now logs a warning so empty
  exports caused by malformed requests are diagnosable.
- clear_active_document failure on detach now logs a warning to help
  trace doc re-injection bugs like #1160.

* log(agent_loop): add warnings to silent except Exception blocks

- builtin tool overrides load failure now logs a warning so misconfigured
  settings don't silently fall back to defaults without a trace.
- Timezone context injection failure now logs a warning to help debug
  incorrect scheduled times in agent-created tasks.
- PDF form-backed document detection failure now logs a warning so
  broken form-doc UI is traceable to the root cause.

* log(llm_core): add warnings to silent except Exception blocks

- Malformed URL in _is_ollama_native_url now logs a warning so bad
  endpoint configs are traceable instead of silently returning False.
- Model list fetch failure now logs a warning with the endpoint URL so
  endpoints that silently vanish from the model picker are diagnosable.

* log: pass exception via exc_info instead of string interpolation

* fix(logging): avoid logging raw URLs in llm_core error paths

Drop the raw url/base_chat_url from the Ollama-detection and
model-list-fetch warning logs added by this sweep, since these values
can contain private hostnames, internal IPs, credentials, or other
deployment details.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 17:49:27 +01:00
Kfir Sadeh fc3a5e555e feat(paths): abstract runtime path logic for frozen distribution packages (#969)
* feat(core): abstract runtime path logic for frozen distribution packages

* Address review feedback: revert browser MCP check, persistent data dir default when frozen, and add path tests
2026-06-15 17:44:10 +01:00
50 changed files with 1307 additions and 735 deletions
+6 -7
View File
@@ -331,8 +331,8 @@ if AUTH_ENABLED:
request.state.current_user = "internal-tool"
request.state.api_token = False
return await call_next(request)
except Exception:
pass
except Exception as _e:
logger.warning("Internal tool auth header check failed", exc_info=_e)
# Allow DIRECT localhost requests (internal service calls from
# heartbeats etc.). Tunnel/proxy-forwarded requests are excluded by
# _is_trusted_loopback so LOCALHOST_BYPASS can't be abused over a
@@ -385,11 +385,10 @@ if AUTH_ENABLED:
_db.close()
try:
await _asyncio.to_thread(_do)
except Exception:
pass
except Exception as _e:
logger.debug("Failed to update token last_used_at", exc_info=_e)
_asyncio.create_task(_touch_last_used(matched_id))
# Keep bearer-token callers out of normal cookie/user
# routes. API-aware routes can read api_token_owner.
request.state.current_user = "api"
request.state.api_token = True
request.state.api_token_id = matched_id
@@ -464,8 +463,8 @@ async def serve_generated_image(filename: str, request: Request):
_db.close()
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
pass
except Exception as _e:
logger.warning("Image ownership verification failed for %r", filename, exc_info=_e)
ext = filename.rsplit('.', 1)[-1].lower()
mime = {
"png": "image/png", "jpg": "image/jpeg", "jpeg": "image/jpeg",
+17 -3
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@ offers and pair to it, without duplicating any LLM logic.
Auth is enforced globally by AuthMiddleware (app.py), so reaching a handler here
means the caller is authenticated by either a cookie session or a Bearer `ody_`
API token. The read endpoints (ping/info/models) accept either; the pairing
endpoints are admin-cookie only.
API token. Ping/info accept either credential type, models requires a chat-
scoped API token for bearer callers, and the pairing endpoints are admin-cookie
only.
Pairing CSRF posture: minting happens ONLY on POST. The session cookie is
SameSite=Lax (routes/auth_routes.py), which a browser does not send on a
@@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ on a GET would be unsafe (Lax cookies ride top-level GET navigations), so GET
import html
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
from core.middleware import require_admin
@@ -52,6 +53,18 @@ def owner_can_see(row_owner, owner) -> bool:
return row_owner is None or row_owner == owner
def require_models_scope(request: Request) -> None:
"""Require the companion chat scope for bearer-token model inventory."""
if not getattr(request.state, "api_token", False):
return
scopes = getattr(request.state, "api_token_scopes", None) or []
if isinstance(scopes, str):
scopes = [scope.strip() for scope in scopes.split(",")]
scope_set = {str(scope).strip() for scope in scopes if str(scope).strip()}
if _pairing.COMPANION_SCOPE not in scope_set:
raise HTTPException(403, "API token requires chat scope")
def mint_pairing_token(owner: str, invalidate=None) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Mint a pairing token AND invalidate the auth middleware's in-memory token
cache, so the new token is accepted on the very next request without a server
@@ -103,6 +116,7 @@ def setup_companion_routes() -> APIRouter:
rows -- the same rule as owner_filter. Read-only; never returns api_key
material.
"""
require_models_scope(request)
import json as _json
from core.database import SessionLocal, ModelEndpoint
+22 -2
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,15 @@ import os
import logging
import sqlite3
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from sqlalchemy import event, create_engine, Column, String, Text, Boolean, DateTime, Integer, ForeignKey, JSON, Index, func, text
from sqlalchemy.engine import Engine
from sqlalchemy.types import TypeDecorator
from sqlalchemy.ext.declarative import declarative_base, declared_attr
from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship, sessionmaker, backref
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Create base class for declarative models
@@ -29,9 +32,26 @@ class TimestampMixin:
def updated_at(cls):
return Column(DateTime, default=utcnow_naive, onupdate=utcnow_naive, nullable=False)
# Get database URL from environment, default to SQLite in DATA_DIR
# Ensure the writable data directory exists before SQLite connects.
from src.constants import DATA_DIR, AUTH_FILE, MEMORY_FILE, USER_PREFS_FILE, SETTINGS_FILE
DATABASE_URL = os.getenv("DATABASE_URL", f"sqlite:///{DATA_DIR}/app.db")
Path(DATA_DIR).mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
def _default_database_url() -> str:
return f"sqlite:///{Path(DATA_DIR) / 'app.db'}"
def _normalize_sqlite_url(url: str) -> str:
if not url.startswith("sqlite:///"):
return url
db_path = url.replace("sqlite:///", "", 1)
if db_path == ":memory:" or os.path.isabs(db_path):
return url
return f"sqlite:///{(Path(get_app_root()) / db_path).resolve().as_posix()}"
# Get database URL from environment, default to SQLite in DATA_DIR
DATABASE_URL = _normalize_sqlite_url(os.getenv("DATABASE_URL", _default_database_url()))
# Create engine
engine = create_engine(
+90 -29
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Imports MemoryManager and MemoryVectorStore from the Odysseus codebase.
"""
import asyncio
import os
import sys
import time
from pathlib import Path
@@ -23,6 +24,55 @@ _memory_manager = None
_memory_vector = None
_initialized = False
_OWNER_ENV_KEYS = ("ODYSSEUS_MCP_MEMORY_OWNER", "ODYSSEUS_MEMORY_OWNER")
_OWNER_SCOPE_ERROR = (
"Error: Memory MCP owner is not configured for an owner-scoped memory store. "
"Set ODYSSEUS_MCP_MEMORY_OWNER for this server or use the owner-aware native memory tool."
)
def _configured_owner() -> str | None:
for key in _OWNER_ENV_KEYS:
owner = os.environ.get(key, "").strip()
if owner:
return owner
return None
def _entry_owner(entry: dict) -> str | None:
owner = entry.get("owner")
if owner is None:
return None
owner_text = str(owner).strip()
return owner_text or None
def _owner_scoped_store(entries: list[dict]) -> bool:
return any(_entry_owner(entry) for entry in entries if isinstance(entry, dict))
def _scope_entries() -> tuple[str | None, list[dict], list[dict], str | None]:
"""Return configured owner, all entries, visible entries, and optional error."""
entries = _memory_manager.load_all()
owner = _configured_owner()
if owner is None and _owner_scoped_store(entries):
return None, entries, [], _OWNER_SCOPE_ERROR
if owner is None:
visible = [
entry for entry in entries
if isinstance(entry, dict) and _entry_owner(entry) is None
]
else:
visible = [
entry for entry in entries
if isinstance(entry, dict) and _entry_owner(entry) == owner
]
return owner, entries, visible, None
def _text_result(text: str) -> list[TextContent]:
return [TextContent(type="text", text=text)]
def _ensure_init():
"""Lazy-init memory managers on first use."""
@@ -75,24 +125,26 @@ async def list_tools() -> list[Tool]:
@server.call_tool()
async def call_tool(name: str, arguments: dict) -> list[TextContent]:
if name != "manage_memory":
return [TextContent(type="text", text=f"Unknown tool: {name}")]
return _text_result(f"Unknown tool: {name}")
_ensure_init()
if not _memory_manager:
return [TextContent(type="text", text="Error: Memory manager not available")]
return _text_result("Error: Memory manager not available")
action = arguments.get("action", "")
if action == "list":
category_filter = arguments.get("category", "")
memories = _memory_manager.load()
_owner, _all_memories, memories, scope_error = _scope_entries()
if scope_error:
return _text_result(scope_error)
if category_filter:
memories = [m for m in memories if m.get("category", "").lower() == category_filter.lower()]
if not memories:
msg = "No memories found"
if category_filter:
msg += f" in category '{category_filter}'"
return [TextContent(type="text", text=msg + ".")]
return _text_result(msg + ".")
lines = [f"Found {len(memories)} memory entries:\n"]
for m in memories:
@@ -102,15 +154,17 @@ async def call_tool(name: str, arguments: dict) -> list[TextContent]:
if len(text) > 150:
text = text[:150] + "..."
lines.append(f"- [{cat}] `{mid}` — {text}")
return [TextContent(type="text", text="\n".join(lines))]
return _text_result("\n".join(lines))
elif action == "add":
text = arguments.get("text", "")
category = arguments.get("category", "fact")
if not text:
return [TextContent(type="text", text="Error: Memory text cannot be empty")]
entry = _memory_manager.add_entry(text, source="ai_agent", category=category)
memories = _memory_manager.load_all()
return _text_result("Error: Memory text cannot be empty")
owner, memories, _visible, scope_error = _scope_entries()
if scope_error:
return _text_result(scope_error)
entry = _memory_manager.add_entry(text, source="ai_agent", category=category, owner=owner)
memories.append(entry)
_memory_manager.save(memories)
if _memory_vector and _memory_vector.healthy:
@@ -118,25 +172,28 @@ async def call_tool(name: str, arguments: dict) -> list[TextContent]:
_memory_vector.add(entry["id"], text)
except Exception:
pass
return [TextContent(type="text", text=f"Memory added: [{category}] {text} (id: {entry['id'][:8]})")]
return _text_result(f"Memory added: [{category}] {text} (id: {entry['id'][:8]})")
elif action == "edit":
memory_id = arguments.get("memory_id", "")
new_text = arguments.get("text", "")
if not memory_id or not new_text:
return [TextContent(type="text", text="Error: edit needs memory_id and text")]
memories = _memory_manager.load_all()
found = False
return _text_result("Error: edit needs memory_id and text")
_owner, memories, visible, scope_error = _scope_entries()
if scope_error:
return _text_result(scope_error)
full_id = None
for m in memories:
for m in visible:
if m.get("id", "").startswith(memory_id):
m["text"] = new_text
m["timestamp"] = int(time.time())
found = True
full_id = m["id"]
break
if not found:
return [TextContent(type="text", text=f"Error: Memory '{memory_id}' not found")]
if not full_id:
return _text_result(f"Error: Memory '{memory_id}' not found")
for m in memories:
if m.get("id") == full_id:
m["text"] = new_text
m["timestamp"] = int(time.time())
break
_memory_manager.save(memories)
if _memory_vector and _memory_vector.healthy and full_id:
try:
@@ -144,24 +201,26 @@ async def call_tool(name: str, arguments: dict) -> list[TextContent]:
_memory_vector.add(full_id, new_text)
except Exception:
pass
return [TextContent(type="text", text=f"Memory updated: {new_text}")]
return _text_result(f"Memory updated: {new_text}")
elif action == "delete":
memory_id = arguments.get("memory_id", "")
if not memory_id:
return [TextContent(type="text", text="Error: delete needs memory_id")]
memories = _memory_manager.load_all()
return _text_result("Error: delete needs memory_id")
_owner, memories, visible, scope_error = _scope_entries()
if scope_error:
return _text_result(scope_error)
full_id = None
deleted_text = ""
deleted_category = ""
for m in memories:
for m in visible:
if m.get("id", "").startswith(memory_id):
full_id = m["id"]
deleted_text = m.get("text", "")
deleted_category = m.get("category", "")
break
if not full_id:
return [TextContent(type="text", text=f"Error: Memory '{memory_id}' not found")]
return _text_result(f"Error: Memory '{memory_id}' not found")
memories = [m for m in memories if m.get("id") != full_id]
_memory_manager.save(memories)
if _memory_vector and _memory_vector.healthy and full_id:
@@ -171,30 +230,32 @@ async def call_tool(name: str, arguments: dict) -> list[TextContent]:
pass
cat = f"[{deleted_category}] " if deleted_category else ""
snippet = deleted_text if len(deleted_text) <= 120 else deleted_text[:117] + "..."
return [TextContent(type="text", text=f"Memory deleted: {cat}{snippet} (id: {memory_id})")]
return _text_result(f"Memory deleted: {cat}{snippet} (id: {memory_id})")
elif action == "search":
query = arguments.get("text", "")
if not query:
return [TextContent(type="text", text="Error: search needs text (query)")]
memories = _memory_manager.load()
return _text_result("Error: search needs text (query)")
_owner, _all_memories, memories, scope_error = _scope_entries()
if scope_error:
return _text_result(scope_error)
if hasattr(_memory_manager, 'get_relevant_memories'):
results = _memory_manager.get_relevant_memories(query, memories, threshold=0.05, max_items=20)
else:
query_lower = query.lower()
results = [m for m in memories if query_lower in m.get("text", "").lower()][:20]
if not results:
return [TextContent(type="text", text=f"No memories found matching '{query}'.")]
return _text_result(f"No memories found matching '{query}'.")
lines = [f"Found {len(results)} matching memories:\n"]
for m in results:
cat = m.get("category", "fact")
mid = m.get("id", "?")[:8]
text = m.get("text", "")
lines.append(f"- [{cat}] `{mid}` — {text}")
return [TextContent(type="text", text="\n".join(lines))]
return _text_result("\n".join(lines))
else:
return [TextContent(type="text", text=f"Error: Unknown action '{action}'. Use: list, add, edit, delete, search")]
return _text_result(f"Error: Unknown action '{action}'. Use: list, add, edit, delete, search")
async def run():
+2
View File
@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ def setup_api_token_routes() -> APIRouter:
payload = await request.json()
except Exception:
payload = {}
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
payload = {}
with get_db_session() as db:
token = db.query(ApiToken).filter(ApiToken.id == token_id).first()
if not token:
+8 -8
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ from core.database import Session as DBSession, ModelEndpoint
from src.llm_core import normalize_model_id
from src.endpoint_resolver import normalize_base
from src.context_compactor import maybe_compact, trim_for_context
from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user
from src.auth_helpers import effective_user
from src.prompt_security import untrusted_context_message
from routes.prefs_routes import _load_for_user as load_prefs_for_user
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ def _enforce_chat_privileges(request, sess) -> None:
which means unrestricted allowed_models / zero cap -> no-op for them.
"""
try:
user = get_current_user(request)
user = effective_user(request)
except Exception:
user = None
if not user:
@@ -346,11 +346,11 @@ def add_user_message(sess, chat_handler, preprocessed: PreprocessedMessage, inco
def fire_message_event(request, webhook_manager, session_id: str, sess, message: str, compare_mode: bool = False):
"""Fire webhook and event_bus events for a new user message."""
if webhook_manager and not compare_mode:
asyncio.create_task(webhook_manager.fire("chat.message", {
webhook_manager.fire_and_forget("chat.message", {
"session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model, "message": message[:2000],
}))
})
from src.event_bus import fire_event
user = get_current_user(request)
user = effective_user(request)
fire_event("message_sent", user)
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ async def build_chat_context(
fire_message_event(request, webhook_manager, session_id, sess, message, compare_mode)
# Resolve user prefs
user = get_current_user(request)
user = effective_user(request)
uprefs = load_prefs_for_user(user)
# Memory enabled?
@@ -1120,10 +1120,10 @@ def run_post_response_tasks(
# Webhook
if webhook_manager and not compare_mode:
asyncio.create_task(webhook_manager.fire("chat.completed", {
webhook_manager.fire_and_forget("chat.completed", {
"session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model,
"user_message": message, "response": full_response[:2000],
}))
})
# Auto-name
if needs_auto_name(sess.name):
+13 -12
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ from src.endpoint_resolver import normalize_base as _normalize_base, build_chat_
from src.session_search import search_session_messages
from src.prompt_security import untrusted_context_message
from core.exceptions import SessionNotFoundError
from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user
from src.auth_helpers import effective_user, get_current_user
from routes.session_routes import _verify_session_owner
from routes.document_helpers import _owner_session_filter
from core.database import SessionLocal, get_session_mode, set_session_mode
@@ -126,7 +126,8 @@ def _clear_orphaned_session_endpoint(sess, owner: str | None = None) -> bool:
sess.model = ""
sess.headers = {}
return True
except Exception:
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to clear orphaned session endpoint", exc_info=e)
db.rollback()
return False
finally:
@@ -144,7 +145,8 @@ def _endpoint_cache_contains_model(endpoint, model: str) -> bool:
return True
try:
models = json.loads(raw) if isinstance(raw, str) else raw
except Exception:
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to parse cached models list, treating as containing model", exc_info=e)
return True
if not isinstance(models, list) or not models:
return True
@@ -236,7 +238,8 @@ def _recover_empty_session_model(sess, session_id: str, owner: str | None = None
is_chatgpt_subscription = False
try:
cached = json.loads(ep.cached_models) if isinstance(ep.cached_models, str) else (ep.cached_models or [])
except Exception:
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to parse cached_models for endpoint %r", getattr(ep, "id", "?"), exc_info=e)
cached = []
if not cached:
visible = []
@@ -360,7 +363,7 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
sess = session_manager.get_session(session)
except KeyError:
raise HTTPException(404, f"Session '{session}' not found")
owner = get_current_user(request)
owner = effective_user(request)
if _clear_orphaned_session_endpoint(sess, owner=owner):
raise HTTPException(400, "Selected model endpoint was removed. Pick another model in Settings.")
@@ -600,7 +603,7 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
# but BEFORE loading. Prevents cross-user session hijack.
_verify_session_owner(request, session)
sess = session_manager.get_session(session)
owner = get_current_user(request)
owner = effective_user(request)
if _clear_orphaned_session_endpoint(sess, owner=owner):
raise HTTPException(400, "Selected model endpoint was removed. Pick another model in Settings.")
# Issue #587: picker shows a model from the endpoint cache but
@@ -631,7 +634,7 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
_enforce_chat_privileges(request, sess)
# Ensure session has auth headers
resolve_session_auth(sess, session, owner=get_current_user(request))
resolve_session_auth(sess, session, owner=effective_user(request))
# Check for research_pending BEFORE mode persist overwrites it
do_research = str(use_research).lower() == "true"
@@ -646,8 +649,8 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
elif attachments:
try:
att_ids = [str(x) for x in json.loads(attachments)]
except Exception:
pass
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to parse attachments JSON, ignoring attachments", exc_info=e)
no_memory = str(form_data.get("no_memory", "")).lower() == "true"
pre_context_tool_policy = build_effective_tool_policy(
@@ -1297,8 +1300,6 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
"doc_stream_open", "doc_stream_delta",
"doc_update", "doc_suggestions", "ui_control",
"rounds_exhausted",
"loop_breaker_triggered",
"intent_nudge_exhausted",
"ask_user",
"plan_update",
):
@@ -1484,7 +1485,7 @@ def setup_chat_routes(
if not q or not q.strip():
return []
_user = get_current_user(request)
_user = effective_user(request)
return [
result.to_dict()
for result in search_session_messages(
+3 -1
View File
@@ -505,6 +505,8 @@ def _cached_model_scan_script(model_dirs: list[str] | None = None, add_hf_cache:
" if u.startswith('KB'): return int(n * 1024)",
" return int(n)",
"def scan_ollama():",
" if any(m.get('is_ollama') for m in models): return",
" if os.name == 'nt' and not os.environ.get('ODYSSEUS_ALLOW_OLLAMA_CLI_SCAN'): return",
" if not shutil.which('ollama'): return",
" try:",
" p = subprocess.run(['ollama', 'list'], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, text=True, timeout=6)",
@@ -535,8 +537,8 @@ def _cached_model_scan_script(model_dirs: list[str] | None = None, add_hf_cache:
" models.append({'repo_id':name,'size_bytes':size_bytes,'nb_files':1,'has_incomplete':False,'path':'ollama','backend':'ollama','is_ollama':True})",
" return",
"for _hf_cache in hf_cache_paths(): scan_hf(_hf_cache)",
"scan_ollama()",
"scan_ollama_api()",
"scan_ollama()",
]
for model_dir in model_dirs or []:
lines.append(f"scan_dir(os.path.expanduser({model_dir!r}))")
+4 -3
View File
@@ -503,7 +503,8 @@ def setup_document_routes(session_manager, upload_handler=None) -> APIRouter:
user = get_current_user(request)
try:
data = await request.json()
except Exception:
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to parse export request body, defaulting to empty", exc_info=e)
data = {}
ids = data.get("ids") or []
if not ids:
@@ -645,8 +646,8 @@ def setup_document_routes(session_manager, upload_handler=None) -> APIRouter:
try:
from src.agent_tools.document_tools import clear_active_document
clear_active_document(doc_id)
except Exception:
pass
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to clear active document %r on detach", doc_id, exc_info=e)
db.commit()
db.refresh(doc)
return _doc_to_dict(doc)
+4 -3
View File
@@ -79,15 +79,16 @@ def _email_tag_owner_aliases(account_id: str | None, owner: str = "") -> list[st
cfg.get("smtp_user") or "",
cfg.get("from_address") or "",
])
except Exception:
except Exception as _e:
logger.warning("Failed to resolve email account alias", exc_info=_e)
resolved_account_id = None
row = db.get(_EA, resolved_account_id) if resolved_account_id else None
if row:
aliases.extend([row.owner or "", row.imap_user or "", row.from_address or ""])
finally:
db.close()
except Exception:
pass
except Exception as _e:
logger.warning("Failed to load email aliases", exc_info=_e)
out = []
for a in aliases:
a = (a or "").strip()
+1
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Form, Depends
from core.constants import EMBEDDING_ENDPOINT_FILE, FASTEMBED_CACHE_DIR
from core.middleware import require_admin
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+3 -3
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ from core.session_manager import SessionManager
from core.models import ChatMessage
from src.request_models import SessionResponse
from core.database import Session as DbSession, SessionLocal, Document, GalleryImage, utcnow_naive
from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user, effective_user, _auth_disabled, owner_filter
from src.auth_helpers import effective_user, _auth_disabled, owner_filter
from src.session_actions import is_session_recently_active
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ def setup_session_routes(session_manager: SessionManager, config: dict, webhook_
endpoint_id: str = Form(""),
):
skip_val = str(skip_validation).lower() == "true"
user = get_current_user(request)
user = effective_user(request)
endpoint_api_key = ""
endpoint_base_url = ""
_reject_raw_endpoint_url_for_non_admin(request, user, endpoint_id, endpoint_url)
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ def setup_session_routes(session_manager: SessionManager, config: dict, webhook_
db.close()
# Switch model/endpoint mid-session
if model is not None and endpoint_url is not None:
user = get_current_user(request)
user = effective_user(request)
_reject_raw_endpoint_url_for_non_admin(request, user, endpoint_id, endpoint_url)
endpoint_api_key = ""
endpoint_base_url = ""
+5 -5
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from fastapi import APIRouter, Request, File, UploadFile, HTTPException
from typing import List
import logging
from core.middleware import require_admin
from src.auth_helpers import get_current_user
from src.auth_helpers import effective_user
from src.upload_handler import count_recent_uploads
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ def setup_upload_routes(upload_handler):
for u in files:
try:
meta = upload_handler.save_upload(u, client_ip, owner=get_current_user(request))
meta = upload_handler.save_upload(u, client_ip, owner=effective_user(request))
out.append({
"id": meta["id"],
"name": meta["name"],
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ def setup_upload_routes(upload_handler):
original_name = info.get("name", file_id)
auth_mgr = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_manager", None)
auth_configured = bool(auth_mgr and auth_mgr.is_configured)
current_user = get_current_user(request)
current_user = effective_user(request)
file_owner = info.get("owner") if info else None
if auth_configured:
if not current_user:
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ def setup_upload_routes(upload_handler):
info = _load_upload_info(file_id)
auth_mgr = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_manager", None)
auth_configured = bool(auth_mgr and auth_mgr.is_configured)
current_user = get_current_user(request)
current_user = effective_user(request)
file_owner = info.get("owner") if info else None
if auth_configured:
if not current_user:
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ def setup_upload_routes(upload_handler):
raise HTTPException(404, "File not found")
auth_mgr = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_manager", None)
auth_configured = bool(auth_mgr and auth_mgr.is_configured)
current_user = get_current_user(request)
current_user = effective_user(request)
file_owner = info.get("owner")
if auth_configured:
if not current_user:
+2 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
"""Webhook, API Token, and sync chat routes."""
import asyncio
import uuid
import logging
from typing import Optional
@@ -385,10 +384,10 @@ def setup_webhook_routes(
sess.add_message(ChatMessage("assistant", reply))
session_manager.save_sessions()
asyncio.create_task(webhook_manager.fire("chat.completed", {
webhook_manager.fire_and_forget("chat.completed", {
"session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model,
"user_message": message[:2000], "response": reply[:2000],
}))
})
return {"response": reply, "session_id": session_id, "model": sess.model}
+4
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@ GPU_BANDWIDTH = {
"6950 xt": 576, "6900 xt": 512, "6800 xt": 512, "6800": 512, "6700 xt": 384, "6600 xt": 256, "6600": 224,
"mi300x": 5300, "mi300": 5300, "mi250x": 3277, "mi250": 3277, "mi210": 1638, "mi100": 1229,
"9070 xt": 624, "9070": 488, "9060 xt": 322, "9060": 322,
# NVIDIA GB10 Grace-Blackwell superchip (DGX Spark). Unified LPDDR5X memory,
# not Apple Silicon, so it lives in the generic GPU table — the Apple-only
# lookup never matches it (its name carries no "apple").
"gb10": 273,
}
# Pre-sort keys by length descending for correct substring matching
+163 -14
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse
import httpx
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
from src.constants import WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT
from .analytics import RateLimitError, error_logger
from .cache import (
CONTENT_CACHE_DIR,
@@ -89,18 +91,128 @@ def _public_http_url(url: str) -> bool:
return False
def _get_public_url(url: str, headers: dict, timeout: int, max_redirects: int = 5) -> httpx.Response:
class BodyTooLargeError(Exception):
"""The server declared a body larger than the hard fetch ceiling."""
def __init__(self, url: str, declared_bytes: int):
self.url = url
self.declared_bytes = declared_bytes
super().__init__(
f"response body is {declared_bytes:,} bytes, over the "
f"{WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:,}-byte hard cap"
)
class _CappedFetch:
"""Result of a size-capped streaming GET.
Carries just what fetch_webpage_content needs from an httpx.Response,
plus the cap bookkeeping: the (possibly truncated) body, whether the
cap cut it short, and the size the server declared via Content-Length
(wire bytes; None when absent).
"""
__slots__ = ("status_code", "headers", "content", "truncated",
"declared_bytes", "encoding", "url")
def __init__(self, status_code, headers, content, truncated,
declared_bytes, encoding, url):
self.status_code = status_code
self.headers = headers
self.content = content
self.truncated = truncated
self.declared_bytes = declared_bytes
self.encoding = encoding
self.url = url
@property
def text(self) -> str:
return self.content.decode(self.encoding or "utf-8", errors="replace")
def raise_for_status(self):
if self.status_code >= 400:
request = httpx.Request("GET", self.url)
raise httpx.HTTPStatusError(
f"HTTP {self.status_code} for {self.url}",
request=request,
response=httpx.Response(self.status_code, request=request),
)
def _get_public_url(url: str, headers: dict, timeout: int, max_redirects: int = 5,
max_bytes: int = None) -> "_CappedFetch":
"""Capped streaming GET with SSRF-guarded manual redirects.
The body is streamed and buffering stops at ``max_bytes`` (default: the
soft cap), so an oversized resource cannot be pulled into memory or the
content cache in full. When Content-Length already declares a body over
the hard ceiling, the fetch is refused before any body bytes are read.
"""
cap = min(max_bytes or WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES)
current = url
for _ in range(max_redirects + 1):
if not _public_http_url(current):
raise httpx.RequestError("Blocked private/internal URL", request=httpx.Request("GET", current))
response = httpx.get(current, headers=headers, timeout=timeout, follow_redirects=False)
if response.status_code not in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
return response
location = response.headers.get("location")
if not location:
return response
current = urljoin(str(response.url), location)
# Force identity transfer-encoding. With gzip/deflate the wire bytes
# (and Content-Length) can be a small fraction of the decoded body, so
# a tiny compressed response could pass the hard-cap preflight and then
# expand past the ceiling in a single decoded chunk before the streamed
# cap below can slice it. Identity makes Content-Length the true body
# size and keeps each streamed chunk bounded by the network read.
req_headers = dict(headers or {})
req_headers["Accept-Encoding"] = "identity"
with httpx.stream("GET", current, headers=req_headers, timeout=timeout,
follow_redirects=False) as response:
if response.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
location = response.headers.get("location")
if not location:
return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers, b"",
False, None, response.encoding, str(response.url))
current = urljoin(str(response.url), location)
continue
# A server can ignore the identity request and still return a
# compressed body; httpx.iter_bytes would then decode it, and a tiny
# gzip can balloon into one decoded chunk far past the cap before we
# slice. Refuse a compressed Content-Encoding so the streamed cap
# stays a real memory bound (Content-Length is the compressed wire
# length here, so the preflight and size metadata are unreliable too).
enc = (response.headers.get("content-encoding") or "").strip().lower()
if enc and enc != "identity":
raise httpx.RequestError(
f"Refusing compressed response (Content-Encoding: {enc}) after "
"requesting identity: cannot bound decoded body size",
request=httpx.Request("GET", current),
)
declared = None
raw_len = response.headers.get("content-length")
if raw_len and raw_len.isdigit():
declared = int(raw_len)
# Refuse before buffering anything when the server already tells
# us the body exceeds the absolute ceiling (Content-Length is wire
# bytes; the decompressed body can only be larger).
if declared is not None and declared > WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:
raise BodyTooLargeError(current, declared)
chunks = []
read = 0
truncated = False
# We requested identity above, so iter_bytes yields the raw body in
# network-read-sized chunks (no decompression expansion); the cap
# therefore bounds what we actually buffer.
for chunk in response.iter_bytes():
read += len(chunk)
if read > cap:
keep = cap - (read - len(chunk))
if keep > 0:
chunks.append(chunk[:keep])
truncated = True
break
chunks.append(chunk)
return _CappedFetch(response.status_code, response.headers,
b"".join(chunks), truncated, declared,
response.encoding, str(response.url))
raise httpx.RequestError("Too many redirects", request=httpx.Request("GET", current))
# PDF extraction (optional dependency)
@@ -222,9 +334,19 @@ def _empty_result(url: str, error: str = "") -> dict:
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Main content fetcher
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0) -> dict:
"""Fetch and extract meaningful content from a webpage with caching."""
cache_key = generate_cache_key(url)
def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0,
max_bytes: int = None) -> dict:
"""Fetch and extract meaningful content from a webpage with caching.
``max_bytes`` raises the download budget per call (clamped to the hard
cap); the default is the soft cap. When the body is cut short the result
carries ``truncated``/``fetched_bytes``/``total_bytes`` so callers can
tell the model the content is partial (#3812).
"""
effective_cap = min(max_bytes or WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES)
# The cap is part of the cache identity: a truncated soft-cap fetch must
# not be served to a later full-budget request for the same URL.
cache_key = generate_cache_key(f"{url}#cap={effective_cap}")
cache_file = CONTENT_CACHE_DIR / f"{cache_key}.cache"
# Check cache
@@ -247,18 +369,24 @@ def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0) ->
# Fetch
try:
headers = {
"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.124 Safari/537.36",
"User-Agent": WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT,
"Accept": "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8",
"Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.5",
"Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate",
# identity so the streamed size cap in _get_public_url stays honest
# (a compressed body can decode to far more than Content-Length).
"Accept-Encoding": "identity",
"Connection": "keep-alive",
}
response = _get_public_url(url, headers=headers, timeout=timeout)
response = _get_public_url(url, headers=headers, timeout=timeout,
max_bytes=effective_cap)
if response.status_code == 429:
raise RateLimitError(f"Rate limit hit for {url} (attempt {retry_attempt})")
response.raise_for_status()
except BodyTooLargeError as e:
error_logger.warning(f"Refused oversized body for {url}: {e}")
return _empty_result(url, f"TooLarge: {e}")
except httpx.HTTPStatusError as e:
error_logger.warning(f"HTTP {e.response.status_code} fetching {url}: {e}")
return _empty_result(url, f"HTTP {e.response.status_code}: {e}")
@@ -269,9 +397,27 @@ def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0) ->
error_logger.error(str(e))
return _empty_result(url, str(e))
# Size bookkeeping shared by every content branch below. getattr keeps
# plain httpx.Response stand-ins (tests) working without the cap fields.
_size_fields = {
"truncated": getattr(response, "truncated", False),
"fetched_bytes": len(response.content),
"total_bytes": getattr(response, "declared_bytes", None),
}
# PDF handling
content_type = response.headers.get("Content-Type", "").lower()
if "application/pdf" in content_type or url.lower().endswith(".pdf"):
if _size_fields["truncated"]:
# A PDF cut mid-stream is not parseable; unlike text there is no
# useful partial result, so report the budget problem instead.
_declared = _size_fields["total_bytes"]
return _empty_result(
url,
f"TooLarge: PDF exceeds the {effective_cap:,}-byte fetch budget"
+ (f" (size {_declared:,} bytes)" if _declared else "")
+ "; retry with a larger budget if it fits under the hard cap",
)
if pdf_extract_text is None:
logger.error("pdfminer.six is not installed; cannot extract PDF text.")
pdf_text = ""
@@ -295,6 +441,7 @@ def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0) ->
"js_message": "",
"success": bool(pdf_text),
"error": "" if pdf_text else "Failed to extract PDF text",
**_size_fields,
}
_cache_result(cache_file, cache_key, result, url)
return result
@@ -329,6 +476,7 @@ def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0) ->
"js_message": "",
"success": bool(text_body),
"error": "" if text_body else "Empty response body",
**_size_fields,
}
_cache_result(cache_file, cache_key, result, url)
return result
@@ -391,6 +539,7 @@ def fetch_webpage_content(url: str, timeout: int = 5, retry_attempt: int = 0) ->
"js_message": js_message,
"success": True,
"error": "",
**_size_fields,
}
_cache_result(cache_file, cache_key, result, url)
return result
+4 -6
View File
@@ -9,14 +9,12 @@ from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse, parse_qs
import httpx
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
from src.constants import SEARXNG_INSTANCE
from src.constants import SEARXNG_INSTANCE, REQUEST_TIMEOUT, WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT
from .analytics import RateLimitError, error_logger
from .query import build_enhanced_query
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
REQUEST_TIMEOUT = 20
# Provider registry — maps setting value to (label, needs_key, needs_url)
PROVIDER_INFO = {
"searxng": ("SearXNG", False, True),
@@ -140,7 +138,7 @@ def searxng_search_api(query: str, count: Optional[int] = None, categories: str
count = count if count is not None else _get_result_count()
instance = _get_search_instance()
api_key = ""
headers = {"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0"}
headers = {"User-Agent": WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT}
if api_key:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {api_key}"
# News/fresh queries do badly in the 'general' category — it favours
@@ -252,7 +250,7 @@ def searxng_search(query, max_results=10):
"""Search using SearXNG instance - parsing HTML."""
instance = _get_search_instance()
api_key = ""
req_headers = {"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0"}
req_headers = {"User-Agent": WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT}
if api_key:
req_headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {api_key}"
try:
@@ -391,7 +389,7 @@ def duckduckgo_search(query: str, count: Optional[int] = None, time_filter: Opti
response = httpx.get(
"https://html.duckduckgo.com/html/",
params={"q": query, "kp": _safesearch_for("duckduckgo_html")},
headers={"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0"},
headers={"User-Agent": WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT},
timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT,
)
response.raise_for_status()
+19 -228
View File
@@ -38,167 +38,6 @@ from src.agent_tools import (
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Redaction patterns for common secret-bearing shapes. Explicit and tested
# (see tests/test_loop_guard_signals.py) rather than one clever broad regex —
# safety first, but we try not to mangle harmless prose. Applied in order.
_REDACTED = "[redacted]"
# Cookie: ... / Set-Cookie: ... — redact the rest of the line (cookies hold spaces).
_SENSITIVE_COOKIE_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)\b((?:set-)?cookie\s*[:=]\s*)[^\r\n]+"
)
# URL credentials, e.g. postgres://user:pass@host/db. The password half allows
# inner colons (postgres://user:pa:ss@host/db) but still stops at / and @.
_SENSITIVE_URL_CRED_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)\b([a-z][a-z0-9+.\-]*://)[^\s:/@]+:[^\s/@]+@"
)
# Prefix-only discovery regexes. Each matches the key and its separator (the part
# we KEEP); the value that follows is found by a linear scanner rather than by a
# regex, so there is no backtracking-prone quantifier over uncontrolled input.
#
# Authorization: Bearer <tok> / Authorization: Basic "two word secret"
_AUTH_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)authorization\s*[:=]\s*(?:bearer|basic)\s+"
)
# Provider-prefixed env names, e.g. OPENAI_API_KEY=..., AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=...,
# GITHUB_TOKEN=... — require a sensitive suffix preceded by `_` so benign names
# that merely end in KEY (MONKEY, TURKEY) are left alone.
_ENV_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(
r"(?:export\s+)?\b[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*"
r"_(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|PWD|CREDENTIALS?)\s*=\s*"
)
# Generic sensitive key, e.g. password=..., api_key: ..., client_secret=...
_KEY_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)\b(?:password|passwd|pwd|token|api[_-]?key|client_secret|secret)\b\s*[:=]\s*"
)
# Obvious provider-shaped bare tokens (no surrounding key needed).
_SENSITIVE_BARE_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(
r"\b("
r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}" # OpenAI / Anthropic style
r"|gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}" # GitHub PAT
r"|xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9\-]{10,}" # Slack
r"|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}" # AWS access key id
r"|hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}" # Hugging Face token
r"|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_\-]{20,}" # Google API key
r")\b"
)
def _consume_secret_value_end(text: str, start: int) -> int:
"""Return the exclusive end index of the secret value beginning at ``start``.
If the value is quoted, scan to the matching unescaped quote (backslash
escapes are skipped two chars at a time). Otherwise scan to the first
whitespace, comma, or semicolon. The scan is linear in the length of the
input, so it cannot exhibit catastrophic backtracking.
"""
n = len(text)
if start >= n:
return start
quote = text[start]
if quote in ("'", '"'):
i = start + 1
while i < n:
ch = text[i]
if ch == "\\":
i += 2
continue
if ch == quote:
return i + 1
i += 1
return n # unterminated quote: redact to the end
i = start
while i < n and not text[i].isspace() and text[i] not in (",", ";"):
i += 1
return i
def _redact_after_prefix(text: str, prefix_re: "re.Pattern") -> str:
"""Redact the value following each ``prefix_re`` match using a linear scan."""
result = []
pos = 0
n = len(text)
while pos < n:
match = prefix_re.search(text, pos)
if match is None:
result.append(text[pos:])
break
result.append(text[pos:match.end()])
value_end = _consume_secret_value_end(text, match.end())
if value_end > match.end():
result.append(_REDACTED)
pos = value_end
else:
# Empty value: nothing to redact; step past the prefix and continue.
pos = match.end()
if pos < n:
result.append(text[pos])
pos += 1
return "".join(result)
def _redact_private_keys(text: str) -> str:
"""Replace PEM private-key blocks with a placeholder via linear scanning.
Finds ``-----BEGIN `` markers, verifies the header names a PRIVATE KEY,
locates the matching ``-----END `` marker, and collapses the whole block.
No regex is used, so the (multi-line, uncontrolled) body cannot trigger
polynomial matching.
"""
begin_marker = "-----BEGIN "
end_marker = "-----END "
dash = "-----"
max_header = 64 # generous bound on "[TYPE ]PRIVATE KEY"
result = []
pos = 0
while True:
begin = text.find(begin_marker, pos)
if begin == -1:
result.append(text[pos:])
return "".join(result)
header_start = begin + len(begin_marker)
header_close = text.find(dash, header_start)
if (
header_close == -1
or header_close - header_start > max_header
or not text[header_start:header_close].endswith("PRIVATE KEY")
):
result.append(text[pos:header_start])
pos = header_start
continue
end = text.find(end_marker, header_close)
if end == -1:
result.append(text[pos:])
return "".join(result)
end_header_start = end + len(end_marker)
end_close = text.find(dash, end_header_start)
if (
end_close == -1
or end_close - end_header_start > max_header
or not text[end_header_start:end_close].endswith("PRIVATE KEY")
):
result.append(text[pos:header_start])
pos = header_start
continue
result.append(text[pos:begin])
result.append("[redacted private key]")
pos = end_close + len(dash)
def _redact_sensitive_text(value: object) -> str:
"""Redact obvious credential values before surfacing tool output."""
if value is None:
return ""
text = str(value)
text = _redact_private_keys(text)
text = _redact_after_prefix(text, _AUTH_PREFIX_RE)
text = _SENSITIVE_COOKIE_RE.sub(r"\1" + _REDACTED, text)
text = _SENSITIVE_URL_CRED_RE.sub(r"\1" + _REDACTED + "@", text)
text = _redact_after_prefix(text, _ENV_PREFIX_RE)
text = _redact_after_prefix(text, _KEY_PREFIX_RE)
return _SENSITIVE_BARE_TOKEN_RE.sub(_REDACTED, text)
def _load_mcp_disabled_map() -> Dict[str, set]:
"""Load per-server disabled tool sets from the database."""
@@ -685,7 +524,7 @@ def get_builtin_overrides() -> dict:
ov = get_setting("builtin_tool_overrides", {})
return ov if isinstance(ov, dict) else {}
except Exception as e:
logger.warning('Failed to load builtin tool overrides: %s', e)
logger.warning("Failed to load builtin tool overrides, using defaults", exc_info=e)
return {}
@@ -1090,8 +929,8 @@ def _build_system_prompt(
try:
from src.user_time import current_datetime_context_message
_datetime_message = current_datetime_context_message()
except Exception:
pass
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to build datetime context message", exc_info=e)
# Document context is kept as a SEPARATE message (not merged into the tool
# prompt) so the context trimmer doesn't destroy it when truncating the
@@ -1134,8 +973,8 @@ def _build_system_prompt(
try:
from src.pdf_form_doc import find_source_upload_id
_is_form_backed = bool(find_source_upload_id(active_document.current_content or ""))
except Exception:
pass
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to detect if document is form-backed, assuming plain", exc_info=e)
if _is_form_backed:
doc_ctx = (
@@ -2376,7 +2215,6 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
# signatures + consecutive no-text tool rounds to bail early.
_recent_call_sigs = collections.deque(maxlen=6)
_stuck_rounds = 0
_MAX_STUCK_ROUNDS = 4 # consecutive no-progress rounds before loop-breaker bails
# Frequency of each exact call signature (tool + args), for the runaway
# backstop. Counting identical repeats — not distinct same-tool calls —
# lets a legit batch (e.g. 18 calendar events at once) through.
@@ -2799,22 +2637,17 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
# promise: short response (<400 chars), no fenced code/answer,
# and an action-intent phrase was matched. Long answers that
# happen to contain "let me know" are not stalls.
_promise_shape = (
_looks_like_promise = (
not guide_only
and _intent_match is not None
and len(_intent_text) < 400
and "```" not in _intent_text
and _intent_nudge_count < _MAX_INTENT_NUDGES
)
_looks_like_promise = _promise_shape and _intent_nudge_count < _MAX_INTENT_NUDGES
if _looks_like_promise:
_intent_nudge_count += 1
_matched_phrase = _intent_match.group(0).strip()
# Don't log the matched phrase — it's raw model text that may
# carry credentials. Structural metadata only.
logger.info(
"[agent] intent-without-action nudge #%d on round %d",
_intent_nudge_count, round_num,
)
logger.info(f"[agent] intent-without-action nudge #{_intent_nudge_count} on round {round_num}: {_matched_phrase!r}")
messages.append({
"role": "system",
"content": (
@@ -2830,24 +2663,6 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
# Visible signal in the stream so the user knows we caught it.
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "agent_step", "round": round_num + 1})}\n\n'
continue
# The model keeps announcing actions it never takes and we've spent
# every nudge — surface why the turn is ending instead of letting it
# look like a clean completion.
if _promise_shape and _intent_nudge_count >= _MAX_INTENT_NUDGES:
_matched_phrase = _intent_match.group(0).strip()
_matched_phrase_safe = _redact_sensitive_text(_matched_phrase)
_in_message = (
f"Intent-nudge cap reached on round {round_num}: the model "
f"announced an action ({_matched_phrase_safe!r}) without a tool call "
f"after {_intent_nudge_count} nudge(s); ending the turn."
)
# Do not log the matched phrase, even redacted. It is raw model
# text and may contain credentials; keep logs structural only.
logger.warning(
"[agent] intent-nudge cap exhausted on round %d (%d/%d)",
round_num, _intent_nudge_count, _MAX_INTENT_NUDGES,
)
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "intent_nudge_exhausted", "round": round_num, "nudges": _intent_nudge_count, "max_nudges": _MAX_INTENT_NUDGES, "message": _in_message})}\n\n'
break # no tools — done
# ── Loop-breaker (Terminus-style stall detector) ──────────────
@@ -2880,23 +2695,10 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
# Distinct calls to one tool (a real batch) are legitimate work, so we
# count identical call signatures, not raw per-tool-type totals.
_runaway = _detect_runaway_call(_call_freq)
if _stuck_rounds >= _MAX_STUCK_ROUNDS or _runaway:
if _stuck_rounds >= 4 or _runaway:
reason = (f"calling {_runaway} with identical arguments over and over" if _runaway
else "repeating the same tool calls without new progress")
_lb_message = (
f"Loop-breaker stopped the agent on round {round_num}: {reason}. "
"Forced one tool-free round to converge on an answer or state what's blocked."
)
# Log structural metadata only — `_sig` is raw tool-call content
# that may carry credentials.
logger.warning(
"[agent] loop-breaker tripped on round %d (%s); "
"stuck_rounds=%d/%d runaway=%r",
round_num, reason, _stuck_rounds, _MAX_STUCK_ROUNDS, _runaway,
)
# Surface the stop cause to the stream so the user (and journalctl)
# can tell a guard fired, not a clean completion.
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "loop_breaker_triggered", "round": round_num, "reason": reason, "stuck_rounds": _stuck_rounds, "max_stuck_rounds": _MAX_STUCK_ROUNDS, "runaway": _runaway, "message": _lb_message})}\n\n'
logger.warning(f"[agent] loop-breaker tripped on round {round_num} ({reason}); sig={_sig[:80]!r}")
# The model has been executing tools, so its results are already
# in context. Force ONE tool-free round to converge: write the
# answer from what it has, or state plainly what's blocking it.
@@ -2975,10 +2777,6 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
cmd_display = block.content.split("\n")[0].strip()[:80]
else:
cmd_display = block.content.strip()
# The display string is streamed (tool_start/tool_output) and persisted;
# redact any secrets in it. block.content itself is left untouched so
# tool execution still sees the real command.
cmd_display = _redact_sensitive_text(cmd_display)
if tool_policy and tool_policy.blocks(block.tool_type):
desc = f"{block.tool_type}: BLOCKED"
@@ -3024,15 +2822,8 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
evt = await _progress_q.get()
if evt is None:
break
# Redact secrets in the live tail before streaming — the
# final tool_output is redacted, so the progress tail must
# be too, or a secret could flash by mid-run. Copy so we
# don't mutate the tool's own event payload.
_evt = dict(evt)
if isinstance(_evt.get("tail"), str):
_evt["tail"] = _redact_sensitive_text(_evt["tail"])
yield (
f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "tool_progress", "tool": block.tool_type, "round": round_num, **_evt})}\n\n'
f'data: {json.dumps({"type": "tool_progress", "tool": block.tool_type, "round": round_num, **evt})}\n\n'
)
desc, result = await _tool_task
@@ -3098,7 +2889,7 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
result["results"] = _clean
elif "stdout" in result:
result["stdout"] = _clean
except Exception:
except (json.JSONDecodeError, Exception):
pass
# Emit doc-specific event for document tools — the frontend
@@ -3167,29 +2958,29 @@ async def stream_agent_loop(
# empty) stdout/stderr; fall back to the error so the "timed
# out" reason reaches the UI instead of a blank result.
raw = result["stdout"] or result["stderr"] or result.get("error", "")
output_text = _truncate(_redact_sensitive_text(raw))
output_text = _truncate(raw)
elif "output" in result:
# bash / python canonical result: {"output": ..., "exit_code": ...}
raw = result["output"] or ""
output_text = _truncate(_redact_sensitive_text(raw))
output_text = _truncate(raw)
elif "response" in result:
# AI interaction tools (chat_with_model, send_to_session)
label = result.get("model", result.get("session_name", "AI"))
output_text = _truncate(_redact_sensitive_text(f"{label}: {result['response']}"))
output_text = _truncate(f"{label}: {result['response']}")
elif "content" in result:
output_text = _truncate(_redact_sensitive_text(result["content"]))
output_text = _truncate(result["content"])
elif "results" in result:
output_text = _truncate(_redact_sensitive_text(result["results"]))
output_text = _truncate(result["results"])
elif "session_id" in result and "name" in result:
output_text = f"Session created: {result['name']} (id: {result['session_id']})"
elif "success" in result:
output_text = (
f"Written: {result.get('path', '')}"
if result["success"]
else f"Error: {_redact_sensitive_text(result.get('error', ''))}"
else f"Error: {result.get('error', '')}"
)
elif "error" in result:
output_text = _truncate(_redact_sensitive_text(result["error"]))
output_text = _truncate(result["error"])
# Emit tool_output (include ui_event data if present)
tool_output_data = {"type": "tool_output", "tool": block.tool_type, "command": cmd_display, "output": output_text, "exit_code": result.get("exit_code")}
+32 -2
View File
@@ -57,13 +57,23 @@ class WebSearchTool:
class WebFetchTool:
async def execute(self, content: str, ctx: dict) -> dict:
from src.search.content import fetch_webpage_content
from src.constants import WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES
raw = content.strip()
url = ""
max_bytes = None
if raw.startswith("{"):
try:
parsed = json.loads(raw)
if isinstance(parsed, dict):
url = str(parsed.get("url") or "").strip()
# Download-budget override (#3812): "full": true raises the
# budget to the hard cap; an explicit max_bytes is clamped
# to the hard cap downstream. Default stays the soft cap.
if parsed.get("full") is True:
max_bytes = WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES
mb = parsed.get("max_bytes")
if isinstance(mb, int) and mb > 0:
max_bytes = mb
except json.JSONDecodeError:
url = ""
if not url:
@@ -78,7 +88,7 @@ class WebFetchTool:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
try:
result = await asyncio.wait_for(
loop.run_in_executor(None, lambda: fetch_webpage_content(url, timeout=10)),
loop.run_in_executor(None, lambda: fetch_webpage_content(url, timeout=10, max_bytes=max_bytes)),
timeout=30,
)
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
@@ -94,8 +104,28 @@ class WebFetchTool:
return {"error": f"web_fetch: {url}: {err}", "exit_code": 1}
return {"error": f"web_fetch: {url}: no readable text content (not HTML, or the page needs JS/login)", "exit_code": 1}
# Tell the model when the download budget cut the body short and how
# to get the rest, instead of silently presenting a partial page as
# the whole thing.
size_note = ""
if result.get("truncated"):
fetched = result.get("fetched_bytes") or 0
total = result.get("total_bytes")
total_txt = f" of {total:,} bytes" if total else ""
size_note = (
f"[partial content: download stopped at {fetched:,} bytes{total_txt}. "
f'Re-call with {{"url": "{url}", "full": true}} to fetch up to '
f"{WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES:,} bytes.]\n\n"
)
# The notice must lead the output so the MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS trim below can
# never drop it. The title is untrusted, uncapped page content, so a
# giant title ahead of the notice could push it out of range; keep the
# notice first and cap the title as a second guard.
if len(title) > 300:
title = title[:300] + "..."
header = (f"# {title}\n" if title else "") + f"Source: {url}\n\n"
output = header + text
output = size_note + header + text
if len(output) > MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS:
output = output[:MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS] + "\n\n[...truncated]"
return {"output": output, "exit_code": 0}
+3 -2
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import subprocess
import sys
from core.platform_compat import IS_WINDOWS, which_tool
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ _BUILTIN_NPX_SERVERS = {
"name": "Built-in: Browser",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@playwright/mcp@latest", "--headless", "--caps", "vision"],
},
}
}
# Global flag to disable MCP if there are compatibility issues
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ async def register_builtin_servers(mcp_manager):
logger.info("Built-in MCP servers disabled via ODYSSEUS_DISABLE_MCP")
return
base_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
base_dir = get_app_root()
python = sys.executable
async def _connect_python_server(server_id: str, script_path: str, name: str):
+3 -2
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
from pydantic import Field, field_validator
from src.constants import DATA_DIR as _DATA_DIR_CONST
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
# Cross-platform OS flag, exposed here so callers can `from src.config import
# IS_WINDOWS`. Defined locally (a trivial `os.name == "nt"`) rather than imported
@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ IS_WINDOWS = os.name == "nt"
class DataConfig(BaseSettings):
"""Configuration for data storage and file handling."""
# Base directory
base_dir: Path = Field(default=Path(__file__).parent.parent, description="Base directory for the application")
base_dir: Path = Field(default=Path(get_app_root()), description="Base directory for the application")
# Data paths
data_dir: Path = Field(default=Path(_DATA_DIR_CONST), description="Main data directory")
@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ class AppConfig(BaseSettings):
if isinstance(v, dict) and "base_dir" in v:
base_dir = v["base_dir"]
else:
base_dir = Path(__file__).parent.parent
base_dir = Path(get_app_root())
# Convert string paths to Path objects relative to base_dir
data_dir = Path(_DATA_DIR_CONST)
+26 -3
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,14 @@
"""Application-wide constants and configuration values."""
import os
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root, get_default_data_dir
APP_VERSION = "1.0.0"
# Base paths
BASE_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))) + "/"
BASE_DIR = os.path.join(get_app_root(), "")
STATIC_DIR = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, "static")
DATA_DIR = os.getenv("ODYSSEUS_DATA_DIR", os.path.join(BASE_DIR, "data"))
DATA_DIR = os.getenv("ODYSSEUS_DATA_DIR", get_default_data_dir())
# Data file paths
# Single source of truth: every persisted file/dir lives under DATA_DIR, which
@@ -55,7 +57,13 @@ MEMORY_VECTORS_DIR = os.path.join(DATA_DIR, "memory_vectors")
# Paths with an intentional dedicated env override, defaulting under DATA_DIR.
MAIL_ATTACHMENTS_DIR = os.getenv("ODYSSEUS_MAIL_ATTACHMENTS_DIR", os.path.join(DATA_DIR, "mail-attachments"))
FASTEMBED_CACHE_DIR = os.getenv("FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH", os.path.join(DATA_DIR, "fastembed_cache"))
# `or` (not os.getenv's default arg) so a PRESENT-but-EMPTY value falls back to
# the default. docker-compose.yml injects `FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH=${FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH:-}`,
# which sets the var to "" when the host hasn't defined it. os.getenv(name, default)
# only returns the default when the var is ABSENT, so the empty string would win →
# os.makedirs("") raises [Errno 2] No such file or directory: '' → FastEmbed fails to
# init and all vector features (RAG, semantic memory, tool index) silently degrade.
FASTEMBED_CACHE_DIR = os.getenv("FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH") or os.path.join(DATA_DIR, "fastembed_cache")
# Agent tool output limits (single source of truth — imported by tool_execution.py,
# tool_implementations.py, agent_tools.py, and any other module that needs them)
@@ -63,11 +71,26 @@ MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS = 10_000 # cap for bash/python/web_search/web_fetch outpu
MAX_READ_CHARS = 20_000 # cap for read_file / document preview
MAX_DIFF_LINES = 400 # cap for edit_file unified-diff display
# web_fetch response-size policy (#3812). MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS above only trims
# what the agent SEES; these caps bound what the server downloads, parses,
# and writes to the content cache. The soft cap is the default download
# budget; the agent can raise it per call (full/max_bytes) but never past
# the hard cap, so a model can't decide to pull a multi-GB file.
WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES = 2_000_000 # default download budget (2 MB)
WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES = 20_000_000 # absolute ceiling, even with override (20 MB)
# API Configuration
MAX_CONTEXT_MESSAGES = 90
REQUEST_TIMEOUT = 20
OPENAI_COMPAT_PATH = "/v1/chat/completions"
# Outbound UA for web_fetch / web_search scraping; common desktop UA so pages serve normal HTML.
WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT = os.environ.get(
"WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT",
"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 "
"(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/148.0.0.0 Safari/537.36",
)
# Environment variables with defaults
DEFAULT_HOST = os.getenv("LLM_HOST", "localhost")
LLM_HOSTS = [h.strip() for h in os.getenv("LLM_HOSTS", "").split(",") if h.strip()]
+2
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@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ import numpy as np
import httpx
from typing import List, Optional
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_DEFAULT_MODEL = "all-minilm:l6-v2"
+4 -3
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@@ -283,7 +283,8 @@ def _is_ollama_native_url(url: str) -> bool:
"""Return True for native Ollama API URLs, including Ollama Cloud."""
try:
parsed = urlparse(url or "")
except Exception:
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to parse URL for Ollama detection", exc_info=e)
return False
host = parsed.hostname or ""
path = (parsed.path or "").rstrip("/")
@@ -1345,8 +1346,8 @@ def list_model_ids(
r = httpx.get(root + "/api/tags", timeout=timeout)
r.raise_for_status()
return [m.get("name") or m.get("model") for m in (r.json().get("models") or []) if m.get("name") or m.get("model")]
except Exception:
pass
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to fetch model list from configured endpoint", exc_info=e)
return []
def normalize_model_id(
+3 -1
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@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ import os
import re
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _format_mcp_connection_error(name: str, command: str = "", args: Optional[List[str]] = None, error: Exception = None) -> str:
@@ -508,7 +510,7 @@ class McpManager:
return False
script_rel, name = _BUILTIN_SERVERS[server_id]
base_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
base_dir = get_app_root()
script_path = os.path.join(base_dir, script_rel)
# Clean up old connection
+1
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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import time
from pathlib import Path
from src.constants import RAG_DIR
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+30
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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
"""Helpers for resolving runtime paths in source and frozen builds."""
import os
import sys
def get_app_root() -> str:
"""Return the app root directory.
In normal source runs, this is the repository root. In a frozen Windows
build, it is the bundle content root (PyInstaller's internal directory)
so bundled runtime folders like `static/`, `scripts/`, and `data/` stay
together with the executable payload.
"""
if getattr(sys, "frozen", False):
return getattr(sys, "_MEIPASS", os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(sys.executable)))
return os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
def get_default_data_dir() -> str:
"""Return the default path to the data directory.
In normal runs, this is a 'data' subdirectory under the app root.
In frozen builds, it is a persistent user directory (~/.odysseus/data)
to prevent SQLite databases and other persistent files from being
written to the ephemeral, temporary extraction bundle directory.
"""
if getattr(sys, "frozen", False):
return os.path.join(os.path.expanduser("~"), ".odysseus", "data")
return os.path.join(get_app_root(), "data")
+24 -5
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@@ -236,6 +236,29 @@ def _digest_windows(now):
]
def _checkin_calendar_events(db, owner, start, end):
"""Calendar events in [start, end] for ONE owner, for the check-in digest.
Ownership lives on CalendarCal.owner; events inherit it via calendar_id.
The digest query had no owner scope, so it pulled EVERY user's events into
one user's check-in (a cross-tenant leak of summaries/locations). Scope it
by joining CalendarCal, mirroring routes/calendar_routes.list_events.
"""
from core.database import CalendarEvent as _CE, CalendarCal as _CC
return (
db.query(_CE)
.join(_CC, _CE.calendar_id == _CC.id)
.filter(
_CC.owner == owner,
_CE.dtstart >= start,
_CE.dtstart <= end,
_CE.status != "cancelled",
)
.order_by(_CE.dtstart)
.all()
)
class TaskScheduler:
def __init__(self, session_manager):
self._session_manager = session_manager
@@ -1127,11 +1150,7 @@ class TaskScheduler:
# Strip timezone for naive DB comparison
_s = start.replace(tzinfo=None) if start.tzinfo else start
_e = end.replace(tzinfo=None) if end.tzinfo else end
evs = _db.query(_CE).filter(
_CE.dtstart >= _s,
_CE.dtstart <= _e,
_CE.status != "cancelled",
).order_by(_CE.dtstart).all()
evs = _checkin_calendar_events(_db, task.owner, _s, _e)
if not evs:
continue
# Group by importance for richer output
+14 -3
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@@ -3797,7 +3797,7 @@ async def do_resolve_contact(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
if not name:
return {"error": "name is required", "exit_code": 1}
contacts = {} # email -> {name, source}
contacts = {} # email_or_phone -> {name, source, phone?}
# 1. CardDAV (Radicale) — structured contacts. Call in-process: a
# server-side httpx GET to /api/contacts/search carries no session
@@ -3812,10 +3812,18 @@ async def do_resolve_contact(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
match = q in hay_name or any(q in (e or "").lower() for e in c.get("emails", []))
if not match:
continue
has_email = False
for email in (c.get("emails") or []):
email = (email or "").strip().lower()
if email and "@" in email:
contacts[email] = {"name": c.get("name") or email, "source": "contacts"}
has_email = True
# Fall back to phone numbers when the contact has no email address
if not has_email:
for phone in (c.get("phones") or []):
phone = (phone or "").strip()
if phone:
contacts[phone] = {"name": c.get("name") or phone, "source": "contacts", "phone": phone}
except Exception:
pass
@@ -3835,8 +3843,11 @@ async def do_resolve_contact(content: str, owner: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
return {"output": f"No contacts found matching '{name}'.", "exit_code": 0}
lines = [f"Contacts matching '{name}':"]
for email, info in contacts.items():
lines.append(f"- {info['name']} <{email}> ({info['source']})")
for key, info in contacts.items():
if info.get("phone"):
lines.append(f"- {info['name']} — phone: {info['phone']} ({info['source']})")
else:
lines.append(f"- {info['name']} <{key}> ({info['source']})")
return {"output": "\n".join(lines), "exit_code": 0}
+4 -3
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@@ -68,11 +68,12 @@ FUNCTION_TOOL_SCHEMAS = [
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "web_fetch",
"description": "Fetch and read the text content of a specific URL the user names (e.g. 'check example.com', 'what's on this page <url>'). Use when you already have a concrete URL/domain. NOT for open-ended searches (use web_search) or 'research X' jobs (use trigger_research).",
"description": "Fetch and read the text content of a specific URL the user names (e.g. 'check example.com', 'what's on this page <url>'). Use when you already have a concrete URL/domain. NOT for open-ended searches (use web_search) or 'research X' jobs (use trigger_research). Downloads are size-budgeted; a '[partial content: ...]' notice in the result means the body was cut short and you can re-call with full=true for the rest.",
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"url": {"type": "string", "description": "The URL or domain to fetch (http/https; a bare domain like example.com is fine)"}
"url": {"type": "string", "description": "The URL or domain to fetch (http/https; a bare domain like example.com is fine)"},
"full": {"type": "boolean", "description": "Raise the download budget to the hard cap for large pages/files. Use only after a result reported partial content."}
},
"required": ["url"]
}
@@ -1008,7 +1009,7 @@ FUNCTION_TOOL_SCHEMAS = [
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "resolve_contact",
"description": "Look up a contact's email address by name. Searches CardDAV address book and sent email history. Use when the user says 'message [name]' or 'email [name]' without an email address.",
"description": "Look up a contact by name. Searches CardDAV address book and sent email history. Returns email addresses (when available) or phone numbers. Use when the user says 'message [name]', 'email [name]', or asks for someone's contact details.",
"parameters": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
-17
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@@ -1911,23 +1911,6 @@ import { wireArrowUpRecall, getLastUserMessageFromChatHistory } from './composer
_chatBox.appendChild(note);
try { note.scrollIntoView({ block: 'end', behavior: 'smooth' }); } catch (_) { uiModule.scrollHistory && uiModule.scrollHistory(); }
}
} else if (json.type === 'loop_breaker_triggered' || json.type === 'intent_nudge_exhausted') {
// A loop guard ended the turn — surface why so it isn't mistaken
// for a clean completion or a silent stall.
const _chatBox = document.getElementById('chat-history');
if (!_isBg && _chatBox) {
const note = document.createElement('div');
note.className = 'stopped-indicator loop-guard-stop';
const label = document.createElement('span');
label.className = 'rounds-exhausted-label';
label.textContent = json.message ||
(json.type === 'loop_breaker_triggered'
? 'Stopped by the loop-breaker (no new progress).'
: 'Stopped: announced an action but never called the tool.');
note.appendChild(label);
_chatBox.appendChild(note);
try { note.scrollIntoView({ block: 'end', behavior: 'smooth' }); } catch (_) { uiModule.scrollHistory && uiModule.scrollHistory(); }
}
} else if (json.type === 'model_actual') {
if (!_isBg && holder) {
holder._requestedModel = json.requested_model || holder._requestedModel || modelName;
+3
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@@ -219,6 +219,9 @@ class _WebhookManager:
async def fire(self, event, payload):
return None
def fire_and_forget(self, event, payload):
return None
def _install_sync_chat_stubs(monkeypatch):
# FastAPI checks for python_multipart at import time when Form is used;
+74
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@@ -502,3 +502,77 @@ def test_delete_token_owner_check_skipped_when_auth_disabled(monkeypatch, token_
resp = delete_token(request=req, token_id="tok123")
assert resp == {"status": "deleted"}
fake_session.delete.assert_called_once_with(fake_token)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 7. PATCH /api/tokens/{id} — non-object JSON bodies must not 500
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_update_token_with_array_body_does_not_500(monkeypatch, token_routes_mod):
"""PATCH body of [] must be normalised to {} and not raise."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
mod = token_routes_mod
token = SimpleNamespace(
id="tok123", name="original", owner="alice",
token_prefix="ody_orig", scopes="email:read", is_active=True,
)
fake_session = MagicMock()
fake_session.query.return_value.filter.return_value.first.return_value = token
monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "get_db_session", lambda: _db_ctx(fake_session))
invalidator = MagicMock()
req = _patch_request(invalidator, [])
update_token = _get_handler(mod, "PATCH", "/tokens/{token_id}")
resp = asyncio.run(update_token(request=req, token_id="tok123"))
# Name and scopes must be unchanged — payload was normalised to {}
assert token.name == "original"
assert token.scopes == "email:read"
assert resp["name"] == "original"
def test_update_token_with_null_body_does_not_500(monkeypatch, token_routes_mod):
"""PATCH body of null must be normalised to {} and not raise."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
mod = token_routes_mod
token = SimpleNamespace(
id="tok123", name="original", owner="alice",
token_prefix="ody_orig", scopes="chat", is_active=True,
)
fake_session = MagicMock()
fake_session.query.return_value.filter.return_value.first.return_value = token
monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "get_db_session", lambda: _db_ctx(fake_session))
invalidator = MagicMock()
req = _patch_request(invalidator, None)
update_token = _get_handler(mod, "PATCH", "/tokens/{token_id}")
resp = asyncio.run(update_token(request=req, token_id="tok123"))
assert token.name == "original"
assert token.scopes == "chat"
def test_update_token_normal_object_still_works(monkeypatch, token_routes_mod):
"""Normal dict payload continues to update fields as before."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_ENABLED", "true")
mod = token_routes_mod
token = SimpleNamespace(
id="tok123", name="original", owner="alice",
token_prefix="ody_orig", scopes="email:read", is_active=True,
)
fake_session = MagicMock()
fake_session.query.return_value.filter.return_value.first.return_value = token
monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "get_db_session", lambda: _db_ctx(fake_session))
invalidator = MagicMock()
req = _patch_request(invalidator, {"name": "updated"})
update_token = _get_handler(mod, "PATCH", "/tokens/{token_id}")
resp = asyncio.run(update_token(request=req, token_id="tok123"))
assert token.name == "updated"
assert resp["name"] == "updated"
invalidator.assert_called_once()
+7 -7
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ class _Session:
def test_allowed_models_legacy_empty_list_remains_unrestricted(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.get_current_user", lambda request: "alice")
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.effective_user", lambda request: "alice")
_enforce_chat_privileges(
_Request({"allowed_models": [], "max_messages_per_day": 0}),
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ def test_allowed_models_legacy_empty_list_remains_unrestricted(monkeypatch):
def test_allowed_models_explicit_empty_restricted_list_blocks_all_models(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.get_current_user", lambda request: "alice")
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.effective_user", lambda request: "alice")
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
_enforce_chat_privileges(
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ def test_allowed_models_explicit_empty_restricted_list_blocks_all_models(monkeyp
def test_allowed_models_nonempty_list_still_restricts_without_new_flag(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.get_current_user", lambda request: "alice")
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.effective_user", lambda request: "alice")
_enforce_chat_privileges(
_Request({"allowed_models": ["provider/model-a"], "max_messages_per_day": 0}),
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ def test_allowed_models_nonempty_list_still_restricts_without_new_flag(monkeypat
def test_no_restriction_allows_any_model(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.get_current_user", lambda request: "alice")
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.effective_user", lambda request: "alice")
privs = {"allowed_models": [], "block_all_models": False, "max_messages_per_day": 0}
_enforce_chat_privileges(_Request(privs), _Session("provider/model-a"))
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ def test_no_restriction_allows_any_model(monkeypatch):
def test_specific_allowlist_blocks_models_outside_it(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.get_current_user", lambda request: "alice")
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.effective_user", lambda request: "alice")
privs = {
"allowed_models": ["gpt-4"],
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ def test_specific_allowlist_blocks_models_outside_it(monkeypatch):
def test_block_all_models_blocks_regardless_of_allowed_models_contents(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.get_current_user", lambda request: "alice")
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.effective_user", lambda request: "alice")
# Even if allowed_models contains entries, block_all_models wins.
privs = {
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ def test_block_all_models_blocks_regardless_of_allowed_models_contents(monkeypat
def test_admin_user_is_never_blocked(monkeypatch):
from core.auth import ADMIN_PRIVILEGES
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.get_current_user", lambda request: "admin")
monkeypatch.setattr("routes.chat_helpers.effective_user", lambda request: "admin")
class _AdminAuthManager:
def get_privileges(self, username):
+70
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@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
"""Check-in calendar digest must be scoped to the task owner.
The digest query selected CalendarEvent with no owner scope, so a scheduled
check-in for one user pulled EVERY user's calendar events (summaries,
locations) into their digest a cross-tenant leak. Ownership lives on
CalendarCal.owner; the query must join it, like routes/calendar_routes.
"""
import tempfile
import uuid
from datetime import datetime
import pytest
from sqlalchemy import create_engine
from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker
from sqlalchemy.pool import NullPool
import core.database as cdb
from core.database import CalendarEvent, CalendarCal
from src.task_scheduler import _checkin_calendar_events
_TMPDB = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".db", delete=False)
_ENGINE = create_engine(f"sqlite:///{_TMPDB.name}", connect_args={"check_same_thread": False}, poolclass=NullPool)
cdb.Base.metadata.create_all(_ENGINE)
_TS = sessionmaker(bind=_ENGINE, autoflush=False, autocommit=False)
def _seed():
db = _TS()
try:
db.query(CalendarEvent).delete(); db.query(CalendarCal).delete()
db.add(CalendarCal(id="calA", owner="alice", name="A"))
db.add(CalendarCal(id="calB", owner="bob", name="B"))
db.add(CalendarEvent(uid="a1", calendar_id="calA", summary="Alice mtg",
dtstart=datetime(2026, 6, 10, 9, 0),
dtend=datetime(2026, 6, 10, 10, 0), status="confirmed"))
db.add(CalendarEvent(uid="b1", calendar_id="calB", summary="Bob secret",
dtstart=datetime(2026, 6, 10, 10, 0),
dtend=datetime(2026, 6, 10, 11, 0), status="confirmed"))
db.commit()
finally:
db.close()
def test_digest_only_returns_owner_events():
_seed()
db = _TS()
try:
s, e = datetime(2026, 6, 1), datetime(2026, 6, 30)
alice = _checkin_calendar_events(db, "alice", s, e)
assert [ev.summary for ev in alice] == ["Alice mtg"] # not Bob's
bob = _checkin_calendar_events(db, "bob", s, e)
assert [ev.summary for ev in bob] == ["Bob secret"]
finally:
db.close()
def test_cancelled_excluded_and_window_respected():
_seed()
db = _TS()
try:
db2 = _TS()
db2.add(CalendarEvent(uid="a2", calendar_id="calA", summary="cancelled",
dtstart=datetime(2026, 6, 11),
dtend=datetime(2026, 6, 11, 1, 0), status="cancelled"))
db2.commit(); db2.close()
s, e = datetime(2026, 6, 1), datetime(2026, 6, 30)
out = _checkin_calendar_events(db, "alice", s, e)
assert "cancelled" not in [ev.summary for ev in out]
finally:
db.close()
+32 -2
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@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ import json
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import pytest
from fastapi import HTTPException
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
# core.database instantiates SQLAlchemy declarative classes at import time, which
@@ -225,12 +228,34 @@ def test_models_route_scopes_api_token_to_token_owner(monkeypatch):
endpoints = _call_models_route(
monkeypatch,
rows,
_request(api_token=True, api_token_owner="alice", current_user="api"),
_request(
api_token=True,
api_token_owner="alice",
api_token_scopes=["chat"],
current_user="api",
),
)
assert _endpoint_names(endpoints) == ["alice-endpoint", "shared-endpoint"]
def test_models_route_rejects_api_token_without_chat_scope(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(companion_routes, "get_current_user", lambda request: "api")
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
_models_route()(
_request(
api_token=True,
api_token_owner="alice",
api_token_scopes=["todos:read"],
current_user="api",
)
)
assert exc.value.status_code == 403
assert "chat scope" in exc.value.detail
def test_models_route_unresolved_owner_returns_only_shared_rows(monkeypatch):
rows = [
_ep(1, "alice-endpoint", "alice"),
@@ -242,7 +267,12 @@ def test_models_route_unresolved_owner_returns_only_shared_rows(monkeypatch):
endpoints = _call_models_route(
monkeypatch,
rows,
_request(api_token=True, api_token_owner=None, current_user="api"),
_request(
api_token=True,
api_token_owner=None,
api_token_scopes=["chat"],
current_user="api",
),
)
assert _endpoint_names(endpoints) == ["shared-endpoint"]
+44
View File
@@ -786,6 +786,50 @@ def test_cached_model_scan_reports_plain_dir_gguf(tmp_path):
assert ggufs[3]["quant"] == "BF16"
def test_cached_model_scan_uses_ollama_api_before_cli_and_windows_opt_in():
script = _cached_model_scan_script()
assert "scan_ollama_api()\nscan_ollama()" in script
assert "if any(m.get('is_ollama') for m in models): return" in script
assert "os.name == 'nt'" in script
assert "ODYSSEUS_ALLOW_OLLAMA_CLI_SCAN" in script
@pytest.mark.skipif(os.name != "nt", reason="Windows Ollama CLI startup guard")
def test_cached_model_scan_does_not_launch_ollama_cli_on_windows(tmp_path):
"""Official Ollama for Windows can auto-start the tray/server on `ollama list`.
The read-only cache scanner must not invoke that CLI unless explicitly opted in.
"""
marker = tmp_path / "ollama-called.txt"
fake_ollama = tmp_path / "ollama.cmd"
fake_ollama.write_text(
"@echo off\r\n"
f'echo called>"{marker}"\r\n'
"echo NAME ID SIZE MODIFIED\r\n"
"echo local-model:latest abc 1 GB now\r\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
empty_home = tmp_path / "home"
empty_home.mkdir()
scan_py = tmp_path / "scan_cache.py"
scan_py.write_text(_cached_model_scan_script(), encoding="utf-8")
env = dict(os.environ)
env["PATH"] = str(tmp_path) + os.pathsep + env.get("PATH", "")
env["HOME"] = str(empty_home)
env.pop("ODYSSEUS_ALLOW_OLLAMA_CLI_SCAN", None)
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(scan_py)],
check=True,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
env=env,
)
assert marker.exists() is False
assert all(m.get("backend") != "ollama" for m in json.loads(proc.stdout))
def test_cached_model_scan_uses_huggingface_cache_env(tmp_path):
"""Docker recreates can leave the persisted HF cache outside HOME.
The Serve scanner should honor the cache env path instead of only ~/.cache.
+69
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@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
"""Regression: FASTEMBED_CACHE_DIR must tolerate a PRESENT-but-EMPTY
FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH.
docker-compose.yml injects ``FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH=${FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH:-}``,
which sets the variable to ``""`` when the host has not defined it. The old
``os.getenv("FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH", default)`` only used the default when the
variable was ABSENT, so an empty value made ``FASTEMBED_CACHE_DIR == ""``
``os.makedirs("")`` raised ``[Errno 2] No such file or directory: ''``
FastEmbed failed to initialise and every vector feature (RAG, semantic memory,
tool index) silently degraded on the default Docker stack.
These tests pin the fix: empty is treated like absent use the DATA_DIR
default, while an explicit non-empty override is still honoured.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib
import os
import src.constants as constants
def _reload_with(monkeypatch, value):
"""Reload src.constants with FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH set to ``value`` (or
removed when ``value`` is None) and return the reloaded module."""
if value is None:
monkeypatch.delenv("FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH", raising=False)
else:
monkeypatch.setenv("FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH", value)
return importlib.reload(constants)
def _restore(monkeypatch):
"""Return the module to its env-default state so reloading it here does
not leak a test-specific FASTEMBED_CACHE_DIR into other tests."""
monkeypatch.delenv("FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH", raising=False)
importlib.reload(constants)
def test_empty_fastembed_cache_path_falls_back_to_default(monkeypatch):
"""The bug: an empty FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH (exactly what Docker injects)
must fall back to the DATA_DIR default, never the empty string."""
try:
mod = _reload_with(monkeypatch, "")
assert mod.FASTEMBED_CACHE_DIR, "empty env must not yield an empty path"
assert mod.FASTEMBED_CACHE_DIR == os.path.join(mod.DATA_DIR, "fastembed_cache")
finally:
_restore(monkeypatch)
def test_unset_fastembed_cache_path_uses_default(monkeypatch):
"""Sanity: an absent variable also resolves to the default."""
try:
mod = _reload_with(monkeypatch, None)
assert mod.FASTEMBED_CACHE_DIR == os.path.join(mod.DATA_DIR, "fastembed_cache")
finally:
_restore(monkeypatch)
def test_explicit_fastembed_cache_path_is_respected(monkeypatch):
"""A real explicit override must still win — the fix only changes the
empty-value handling, not the documented FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH override."""
custom = os.path.join("custom", "fastembed-cache")
try:
mod = _reload_with(monkeypatch, custom)
assert mod.FASTEMBED_CACHE_DIR == custom
finally:
_restore(monkeypatch)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ def _build_context_harness(monkeypatch, chat_helpers, history):
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "extract_preset", fake_extract_preset)
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "add_user_message", fake_add_user_message)
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "load_prefs_for_user", lambda user: {})
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "get_current_user", lambda request: "tester")
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "effective_user", lambda request: "tester")
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "normalize_model_id", lambda endpoint_url, model, **kwargs: None)
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "maybe_compact", fake_maybe_compact)
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "trim_for_context", lambda messages, context_length: messages)
-350
View File
@@ -1,350 +0,0 @@
"""Regression: stream_agent_loop surfaces *why* a guard ended the turn.
Two internal guards used to stop the agent in ways that looked like a clean
completion or a vague blocked message:
* the loop-breaker stall detector -> now emits `loop_breaker_triggered`
* the intent-without-action nudge cap -> now emits `intent_nudge_exhausted`
These tests run the real loop body against a fake LLM stream (no model calls,
no sleeps) and assert the structured stop event is emitted.
"""
import asyncio
import json
import logging
import pytest
import src.agent_loop as al
def _collect(gen):
async def _run():
return [c async for c in gen]
return asyncio.run(_run())
def _types(chunks):
out = []
for c in chunks:
if c.startswith("data: ") and not c.startswith("data: [DONE]"):
try:
out.append(json.loads(c[6:]))
except Exception:
pass
return out
def _patch_common(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "get_setting", lambda key, default=None: default, raising=False)
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "get_mcp_manager", lambda: None, raising=False)
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "estimate_tokens", lambda *a, **k: 10, raising=False)
async def _fake_exec(block, *a, **k):
return ("bash", {"output": "ok", "exit_code": 0})
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "execute_tool_block", _fake_exec, raising=False)
def _run_loop(monkeypatch, round_text, max_rounds, relevant_tools={"bash"}):
async def _fake_stream(_candidates, messages, **kwargs):
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"delta": round_text})}\n\n'
yield "data: [DONE]\n\n"
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "stream_llm_with_fallback", _fake_stream, raising=False)
gen = al.stream_agent_loop(
"http://x/v1", "m",
[{"role": "user", "content": "do a long multi-step task"}],
max_rounds=max_rounds,
relevant_tools=relevant_tools,
)
return _types(_collect(gen))
def test_emits_loop_breaker_triggered_on_repeated_no_progress(monkeypatch):
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
# Same exact tool call every round, no answer text -> stuck-round streak
# trips the loop-breaker once the cap is reached.
events = _run_loop(monkeypatch, "```bash\necho hi\n```", max_rounds=8)
lb = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "loop_breaker_triggered"]
assert lb, events
e = lb[0]
assert e["reason"]
assert e["max_stuck_rounds"] == 4
assert e["stuck_rounds"] >= 4
assert "message" in e
def test_no_loop_breaker_on_normal_finish(monkeypatch):
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
events = _run_loop(monkeypatch, "All done, here is your answer.", max_rounds=8)
assert not any(e.get("type") == "loop_breaker_triggered" for e in events), events
def test_emits_intent_nudge_exhausted_when_cap_reached(monkeypatch):
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
# The model keeps announcing an action with no tool call. After the nudge
# cap is spent, the turn ends with an explicit intent_nudge_exhausted event.
events = _run_loop(monkeypatch, "Let me check the logs now", max_rounds=5)
inx = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "intent_nudge_exhausted"]
assert inx, events
e = inx[0]
assert e["max_nudges"] == 2
assert e["nudges"] >= 2
assert "message" in e
def test_no_intent_nudge_exhausted_on_normal_finish(monkeypatch):
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
events = _run_loop(monkeypatch, "Here is the complete answer to your question.", max_rounds=5)
assert not any(e.get("type") == "intent_nudge_exhausted" for e in events), events
def _assert_guard_log_safe(caplog, *, structural, secret="secret123"):
"""The guard's own structural log line fired, and that record carries no raw
secret. Scoped to the guard's records on purpose: an unrelated, pre-existing
round-summary log echoes raw model text and is out of scope for this PR."""
records = [r for r in caplog.records if structural in r.getMessage()]
assert records, caplog.text
for r in records:
assert secret not in r.getMessage(), r.getMessage()
def test_intent_nudge_logging_does_not_leak_secret(monkeypatch, caplog):
# The model announces an action (no tool call) with a secret in the text.
# The nudge logger must record only structural metadata, never the matched
# phrase — so the credential never lands in journalctl.
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
with caplog.at_level(logging.INFO, logger="src.agent_loop"):
events = _run_loop(monkeypatch, "Let me check api_key=secret123 now", max_rounds=5)
assert any(e.get("type") == "intent_nudge_exhausted" for e in events), events
_assert_guard_log_safe(caplog, structural="intent-without-action nudge")
def test_loop_breaker_logging_does_not_leak_secret(monkeypatch, caplog):
# A repeated tool command carrying a secret trips the loop-breaker. The
# structural log must not contain `_sig` / raw tool-call content.
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
with caplog.at_level(logging.INFO, logger="src.agent_loop"):
events = _run_loop(monkeypatch, "```bash\necho api_key=secret123\n```", max_rounds=8)
assert any(e.get("type") == "loop_breaker_triggered" for e in events), events
_assert_guard_log_safe(caplog, structural="loop-breaker tripped")
def test_redacts_sensitive_tool_output_before_surfacing():
text = al._redact_sensitive_text(
"password: private-value\n"
"api_key=private-key\n"
"Authorization: Bearer private-token\n"
"normal output"
)
assert "private-value" not in text
assert "private-key" not in text
assert "private-token" not in text
assert "password: [redacted]" in text
assert "api_key=[redacted]" in text
assert "Authorization: Bearer [redacted]" in text
assert "normal output" in text
_GCP_API_KEY_SAMPLE = "AI" + "za" + ("A" * 35)
# (input, secret substring that must be gone, expected substring that must remain)
_REDACTION_CASES = [
("Authorization: Bearer abc123tok", "abc123tok", "Authorization: Bearer [redacted]"),
("Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz", "dXNlcjpwYXNz", "Authorization: Basic [redacted]"),
# Quoted Authorization value (spaces) must be redacted whole.
('Authorization: Bearer "two word secret"', "two word secret", "Authorization: Bearer [redacted]"),
# Escaped quote inside a quoted secret must not leak the tail.
(r'password="abc\"def secret"', "def secret", "password=[redacted]"),
# URL password containing a colon must still be redacted whole.
("postgres://user:pa:ss@host/db", "pa:ss", "postgres://[redacted]@host/db"),
# Provider-shaped bare tokens.
("token is hf_abcdefghij1234567890XYZ", "hf_abcdefghij1234567890XYZ", "[redacted]"),
("key " + _GCP_API_KEY_SAMPLE, _GCP_API_KEY_SAMPLE, "[redacted]"),
("Cookie: session=abc123secret", "abc123secret", "Cookie: [redacted]"),
("Set-Cookie: sid=xyz789; HttpOnly", "xyz789", "Set-Cookie: [redacted]"),
("postgres://user:pa55word@host/db", "pa55word", "postgres://[redacted]@host/db"),
("client_secret=supersecretvalue", "supersecretvalue", "client_secret=[redacted]"),
("OPENAI_API_KEY=abcd1234deadbeef", "abcd1234deadbeef", "OPENAI_API_KEY=[redacted]"),
# Quoted multi-word env value must be fully redacted, not clipped at the space.
('OPENAI_API_KEY="two word secret"', "two word secret", "OPENAI_API_KEY=[redacted]"),
('password: "my secret value"', "my secret value", "password: [redacted]"),
("here is sk-abcdefghij1234567890", "sk-abcdefghij1234567890", "[redacted]"),
(
"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIfakeKEYbody\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----",
"MIIfakeKEYbody",
"[redacted private key]",
),
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("raw, secret, expected", _REDACTION_CASES)
def test_redaction_covers_requested_secret_shapes(raw, secret, expected):
out = al._redact_sensitive_text(raw)
assert secret not in out, out
assert expected in out, out
@pytest.mark.parametrize("raw", [
"the build completed in 3.2s with 0 errors",
"password reset email sent to the user",
"Listing 5 files: a.py b.py c.py d.py e.py",
"https://example.com/path?page=2",
# Benign uppercase names that merely end in KEY must not be redacted.
"MONKEY=banana",
"TURKEY=dinner",
])
def test_redaction_keeps_normal_output_readable(raw):
assert al._redact_sensitive_text(raw) == raw
def test_redacts_before_truncating():
# A secret near the start must be gone even if truncation would otherwise
# only clip the tail — redaction runs first.
raw = "api_key=topsecretvalue " + ("x" * 50_000)
out = al._truncate(al._redact_sensitive_text(raw))
assert "topsecretvalue" not in out
assert "api_key=[redacted]" in out
def _run_tool_result(monkeypatch, tool, exec_result, max_rounds=2):
"""Drive one tool round whose execution returns `exec_result`, and collect
the streamed events. Used to assert restored per-tool-result emissions."""
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
async def _fake_exec(block, *a, **k):
return (tool, exec_result)
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "execute_tool_block", _fake_exec, raising=False)
round_text = f"```{tool}\n{{}}\n```"
async def _fake_stream(_candidates, messages, **kwargs):
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"delta": round_text})}\n\n'
yield "data: [DONE]\n\n"
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "stream_llm_with_fallback", _fake_stream, raising=False)
gen = al.stream_agent_loop(
"http://x/v1", "m",
[{"role": "user", "content": "do something"}],
max_rounds=max_rounds,
relevant_tools={tool},
)
return _types(_collect(gen))
def test_restores_doc_suggestions_event(monkeypatch):
events = _run_tool_result(
monkeypatch, "suggest_document",
{"action": "suggest", "doc_id": "d1", "suggestions": [{"text": "x"}], "exit_code": 0},
)
assert any(e.get("type") == "doc_suggestions" for e in events), events
def test_restores_doc_update_event(monkeypatch):
events = _run_tool_result(
monkeypatch, "edit_document",
{"action": "edit", "doc_id": "d1", "content": "body", "version": 2,
"title": "T", "language": "md", "exit_code": 0},
)
# A native document block also emits doc_update AFTER tool_output, so a plain
# "any doc_update" check would pass even if the restored generic block were
# gone. Prove the restored block fires BEFORE the first tool_output.
types = [e.get("type") for e in events]
assert "doc_update" in types, events
assert "tool_output" in types, events
assert types.index("doc_update") < types.index("tool_output"), types
def test_restores_ui_control_event(monkeypatch):
events = _run_tool_result(
monkeypatch, "ui_control",
{"ui_event": "toggle", "toggle_name": "bash", "state": "off", "exit_code": 0},
)
assert any(e.get("type") == "ui_control" for e in events), events
def test_restores_plan_update_event(monkeypatch):
events = _run_tool_result(
monkeypatch, "update_plan",
{"plan_update": {"steps": [{"text": "step", "done": True}]}, "exit_code": 0},
)
assert any(e.get("type") == "plan_update" for e in events), events
def test_restores_ask_user_event_and_persists_question(monkeypatch):
events = _run_tool_result(
monkeypatch, "ask_user",
{"ask_user": {"question": "Which option?", "options": [{"label": "A"}, {"label": "B"}]},
"exit_code": 0},
)
# Exactly one ask_user event — not re-emitted on a follow-up round.
_ask_events = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "ask_user"]
assert len(_ask_events) == 1, events
# The question is streamed as assistant text so it persists for replay.
# Upstream prepends "\n\n" when full_response already holds streamed text,
# so match on containment — and it must be streamed exactly once.
_q_deltas = [e for e in events if "Which option?" in (e.get("delta") or "")]
assert len(_q_deltas) == 1, events
# Setting `_awaiting_user` breaks the loop, so the turn does NOT advance into
# another agent round (which would emit an agent_step event) after the ask.
assert not any(e.get("type") == "agent_step" for e in events), events
def test_redacts_command_display_in_streamed_events(monkeypatch):
# A tool command line can carry a secret. The streamed command display
# (tool_start / tool_output) must be redacted, even though the real command
# passed to execution is left untouched.
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
round_text = "```bash\necho api_key=secret123\n```"
async def _fake_stream(_candidates, messages, **kwargs):
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"delta": round_text})}\n\n'
yield "data: [DONE]\n\n"
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "stream_llm_with_fallback", _fake_stream, raising=False)
gen = al.stream_agent_loop(
"http://x/v1", "m",
[{"role": "user", "content": "run it"}],
max_rounds=2,
relevant_tools={"bash"},
)
events = _types(_collect(gen))
cmds = [e for e in events if e.get("type") in ("tool_start", "tool_output")]
assert cmds, events
assert all("secret123" not in (e.get("command") or "") for e in cmds), cmds
assert any("api_key=[redacted]" in (e.get("command") or "") for e in cmds), cmds
def test_redacts_live_tool_progress_tail(monkeypatch):
# A secret in the live progress tail must be redacted before streaming —
# otherwise it flashes by before the (already redacted) final tool_output.
_patch_common(monkeypatch)
async def _fake_exec(block, *a, **k):
await k["progress_cb"]({"tail": "api_key=secret123", "elapsed_s": 1})
return ("bash", {"output": "done", "exit_code": 0})
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "execute_tool_block", _fake_exec, raising=False)
round_text = "```bash\necho hi\n```"
async def _fake_stream(_candidates, messages, **kwargs):
yield f'data: {json.dumps({"delta": round_text})}\n\n'
yield "data: [DONE]\n\n"
monkeypatch.setattr(al, "stream_llm_with_fallback", _fake_stream, raising=False)
gen = al.stream_agent_loop(
"http://x/v1", "m",
[{"role": "user", "content": "run it"}],
max_rounds=2,
relevant_tools={"bash"},
)
events = _types(_collect(gen))
prog = [e for e in events if e.get("type") == "tool_progress"]
assert prog, events
assert all("secret123" not in (e.get("tail") or "") for e in prog), prog
assert any("api_key=[redacted]" in (e.get("tail") or "") for e in prog), prog
# Other fields are preserved.
assert any(e.get("elapsed_s") == 1 for e in prog), prog
+150
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
import asyncio
import mcp_servers.memory_server as memory_server
from src.memory import MemoryManager
class FakeVector:
healthy = True
def __init__(self):
self.added = []
self.removed = []
def add(self, memory_id, text):
self.added.append((memory_id, text))
def remove(self, memory_id):
self.removed.append(memory_id)
def _tool_text(arguments):
result = asyncio.run(memory_server.call_tool("manage_memory", arguments))
return result[0].text
def _entry(manager, text, owner=None, memory_id=None, category="fact"):
entry = manager.add_entry(text, owner=owner, category=category)
if memory_id:
entry["id"] = memory_id
return entry
def _configure_server(monkeypatch, manager, vector=None):
monkeypatch.setattr(memory_server, "_memory_manager", manager)
monkeypatch.setattr(memory_server, "_memory_vector", vector)
monkeypatch.setattr(memory_server, "_initialized", True)
for key in memory_server._OWNER_ENV_KEYS:
monkeypatch.delenv(key, raising=False)
def test_mcp_memory_uses_configured_owner_for_all_operations(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
manager = MemoryManager(str(tmp_path))
vector = FakeVector()
alice = _entry(
manager,
"Alice likes green tea",
owner="alice",
memory_id="aaaaaaaa-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
)
bob = _entry(
manager,
"Bob likes espresso",
owner="bob",
memory_id="bbbbbbbb-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
)
manager.save([alice, bob])
_configure_server(monkeypatch, manager, vector)
monkeypatch.setenv("ODYSSEUS_MCP_MEMORY_OWNER", "alice")
list_text = _tool_text({"action": "list"})
assert "Alice likes green tea" in list_text
assert "Bob likes espresso" not in list_text
search_text = _tool_text({"action": "search", "text": "likes"})
assert "Alice likes green tea" in search_text
assert "Bob likes espresso" not in search_text
add_text = _tool_text({
"action": "add",
"text": "Alice prefers concise notes",
"category": "preference",
})
assert "Memory added" in add_text
added = next(
entry for entry in manager.load_all()
if entry["text"] == "Alice prefers concise notes"
)
assert added["owner"] == "alice"
assert vector.added == [(added["id"], "Alice prefers concise notes")]
edit_text = _tool_text({
"action": "edit",
"memory_id": bob["id"][:8],
"text": "Bob changed",
})
assert edit_text == "Error: Memory 'bbbbbbbb' not found"
bob_after_edit = next(
entry for entry in manager.load_all()
if entry["id"] == bob["id"]
)
assert bob_after_edit["text"] == "Bob likes espresso"
delete_text = _tool_text({"action": "delete", "memory_id": bob["id"][:8]})
assert delete_text == "Error: Memory 'bbbbbbbb' not found"
assert any(entry["id"] == bob["id"] for entry in manager.load_all())
def test_mcp_memory_fails_closed_without_owner_for_owner_scoped_store(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
manager = MemoryManager(str(tmp_path))
alice = _entry(manager, "Alice private memory", owner="alice", memory_id="aaaaaaaa-0000")
bob = _entry(manager, "Bob private memory", owner="bob", memory_id="bbbbbbbb-0000")
manager.save([alice, bob])
_configure_server(monkeypatch, manager, FakeVector())
before = manager.load_all()
actions = [
{"action": "list"},
{"action": "search", "text": "private"},
{"action": "add", "text": "new ownerless memory"},
{"action": "edit", "memory_id": alice["id"][:8], "text": "changed"},
{"action": "delete", "memory_id": alice["id"][:8]},
]
for arguments in actions:
assert _tool_text(arguments).startswith("Error: Memory MCP owner is not configured")
assert manager.load_all() == before
def test_mcp_memory_preserves_ownerless_local_behavior(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
manager = MemoryManager(str(tmp_path))
legacy = _entry(
manager,
"Legacy local memory",
memory_id="llllllll-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
)
manager.save([legacy])
_configure_server(monkeypatch, manager, FakeVector())
assert "Legacy local memory" in _tool_text({"action": "list"})
assert "Legacy local memory" in _tool_text({"action": "search", "text": "legacy"})
add_text = _tool_text({"action": "add", "text": "Another local memory"})
assert "Memory added" in add_text
added = next(
entry for entry in manager.load_all()
if entry["text"] == "Another local memory"
)
assert "owner" not in added
assert _tool_text({
"action": "edit",
"memory_id": legacy["id"][:8],
"text": "Updated local memory",
}) == "Memory updated: Updated local memory"
assert any(entry["text"] == "Updated local memory" for entry in manager.load_all())
delete_text = _tool_text({"action": "delete", "memory_id": legacy["id"][:8]})
assert delete_text.startswith("Memory deleted:")
assert all(entry["id"] != legacy["id"] for entry in manager.load_all())
+1 -1
View File
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ async def test_build_chat_context_incognito_does_not_duplicate_current_user_mess
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "extract_preset", fake_extract_preset)
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "add_user_message", fake_add_user_message)
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "load_prefs_for_user", lambda user: {})
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "get_current_user", lambda request: "tester")
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "effective_user", lambda request: "tester")
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "normalize_model_id", lambda endpoint_url, model, **kwargs: None)
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "maybe_compact", fake_maybe_compact)
monkeypatch.setattr(chat_helpers, "trim_for_context", lambda messages, context_length: messages)
+50
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
import os
import sys
from unittest import mock
import pytest
from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root, get_default_data_dir
def test_get_app_root_normal_run():
"""Verify that get_app_root returns the repository root parent of src/ when not frozen."""
with mock.patch.object(sys, "frozen", False, create=True):
app_root = get_app_root()
# Verify it is a valid directory path and matches expected parent structure
assert os.path.isdir(app_root)
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(app_root, "src"))
def test_get_app_root_frozen_with_meipass():
"""Verify that get_app_root returns the sys._MEIPASS directory when frozen by PyInstaller."""
mock_meipass = os.path.abspath("mock_meipass_dir")
with mock.patch.object(sys, "frozen", True, create=True), \
mock.patch.object(sys, "_MEIPASS", mock_meipass, create=True):
app_root = get_app_root()
assert app_root == mock_meipass
def test_get_app_root_frozen_without_meipass():
"""Verify that get_app_root falls back to the sys.executable parent directory when frozen but _MEIPASS is absent."""
mock_exe_path = os.path.join(os.path.abspath("mock_exe_dir"), "Odysseus.exe")
with mock.patch.object(sys, "frozen", True, create=True), \
mock.patch.object(sys, "executable", mock_exe_path, create=True):
# Remove sys._MEIPASS if it exists in the test process environment
if hasattr(sys, "_MEIPASS"):
delattr(sys, "_MEIPASS")
app_root = get_app_root()
assert app_root == os.path.abspath("mock_exe_dir")
def test_get_default_data_dir_normal():
"""Verify that get_default_data_dir resolves to get_app_root() / 'data' when not frozen."""
with mock.patch.object(sys, "frozen", False, create=True):
res = get_default_data_dir()
assert res == os.path.join(get_app_root(), "data")
def test_get_default_data_dir_frozen():
"""Verify that get_default_data_dir resolves to a persistent user path under ~ when frozen."""
with mock.patch.object(sys, "frozen", True, create=True):
res = get_default_data_dir()
expected = os.path.join(os.path.expanduser("~"), ".odysseus", "data")
assert res == expected
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ def test_content_fetcher_extracts_og_image_and_body_fallback(module, tmp_path, m
monkeypatch.setattr(module, "CONTENT_CACHE_DIR", tmp_path)
module.content_cache_index.clear()
monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_get_public_url", lambda url, headers, timeout: _FakeResponse(html))
monkeypatch.setattr(module, "_get_public_url", lambda url, headers, timeout, **kwargs: _FakeResponse(html))
result = module.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/parity-test")
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ def test_fetch_webpage_content_returns_empty_result_on_http_status_error(status_
monkeypatch.setattr(
service_content,
"_get_public_url",
lambda url, headers, timeout: _FakeErrorResponse(status_code),
lambda url, headers, timeout, **kwargs: _FakeErrorResponse(status_code),
)
result = service_content.fetch_webpage_content(f"https://example.com/status-{status_code}")
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ def test_fetch_webpage_content_429_takes_distinct_rate_limit_path(tmp_path, monk
monkeypatch.setattr(
service_content,
"_get_public_url",
lambda url, headers, timeout: _FakeRateLimitResponse(),
lambda url, headers, timeout, **kwargs: _FakeRateLimitResponse(),
)
result = service_content.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/rate-limited")
+7 -1
View File
@@ -904,7 +904,13 @@ def test_web_fetch_guard_blocks_redirect_into_private(monkeypatch):
url = "http://public.example/start"
headers = {"location": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}
monkeypatch.setattr(httpx, "get", lambda url, **kwargs: _Resp())
from contextlib import contextmanager
@contextmanager
def _fake_stream(method, url, **kwargs):
yield _Resp()
monkeypatch.setattr(httpx, "stream", _fake_stream)
with _pytest.raises(httpx.RequestError) as exc:
content._get_public_url("http://public.example/start", headers={}, timeout=5)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -52,6 +52,6 @@ def test_chat_endpoint_recovery_paths_are_owner_scoped():
assert "def _clear_orphaned_session_endpoint(sess, owner:" in chat_routes
assert "def _recover_empty_session_model(sess, session_id: str, owner:" in chat_routes
assert "q = owner_filter(q, ModelEndpoint, owner)" in chat_routes
assert "resolve_session_auth(sess, session, owner=get_current_user(request))" in chat_routes
assert "resolve_session_auth(sess, session, owner=effective_user(request))" in chat_routes
assert "def resolve_session_auth(sess, session_id: str, owner:" in chat_helpers
assert "update_q = update_q.filter(DBSession.owner == owner)" in chat_helpers
+1 -1
View File
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ def _patch_fetch(monkeypatch, text, content_type):
monkeypatch.setattr(
content_mod,
"_get_public_url",
lambda url, headers=None, timeout=5: _FakeResponse(text, content_type),
lambda url, headers=None, timeout=5, **kwargs: _FakeResponse(text, content_type),
)
+206
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
"""web_fetch download budgets (#3812).
MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS only trims what the agent sees; these caps bound what the
server downloads, parses, and caches. Soft cap by default with a truncation
notice, per-call override clamped to the hard cap, and a pre-buffer refusal
when Content-Length already exceeds the hard ceiling.
"""
import json
from contextlib import contextmanager
import pytest
from src.constants import WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES
from services.search import content as content_mod
class _FakeStream:
"""Stands in for the httpx.stream(...) context manager."""
def __init__(self, body: bytes, content_type="text/plain", content_length=None,
status_code=200, chunk=8192):
self._body = body
self._chunk = chunk
self.status_code = status_code
self.encoding = "utf-8"
self.url = "https://example.com/x"
self.headers = {"Content-Type": content_type}
if content_length is not None:
self.headers["content-length"] = str(content_length)
self.body_reads = 0
def iter_bytes(self):
for i in range(0, len(self._body), self._chunk):
self.body_reads += 1
yield self._body[i:i + self._chunk]
@pytest.fixture
def no_cache(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
monkeypatch.setattr(content_mod, "CONTENT_CACHE_DIR", tmp_path)
monkeypatch.setattr(content_mod, "_cache_result", lambda *a, **k: None)
monkeypatch.setattr(content_mod, "_public_http_url", lambda u: True)
def _patch_stream(monkeypatch, fake):
@contextmanager
def fake_stream(method, url, **kwargs):
yield fake
monkeypatch.setattr(content_mod.httpx, "stream", fake_stream)
return fake
def test_body_under_cap_is_untouched(monkeypatch, no_cache):
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, _FakeStream(b"hello world"))
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/a.txt")
assert r["success"] is True
assert r["content"] == "hello world"
assert r["truncated"] is False
assert r["fetched_bytes"] == len(b"hello world")
def test_body_over_soft_cap_truncates_with_flags(monkeypatch, no_cache):
body = b"x" * (WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES + 50_000)
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, _FakeStream(body, content_length=len(body)))
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/big.txt")
assert r["truncated"] is True
assert r["fetched_bytes"] == WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES
assert r["total_bytes"] == len(body)
assert len(r["content"]) == WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES
def test_max_bytes_override_raises_budget(monkeypatch, no_cache):
body = b"y" * (WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES + 50_000)
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, _FakeStream(body))
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content(
"https://example.com/big.txt", max_bytes=len(body) + 1
)
assert r["truncated"] is False
assert r["fetched_bytes"] == len(body)
def test_override_is_clamped_to_hard_cap(monkeypatch, no_cache):
# Ask for more than the ceiling; the effective budget must be the ceiling.
fake = _patch_stream(monkeypatch, _FakeStream(b"z" * 10, chunk=4))
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content(
"https://example.com/a.txt", max_bytes=WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES * 10
)
assert r["success"] is True
# The clamp itself: effective cap recorded in the cache key path is the
# hard cap, and a declared body over the ceiling is refused regardless.
big = _FakeStream(b"", content_length=WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES + 1)
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, big)
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content(
"https://example.com/huge.bin", max_bytes=WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES * 10
)
assert r["success"] is False
assert "TooLarge" in r["error"]
assert big.body_reads == 0 # refused before buffering
def test_declared_over_hard_cap_refused_before_buffering(monkeypatch, no_cache):
fake = _FakeStream(b"irrelevant", content_length=WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES + 1)
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, fake)
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/huge.iso")
assert r["success"] is False
assert "TooLarge" in r["error"]
assert fake.body_reads == 0
def test_truncated_pdf_is_an_error_not_garbage(monkeypatch, no_cache):
body = b"%PDF-1.4 " + b"p" * (WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES + 10)
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, _FakeStream(body, content_type="application/pdf"))
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/big.pdf")
assert r["success"] is False
assert "TooLarge" in r["error"]
def test_fetch_requests_identity_encoding(monkeypatch, no_cache):
# Compressed responses can decode to far more than Content-Length, so the
# streamed cap and the hard-cap preflight are only honest when we refuse
# transfer compression. Pin that the fetch advertises identity, not gzip.
seen = {}
@contextmanager
def fake_stream(method, url, **kwargs):
seen["headers"] = kwargs.get("headers") or {}
yield _FakeStream(b"hello")
monkeypatch.setattr(content_mod.httpx, "stream", fake_stream)
content_mod.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/a.txt")
assert seen["headers"].get("Accept-Encoding") == "identity"
def test_rejects_compressed_response_that_ignored_identity(monkeypatch, no_cache):
# We request Accept-Encoding: identity, but a server can ignore it and send
# gzip anyway. httpx would decode it, so a tiny compressed body could balloon
# past the cap in one decoded chunk. Refuse before reading the body.
fake = _FakeStream(b"x" * 5000, content_length=40)
fake.headers["content-encoding"] = "gzip"
_patch_stream(monkeypatch, fake)
r = content_mod.fetch_webpage_content("https://example.com/a.txt")
assert r["success"] is False
assert "Content-Encoding" in r["error"] or "compressed" in r["error"]
assert fake.body_reads == 0 # refused before decoding any body
def test_oversized_title_does_not_hide_partial_notice(monkeypatch):
# The partial-content notice is the PR's core contract; an untrusted,
# oversized page title must not push it past MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS.
import asyncio
from src.agent_tools.web_tools import WebFetchTool
from src.constants import MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS
def fake_fetch(url, timeout=10, max_bytes=None):
return {
"content": "partial body",
"title": "T" * (MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS + 5_000),
"error": "",
"truncated": True,
"fetched_bytes": WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES,
"total_bytes": 9_000_000,
}
import src.search.content as alias_mod
monkeypatch.setattr(alias_mod, "fetch_webpage_content", fake_fetch)
out = asyncio.run(WebFetchTool().execute(
json.dumps({"url": "https://example.com/big.txt"}), ctx={}
))
assert out["exit_code"] == 0
assert out["output"].startswith("[partial content:")
assert '"full": true' in out["output"]
def test_tool_layer_emits_partial_notice_and_parses_full(monkeypatch):
import asyncio
from src.agent_tools.web_tools import WebFetchTool
calls = {}
def fake_fetch(url, timeout=10, max_bytes=None):
calls["max_bytes"] = max_bytes
return {
"content": "partial body",
"title": "Big File",
"error": "",
"truncated": True,
"fetched_bytes": WEB_FETCH_SOFT_MAX_BYTES,
"total_bytes": 5_000_000,
}
import src.search.content as alias_mod
monkeypatch.setattr(alias_mod, "fetch_webpage_content", fake_fetch)
out = asyncio.run(WebFetchTool().execute(
json.dumps({"url": "https://example.com/big.txt"}), ctx={}
))
assert out["exit_code"] == 0
assert "[partial content:" in out["output"]
assert '"full": true' in out["output"]
assert calls["max_bytes"] is None
asyncio.run(WebFetchTool().execute(
json.dumps({"url": "https://example.com/big.txt", "full": True}), ctx={}
))
assert calls["max_bytes"] == WEB_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES
+18
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
"""The web scraping path routes its User-Agent through one constant.
Guards the dedup: web_fetch / web_search outbound UAs go through
WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT, so a stale or bare Mozilla string cannot be re-inlined in
the search sources.
"""
from pathlib import Path
_SEARCH = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "services" / "search"
def test_search_sources_have_no_inline_mozilla_ua():
offenders = [
str(py.relative_to(_SEARCH.parent.parent))
for py in _SEARCH.rglob("*.py")
if "Mozilla/" in py.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
]
assert not offenders, f"inline Mozilla UA found; use WEB_FETCH_USER_AGENT: {offenders}"
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
"""Guard: every public webhook emitter goes through the manager.
Public emitters in `routes/` must schedule their fire through
`webhook_manager.fire_and_forget(...)` (or `_spawn_tracked`). A bare
`asyncio.create_task(webhook_manager.fire(...))` escapes
`WebhookManager._bg_tasks`, so asyncio only holds a weak reference to the
delivery task and the GC can collect it before it sends silently dropping
the webhook. Catching this with a scan stops a regression from sneaking
back in via a copy-paste.
"""
import ast
from pathlib import Path
ROUTES_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "routes"
def _untracked_fire_calls(tree: ast.AST) -> list[tuple[int, str]]:
"""Return (lineno, snippet) for any asyncio.create_task(webhook_manager.fire(...))."""
hits: list[tuple[int, str]] = []
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if not isinstance(node, ast.Call):
continue
func = node.func
if not (isinstance(func, ast.Attribute) and func.attr == "create_task"):
continue
if not (isinstance(func.value, ast.Name) and func.value.id == "asyncio"):
continue
if not node.args:
continue
inner = node.args[0]
if not isinstance(inner, ast.Call):
continue
inner_func = inner.func
if (
isinstance(inner_func, ast.Attribute)
and inner_func.attr == "fire"
and isinstance(inner_func.value, ast.Name)
and inner_func.value.id == "webhook_manager"
):
hits.append((node.lineno, ast.unparse(node)))
return hits
def test_no_untracked_webhook_fire_in_routes():
offenders: list[str] = []
for path in ROUTES_DIR.rglob("*.py"):
tree = ast.parse(path.read_text(), filename=str(path))
for lineno, snippet in _untracked_fire_calls(tree):
offenders.append(f"{path.relative_to(ROUTES_DIR.parent)}:{lineno}: {snippet}")
assert not offenders, (
"Public webhook emitters must use webhook_manager.fire_and_forget(...) "
"so the delivery task is tracked in WebhookManager._bg_tasks. Found "
"untracked emitter(s):\n " + "\n ".join(offenders)
)